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Train operations for freight and passengers using
rollingstock.
Access charge A fee paid by an operator of transport services for the use
of infrastructure.
Access regime Procedures to govern access to rail track. Includes setting




Net tonne-kilometre divided by net tonne carried. This is a
measure of the average distance that freight is carried.
Average load per
locomotive
Net tonne carried divided by the number of locomotives.




Physically fixed infrastructure such as track, sleepers,
signals, terminals and yards.
Bulk freight Comprises commodities such as coal, iron ore, other
minerals and grain.
Catenary system Overhead power cables for electric trains.
Competition for the
market




Encompasses competition between train operators and
other modes, between train operators for the same
customers, and between train operators for train schedules.
Competitive
tendering
The process of selecting a preferred supplier from a range
of potential contractors by seeking offers (tenders) and
evaluating these on the basis of one or more selection
criteria.XIV GLOSSARY
Commercialisation Embodies the same principles of Corporatisation but does
not usually have an equivalent legislative basis.
Community Service
Obligation
A community service obligation arises when a government
requires a public enterprise to carry out activities (relating
to outputs and inputs) which it would not elect to do so on a




Refers to government and private enterprises competing on
a similar footing regarding commercial incentives and
disciplines, taxation and regulation. It also refers to
different transport modes operating under similar or
consistent investment, taxation, charging and regulatory
frameworks.
Contracting out An arrangement whereby a contracting agency enters into a
contract with a supplier from outside that agency for the
provision of goods and/or services which typically have
previously been provided internally — not necessarily
involving competitive bids. Also called ‘outsourcing’.
Corporatisation Corporatisation aims to replicate private sector commercial
incentives and sanctions on public enterprises. Corporatised
public enterprises are constituted as either a limited liability




A linear programming technique used to estimate the
relative productivity of railways.
Economies of
density
Where average unit costs fall as the number of passengers
or volume of freight increases on a particular route or
network.
Economies of scale Where average unit costs fall as the size of the railway
increases.
Economies of scope Where average unit costs fall as the railway increases the
range of services its provides.
Externalities Where the activities of one party impose costs or benefits
on another.GLOSSARY XV
Farebox revenue The revenue a public transport operator collects directly
from fares.
Franchising Involves the granting of a right or licence to operate a
defined service and to receive associated revenues. The
World Bank refers to this arrangement as concessioning.




The separation of an organisation by product (freight and
passenger services) or by geography (regional railways).
Intermodal
competition
Competition between rail and other modes of transport.
Jurisdictions Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments.
Mutual recognition The acceptance by other jurisdictions of accreditation of a
rail operator or owner in one State or Territory.
Natural monopoly Where economies make it possible for one firm to supply
the entire market more cheaply than a number of firms.
Net tonne-kilometre Unit of measure representing the transport of one tonne of
freight over a distance of one kilometre.
Non-bulk freight General freight, comprising containerised freight, steel,




The movement of passengers between cities and country
towns.
On time running Measures the proportion of train trips which arrive within a
given time of the scheduled arrival time.
Partial productivity
indicators
The ratio of the quantity of a single output to the quantity
of a single input.
Passenger-
kilometre
Unit of measure representing the transport of one passenger
over a distance of one kilometre.XVI GLOSSARY
Privatisation The transfer (sale) of a government enterprise to the private
sector.
Productivity The relationship between a rail system’s total inputs and
outputs. This relationship incorporates the effects of both
scale efficiency and technical efficiency.
Purchaser-provider
model (framework)
The separation of the responsibility for deciding what
outputs should be produced from the responsibility for
deciding how the output should be produced.
Rail-on-rail
competition
Competition between train operators for the same
customers on a given network.
Regulation The Council of Australian Governments defines regulation
to be the ‘broad range of legally enforceable instruments
which impose mandatory requirements upon business and
the community as well as to those voluntary codes and
advisory instruments … for which there is a reasonable
expectation of widespread compliance.’ (COAG 1997, p.2)
Rollingstock A generic term for locomotives, passenger cars, multiple
unit railcar sets and freight wagons.
Scale efficiency Reflects the extent to which a railway is advantaged or
disadvantaged, in terms of its productivity, by the scale (or
size) of its operations.
Structural
separation
The separation of an organisation into discrete legal
entities.
Technical efficiency Refers to the productivity (or efficiency) of a railway after
netting out the estimated advantages or disadvantages
arising from factors such as the scale of its operations.
Total factor
productivity




See Below track infrastructure.
Traffic density
(freight)
Net tonne-kilometre divided by route-kilometre.GLOSSARY XVII
Train operations See Above track operations.
Urban passenger Generally refers to the movement of passengers within a
town, city or metropolitan area.
Vertical separation The separation of an organisation by function (track
infrastructure and train operations).XVIII TERMS OF
REFERENCE
Terms of reference
I, PETER COSTELLO, Treasurer, pursuant to Part 3 of the Productivity Commission Act 1998,
hereby refer progress in rail reform to the Commission for inquiry and report within twelve months
of receipt of this reference. The Commission is to hold hearings for the purposes of the inquiry.
Background
2. Australia’s rail network forms a crucial part of Australia’s transport infrastructure. Past
reforms have delivered significant improvements in the operation of Australia’s rail systems.
However, the pace and nature of the reforms vary between systems. Performances in some
areas continue to be below world’s best practice. There is a need to undertake a stocktake of
progress in rail reform to identify areas, including both urban passengers and freight, where
further action is most needed. The Industry Commission last undertook a stocktake of
progress in rail reform in 1991.
Scope of Inquiry
3. In undertaking this inquiry, the Commission should identify progress made in rail reform as
well as areas which could be subject to further reforms and the benefits of pursuing further
reforms. The Commission should also clearly differentiate its analysis of interstate rail
operations from intrastate and urban rail operations.
4. The Commission should report on:
(a) recent reform initiatives and their implications;
(b) the current structure of the rail industry, including the regulatory environment;
(c) structural and operational rigidities and impediments which constrain the efficiency
and development of the rail industry;
(d) the strengths and weaknesses of the Australian rail industry, drawing on international
and intermodal comparisons where appropriate;
(e) the operation of third party access regimes for the interstate and intrastate rail freight
networks;
(f) the implications of the changing role of the Commonwealth, the States and the private
sector in rail operations and ownership;
(g) the implications for rail transport services and the economy generally of regulations,
charges and arrangements affecting competing and complementary modes of
transport; and
(h) international best practice in rail and impediments to achieving best practice in
Australia.
5. The Commission should also:
(a) report on implementation strategies for any measures recommended by the
Commission;
(b) take account of any recent studies undertaken; and
(c) have regard to the established economic, social, regional development and
environmental objectives of governments.
6. The Commission’s recommendations will be considered by the Government and the
Government’s response shall be announced as soon as possible after the receipt of the
Commission’s report.
PETER COSTELLO
5 August 1998OVERVIEW XIX
Overview
Key messages
·  Reforms in the 1990s have transformed the structure and operations of Australia’s
railways;
–  there is now greater competition between railways and more private sector
participation in some corridors.
·  The productivity of Australia’s railways has increased significantly;
–  but is still significantly less than in North America, even allowing for differences
in scale and other factors.
·  Most government-owned railways are still not viable:
–  they face increasing competition from other transport modes;
–  suffer from inadequate investment; and
–  require significant government subsidies.
·  Greater commercial focus is needed, which is best achieved by:
–  contracting out, franchising or privatising existing government-owned railways;
–  the entry of new owners and further investment in the industry; and
–  rigorous application of contracts between governments and railways to meet
non-commercial objectives.
·  Subsidisation of track in regional areas is an inappropriate way of meeting social
objectives.
·  Different mixes of structural, access and ownership arrangements are required for
different networks.
·  The Commonwealth has an important role in:
–  developing a national transport policy framework;
–  facilitating ongoing harmonisation of regulatory arrangements;
–  establishing a single manager for the interstate network; and
–  ensuring a more commercial approach to road provision.
·  The Commonwealth also has a role in financing freight bypass lines in Sydney;
–  subject to agreement by NSW to the interstate network manager.
·  The suggested reforms have greatest relevance to Queensland, NSW and WA.
·  Further reform is essential for the survival of most Australian railways.XX OVERVIEW
Significance of railways in Australia
Railways are an important part of Australia’s transport
system and make a significant contribution to the Australian
economy. They play a major role in hauling bulk
commodities to ports, transporting general freight along
major transport corridors and carrying passengers,
particularly in urban areas.
Some facts and figures
·  Rail transport contributed 0.5 per cent of GDP and 8 per cent of transport value-
added in 1997-98.
·  Employment is around 36 500, down from nearly 90 000 in 1986, with a large
proportion of the reduction occurring outside capital cities.
·  The number of private railways has increased from six in 1991 to 19 in 1999.
·  Rail has carried around one third of all domestic freight over the past 25 years:
–  with a fourfold increase in the tonnage of coal and minerals;
–  but a steady decline in market share in non-bulk interstate freight (down from
45 per cent to 32 per cent) and in agricultural products.
·  Rail carries around half of all freight on the East-West corridor, but less than one
quarter on the North-South corridor.
·  States invested $1.6 billion in rail in 1997-98, compared with $151 million by the
Commonwealth.
·  State subsidies to rail exceeded $2.3 billion in 1997-98.
At the national level, rail has maintained its share of freight
during the last 25 years because of strong growth in
Australia’s mineral, ores and coal sectors. But it has lost
market share to road in the interstate transport of non-bulk
commodities, more so on the North-South corridor compared
with the East-West.  The loss is mainly due to improvements





have taken place in
the composition of
rail freight...OVERVIEW XXI









1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996












































1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995




































A major trend in Australia’s urban passenger transport is the
growth in the use of cars and the relatively static contribution
of public transport (both bus and rail). The primary
explanation is that the rail network is geared to providing
transport along corridors to and from central business
districts, while employment, retail and other activities have
decentralised into suburban areas.
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There has also been a decrease in non-urban passenger travel
by rail, even though total travel by all modes (rail, bus, air
and car) has increased.
Reforms since 1991
Australian governments have long recognised the need to
improve the performance of Australia’s rail systems. Since
the Industry Commission’s 1991 inquiry into rail, all
governments have implemented reforms. Although railways
face similar problems, governments have adopted different
solutions.
A wide spectrum of structural arrangements is now in place











retained a single integrated railway that provides all services,
including freight, non-urban and urban passenger services
and maintenance of rollingstock, as well as track
infrastructure. NSW, on the other hand, has separated the
former State Rail Authority into four businesses.
Similarly, there is a range of ownership and governance
arrangements. In WA, Westrail currently operates as a
commercialised (rather than corporatised) railway, with plans
to privatise its freight operations by the end of 1999. In
NSW, the Rail Access Corporation, FreightCorp and Rail
Services Australia have been corporatised. In Victoria,
V/Line Freight has been privatised as Freight Victoria, and
Bayside and Hillside Trains (urban passenger) have been
franchised to private operators. The Commonwealth has
privatised parts of the former Australian National Railways
(Tasrail, GSR and ASR).
Several joint initiatives between governments and industry
have been undertaken to improve consistency of safety
regulation and operating procedures and standards. Initiatives
include simplification of safety accreditation processes and
the development of codes of practice for operating
procedures and standards.
A variety of access regimes has been implemented across
jurisdictions. Currently, access to the Commonwealth’s track
is covered under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act and
administered by the Australian Rail Track Corporation. All
mainland States have introduced access regimes, although
none has yet been recommended for certification by the
National Competition Council or accepted as an undertaking
by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
Recent reforms have led to greater participation by the
private sector through the franchising and privatisation of
some government-owned railways. In some instances,
particularly on the East-West corridor, new private operators











There have been significant improvements in the productivity
of government-owned railways in providing freight and
passenger services in Australia over the period 1989-90 to
1997-98. The average annual growth in (total factor)
productivity of around 8 per cent was greater than that of
Canada, Japan and the United States.
While Australia has narrowed the productivity gap with these
countries, there remains a significant difference. Australia’s
level of productivity in 1998 was about two thirds of the best
performing countries (in 1997).































Some of the difference is due to factors which inherently
disadvantage Australia, such as scale of operation. However,
technical efficiency (productivity adjusted for the effect of










Technical efficiency levels of freight and passenger systems
























Freight customers in Australia have benefited from the
improvement in productivity. Real freight rates decreased by
30 per cent between 1990 and 1998. This is comparable with
decreases in Canada and the United States of 33 and 26 per
cent respectively between 1990 and 1997.
On average, freight rates in 1998 were still higher in
Australia (3.8 cents per net tonne-kilometre) than in Canada
(2.1) and the United States (2.3) in 1997, although lower than
most European countries and Japan. These differences partly




around 30 per cent…
but are still
significantly higher
than those in North
America.XXVI OVERVIEW
Real freight rates by country
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Despite progress, impediments remain
Despite the reforms implemented since 1991 and higher
productivity and lower freight rates, progress in some areas
has been slow and impediments remain. The problems facing
the industry have not been fully addressed by the reforms and
new problems have emerged.
Many government-owned railways are losing money, even
after the inclusion of payments by governments for non-
commercial activities, or are barely viable.
Inadequate investment in infrastructure has been a particular
problem (leading to speed restrictions on some sections of
the interstate track), resulting in calls for significant
government funds to improve existing networks and build
new ones.
Despite corporatisation, government-owned railways are still
insufficiently commercially focused. Governments, as
shareholders, have not demanded nor enforced the same










– lack of commercial
focus;...OVERVIEW XXVII
Current arrangements do not ensure competitive neutrality
between government and private railways, nor between
transport modes.
The introduction of access regimes has been slow and the
complexity of existing arrangements in some jurisdictions is
hindering industry performance. There are deficiencies in the
processes for pricing and allocating train schedules, such as
grandfathering schedules to incumbents. These can act as
barriers to entry.
There are still inconsistencies in safety accreditation fees and
operating procedures and standards. These act as
impediments to the entry of train operators, both on interstate
and intrastate networks, and inhibit efficient operation in
some markets.
Increased commercial focus is the key
Increasing the commercial focus of railways is the key to
further productivity gains and to facilitating the investment
required for rail to make its best contribution to Australian
transport.
While most government railways are corporatised, the
remaining problems may reflect the way the corporatisation
model has been implemented.
Governments still subject their rail operators to multiple and
often conflicting objectives relating to social welfare,
employment and regional development.
In addition, governments as shareholders facing budget
constraints (and observing poor returns in rail) are often
reluctant to provide adequate equity funding or allow
railways to borrow on their own behalf,
even if justified commercially.
Limitations may also apply to the
corporatisation model itself. In particular,
governments are often unable to maintain
an arm’s length relationship from their railway boards
















– a lack of
commercial
discipline.XXVIII OVERVIEW
because of political and community pressures. Public
ownership also subjects governments and taxpayers to
considerable commercial risks.
Private sector alternatives to government provision have an
important role to play in overcoming these problems.
If contracts are well specified and competitively tendered,
contracting out offers potential benefits.
Franchising can generate further gains because franchisees
usually bear revenue risk, so strengthening their incentives to
improve service quality and expand the size of the market.
The experience with recent rail privatisation in Australia is
encouraging and supports privatising freight railways
operating in competitive markets. Special arrangements
would be required for rollingstock used by private
franchisees on the main coal lines.
Recent experience with privatised railways
Tasrail
·  Purchased by Australian Transport Network in 1997 for $22 million.
·  Revenue has increased since by around 50 per cent.
·  Achieved an operating profit of $1.2 million in its first seven months of business —
the first profit in 130 years of Tasmanian railways.
·  Plans to invest $40 million over four years in rollingstock and infrastructure.
·  Purchased the Emu Bay Railway — a minerals railway — from Pasminco for
$7.8 million in 1998.
Australia Southern Railroad
·  Purchased Australian National Railways’ freight and maintenance business in
South Australia for $57 million in 1997.
·  Plans to invest $62 million over five years.
Freight Victoria
·  Purchased V/Line Freight (VLF) for $163 million in 1999 despite VLF losing over
$15 million in 1997-98.
· Plans to invest $36 million in rail infrastructure and rollingstock over two years.





Competition has a role to play
Where effective, competition can be relied upon to improve
performance. There are a number of forms which
competition can take, both ‘in’ the market, and ‘for’ the
market. Much of the rail network is already subject to
competition from road, air and coastal shipping and/or
competition in downstream markets.
The emphasis in rail reform has been on introducing
competition between train operators on the same track and
for train schedules by implementing access regimes and
reforming the structure of railways. Separating train
operations from track (vertical separation) is designed to
increase the effectiveness of an access regime by removing
the conflict of interest an integrated railway has over
allowing competitors access to its track.
But, access regulation and vertical separation may be less
effective in markets where there is limited scope for more
than one train operator, effective competition from other
modes of transport, and/or competition in downstream
markets.
Railways can also be separated by function or geography
(horizontal separation). Horizontal separation allows:
·  specific regulatory regimes to be put in place for different
rail businesses;
·  contractual arrangements to be implemented more
effectively to provide non-commercial services; and
·  services to be franchised — a means of addressing market
power by introducing competition ‘for’ the market
through periodic competitive bidding.
The benefits of structural separation need to be balanced
against the costs, which can include a loss of economies of
scope, coordination costs, a loss of commercial sustainability
and adjustment costs. No single structure or access regime is
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not limited to vertical
separation.
Separation may
involve costs and...XXX OVERVIEW
Structural reform to enhance competition in the market will
not necessarily address problems of inadequate investment in
track infrastructure.
Other reforms are also important
It is important also to improve other aspects of the rail
operating environment. This includes improving the
operation of the interstate network, achieving competitive
neutrality, harmonising operating procedures and standards,
and facilitating market-based access.
Management of the interstate network
Across the interstate network there are four authorities
responsible for access and five for allocating train schedules
and investment. In some parts, the network is owned by a
train operator (WA), while in others the train ownership is
separated from track ownership (NSW). The multiplicity of
network managers imposes costs on train operators in
negotiating train schedules and access charges. Also it
impedes the efficient allocation of train schedules, the overall
use of the network and efficient investment.
The Australian Rail Track Corporation’s ‘one stop shop’
model goes some way to reducing the costs to operators. But
deficiencies in train schedule allocation on the interstate
network and coordinating investment across jurisdictions still
exist.
To overcome these deficiencies, a single network manager
(broadly based on those already operating in the electricity
and gas industries) is required. It would manage competitive
access to the interstate network and facilitate planning and
investment.
Administration of the access regime should be flexible,

















Competitive neutrality within the rail industry
While corporatisation has the potential to place government-
owned railways on a commercial footing, in practice it
appears insufficient to achieve competitive neutrality in the
rail transport market.
There are concerns that  government-owned railways are able
to offer lower freight rates than their private sector
counterparts because the requirement to make a commercial
return is not binding. There are also concerns about the
retention of surplus assets by public rail operators.
Such practices could place existing private operators at a
disadvantage relative to their government-owned competitors
and deter new private sector entrants and investment. These
concerns could be raised through competitive neutrality
complaints mechanisms under the Competition Principles
Agreement. A more effective approach could be to facilitate
private sector participation through the appropriate use of
contracting out, franchising or privatisation.
Competitive neutrality between rail and road
Government decisions relating to investment, taxes and
charges, access regimes and safety regulations affect
competitive neutrality between road and rail transport.
There are still concerns over the different funding criteria
applied to road and rail and the comparative levels of
government investment in each. The differences in funding
have decreased significantly over the past 30 years.
Nevertheless, evidence suggests there has been inadequate
investment in some parts of the rail network.
Notwithstanding recent reforms, heavy vehicle charges do
not cover the full costs of road usage, including road and
bridge wear, pollution, accidents and congestion.
These factors disadvantage rail compared to road. But large
subsidies also are provided to rail and the 1999 taxation
legislation has partly addressed concerns relating to the diesel
fuel excise.
Competitive neutrality
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Adopting a more commercial approach to the provision of
both rail and road would overcome competitive neutrality
concerns. Further subsidies to the rail sector or a complex
integrated approach to planning and funding would be less
effective.
Safety regulation and operating procedures and standards
Although progress has been made by Commonwealth, State
and Territory Governments, and industry, to reduce
inconsistent regulation in railways, the outcomes are
uncertain. Accreditation fees are still duplicated across
jurisdictions. If mutual recognition does not work,
consideration could be given to establishing a single national
safety regulator.
Codes of practice for operating procedures and standards are
still being developed and are yet to be implemented. The
process of ongoing harmonisation can be improved by
establishing a permanent mechanism to facilitate change.
Best practice regulation involving the assessment of the
impact of proposals and industry consultation would be part
of this process.
Access arrangements
Access regimes should incorporate market-based
mechanisms, such as auctions, for allocating and transferring
train schedules. Prices would then reflect the value users
place on access to the track.
What should governments do?
The overall objective of reform is to have an efficient
transport system delivering Australian freight and transport
needs.
A more commercial approach should be applied to all modes
of transport. Reflecting this, the Commonwealth should
develop an overarching national transport policy framework.














reform is an efficient
transport system.OVERVIEW XXXIII
adjusting current user charges for heavy vehicles and
instituting a public inquiry into all aspects of road provision.
To fulfil its role in the transport system, rail needs to meet the
challenge of increasing competition from other transport
modes. In some markets, the future of rail without
government subsidies is uncertain unless rail improves its
performance and competitiveness significantly.
Improvements in efficiency can come from three sources:
·  making better use of the existing infrastructure,
rollingstock and technology;
·  introducing appropriate infrastructure and equipment; and
·  optimising the use of rail in the transport logistics chain.
Simply investing more government money without other
reforms — particularly to loss-making railways — is not the
answer. Rather, it is the role of governments to create a
sound and stable operating environment to provide greater
certainty for the industry.
There are grounds for the Commonwealth Government
investing further in freight lines to alleviate bottlenecks in
Sydney’s rail system, given its national importance to the
interstate freight network. This should be conditional upon
acceptance by NSW of a single market manager for the
interstate network.
Commonwealth Government
The Commonwealth Government has a significant role in
leading the reform process, both in areas where it has direct
responsibility and where a national approach is required.
Priorities include:
·  developing an overarching national transport policy
framework;
·  establishing a permanent mechanism to ensure ongoing
harmonisation of rail operating procedures and standards;
·  establishing a market manager for the interstate network,








·  investigating the feasibility of developing a market
approach to access;
·  contributing funds to alleviate congestion in Sydney,
conditional upon further reform;
·  promoting competitive neutrality between rail and other
transport modes by adopting a more commercial approach
in all modes; and
·  establishing a public inquiry to examine the current
institutional arrangements for road provision, including
planning, funding, investment and road charging.
Individual jurisdictions
Individual jurisdictions should concentrate on introducing
greater commercial discipline through appropriate ownership,
structural and access arrangements, tailored to each broad
class of railway (summarised below for interstate, regional,
coal and urban passenger networks). Ultimately, under these
arrangements the private sector would operate most railways.
Interstate freight network
Characteristics
·  Standard gauge mainline (eg Brisbane to Perth); strong intermodal competition
(road, sea); some rail-on-rail competition; multiple owners and network managers;
market segmentation; potential for competition in access.
Appropriate policy package
·  Single network manager, which does not own trains or track.
·  Vertical separation of train operations and track infrastructure.
·  An access regime embedded in a market code of conduct, approved by the
ACCC.
Expected outcomes
·  Coordinated management of access charges and train schedules; facilitation of




Regional freight networks (without market power)
Characteristics
·  Mainly intrastate (eg Tasrail); low volume; strong competition from road; limited
rail-on-rail competition.
Appropriate policy package
·  Horizontal separation from other freight and urban passenger networks.
·  Vertical integration.
·  ‘Light handed’ access regime.
·  Privatisation of railway operations including track (or with a long term lease on
track).
Expected outcomes
·  Improved quality and cost of service; integration into the logistics chain;
commercial viability.
Main coal networks (with market power)
Characteristics
·  Main coal lines in Queensland and NSW; high volumes; geographically (intrastate)
based; significant market power (little competition from road or rail-on-rail
competition).
Appropriate policy package
·  Horizontal separation from other freight and urban passenger networks.
·  Vertical integration.
·  Franchise the operation using competitive bidding for lowest freight rates.
·  Lease track and rollingstock to franchisee.
·  Access incorporated into franchise agreements.
·  Private railway operators.
Expected outcomes
·  Operational and commercial independence; increased transparency; market
power addressed; competition ‘for’ the market; yardstick competition between coal
networks; promotes integration into the logistics chain.XXXVI OVERVIEW
Urban passenger networks
Characteristics
·  Non-commercial; no rail-on-rail competition; strong intermodal competition.
Appropriate policy package
·  Horizontal separation from regional and interstate networks (and within
metropolitan areas).
·  Vertical integration.
·  Contracting out or franchising through competition for lowest subsidies.
·  Access incorporated into contracts or franchise agreements.
·  Private railway operators.
Expected outcomes
·  Increased effectiveness of purchaser-provider arrangements; competition for the
market; more efficient urban transport system; lower subsidies.
Social issues
A commercial approach eliminates the need to subsidise rail
for economic reasons, such as achieving competitive
neutrality, but does not preclude governments from using rail
services to achieve social objectives.
However, subsidisation of track infrastructure is a costly and
indirect way of assisting people in regional areas. If
governments wish to provide such assistance it is best done
directly through contractual arrangements with regional
railways, as in urban areas.
More generally, governments need to address the existing
deficiencies in the implementation of the purchaser-provider
framework for such arrangements.
They should specify clearly their non-commercial
objectives — social,  regional  or
environmental — and the basis for the
level of subsidy to be provided.
Railway workers have already faced











years. Employment has fallen by almost 60  per  cent since
1986, two thirds of which was in regional areas. Changes in
technology and increased competitive pressure from
alternative transport modes, as well as past reforms, have
contributed to this decline.
Concern about further job losses is natural and reform has to
be handled sensitively. General assistance available to all
displaced workers, such as training programs, have
advantages. However, where job losses are regionally
concentrated, a case for specific assistance to particular areas
can be made if these areas have substantially greater
difficulty than others in adjusting to structural change.
There have been calls to abandon or slow down the reform
process. But slowing reform of Australia’s rail industry
would disadvantage rail users and not necessarily lead to
increased job security within the industry. Maintaining
inappropriate employment levels would adversely affect the
competitive position of railways in some of their major
markets, such as coal, minerals, grain, and interstate freight,
thus jeopardising future employment in rail.
If reform of railways is not pursued, the industry may not
survive long into the 21st century, other than as a carrier of
coal and other bulk products.
Further reform of rail will yield significant benefits to
consumers of rail services. Passengers will benefit from
better services. Rail is also an important input into many
industries, especially the export-oriented mineral and grain
sectors. Reductions in freight costs and improved service
quality will result in significant benefits, not only to




Slowing reform is not
the answer…
and may jeopardise








Urban rail networks should be vertically integrated and horizontally separated
from other rail networks.
RECOMMENDATION 6.2
Train operations should be vertically separated from track infrastructure on the
entire interstate network. The infrastructure should be managed by a single
network manager.
A process involving the Commonwealth and affected States should be established
to determine the roles and functions of the network manager and develop a code
of conduct.
RECOMMENDATION 6.3
Regional rail networks without market power should be horizontally separated
from other networks and vertically integrated.
RECOMMENDATION 6.4
Regional rail networks with market power (the main coal lines) should be
horizontally separated from other networks.
RECOMMENDATION 7.1
Governments which own railways should pursue further private sector
involvement (through contracting out, BOOT-type arrangements, franchising or
privatisation) as an integral part of their approach to rail reform.
RECOMMENDATION 7.2
All remaining government-owned freight operations should be privatised, with
special arrangements for the rollingstock used on the main coal lines.XL RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDATION 8.1
The pricing and allocation of train schedules should reflect the value that users
place on the track. To encourage this, the Commonwealth Government should
establish a process to investigate the feasibility of developing a market approach
for allocating schedules or transferring capacity on the interstate network.
RECOMMENDATION 9.1
A national approach should be developed for charging rail safety accreditation
fees, with a single annual fee for accreditation and mutual recognition.
RECOMMENDATION 9.2
The principles of best practice regulation, as endorsed by the Council of
Australian Governments, should be applied to the development and
implementation of railway codes of practice.
RECOMMENDATION 9.3
The Commonwealth Government should establish a permanent mechanism to
ensure the ongoing harmonisation or uniformity of railway operating procedures
and standards.
RECOMMENDATION 10.1
The National Road Transport Commission should prepare — and recommend to
the Ministerial Council for Road Transport for adoption — a revised schedule of
heavy vehicle charges which ensures that each class of vehicle pays the full cost
of its road use.RECOMMENDATIONS XLI
RECOMMENDATION 10.2
Governments should adopt a more commercial approach to railways and road
provision. This will involve:
•   the Commonwealth Government introducing an overarching policy framework
for national transport;
•   applying competitive contracting out, franchising or full privatisation to
railways;
•   establishing a network manager for the interstate track to manage competitive
access and facilitate planning;
•   applying the purchaser-provider model rigorously where non-commercial
objectives are being pursued; and
•   evaluating major road and rail projects using cost-benefit analysis where the
projects are expected to have significant external effects.
RECOMMENDATION 10.3
The Commonwealth Government should — as a matter of national priority —
allocate additional funds to projects which would alleviate route congestion in the
Sydney metropolitan area, subject to the adoption of a network manager for the
interstate track.
RECOMMENDATION 10.4
The Commonwealth Government should establish a public inquiry into road
provision in Australia. This inquiry should examine:
•   road transport planning processes;
•   methods of investment appraisal (including the evaluation and allocation of
costs and benefits);
•   funding arrangements (including taxation, charges and grants);
•   the scope to improve road pricing; and
•   current institutional arrangements and alternatives.
RECOMMENDATION 11.1
Governments need to address the deficiencies in the application of the purchaser-
provider framework to rail and should enter into transparent contractual
arrangements with clearly specified non-commercial objectives.INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
Australia’s first railways began operation in the 1850s. At that time the only viable
alternatives were bullocks, horses and in a few instances, steamships. The new
found technology seemed set to change the face of Australia:
When the first steam train ran in Australia, the puffs of smoke were like the opening of
a magician’s act. In a land where settlers had wandered far from the coast and navigable
rivers were few … steam locomotives seemed likely to transform the country. (Blainey
1983, p. 227)
In many respects railways did transform transport in Australia. They became vital in
linking Australia’s cities and ports to the rural hinterland, facilitating the expansion
of Australia’s exports as well as allowing governments to pursue social and political
objectives.
However, a lot has changed since then for both Australia and its railways. Today,
travellers and Australian industry enjoy the flexibility of a range of transport
options — on land, sea and in the air. Although railways play a significant role in
the intrastate carriage of bulk commodities and in urban public transport, they are
not faring so well in other transport markets. The Victorian Government
commented:
We are overdependent on air for many purposes, and on road freight for many other
purposes, just because of the disgraceful lack of productivity of the maritime trades and
of the rail industry. So we have a sparse continent, the tyranny of distance … in which
our two most prospective long-term modes are disabled by history… (trans., p. 949)
Railways must now look to the future — but that future is uncertain. What the
industry and governments do in the next few years will determine whether rail is an
important part of the transport system in the 21st century. As Hearsch commented:
Australia’s rail industry is at an important crossroads … Rail can make a very much
larger contribution to Australia’s economic development and provide substantially
greater benefits for Australia as a whole. (Hearsch 1998, p. 28)
This inquiry is about giving the Australian rail industry an opportunity to secure its
future.2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
1.1 This inquiry
The then Industry Commission conducted an inquiry into rail transport in 1991
(IC  1991b). The report examined factors leading to inefficient resource use in
Australian railways and recommended action to remove such inefficiencies.
In recent years there has been increasing public focus on improving the performance
of Australia’s railways. With this focus, Commonwealth, State and Territory
Governments, and the rail industry, have implemented substantial reforms to
Australian railways since the Commission’s 1991 inquiry. However, these changes
have varied, both in nature and pace, across Australia.
The Commonwealth Government has asked the Productivity Commission to inquire
into progress in rail reform since 1991. The terms of reference direct the
Commission to undertake a stocktake of reforms already made within Australian
railways, identify areas where further reform may be warranted and any resulting
benefits and costs. Specific matters on which the Commission was asked to report
include:
·  the current structure of the railways and associated industries in Australia;
·  the nature of recent reforms affecting railways, including access arrangements
and their implications;
·  strengths and weaknesses of the Australian rail industry, drawing on
international and intermodal comparisons as appropriate;
·  impediments which constrain the efficiency and performance of rail transport;
·  the implications for rail and the economy generally of regulations, charges and
arrangements affecting competing and complementary modes of transport;
·  the changing roles of the Commonwealth, States and the private sector; and
·  implementation strategies for measures that could be taken to remove
impediments to improved efficiency and performance.
The terms of reference for the inquiry are set out in full on page XVIII.
The inquiry is broad ranging, covering freight and passenger rail systems, and
interstate, intrastate and urban rail operations. A key focus is on rail freight
activities. For the purposes of this inquiry the infrastructure of railway networks, the
operation of trains on these networks and associated industries (such as railway
workshops) are defined as the ‘rail industry’.INTRODUCTION 3
The Commission has not examined in any detail:
·  the technical aspects or merits of specific private sector (or joint private
sector/government) rail infrastructure investment proposals;
·  other modes of transport, including light rail. The inquiry has covered aspects of
road freight and other transport only insofar as they are competitors with, or
complementary to, rail transport;
·  intermodal transport issues, such as the efficient movement of containers from
ports on to the rail network; and
·  issues relating to environmental costs (such as greenhouse gas emissions and
atmospheric pollution) and congestion costs. These are examined only in the
context of the relative performance of rail and road transport.
In examining the issues raised by this inquiry and formulating its recommendations,
the Commission in accordance with its Act has considered the interests of the
community as a whole. The Commission has had regard to the overall performance
of the economy, taking into account the social, regional development, economic
growth, employment and environmental objectives of government.
The Commission has sought to offer solutions to the remaining problems in the rail
industry that will encourage it to fulfil its various roles in the economy. The rail
industry consists of diverse sectors — ranging from urban passenger transport to
interstate freight transport — which differ in terms of their characteristics and the
impediments constraining their performance. The Commission’s approach has been
to tailor its recommendations to each sector.
There is often more than one policy option to improve the performance of each
sector. The Commission has tried to identify the options and then formulate a reform
package for each sector which it believes will provide the greatest benefits.
1.2 Other inquiries and reports
The Commission has taken into account previous inquiries and reports which
discuss the rail industry. In particular, two recent reports have been complementary
to the Commission’s inquiry: House of Representatives Standing Committee on
Communications, Transport and Microeconomic Reform, Tracking Australia, an
Inquiry into the Role of Rail in the National Transport Network  (HORSCCTMR
1998b); and Rail Projects Taskforce, Revitalising Rail: the Private Sector Solution
(RPT 1999).4 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Other reports which have been drawn upon in this inquiry, in addition to the 1991
Industry Commission inquiry on rail, include:
·  Hilmer et al. (1993) National Competition Policy;
·  Industry Commission (IC 1994b) Urban Transport;
·  National Transport Planning Taskforce (NTPT  1994) Building for the Job:
A Strategy for Australia’s Transport Network;
·  Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of Government
Trading Enterprises (SCNPMGTE  1998) Government Trading Enterprises
Performance Indicators, 1992-93 to 1996-97; and
·  Productivity Commission (PC 1998a) The Australian Black Coal Industry.
1.3 This report
In preparing this report the Commission has drawn on evidence from a wide range
of sources, seeking input from those with an interest in, and knowledge of, the rail
industry. On 30 March 1999 the Commission released the Draft Report, and invited
comment on the draft recommendations contained in the report.
Over the life of the inquiry, the Commission received 128 submissions from
individuals and organisations, including public and private rail operators, users of
rail services, industry associations, freight forwarders, community groups, and
Commonwealth, State and Local Governments and agencies. The Commission also
held two sets of public hearings before and after the release of the Draft Report
(appendix A).
The Commission has benefited from visiting many interested parties around
Australia for discussions (appendix A). These included tours of various terminals,
signalling facilities and stations, and inspections of the track (Melbourne-Adelaide
and Sydney-Cootamundra-Parkes-Bathurst-Sydney) in order to gain a greater
understanding of rail operations. In addition, the Commission travelled on various
freight, urban and interstate passenger trains. It also visited organisations in New
Zealand and Europe to obtain knowledge of rail reform in those countries.
The Commission held two technical workshops and a public workshop to discuss
the analysis of railway performance presented in chapter 4.
The Commission was encouraged by the participation in this inquiry from groups
across the rail industry and other transport sectors, and from governments and
agencies. The Commission thanks participants for the effort, thoroughness and
thoughtfulness of their submissions.INTRODUCTION 5
The structure of this report reflects the approach described in section 1.1. The rail
industry is described, and key reforms summarised in chapters 2 and 3. The
performance of Australian railways is analysed and compared to that of other
countries in chapter 4. Chapter 5 outlines the Commission’s approach to assessing
the best policies to overcome impediments to improved rail performance. The
following six chapters, 6  to  11, each cover a major issue for this inquiry. The
objectives of, and gains from reform of industry structure and ownership are
assessed in chapters 6 and 7 respectively. Chapters  8 and 9 discuss regulation
relating to access arrangements, safety and operating procedures and standards.
Competitive neutrality between rail and other modes of transport, particularly road,
is the focus of chapter 10, while chapter 11 discusses a framework for government
implementation of broader social objectives, such as employment and regional
development. These chapters are drawn together in chapter 12 which outlines the
priorities for further reform and the role of government and the private sector in this




2 Railways in Australia
Australia’s railways have become increasingly specialised in the transport
of bulk commodities, such as coal and iron ore. Competition from road
transport has eroded the previous dominance of railways over the
transport of primary products and non-bulk freight. All Australian mainland
state capital cities have urban rail passenger networks. Railways only
undertake a small proportion of non-urban passenger movements.
Broad categories of railway networks are identified which can be
distinguished by their economic characteristics and the nature of the
market in which they operate.
The terms of reference ask the Commission to report on the current structure of the
industry, to ‘differentiate its analysis of Australian interstate rail operations from
intrastate and urban operations’, and to include discussion of freight and urban
passenger services.
This chapter addresses these terms of reference by describing the role of rail in
transporting freight and passengers in Australia (section  2.1). The different
characteristics of Australia’s rail networks are then identified (section 2.2).
There are currently limitations on the quantity and quality of transport data in
Australia. In a number of instances the most recent statistics are four or five years
old. Hence, as noted by the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional
Services (DTRS) reforms that have been effected in the last three years may have
altered the modal trends presented in this chapter (sub. DR125).
Participants to the inquiry were critical of the availability of quality transport data in
Australia. The National Rail Corporation (NRC) argued:
A general point that could be made is that it will become increasingly difficult to
formulate rational transport policy in this country as the data available to assess what’s
going on now and to assess the effects of possible changes becomes more and more
scarce. (trans., p. 1008)8 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
And Laird noted:
I’d suggest that these data limitations are very severe and they’re probably costing the
country heaps and heaps because it means that treasuries, both state and federal, are not
having adequate data to justify budget outlays. (trans., pp. 711-712)
The Australasian Railway Association argued that the privatisation of railways was
impeding the ability to obtain rail transport data:
It’s something that we at the association are now having increasing difficulty as the
privatisation process occurs when a lot more information now is very much
commercially sensitive … (trans., p. 1040)
There is a lack of up-to-date transport data in Australia, impeding public debate
and sound policy formulation.
2.1 Rail transport in Australia
In Australia, rail transport represents around 0.5 per cent of gross domestic product
and 8 per cent of total transport value added (ABS 1998a).1 In 1998 there were at
least 36 500 full-time workers employed by the railways.2
There is around 43  100  km of broad (1600  mm), standard (1435  mm), narrow
(1067 mm) and dual gauge track in Australia (ARA 1998b). Most of Australia’s
railways are centred on capital cities or ports, extending to rural areas and mining
regions. The standard gauge network links all the mainland state capital cities and
Alice Springs in the Northern Territory (appendix B).
Rail service providers
In 1991, Australia’s rail industry was characterised by integrated State-owned
railways providing passenger and freight services in their respective jurisdictions
with private operators (BHP, Hamersley Iron and Robe River Railroad) hauling iron
ore in Western Australia (table 2.1). In addition, Australian National provided long
distance non-urban passenger services on the Australian mainland, freight services
across jurisdictions, and intrastate freight services in Tasmania and South Australia
(chapter 3).
                                             
1 Estimates of the contribution rail transport makes to Australia’s gross domestic product differ
depending on how the industry is defined. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) definition
of the rail transport industry is based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial
Classification (ANZSIC) (class 6200).
2 Estimate based on full-time employment in the ANZSIC (class 6200).RAILWAYS IN
AUSTRALIA
9
Since 1991, the number of public and private sector rail service providers has grown
considerably (table 2.2). This growth has occurred primarily through the dismantling
of Commonwealth and State-owned railways into passenger, freight and ‘below
track’ infrastructure providers.
In addition, a number of new private operators have entered the industry. These
include interstate freight operators (Specialized Container Transport (SCT), Toll
Rail and Patrick) and smaller private operators providing a range of services
including crews, locomotives and short haul operations (Northern Rivers Railroad
and Great Northern Rail Services).







  Australian National (Cwlth) ää
  State Rail Authority (NSW) ää ä
  Public Transport Corporation (Vic) ää ä
  Queensland Rail (Qld) ää ä
  Westrail (WA) ää ä
  State Transport Authority (SA) ä
Private providers
  BHP (NSW, WA, SA) ä
  Emu Bay Railway (Tas) ä
  Hamersley Iron (WA) ä
  Robe River Railroad (WA) ä
  Silverton Tramway (NSW) ä
  Skitube (NSW) ä
a  Excludes separate maintenance and construction providers and tourist train operators.10 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Freight Track b Principal area
of operation
Public providers
  National Rail Corporation ä Interstate
freight
  Australian Rail Track Corp. ä Interstate track
  State Rail Authority ää NSW
  FreightCorp ä NSW
  Rail Access Corporation ä NSW
  Queensland Rail ää ä ä Qld
  Westrail ää ä ä WA
  TransAdelaide ää Adelaide
Private providers
  Australia Southern Railroad ää SA
  Austrac ä NSW
  Bayside Trainsc ää Melbourne
  BHP ää WA,SA,NSW
  Freight Victoriad ää Vic
  Great Northern Rail Services ä Vic
  Great Southern Railway ä Interstate
passenger
  Hamersley Iron ää WA
  Hillside Trainsc ää Melbourne
  Northern Rivers Railroad ä NSW
  Patrick ä Interstate
freight
  Robe River Railroad ää WA
  Silverton Tramway ä NSW
  Skitube ää NSW
  Specialized Container Trans. ä Interstate
freight
  Tasrail ää Tas
  Toll Rail ä Interstate
freight
  V/Line Passengerc ä Vic
  West Coast Railway ä Vic
a   Excludes separate maintenance and construction providers and tourist train operators. b   Refers to the
owners of mainline tracks, and does not include ownership of sidings, terminals and other ‘below track’
infrastructure.  c    Private provider under franchise agreement with the Victorian Government.




Australia’s domestic freight (excluding pipelines) was around 340 billion net tonne-
kilometres (ntkm) in 1995-96,3 with rail and road transport and coastal shipping
each undertaking around one third (figure 2.1).4 Since 1970-71, road transport has
continued to increase its share of domestic freight activity. The contribution from
coastal shipping has remained relatively static, thereby reducing its share.
Throughout the period shown, rail transport (government and private) has continued
to account for around one third of domestic freight.
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a  Figures for 1995-96 are provisional estimates. b  Most recent data available.
Data sources: Bureau of Transport Economics estimates based on BTCE 1995; Apelbaum 1997 (The
Australian Transport Task, Energy Consumed and Greenhouse Gas Emissions);  ABS (Survey of Motor
Vehicle Use, Cat. no. 9202.0).
                                             
3 Australia’s transport activities can be measured in various ways  —  different measures are
appropriate for different purposes. Tonnes and number of passengers measure the amount of
freight and people using transport services in a given period. Tonne-kilometres and passenger-
kilometres take into account the distance travelled but provide no indication of loading and
unloading activity or the intensity at which the transport system is being used at particular times.
4 There are difficulties in obtaining accurate estimates of freight output from the road transport
industry as often the information sought from vehicle owners is not readily available
(ABS 1998d).12 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Coal and minerals
Railways have maintained their share of domestic freight largely through the growth
in Australia’s minerals sector (appendix C). In particular, the tonnage of coal and
minerals transported by rail (primarily from mines to ports) has increased almost
eight fold from 1962-63 to 1994-95 (figure 2.2).
The growth in the transport of coal and minerals by the railways has allowed rail to
maintain a significant share in the transport of bulk freight commodities, including
coal, minerals, grains and sugar. In 1994-95, government and private railways
accounted for just over one third of the 210 billion ntkm of bulk freight transported
in Australia (figure 2.3).






























































































Data source: BTE 1998.
Primary products
In 1962-63, over 80 per cent of Australia’s agricultural produce (a combination of
bulk and non-bulk freight including grains, sugar and fruit and vegetables) and
about two thirds of livestock output was transported by rail. However, since then
there has been a steady decline in the proportion of agricultural produce and
livestock output transported by rail (figure 2.4). This is primarily due to the growth
in competition from road transport. By 1994-95, the proportion of agriculturalRAILWAYS IN
AUSTRALIA
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produce transported by rail had fallen by about half and less than 10 per cent of
livestock output was transported by rail.
Figure 2.3 Bulk freight transport, percentage shares of net tonne-









Data source: Unpublished BTE estimates.
Figure 2.4 Proportion of agricultural produce and livestock output






































































































a  Includes grains, sugar and fruit and vegetables.
Data source: BTE 1998.14 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Non-bulk freight
Non-bulk (or general) freight comprises a diverse range of commodities including
steel products, meat and fish, wool, plastic resins, paints, livestock and some
agricultural produce.5 In 1994-95, approximately 110  billion ntkm of non-bulk
freight was transported in Australia. Road transport accounted for three quarters of
the non-bulk freight while rail transport and coastal shipping accounted for less than
one fifth and one tenth respectively.
Available evidence relating to interstate freight indicates that rail has lost
considerable market share to road in the transport of non-bulk freight.
Interstate freight
In 1994-95, Australia’s interstate freight was some 118  billion  ntkm or around
35 per cent of domestic freight (table 2.3).
The interstate transport of bulk commodities is dominated by coastal shipping,
accounting for around 95 per cent of the market in 1994-95. Rail and road each
transported less than 3 per cent of interstate bulk freight.
Table 2.3 Long distance freight, 1994-95
Mode a   Interstate Intercapital
Bulk Non-bulk Total
billion ntkm billion ntkm billion ntkm billion ntkm
Road 2.0 26.0 28.0 16.9
Rail 1.9 14.6 16.5 6.7
Coastal shipping 68.3 5.4 73.7 8.3
Total 72.2 46.0 118.2 31.9
a  A small proportion of interstate and intercapital freight is undertaken by air transport.
Sources: Bureau of Transport Economics estimates based on BTE 1998 (Coastal Freight In Australia,
1995-96, Information Paper 42); ABS (Survey of Motor Vehicle Use, Cat. no. 9202.0 and Experimental
Estimates of Freight Movements, Cat. no. 9217.0); DoTR (Aviation Statistics Database).
In contrast, road dominates the interstate transport of non-bulk commodities,
accounting for over half the ntkm in 1994-95. Rail accounted for just under
one third and coastal shipping just over one tenth of non-bulk ntkm.
                                             
5 There are problems in creating clear definitions for bulk and non-bulk commodities. For
example, commodities such as timber, cement and fertilisers can, in some instances, be classified
as either bulk or non-bulk freight.RAILWAYS IN
AUSTRALIA
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Available evidence indicates that since the early 1970s, rail has lost considerable
market share to road in the interstate transport of non-bulk commodities (figure 2.5).
In 1970-71, railways accounted for around 45 per cent of non-bulk interstate freight
compared to around one third for coastal shipping and one fifth for road. Since
1970-71, road transport has accounted for most of the growth in the interstate
transport of non-bulk commodities, resulting in it having the largest share by
1994-95. However, NRC claimed that these trends are currently changing:
There has been a significant change in the competitive position of interstate rail freight
since 1997, when the quality of assets and cost structure of rail began to improve …
The effect has been especially marked on the East Coast. (sub. DR117, p. 5)
Data on the market shares for road, rail and coastal shipping for interstate freight
transport are not yet available to substantiate this claim.
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Data source: Perry and Gargett 1998.
A component of interstate freight is freight transported between capital cities. In
1994-95, intercapital freight transport represented around one quarter of total
interstate freight.
Rail’s market share of freight transported (measured in tonnes) by land between
capital cities generally increases with the length of haul. In 1994-95, on the North-
South corridor, defined as freight flows between Brisbane, Sydney and Melbourne,
rail accounted for 28 per cent of the tonnes of freight transported.16 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
However, Norley (1999) suggested that on the Sydney to Melbourne link, rail’s
market share may now be less than 10 per cent. It was also suggested that some rail
operators (and rail based freight forwarders) had conceded the transport of freight
on this corridor to road. On the other hand, DTRS argued that the total interstate
non-bulk freight market is growing rapidly and that ‘rail has the potential to increase
its market share and profitability considerably’ (sub. DR125, p. 1).
In contrast to the North-South corridor, on the East-West corridor (that is, west of
Sydney and Melbourne) rail accounted for almost one half of the freight transported,
and close to 80 per cent on the Perth to Adelaide link (MM Starrs Pty Ltd and Ian
Wright & Associates 1999).
Importance of rail to selected commodities
Table 2.4 presents the amount and proportion of rail costs to the value of selected
commodities. In 1993-94, the commodity category of coal, oil and gas used the
greatest amount of rail services (public and private) in absolute terms — at around
$1.4 billion. Iron ore had the highest proportion of rail costs to value at 11 per cent.
However, the importance of rail transport to the coal industry is understated in
table  2.4. This is due to its aggregation with oil and gas in the commodity
classification. In particular, the NSW Minerals Council has indicated that rail freight
charges comprise 15 to 30 per cent of the free on board cost of New South Wales
coal exports (PC 1998a).
Table 2.4 Rail costs as a proportion of value, selected commodities,
1993-94




Rail costs as a proportion
 of commodity value
$m $m per cent
Sheep 3 841 72 1.9
Grains 6 197 352 5.7
Coal, oil and gas 20 659 1 383 6.7
Iron ores 3 772 416 11.0
Non-ferrous metal ores 9 334 128 1.4
Petroleum and coal products 25 113 51 0.2
Iron and steel 11 320 73 0.6
Basic non-ferrous metals 11 771 97 0.8
a  A commodity has been included if rail costs exceed $50 million or 5 per cent of commodity value.




Passenger transport involves the movement of people within and between
Australia’s towns and cities. It is undertaken by a variety of modes including cars,
motor cycles, bicycles, trams, ferries, aircraft and railways. The use of private cars
and other light vehicles dominates passenger transport in Australia, in both urban
and non-urban areas.
Urban passenger transport
In Australia, urban transport systems consist of road networks, together with the
private car and other vehicles that use them, public transport modes and paths for
cycling and walking. There are currently urban rail networks in all mainland state
capital cities. The largest network, in Sydney, extends across the greater
metropolitan area from north of Newcastle to south of Wollongong.
Urban rail systems in Australia are usually radial to the central business district of
the city and a high proportion of urban rail travel is undertaken for work or
education during peak times. The State Rail Authority of New South Wales (SRA)
commented on the importance of rail transport to Sydney:
The suburban rail network represents the life blood of Sydney. CityRail provides
approximately 2,300 train services, carrying about 900,000 per week day ... At its
busiest time, the morning peak between about 6.30 a.m. and 9.30 a.m., CityRail carries
about 300,000 passengers. (sub. 67, p. 2)
A major trend in passenger transport in Australia has been the growth in the use of
the private car and the relatively static contribution from public transport modes
(figure 2.6). A primary explanation for this situation is that public transport modes,
including rail, continued to provide transport services to and from the central
business district, while employment, retail and other activities decentralised into
Australia’s expanding residential areas. As noted by the Bureau of Transport and
Communications Economics:
This type of development, which frequently involves large distances between
residential and work locations, has resulted in considerable dependence being placed on
private cars for urban commuting, and correspondingly limited reliance on public
transit systems. (BTCE 1995, p. 151)18 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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A similar explanation for the static contribution by public transport to the transport
of passengers is given by Hearsch:
Australia’s urban population mostly lives in relatively low density housing with the
only exceptions being medium density residential areas in some inner suburbs in both
Sydney and Melbourne. Low density lifestyles generally militate against the effective
use of public transport and help to entrench car ownership. (Hearsch 1998, p. 9)
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a  Represents the latest published estimates available on urban passenger movements across all transport
modes in Australia. b   Includes taxis. In 1990-91, taxis comprised around 1.7 per cent of urban car pkm.
c Includes trams. Between 1970-71 and 1992-93 tram pkm were 8 per cent of urban rail pkm.
Data source: BTCE 1995.
Non-urban passenger transport
In 1970-71, rail provided about 6 billion non-urban passenger-kilometres (pkm) or
approximately 10 per cent of total non-urban passenger transport. However, there
has been a dramatic decline in the number of non-urban pkm undertaken by rail
despite growth in this market. By 1994-95, the non-urban pkm of railways had
declined to approximately 2.2 billion pkm (less than 2 per cent of total non-urban
pkm), while the car dominated (figure 2.7).RAILWAYS IN
AUSTRALIA
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Figure 2.7 Non-urban passenger transport, percentage share of









Data source: Estimates provided by the BTE.
Hearsch (1998) categorised non-urban passenger transport as follows:
·  long distance, ranging from 1000 km to 4000 km in length (mainly interstate);
·  medium distance, typically covering routes between cities and major regional
centres between 200 km and 700 km apart; and
·  short distance, intercity services covering routes beyond the defined suburban
area.
Long distance passenger services are dominated by car and air transport. Rail’s role
is generally limited to tourist trains such as the Ghan and Indian-Pacific
(Hearsch 1998).
Medium and short distance trips are also dominated by the private car. However, rail
(and coach) services are offered in most jurisdictions through providers such as
Traveltrain (Queensland Rail) and Countrylink (SRA).
In 1994-95, there were around 47.5 million interstate passenger journeys. Railways
provided transport services to less than 2  per  cent of interstate passengers
(table 2.5).20 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Table 2.5 Interstate (including intercapital) passenger transport, 1994-95
Mode Interstate Intercapital
(component of interstate)
’000 of passengers ’000 of passengers
Car 33 650 3 092
Bus 1 770 496
Rail 610 278
Air 11 422 6 632
Total 47 452 10 498
Source: BTE estimates based on Bureau of Tourism Research 1996 (Domestic Tourism Monitor).
Interstate rail passenger operations are only a small element of the total rail
passenger market. There were 610 000 interstate rail passenger journeys in 1994-95
compared to around 270  million provided each year by CityRail in New South
Wales.
A component of interstate passenger journeys is passenger trips between capital
cities. There were around 10.5 million intercapital passenger journeys in 1994-95,
representing just under one quarter of the total interstate passenger journeys. The
movement of passengers between capital cities is dominated by air transport which
carried almost two thirds of the total intercapital passengers.
Investment
Most public sector investment in railways is undertaken by State Governments. In
1997-98, investment by state and local governments (the local government
component is small) was $1.6  billion compared to $151  million by the
Commonwealth Government (figure 2.8).
From 1981-82 to 1991-92, public sector investment in railways averaged around
$840 million per year. Since 1991-92, however, the level of investment in railways
has increased sharply, largely due to increased investment by the NSW, Queensland
and WA Governments and the Commonwealth Government’s One Nation Program
(HORSCCTMR 1998b).
State government-owned railways provide a range of rail services in both passenger
and freight markets. Accordingly, investment in track and rollingstock by these
railways is equally diverse, funded from borrowings, internal equity and capital
grants from government. Examples of investment by State Governments through the
1990s include the ongoing acquisition of new coal wagons and bogies in New South
Wales (costing $125  million) and the Queensland Mainline Upgrade Project
(costing $526 million) (box 2.1).RAILWAYS IN
AUSTRALIA
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As part of the One Nation program, the Commonwealth Government allocated
$443 million for track upgrades between June 1992 and June 1995. The One Nation
program culminated in the completion of the standard gauge link between
Melbourne and Adelaide (HORSCCTMR 1998a). Appendix  C provides some
further detail on major gauge standardisation initiatives since the 1950s.
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a  Estimates for 1996-97 are preliminary estimates as at November 1997. Figures for 1997-98 are based on
forward estimates.
Data source: HORSCCTMR 1998a.
Box 2.1 The Queensland Mainline Upgrade Project
The Queensland Mainline Upgrade Project allocated $526 million over five years to
upgrade track, bridges and rollingstock. The project commenced in 1992 and was
completed in 1997. Investment projects undertaken included:
·  the purchase of 40 new generation diesel-electric locomotives;
·  the purchase of 250 new container wagons;
·  the replacement of 673 timber bridges; and
·  the construction of 118 km of new alignment on the main North Coast Line from
Brisbane to Cairns and selected routes in south-west Queensland.
Source: QR 1996.22 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The extent of private sector investment in railways since 1991 is unclear. In terms of
track and other fixed infrastructure, there is little evidence of significant private
sector investment, especially compared to public sector investment. However, some
limited evidence of investment by the private sector is available. SCT commented:
SCT is presently investing tens of millions of dollars into rail terminals and rollingstock
… (sub. 80, p. 2)
And, Patrick noted:
Patrick has invested several million dollars in the rail terminals and connections to the
main line in order to provide a modern ‘on dock’ rail terminal with dual gauge access.
(sub. 63, p. 5)
It appears that, in most circumstances, private train operators are leasing
locomotives and rollingstock and are not purchasing new equipment. Private
providers of locomotives (such as Great Northern Rail Services) have indicated that
they are not purchasing new locomotives but rather refurbishing existing assets.
Employment
There have been large reductions in employment in railways (chapter  11 and
appendix J). Evidence from the ABS Labour Force Survey indicates that between
1986 and 1998 full-time employment in railways declined from 88 500 to 36 500
(figure 2.9).6
Up until the mid-1990s most railway workers were employed in government-owned
railways.7 For these railways, from 1972-73 to 1996-97 employment decreased
substantially by around 70  500 employees, or 60  per  cent of the workforce
(figure 2.10). The rate of decrease in employment increased after 1985-86 — mainly
attributable to reductions in employment by the former SRA.
Reduced demand for labour by railways has occurred despite increasing output from
the industry. Freight output, as measured by ntkm, increased by around 158 per cent
over the period shown (figure 2.10).8
                                             
6 Employment estimates from the ABS Labour Force Survey are not comparable with data on
employment in government-owned railways (appendix J).
7 Reliable information on private sector employment in railways is not available.
8 However, there has been a decline in non-urban rail passenger-kilometres (which is only a small
element of total industry output).RAILWAYS IN
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Figure 2.9 Full-time employment in the rail industry, capital city and




































Data source: ABS (Labour Force, Australia, Cat. no. 6203.0, unpublished, various years).
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Data sources: Hensher, Daniels and DeMellow 1992; SCNPMGTE 1998; Rail Access Corporation,
unpublished data; Rail Services Australia, unpublished data; BTE, unpublished data.24 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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However, figure 2.10 overstates the decrease in demand for labour by government
railways, especially in the 10 year period to 1996-97. This is due to the contracting
out of many activities by railways and the transfer of functions (such as regulatory
functions) to other bodies.
Railways have traditionally been an important source of employment in regional
Australia. However, evidence indicates that railway employment outside Australia’s
capital cities has fallen more rapidly than within capital cities. In 1986 over half of
the full-time railway employment (48 000 employees) occurred outside Australia’s
capital cities (figure 2.9). However, by 1998 regional employment had fallen by
three quarters to around 13  000  —  one third of total railway employment. The
largest reductions in regional employment occurred in New South Wales and
Queensland, though reductions have occurred in all jurisdictions (appendix J).
2.2 Railway characteristics
The terms of reference recognise that railway networks in Australia are not all the
same. They have different economic characteristics and markets, face different
issues, and require different policy approaches.
The Draft Report identified four types of rail networks in Australia. They were:
·  urban passenger networks;
·  high volume regional networks;
·  low volume regional networks; and
·  the interstate network.
The inquiry received many submissions commenting on the appropriateness of the
framework adopted by the Commission in the Draft Report and the accuracy of the
characteristics for each network. In addition, some participants (McKillop, NSW
Minerals Council and NRC) provided details on the sections of rail track which
could be regarded as one of the networks identified by the Commission.
With regards to the Commission’s framework, McKillop argued:
One of the most useful contributions of the Draft Report is the framework for analysing
railways by their characteristics. (sub. DR90, p. 2)RAILWAYS IN
AUSTRALIA
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However, the Rail Access Corporation (RAC) was critical of the Commission’s
approach:
The fundamental shortcoming of the categorisation approach used in the Report is that
important detail is lost in attempting to generalise across market types. …
… RAC believes that the categorisation approach and errors of fact have contributed to
the Commission drawing inappropriate conclusions from its analysis of market
structures in Chapter 5 of the Report. (sub. DR102, pp.1, 2)
In response to comments made by participants, the Commission has refined the
categorisation and incorporated information from participants, published sources
and discussions with railways.
The discussion of each network below is not intended to be a rigid taxonomy of rail
operations in Australia. It highlights the predominant features of rail networks in
Australia, while recognising that differences and exceptions do exist within and
between networks across states.
Australia’s rail networks
To facilitate discussion and identification of the issues associated with different
railways in Australia, the Commission has redefined rail networks into three broad
categories. They are:
·  urban passenger networks;
·  the interstate network; and
·  regional networks (including the main coal lines in New South Wales and
Queensland).
These networks can be differentiated according to a number of economic
characteristics relating to:
·  interface issues, which occur when there are competing demands for train
schedules by trains from different networks, for example, freight trains
traversing urban passenger networks.
·  rail competition:
-  ‘for’ the market — competition between bidders tendering to provide a given
service; or
-  ‘in’ the market — competition between train operators for the same
customers. Chapter 5 discusses further, different forms of competition that
can occur within railways.
·  intermodal competition, particularly from road and shipping.26 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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·  level of viability:
-  loss making — requiring continual government funding to either the track or
train operations; or
-  earning a reasonable rate of return that can support future investment and
maintenance; or
-  achieving sustainable monopoly profits.
The characteristics of the different networks are summarised in table  2.6 and
discussed briefly below.











Urban Yes, especially Sydney Some No Yes No
Interstate Yes Limited Yes Yes Uncertain
Regional Yes Limited Limited Most
freight
Uncertain
– Main coal lines Yes No No No Yes
Urban passenger networks
Urban passenger networks exist in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Perth and
Adelaide. The providers of urban passenger transport services include SRA, Bayside
Trains, Hillside Trains, Queensland Rail, Westrail and TransAdelaide.
Interface issues
The potential for interface issues to arise varies considerably across states. Interface
issues are of particular concern in Sydney where there is congestion on the urban
passenger network restricting the passage of freight trains. This is due to the
complexity of the network and the intensity of use by passenger trains at peak
periods. Each day around 100 freight trains are scheduled in conjunction with 2300
passenger trains. As noted by SRA:
The level of train services generated in the CityMet area is quite dense and operates
over a somewhat complicated commuter passenger network. Other operators mainly of
freight services have to traverse the CityMet network to get into their terminals.
(sub. 67, p. 2)RAILWAYS IN
AUSTRALIA
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A number of participants commented on the complexity of the urban passenger
network in Sydney and the problems it creates in introducing structural reforms and
improving the productivity of rail freight. Chapters 6 and 10 discuss further reform
options in the context of the interface issues relating to the Sydney urban network.
Perth and Adelaide on the other hand, have urban passenger networks that are
largely independent of other networks, so that interface issues are less important.
In Perth, only around three freight trains per week traverse the urban passenger
network (Westrail, Perth, pers. comm., 9 June 1999). As noted by the WA
Government:
The metropolitan network is largely confined to suburban rail passenger services with
few points of interaction between passenger and freight services. (sub. 60, p. 3)
In Adelaide, few broad gauge intrastate freight trains traverse TransAdelaide’s
urban network. Following the Melbourne to Adelaide standardisation in 1994-95,
there is also little interface between standard gauge interstate trains and the broad
gauge urban network.
Melbourne and Brisbane lie between these extremes. In Melbourne, there is some
potential for interface issues to arise due to the increasing number of freight trains
that now traverse the urban passenger network. On lines carrying both passengers
and freight, the proportion of intrastate freight trains generally averages between 5
and 10 per cent of total train numbers. In Brisbane, around 15 per cent of total train
kilometres over the urban passenger network are accounted for by freight trains
(Queensland Rail, Brisbane, pers. comm., 3 June 1999).
Due to the differences in gauges, there is only limited interaction between interstate
trains and the urban passenger networks in Melbourne and Brisbane.
Rail competition
With the exception of Melbourne, there is no rail competition on urban passenger
networks.
In Melbourne, there is competition for the market in providing urban passenger
services. National Express and Melbourne Transport Enterprise have secured the
franchises to operate Melbourne’s Bayside and Hillside Trains respectively.
However, the successful franchisees do not compete over the same tracks for
passengers. Instead, the franchises are based on geographic service groups (sub. 82).28 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Intermodal competition
Urban passenger networks are subject to strong intermodal competition from the
private car and other transport modes. The private car has been cited as the greatest
threat to public transport, undertaking around 95  per  cent of all urban trips
(Cox 1997).
Other public transport modes also provide strong intermodal competition. The
majority of bus, tram and ferry services move people from the suburbs to the central
business district, sometimes providing commuters with more than one public
transport option. As noted by the Industry Commission:
Aggregate figures [on private car and public transport mode shares for urban transport]
do, however, conceal the importance of public transport for some types of journeys. For
example, 52 per  cent of commuter trips to Melbourne’s central area are by public
transport and 80 per cent of workers in Sydney’s central city use public transport to get
to work. (IC 1994b, p. 62)
Level of viability
Urban passenger networks in Australia are loss making, requiring continual
government funding. In New South Wales, the Government allocated around
$1 billion in recurrent and capital funding for SRA in 1997-98. In Queensland, the
average government payment (subsidy) per urban rail passenger journey is over five
times the average fare paid by passengers (chapter 11).
The interstate network
There has never been a declared interstate network (sometimes referred to as the
‘national track’). The interstate network can be (and has been) defined in various
ways based on features such as track gauge, past investments by the Commonwealth
Government (especially investments made under the One Nation program) and those
lines used by interstate trains.
For the purposes of this inquiry, the Commission has defined the interstate network
as that presented by NRC (sub.  DR117): the standard gauge track linking all
mainland State capital cities; the lines linking Sydney, Broken Hill and Crystal





As described earlier, with the exception of Sydney, interstate trains (freight and
passenger) generally have limited interface with urban passenger networks. This
situation is primarily due to the differences in track gauges. However, as described
later in this chapter, there are interfaces between the interstate and regional
networks.
Rail competition
There is competition between train operators on the interstate network. In June
1995, SCT commenced interstate rail freight operations in competition with NRC.
TNT (now Toll Rail) followed one year later (sub. DR100).
There is only limited evidence of competition for the market on the interstate
network. RAC noted that competition for the market has occurred on the interstate
network in regard to the BHP billet/slab traffic (sub. DR102).
Intermodal competition
There is vigorous intermodal competition on the interstate network, especially from
road transport. As argued by NRC:
Road transport is the most powerful competitor for rail general freight services.
B-Doubles are a continuing threat to the viability of rail transport. (sub. 53, p. 10)
Apart from competition from road transport, coastal shipping also dominates the
interstate transport of bulk commodities (table 2.3).
Level of viability
The Commission received no evidence of railways extracting monopoly profits from
customers on the interstate network. Indeed, there is no conclusive evidence of the
ability for railways to achieve viability, at least at this stage. In terms of train
operations, NRC continues to run at a loss. The Australian Rail Track Corporation
illustrated the challenges facing rail by reference to NRC:
… NR’s financial profitability was stated at $4.8m (loss) in 1996-97. The most recent
annual report, released late last year, shows that NR’s operating loss has deteriorated to
$9m (after-tax) … This deterioration continues a trend starting in 1995-96 (with the
introduction of private rail competitors) and starkly illustrates the challenge NR faces in
a competitive interstate environment. (sub. DR97, p. 3)30 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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However, NRC argued:
As a corporation under the Corporations Law, National Rail can trade only while it
remains solvent. Since it ceased to receive any financial support from its shareholders
some 15 months ago, its Directors must have an expectation of commercial returns,
backed by shareholder-approved strategic plans. (sub. DR117, p. 5)
As noted earlier, there are now private sector operators on the interstate network. As
private firms, SCT and Toll Rail would be expected to only remain in the market if
they earn, or expect to earn, commercial returns (at least on train operations).
Evidence on the viability of the interstate track is limited due to the multiple owners
of the network. However, in New South Wales the Government provides subsidy
payments to RAC towards track upkeep and maintenance.
Regional networks
The Draft Report identified two types of regional networks — high and low volume.
This categorisation tended to create some confusion over what tracks could be
considered high or low volume. This was especially evident in New South Wales
where some tracks were used by trains carrying freight with different economic
characteristics (coal, grain and containers), as well as non-urban passenger trains.
Nevertheless, most of the tracks within regional networks9 share similar economic
characteristics. The freight transported is often subject to strong intermodal
competition and there is no evidence of railways extracting monopoly profits.
Only certain lines, namely the main coal lines in New South Wales and Queensland,
display distinctly different characteristics to the rest of the regional network.10 The
NSW Minerals Council defined the Hunter Valley coal network as:
… that part of the NSW network bounded by Ulan, Gunnedah, Stratford (Craven) and
Eraring. (sub. DR104, p. 1)
Tonnages of coal carried over the Hunter Valley coal lines exceed 50 million tonnes
(Mt) per year (PC 1998a).
In Queensland, the two main coal lines are those centred on the Oaky Creek and
North Goonyella regions (around 49  Mt per year) and Gregory and South
Blackwater regions (around 24 Mt per year) (PC 1998a).
                                             
9 Regional networks are defined as those lines extending out from capital cities and regional ports
to inland areas, excluding the defined interstate network and private railways in the Pilbara.
10 A detailed discussion of Australia’s coal industry, including the transport of coal by rail, is
presented in PC 1998a.RAILWAYS IN
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The transport of coal and minerals in Australia (excluding the Pilbara) is not
restricted to those lines identified above. However, the main coal lines are
distinguished from the remainder of the regional network by the tonnages of freight
that are transported over the lines and, as discussed later in this section, the ability of
railways to extract monopoly rents from mining companies.
Trains transporting grains, general freight and non-urban passengers also travel on
the main coal lines. Despite this overlap, the main coal lines have different
economic characteristics and specific issues not associated with the remainder of the
regional networks in New South Wales and Queensland. Policies required to
improve the outcomes for users (primarily mining companies) on the main coal lines
are therefore identified separately.
Interface issues
Trains commencing on a regional network carrying minerals, grain or general
freight often traverse both the interstate and urban networks. There are also
interfaces between the main coal lines and the remainder of the regional network.
As noted by the NSW Minerals Council:
In hauling coal from Gunnedah or Ulan to Newcastle, the coal is first hauled on a low
volume regional network, then on a high volume regional network, then on track that is
used by and influenced by interstate freight and urban passenger traffic.
(sub. DR104, p. 1)
Rail competition
With the exception of New South Wales, there is limited evidence of rail
competition either for the market or between train operators on regional networks.
An example of competition for the market in New South Wales is the contract won
by NRC to carry coal to Macquarie Generation’s Bayswater and Liddell power
stations. Another example of competition for the market (outside New South Wales)
was the competitively tendered contract to haul coal from Leigh Creek to Port
Augusta won by FreightCorp in November 1998.
A number of participants argued that rail competition between operators was
beginning to emerge under the vertical separation model adopted in New South
Wales. RAC argued:
… approximately two-thirds of freight in New South Wales on a gross tonne-kilometre
basis has been subject to competition between operators … (trans., p. 642)32 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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A similar view was shared by NRC:
It is not correct that “There is little or no competition either for the market or between
train operators on low volume regional railways”. Instances of competition on low-
volume lines are very few as the possibility of competition on regional lines is very
recent; the NSW Rail Access Corporation has provided successfully for genuine
competition, and in NSW there are several examples where real competition has
occurred. (sub. DR117, p. 4)
However, any competition between train operators in New South Wales will largely
occur on subsidised track. The merits of competition between train operators on
subsidised track are discussed in chapter 11.
Intermodal competition
In Victoria, Western Australia (excluding the Pilbara region), South Australia and
Tasmania, the majority of freight carried by rail on most regional networks is
subject to strong intermodal competition. In terms of grain transport in Victoria,
Vicgrain noted that it has:
... the option of increasing the road component of its grain movement operations.
Vicgrain envisages that this would occur should freight rates increase or should there
not be a suitable level of cooperation between the storage and rail sectors.
(sub. 24, p. 5)
Westrail argued that the majority of the commodities it transported by rail was
subject to competition from road transport, with the exception of bauxite, where
road transport was a less feasible alternative (trans., p. 752). Both FreightCorp and
Queensland Rail have indicated that they face significant competition from heavy
road vehicles in the general freight market (QR 1998; FreightCorp 1998).
However, RAC argued that the transport of a number of commodities by rail on the
regional network in New South Wales was not subject to intermodal competition:
There are some traffics on low volume regional lines, particularly minerals and to a
lesser extent grain, that are not subject to significant intermodal competition.
(sub. DR102, p. 1)
Similarly, the main coal lines in New South Wales and Queensland face little or no
intermodal competition in the transport of coal.
Level of viability
Excluding the main coal lines, the Commission received no evidence of railways
extracting monopoly profits from customers on regional networks.RAILWAYS IN
AUSTRALIA
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In New South Wales and Queensland, the regional networks can be considered loss
making, requiring subsidy payments in excess of $150 million per year (chapter 11).
Despite the lack of intermodal competition highlighted by RAC, there is no
evidence of railways extracting monopoly profits from customers in New South
Wales. An important fact underpinning this position is the high level of competition
in the final markets of these commodities. Commodities such as export grain face
strong competition from alternative suppliers on international markets. Thus there
are no monopoly profits to be earned by grain farmers in final markets to be
extracted by the providers of inputs, including transport.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the rail transport of commodities such
as grain in New South Wales receives government subsidies. If grain farmers
require government subsidies to cover transport costs, it is unlikely that monopoly
profits are simultaneously being extracted by the railways.
In Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania there is some
evidence to suggest the regional networks can earn a reasonable rate of return. With
the exception of Western Australia, new (vertically integrated) private sector
railways have begun operation (Freight Victoria, Australia Southern Railroad and
Tasrail). These private sector companies operate without government subsidies and
would only enter and remain in the market if they earn, or expect to earn, a
commercial return.11 With regards to the viability of rail freight operations in
Tasmania, the Australian Transport Network (owners of Tasrail) stated:
... since acquiring Tasrail, its revenue has increased by approximately 50 per cent and
the company has been returned to profitability. (sub. 25, p. 1)
In Western Australia, Westrail receives no subsidies for freight operations.
However, Westrail does require subsidy payments for non-urban rail passenger
services (some $13.7 million 1997-98) (Westrail 1998).
The main coal lines in New South Wales and Queensland are the most profitable
components of each State’s network. The extraction of monopoly rents from the
transport of coal by the government-owned railways provides indirect evidence of
the profitability of these lines.
                                             
11 In Victoria the State Government provides some limited subsidy payments for the ‘Fast Track’
service (less than container load freight) (sub. 82).34 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Overall appraisal of Australia’s rail networks
Australia’s railways provide transport services to a diverse range of passenger and
freight markets. However, the discussion above has highlighted some distinct
characteristics that exist between States with regard to urban and regional networks.
No urban passenger service in Australia is viable. Participants highlighted the
problem of congestion between freight and passenger trains on the urban passenger
network in Sydney due to its complexity and the intensity of use by passenger trains
at peak periods. On the other hand, in Western Australia and South Australia, the
urban passenger networks have limited interface with other networks.
Notwithstanding some possible exceptions, regional networks (excluding main coal
lines) are characterised by strong intermodal competition, especially from road
transport. Where intermodal competition is absent, there is usually competitive
pressure in downstream markets limiting the ability of railways to extract monopoly
profits.
The regional networks in New South Wales and Queensland are distinguished from
the other States by the considerable government subsidies required to ensure their
continued viability. While some competition between train operators is emerging in
New South Wales, these operators do not cover the full cost of providing track
infrastructure.
Yet the New South Wales and Queensland regional networks also contain the
identified main coal lines that are distinguished by their profitability. Issues
surrounding the extraction of monopoly profits by State Governments from the
transport of coal over these lines are discussed in chapters 3, 6 and 12.
The following chapter describes past and present problems facing the industry. The
reforms initiated by government are also outlined. The characteristics of rail
networks, combined with the current problems facing the industry, provide a basis
for examining the various issues concerning the industry including structure,
governance and access arrangements, and competitive neutrality.RAIL REFORM IN
AUSTRALIA
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3 Rail reform in Australia
The Industry Commission’s 1991 inquiry identified a number of problems
which were impeding the performance of Australia’s rail industry. These
included monopoly pricing in coal freight, inappropriate government
intervention and conflicting objectives, and a lack of competitive neutrality
between transport modes.
Since 1991, Australian Governments have taken different approaches to
reforming the railways. Areas of difference include industry structure,
governance arrangements (including the current or intended level of
private sector participation) and access arrangements.
Some of the problems raised in 1991 have again been identified as
concerns in 1999. In addition, new problems have emerged, particularly in
arrangements for access to rail infrastructure and inconsistent safety
regulation and operating standards.
The terms of reference for this inquiry direct the Commission to undertake a
stocktake of reforms within Australian railways since the Industry Commission’s
(IC) 1991 inquiry into rail transport. The Commission received a number of
submissions from participants providing details of progress made in reforming
railways. These included the Australasian Railway Association (ARA),
Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services, NSW Government
and Queensland Transport.
This chapter describes briefly some of the problems encountered when the IC last
reviewed the industry. It also reviews the key reforms initiated since 1991 in the
areas of industry structure, governance arrangements, access to rail infrastructure,
safety regulation and operating requirements, and heavy road vehicle charging. A
full list of key reforms is provided in appendix D.
Investment in railways, while critical to their performance, is not considered a
reform in this chapter. Investment is not a reform per se, but rather one of the
outcomes of reform and associated change in the industry. Chapter 2 contains a brief
discussion of investment in railways since 1991.36 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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3.1 The 1991 inquiry
In May 1990, the IC commenced an inquiry into Australia’s railways. The inquiry
examined the institutional, regulatory and other arrangements subject to government
influence which led to inefficient resource use, and advised on courses of action to
reduce or remove such inefficiencies. The IC released its final report, Rail
Transport, in August 1991.
Problems and recommendations
Participants to that inquiry identified a wide range of problems with railways in
1991. These included the pricing of rail services (especially the extraction of
monopoly rents), service quality, government intervention, investment deficiencies
and competitive neutrality between transport modes. These problems are
summarised briefly below.
Pricing and monopoly rents
Coal and mineral producers expressed concern about the monopoly of the State
railways in hauling bulk commodities and the excessive freight rates imposed. They
also expressed the view that the monopoly rents were being used to cross subsidise
other rail services. The NSW Coal Association noted:
The coal industry in New South Wales has genuinely been concerned for some time
regarding the lack of a commercial approach to the setting of coal freight rates. The
SRA [State Rail Authority] has generally used an ad-hoc approach, often imposing
‘across-the-board’ increases on the industry to meet revenue targets, rather than
formulating freight rates in accordance with the cost of providing services. The industry
is firmly of the view that this has resulted in freight rates being set well above the level
of costs incurred and allowed the SRA, in previous years, to offset or subsidise the loss
of other sectors. (NSW Coal Association submission to Industry Commission Rail
Transport inquiry, sub. 31, p. 4)
In addition, coal producers highlighted difficulties in establishing the existence and




Participants were critical of the quality of service provided by government-owned
railways. In relation to interstate rail freight services, BHP Transport commented
that:
It is the relatively poor level of interstate rail service which is of concern and results in
a general preference for the direct, reliable and efficient services provided by road
transport. (BHP Transport submission to Industry Commission Rail Transport inquiry,
sub. 32, p. 8)
Criticism of service quality was not restricted to freight but applied also to rail
passenger services.
Government intervention
The IC argued that many of the problems experienced by rail users were a
consequence of government ownership and intervention. In particular, government-
owned railways lacked a commercial focus or clearly defined objectives.
Governments frequently used railways to promote political outcomes. According to
the State Rail Authority of New South Wales (SRA):
… in the past its general level of efficiency, particularly in passenger and [general]
freight areas, has been constrained by government intervention and constraints on its
employment and investment policies. (State Rail submission to Industry Commission
Rail Transport inquiry, sub. 98, p. 21)
In 1991, a number of regulations were in place that restricted the movement of
certain commodities to rail (appendix  C). Combined with these regulations,
governments retained a monopoly position on the provision of rail services, thereby
eliminating any competition within railways. Participants were critical of these
arrangements claiming that they resulted in inefficiencies and price distortions.
Investment in rail infrastructure
Participants argued that urgent investment was needed in railways, including
rollingstock, track and signalling equipment. The condition of these was seen as an
impediment to improving the efficiency of the industry.38 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The IC recognised that deficiencies in the quality of railway infrastructure were
present. However, this did not mean that aggregate investment in railways was
insufficient:
The Commission is aware of tangible evidence of inadequate capital expenditure in
parts of railway systems such as signalling equipment so old as to be unreliable and
railway track in need of realignment consistent with modern operating capacities.
However, given the total capital expenditure in railways appears to have been at a
tenable level, the suggestion is that railways may have suffered from a misallocation of
capital expenditure between different segments such as passengers and freight,
rollingstock and infrastructure.
For the State-owned rail systems, political considerations seem to play the dominant
role in determining the magnitude and nature of railway capital expenditure.
(IC 1991b, p. 126)
Competitive neutrality between transport modes
A number of participants argued that road users were not paying the full cost of
providing road infrastructure. Local councils also highlighted problems regarding
the damage heavy road vehicles were causing to local roads, combined with noise
and pollution costs incurred by local residents. However, it was also recognised that
subsidies were not restricted to road transport. Some participants argued that both
road and rail infrastructure were heavily subsidised by government.
Industry Commission recommendations
In response to the problems facing Australia’s railways, the IC made
27  recommendations covering areas including governance arrangements, price
setting, community service obligations, labour arrangements, traffic regulation, road
user charging and open access to railway infrastructure. Some of the key
recommendations of relevance to the Productivity Commission’s current inquiry are
presented in box 3.1.1
                                             
1The Commission has not detailed the progress achieved on all of the former IC’s 1991
recommendations. Instead, it has focused on those key recommendations of direct relevance to
its current terms of reference (chapter 1).RAIL REFORM IN
AUSTRALIA
39
Box 3.1 Key recommendations of the Industry Commission’s 1991
inquiry
Some key recommendations of the 1991 inquiry into rail transport included:
·  railways be fully commercialised through corporatisation, including incorporation
under corporations law;
·  if governments require railways to provide community services, the conditions of
provision should be set out in contracts, the details of which are made public, and
include the pre-defined fees to be paid to railways;
·  super-normal profits, whether described as ‘royalties’ or otherwise, should not be
obtained via rail freight rates;
·  the introduction of road user charges which reflect more accurately the amount of
road use and pavement damage caused by all classes of vehicles;
·  the removal of all restrictions on the contracting of tasks so that railways can take
every opportunity to attain maximum efficiency;
·  railways not be subject to government policy constraints that are more restrictive
than those applying to private sector enterprises in managing labour resources;
·  State Governments eliminate all regulation of traffics to rail, with the possible
exception of dangerous goods; and
·  owners of railway tracks (whether they be governments, rail authorities or private
owners) be required to allow access by other organisations (whether public or
private) to operate on their tracks, subject only to capacity being available and
negotiation of a commercial agreement which sets the prices and conditions for
access.
Source: IC 1991b.
3.2 Factors driving reform in the 1990s
Apart from the IC’s inquiry into rail transport, related inquiries and research by
other organisations and committees (chapter  1), there have been other factors
driving change in the 1990s. They include:
·  the continued and increasing competition from road transport;
·  the continued pressure on State Government budgets in providing goods and
services to the community;
·  the pressure on railway freight rates from increasing competition in downstream
markets, such as Australia’s black coal industry; and
·  the implementation of the National Competition Policy (NCP).40 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Since the early 1950s railways have been subject to increasing competition in freight
and passenger markets from road, sea and air transport. In the transport of non-bulk
and some bulk commodities, railways suffered substantial losses of traffic to road
transport (appendix C). Many of the reforms initiated by Australian Governments
are in response to rail’s decreasing market share in both freight and passenger
markets.
State Governments pay considerable subsidies for non-commercial rail services
(chapter  10). They face increasing pressure to achieve the twin objectives of
improving services to the community while lowering the level of taxation. One way
in which both these objectives can be met simultaneously is to improve the
efficiency of service delivery.
Railways and their Government owners have benefited greatly from the growth of
Australia’s mineral sector. Apart from the increase in bulk traffic providing a
renewed life for railways in Australia, Governments have used their monopoly
position in rail transport to extract rents from mining companies. However, as
described in the Commission’s report, The Australian Black Coal Industry,
Australian coal mines now face increased competition from overseas suppliers
(PC  1998a). This, in turn, places pressure on Australian coal mines to improve
productivity and lower production costs. As a consequence, the ability of Australian
coal companies to absorb excessive freight rates has diminished. The coal industry
is seeking further efficiency gains from railways to allow it to be more competitive
in its new trading environment.
The forces driving change in railways have been given further impetus by the
introduction of NCP. The key elements of NCP are summarised in box 3.2. The
NCP package incorporated pre-existing intergovernmental agreements on industry-
specific reforms in electricity, gas, water and road transport (NCC 1996a). Although
the rail industry is subject to the general provisions of NCP, it is not part of the
specific Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) to implement the NCP-related
reforms.2 As noted by the National Competition Council (NCC):
Without a national rail reform agreement, the business community, in its attempts to
obtain improved service quality and lower prices, has had to rely on the general
provisions of the CPA [Competition Principles Agreement] and, in particular, the
National Access Regime. (NCC 1997a, p. 142)
These factors driving rail reform in Australia provide a context for examining the
reforms initiated across jurisdictions as outlined below.
                                             
2  An IGA was signed in 1996 which set out principles for achieving a nationally consistent
approach to rail safety.RAIL REFORM IN
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Box 3.2 The National Competition Policy package
In April 1995, the Council of Australian Governments agreed to implement a package
of measures to extend competition policies to previously exempt sectors of the
economy.
The Commonwealth’s Competition Policy Reform Act 1995:
·  amended the competitive conduct rules (Part IV) of the Trade Practices Act 1974
(TPA) and extended their coverage to State and local government business
enterprises and unincorporated businesses;
·  created a new section (Part IIIA) of the TPA establishing a national regime for
access to services provided by ‘nationally significant’ infrastructure facilities;
·  amended the Prices Surveillance Act to extend prices oversight to State- and
Territory-owned business enterprises; and
·  created two new institutions  —  the Australian Competition and Consumer
Commission and the National Competition Council  —  responsible for overseeing
and providing advice on implementation of the policy package.
There were three intergovernmental agreements in the package:
·  the Conduct Code Agreement sets out the basis for extending the coverage of the
TPA.
·  the Competition Principles Agreement established principles on: structural reform of
public monopolies; competitive neutrality between the public and private sectors;
prices oversight of government business enterprises; a regime to provide access to
essential facilities; a review program for legislation restricting competition; and
consultative processes for appointments to the National Competition Council.
·  under the Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and Related
Reforms, the Commonwealth provided payments to States and Territories which
gave effect to the intergovernmental agreements, and met reform commitments in
electricity, gas, water and road transport.
Source: PC 1996.
3.3 Reform initiatives
Railway reforms implemented in Australia since 1991 are described below. They are
based on evidence provided by participants and other published sources. Box 3.3
provides a snapshot of some key rail reforms in Australia, while a more detailed list
is provided in appendix  D. Reforms regarding the deregulation of commodity
traffics, the contracting out of activities and provision of non-commercial rail
services are discussed in appendix C and chapters 7 and 10, respectively.42 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box 3.3 A snapshot of key rail reforms in the 1990s
Reforms initiated by the Commonwealth and State Governments during the 1990s
have significantly altered the operating and institutional environment in which rail
freight and passenger services are provided in Australia. Some of the key reforms are
listed below.
Industry structure:
·  formation of the National Rail Corporation and Australian Rail Track Corporation;
·  separation of the interstate long distance passenger and intrastate freight services
of Australian National;
·  separation of the former State Rail Authority of New South Wales into four new
entities: FreightCorp, Rail Access Corporation, Rail Services Australia and a new
State Rail Authority; and
·  separation of the former Public Transport Corporation of Victoria into V/Line Freight,
V/Line Passenger, Bayside and Hillside Trains (and Swanston and Yarra Trams).
Governance arrangements:
·  commercialisation or corporatisation of almost all government-owned railways;
·  privatisation of interstate long distance passenger and intrastate freight services of
Australian National (Great Southern Railway, Australia Southern Railroad and
Tasrail);
·  privatisation of V/Line Freight; and
·  franchising of V/Line Passenger and Bayside and Hillside Trains.
Access to rail infrastructure services:
·  introduction of Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act establishing a national regime for
access to services provided by ‘nationally significant’ infrastructure facilities; and
·  introduction of rail access regimes in most jurisdictions.
Safety regulation and operating procedures and standards:
·  Intergovernmental Agreement, signed in July 1996, to achieve consistent national
rail safety regulation based on agreed aims and principles; and
·  signing of the Heads of Agreement on Interstate Rail Reform at the National Rail




Most jurisdictions have significantly altered the structure of their railways by
horizontally or vertically separating their former integrated rail authorities.3
The Commonwealth
In 1991, the Commonwealth Government owned the Australian National Railways
Commission, trading as Australian National (AN). AN owned and maintained track
in New South Wales, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania and the
Northern Territory, and provided the following rail services:
·  intrastate freight in South Australia and Tasmania;
·  interstate freight in the Northern Territory, South Australia, Western Australia
and New South Wales; and
·  passenger travel on the Indian Pacific, Ghan and Overland trains.
Since 1991, the Commonwealth Government has both horizontally and vertically
separated AN.
In 1991-92, the National Rail Corporation (NRC) was formed under the National
Rail Agreement 1991 to operate interstate freight operations in Australia. NRC’s
shareholders are the Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments. NRC
commenced commercial operations in April 1993.
The formation of NRC took considerably longer than originally anticipated. The
NSW Government noted a range of internal and external factors which caused these
delays (box 3.4).
Specialized Container Transport (SCT) commenced interstate rail freight operations
in competition with NRC in June 1995. TNT (now Toll) followed one year later
(sub. DR100).
In 1997-98, the Commonwealth Government horizontally separated and privatised
AN’s intrastate freight operations in Tasmania and South Australia and interstate
passenger services (Indian Pacific, Ghan and Overland passenger trains) (see section
below on governance arrangements).
                                             
3 Horizontal separation occurs either by product (freight and passenger services) or by geographic
area (interstate and regional railways). Vertical separation occurs in railways when track
infrastructure and train operations are separated.44 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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AN’s mainline interstate track was vertically separated and transferred to the
Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC). The ARTC commenced operations on
1  July 1998. It has responsibility for management of access and infrastructure
maintenance in South Australia as track owner and in Victoria as track manager via
a lease agreement. In other jurisdictions its function is restricted to interstate access
issues (sub. 74).
Box 3.4 Formation of the National Rail Corporation
The National Rail Corporation (NRC) was formed under the National Rail Corporation
Agreement 1991 (the Agreement) together with Commonwealth and State
Government legislation. The formation of NRC was to be achieved in two phases — a
transition period and an establishment period.
By the end of the five year establishment period (1 February 1998), NRC was to have
been equipped with all relevant assets and operate as a stand-alone entity. However,
implementation of the Agreement took significantly longer than anticipated. As stated
by the NSW Government:
... implementation of the National Rail Agreement has taken considerably longer than
expected ... The main reasons for this appear to be the substantial broadening of the rail
reform agenda since the company commenced operations. (sub. DR128, pp.23, 24)
Specific factors identified included:
·  the moves towards vertical separation of track and train operations, which was not
anticipated at the time of formation of NRC;
·  some technical difficulties with the identification and transfer of assets; and
·  prolonged consideration by shareholders of their obligations to provide the company
with compensation payments and railway assets.
While these issues have now been largely resolved, in the interim NRC has also had
to contend with competition from other train operators as well as continued competition
from road transport.
Source: NSW Government sub. DR128.
New South Wales
The major reform in New South Wales has been the horizontal and vertical
separation of the former SRA in July 1996. Previously, all passenger and freight
services were provided by the vertically integrated SRA. In July 1996, SRA was
separated into the following four agencies:
·  Rail Access Corporation (RAC);
·  FreightCorp;
·  Rail Services Authority (RSA); andRAIL REFORM IN
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·  a new SRA.
RAC is vertically separated from train operations and owns the NSW intrastate and
interstate rail network.
FreightCorp undertakes freight train operations in New South Wales. Recently,
FreightCorp expanded operations into South Australia, carrying coal from Leigh
Creek to Port Augusta and NRC won a contract to haul coal in New South Wales.
RSA provides maintenance services to RAC, FreightCorp, SRA and other business
clients. In 1997-98, RSA was corporatised and renamed Rail Services Australia. As
part of the restructure of the former SRA, it was initially intended that track
maintenance services would be made fully contestable by June 2000. However, the
NSW Government placed a moratorium on contestable contracting out of rail track
maintenance services until July 1999 (chapter  10). The Government has since
partially lifted the moratorium by allowing competition for the provision of
maintenance services on the Bondi Junction to Waterfall line in Sydney and the
Hunter Valley coal lines (some $65 million in maintenance contracts).
The new SRA provides city and country passenger rail services, and train control to
RAC (under contract).
Victoria
In 1991, rail freight and passenger operations in Victoria were provided by the
vertically integrated PTC. In 1995-96, the Victorian Government began a process of
dismantling the PTC with a view to franchising and privatising different elements of
the industry (box 3.5).
In 1995-96 the Rail Corporations Act 1996 was passed which allowed for the
establishment of V/Line Freight and the Victorian Rail Track Access Corporation
(VicTrack) as body corporates. V/Line Freight was separated from the PTC in
1996-97 and VicTrack one year later.
VicTrack was initially given responsibility for train control, maintenance and access
to Victoria’s non-electrified intrastate track (excluding metropolitan tram and train
operations). However, part of the privatisation of V/Line Freight involved a 15 year
lease over the non-metropolitan intrastate track. As such, VicTrack now only retains
landlord responsibilities over this track.
In 1998, the PTC’s urban passenger trains and trams, and non-urban rail passenger
operations were horizontally separated into five corporatised businesses. They were
V/Line Passenger, Bayside and Hillside Trains and Swanston and Yarra Trams.46 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box 3.5 Structural reform in Victoria
In 1995-96 the State Government commenced a program to reform the provision of rail
services in Victoria. This involved the horizontal separation of freight, urban and non-
urban rail passenger services formerly provided by the Public Transport Corporation.
The new rail organisations created were V/Line Freight, V/Line Passenger (non-
urban), Bayside Trains and Hillside Trains.
Associated with this restructure, the Government privatised freight operations while
passenger services were franchised to the private sector through a process of
competitive tendering.
Freight
The Government privatised V/Line Freight in February 1999. Freight Victoria, a
consortium headed by RailAmerica, was the successful bidder, agreeing to pay
$163 million for the freight business. Freight Victoria purchased rollingstock and other
assets, and entered into a 15 year lease over the non-metropolitan intrastate track
(with certain rights of renewal) (sub. 82).
Passengers
The Government has franchised all passenger services. National Express was the
successful bidder to operate Bayside Trains and V/Line Passenger. Melbourne
Transport Enterprises was the successful bidder to operate Hillside Trains.
These franchisees have bought rollingstock and have a lease over the track
infrastructure. The franchise agreements specify, among other things: passenger
service levels; maximum fares at current levels, adjusted for inflation; minimum service
levels; and operational performance (including punctuality and reliability, capacity,
quality of service and journey times). Contract length, subsidy payments and
investment commitments of the franchisees are shown below.








Y e a r s$ m$ m$ m
Bayside Trains 15 83 (19) 640
Hillside Trains 15 91 25 490
V/Line Passenger 10 78 46 165




Queensland Rail (QR) remains horizontally and vertically integrated in providing
passenger and freight services in Queensland. Reform of QR has focused on
improving the financial arrangements between QR and its Government owners,
internal restructuring of QR’s operations as well as allowing for access to the QR
track network.
In 1997-98, the Network Access Group was established in QR to deal with access
issues.
Western Australia
Westrail currently remains horizontally and vertically integrated in providing
passenger and freight services in Western Australia.
However, as discussed in the next section, the Government is intending to privatise
the freight operations of Westrail. If the privatisation occurs as is currently intended,
then the freight operations of Westrail will remain vertically integrated but
horizontally separated from the provider of urban passenger services.
South Australia
In 1991, the SA Government provided urban passenger services through the State
Transport Authority (STA), while intrastate and interstate freight operations were
undertaken by AN.
In 1994-95, the STA was restructured into:
·  TransAdelaide, which assumed the operating functions of the former STA; and
·  Passenger Transport Board, which undertakes the planning, regulatory and
purchasing functions for public transport in Adelaide.
Currently, TransAdelaide provides urban rail passenger services under contract to
the Passenger Transport Board (there is no tendering for the service).
Tasmania
In 1991 freight services were provided by AN (no rail passenger services were
provided). In addition, Emu Bay Railway (owned by Pasminco) transported zinc. In
1997-98, the Commonwealth Government horizontally separated the freight services
provided by AN as part of the privatisation of Tasrail (see below).48 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Governance arrangements
Since 1991, a number of reforms introduced by governments have focused on
making railways more commercially focused. In some instances railways have been
privatised or the provision of the rail services required by government has been
franchised to the private sector. For railways that remain in government ownership,
commercialisation or corporatisation models have been adopted aimed at replicating
many of the commercial incentives which apply to private firms.
The Commonwealth Government sold AN’s intrastate freight and interstate
passenger services to three separate operators in 1997-98. Australia Southern
Railroad and Australian Transport Network (Tasrail) purchased the intrastate freight
operations in South Australia and Tasmania respectively. Great Southern Railways
now provides long distance passenger services linking Perth, Adelaide, Alice
Springs, Sydney and Melbourne.
The NRC and ARTC were corporatised on establishment and incorporated under the
Corporations Law (table 3.1). The Commonwealth Government has also announced
its intention to sell its share of NRC.
Table 3.1 Governance arrangements of government-owned railways
Railway Statutory
Authority
Commercialised Corporatised Incorporated under
Corporations Law
  National Rail Corporation ää
  Australian Rail Track Corp. ää
  State Rail Authority (NSW) ä
  FreightCorp (NSW) ä
  Rail Access Corp. (NSW) ä
  Queensland Rail (Qld) ä
  Westrail (WA) ä
  TransAdelaide (SA) ä
In New South Wales the Government has corporatised FreightCorp and RAC.
However, the Government did not corporatise SRA which remains a statutory
authority with its objectives specified in the Transport Administration Amendment
(Rail Corporatisation and Restructuring) Act 1996.
The Victorian Government has privatised its intrastate freight operations and is the
first Australian Government to franchise the provision of passenger services
(box 3.5).
The Queensland Government corporatised QR in 1995-96.RAIL REFORM IN
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Westrail was not corporatised. Instead, the WA Government decided upon a
commercialisation program that included many of the principles of corporatisation.
However, the Government has announced its intention to privatise the freight
operations of Westrail as a vertically integrated entity. The proposed legislation
allowing for the privatisation of the freight operations of Westrail was being
debated in the Western Australian Parliament in mid-1999. The Government is yet
to announce a decision regarding passenger services (sub. 60).
Access to rail infrastructure services
In April 1995 the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments agreed to
establish a national competition policy, and to work cooperatively on competition
issues within their jurisdictions. As part of these reforms the Competition Policy
Reform Act 1995 introduced Part IIIA into the Trade Practices Act 1974 creating the
National Access Regime (box 3.2 and appendix F). This established an overarching
national regime through which businesses can seek access to nationally significant
infrastructure services that are not covered by another regime (such as state-based
rail access regimes).
Since then there have been significant changes in the institutional arrangements with
regard to access to a range of important railway infrastructure services.
Four applications from governments (NSW, Queensland, South Australia/Northern
Territory and WA) have been made to the NCC to consider the effectiveness of their
regimes and recommend it be ‘certified’ as effective under the national regime
(appendix F). The NSW, SA/NT and WA applications are still under consideration.
Queensland withdrew its application in February 1999 and subsequently applied to
the Queensland Competition Authority to have it deemed effective.
In several instances train operators and track owners have reached commercially
negotiated agreements, without recourse to formal mechanisms. According to the
Tasmanian Government the privately-owned, vertically integrated Tasrail and a
number of other operators have reached commercially negotiated access agreements
even though no formal access arrangements exist in Tasmania (sub. 81, p. 2).
Other operators have negotiated access agreements under state-based regimes. In
New South Wales, Austrac is providing agricultural freight services in the Riverina
region and NRC is providing coal freight services in the Hunter Valley. New private
operators (SCT, Toll Rail and Patrick) are providing services on the interstate
network.50 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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In some cases, potential operators have been unable to gain access under suitable
terms and conditions and have consequently sought access through the declaration
provisions of the National Access Regime (chapter 7).
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has not received
any undertakings for rail. However, the ARTC is developing an industry code to
take to the ACCC covering access to that part of the interstate network it owns
(trans., p. 570).
Safety regulation and operating procedures and standards
Since the IC’s 1991 inquiry, the Commonwealth, State and Northern Territory
Governments, and industry have undertaken several joint initiatives to improve rail
safety regulations and operating requirements (appendices D and G and chapter 9).
The first major step occurred in 1993 when the Australian Transport Council
(ATC), comprising Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers, endorsed a
report, A National Approach to Rail Safety Regulation (ATC  1993). The report
concluded that consistent rail safety regulation was required, particularly for
interstate operations.
An IGA was signed in July 1996 by Commonwealth, State and Northern Territory
Ministers setting out guidelines for the establishment of a safety accreditation
system for interstate operations and stating that all parties would make legislative
provision for accreditation and mutual recognition.
The next significant initiative took place in September 1997, when Commonwealth
and State Ministers signed the Heads of Agreement on Interstate Rail Reform at a
National Rail Summit. Among other things, the parties agreed that there was an
urgent need to reform interstate rail.
By the end of 1997 the issues had been prioritised and the principles for reform
agreed on. The Standing Committee on Transport (SCOT), as the main advisory
body to the ATC, established a Rail Group to facilitate rail reform and advance
uniformity of regulations and operating procedures and standards. The Maunsell
report (Maunsell 1998) provided a detailed assessment of the safety and operational
issues that needed to be addressed and implementation options.
The SCOT Rail Group established a number of Working Groups to address the
priority tasks for action identified in the Maunsell report. The Rail Safety
Committee of Australia (RSCA) was formed in 1998 specifically to address safetyRAIL REFORM IN
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issues and an Industry Reference Group (IRG) was established to develop nationally
consistent standards and operational requirements.
In April 1999, the ATC agreed to SCOT establishing an independent review of
safety arrangements and the establishment of a national non-statutory body to
facilitate and coordinate implementation of uniform operational requirements
(ATC 1999).
Relevant reform in the road industry
An important element in rail’s ability to compete for business with road transport is
the level of heavy road vehicle charges (chapter 10). Since 1991, road charges for
heavy vehicles4 has been addressed primarily through the activities of the National
Road Transport Commission (NRTC).
A key objective of the NRTC is to introduce nationally uniform or consistent road
transport policies, laws and standards. Reforms implemented include a national
registration scheme for all heavy vehicles, uniform technical and operating
standards, and nationally consistent road charges for heavy vehicles.
Between July 1995 and October 1996, Commonwealth, State and Territory
Governments introduced national heavy vehicle charges based on the First Charges
Determination prepared by the NRTC in 1992. In 1998, the NRTC proposed a
revised set of charges for heavy road vehicles.
3.4 Problems identified in 1999
Although the rail industry and governments have undertaken a range of reform
initiatives aimed at improving the efficiency of railways, a number of problems
identified in 1991 still remain. In addition, new problems have emerged.
Problems remaining from 1991
Several problems identified in 1991 have been raised by participants to this current
inquiry. In particular:
·  the need to improve the commercial focus of government-owned railways
further, removing remaining impediments to achieving this objective;
·  inadequate investment in rail infrastructure;
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·  the lack of competitive neutrality between train operators and between transport
modes, particularly road and rail; and
·  whether railways still extract monopoly rents from coal companies through coal
freight rates.
Commercial focus and government involvement
For government-owned railways to fully realise their potential in Australia’s
transport system they need to have an appropriate commercial focus. This requires
that railways:
·  pursue only purely commercial objectives (including the commercial provision
of services to governments); and
·  be responsive to market opportunities and requirements.
To achieve a commercial focus, it is important that railways have:
·  the flexibility to make timely decisions (investment and operational);
·  the ability to form strategic alliances, mergers or joint ventures;
·  access to capital; and
·  no undue restrictions on input choice.
Underpinning this approach, railway management should be subject to performance-
based systems of rewards and sanctions similar to those prevailing in the private
sector.
The Commission received considerable evidence indicating that government-owned
railways have not achieved an appropriate level of commercial focus. This situation
was largely seen as a consequence of the objectives and restrictions placed upon
railways by governments.
Participants indicated that governments did not set purely commercial objectives for
their rail authorities. As argued by Australian Transport Network:
Governments give more weight to non-economic factors, they are risk adverse owners
limiting the business’ growth potential, and they lack in-depth knowledge of the
business. (sub. 25, p. 2)RAIL REFORM IN
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Some argued that government-owned railways could be more responsive to market
opportunities and customer needs. Great Northern Rail Services stated:
When GNR is approached by existing rail clients looking to change providers, it is
often not the cost that is the compelling reason. The reasons put forward are:
·  attitude;
·  lack of flexibility; [and]
·  lack of concern for client needs. (sub. 46, p. 6)
With regards to interstate freight operations, the CRT Group argued:
... NRC adopted an autocratic attitude towards customers in terms of what they would
carry, freight rates and attitudes to the other rail systems. In short they were not
customer service orientated. (sub. 20, p. 4)
The need for stronger commercial focus was summarised by the Department of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry:
The rail industry needs to put more focus and energy into identifying new freight
opportunities, meeting market and customer needs, and developing themselves as part
of the total logistics chain. (sub. 84, p. 3)
The Commission also received evidence that government-owned railways are
unable to achieve a stronger commercial focus due to the restrictions placed on them
by governments. NRC raised issues relating to flexibility in decision making and the
ability to form strategic alliances, mergers or joint ventures:
Under public ownership all of those sort of changes in the corporate boundaries and
structures are extremely difficult. If, for example, one — as a company like ours —
were to attempt to purchase a freight forwarder or enter into some tight alliance with a
freight forwarder, that would require shareholder approval and that shareholder
approval could take months to get. In the meantime, the moves that we wanted to take
would be all over town and they would be effectively blocked by all those people
whose interests were adversely affected by it. (trans., p. 1002)
The Victorian Government raised problems of access to capital:
Across Australia, potential rail investors face an industry which is characterised by the
problems highlighted in the draft report, including:
·  inadequate investment where it is needed (that is, it should be directed by market
forces and not driven by supply), and
·  lack of commercial discipline. (sub. 118, p. 4)54 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The problems associated with government ownership and involvement were
summarised by the NSW Minerals Council:
The reality is that Governments do interfere with the operation of Government-owned
railways, often to the detriment of their economic and operational efficiency …
(sub. 39, p. 29)
In addition to the issues surrounding government ownership, NRC (sub. 117) also
highlighted problems regarding complex and inconsistent regulatory regimes, a lack
of competitive neutrality (especially between road and rail) and limited competition
in some markets served by government-owned railways as further impediments to a
stronger commercial focus.
The need to improve the governance arrangements between governments and their
commercial entities has been highlighted in various reports and inquiries. The IC’s
(1994b) report, Urban Transport, recommended that moves to corporatise
government rail authorities be continued and extended. Chapter 7 discusses further
government and private sector participation in railways.
Investment in rail infrastructure
Many participants argued that the rail industry cannot achieve its full output and
employment potential due to a lack of investment in the industry. ARA stated:
Progress in rail reform has been severely hampered by inadequate infrastructure
investment. (sub. 51, p. 13)
And NRC:
The poor quality of infrastructure used for interstate rail operations increases the cost of
rail operations and affects service quality. (sub. 53, p. 12)
Investment in transport infrastructure has also been examined in a number of other
reports since 1991. In 1994, the National Transport Planning Taskforce found,
among other things, insufficient evidence to support a case for a substantial increase
in the current overall level of transport infrastructure spending. However, the
Taskforce did find that infrastructure investment decision-making and funding was
highly segmented by mode and by level of administration and was not considered on
a nationally consistent basis (NTPT 1994).
The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport
and Microeconomic Reform undertook an inquiry into the role of rail in the national
transport framework in 1998. Its report, Tracking Australia: An Inquiry into the
Role of Rail in the National Transport Network, recommended that the
Commonwealth Government invest $750 million to address the worst deficienciesRAIL REFORM IN
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on the national track within the next three years and spend a further $2 billion over
ten years from 2001 (HORSCCTMR 1998b).
A Rail Projects Taskforce was established in August 1998 to evaluate how
governments could better facilitate viable major rail investment proposals developed
by the private sector. The report from the Taskforce, Revitalising Rail: The Private
Sector Solution, recommended, among other things, that the Commonwealth
Government accelerate the existing planned capital expenditure of $250 million and
spend an additional $470 million on the national track by June 2002. However, the
Taskforce also recommended that this funding should be conditional on State
Governments achieving identified reform measures (RPT 1999).
Chapters 7 and 10 discuss investment issues in railways.
Competitive neutrality
A number of participants considered that government-owned railways do not
compete for business on a competitively neutral basis with private operators. In
addition, debate and complaints by both rail and road operators regarding
competitive neutrality between them indicates that this is still an issue.
Many submissions from the rail industry argued that heavy freight vehicles are not
paying the full cost of providing road infrastructure. Conversely, other participants
argued that rail is heavily subsidised compared to the road industry.
Chapter 10 discusses the main reforms needed to promote competitive neutrality
between train operators and between transport modes.
Monopoly rents
The NSW and Queensland Governments have begun phasing out identified
monopoly rents on coal freight charges. However, mining companies still appear
unconvinced that governments have (or will have by the end of the planned removal
period) removed the entire monopoly rent component on coal freight charges.
Rio Tinto noted:
While reductions or potential reductions in rail charges are significant, although offset
to a degree by royalty rate increases at least in Queensland, there is concern that the
new charges still contain a monopoly rent component. This concern has been
aggravated by the manner in which the methodology for calculating the charges has
been introduced. (sub. 58, pp. 6-7)56 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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And NSW Minerals Council commented:
There has been a reduction in the explicit monopoly rent paid for access for coal
haulage as it is phased out in four equal steps (in $/tonne terms) to zero on 1 July 2000.
There is no indication that all monopoly rent is being phased out, as the calculation of
monopoly rent was not transparent. (sub. 39, p. 25)
The issue of monopoly rents on coal freight was addressed in the Commission’s
(1998a) report, The Australian Black Coal Industry. The Commission found that
while the phased removal of identified monopoly rents had improved the efficiency
of rail pricing and encouraged improved performance by railways, the pace of
change had been slow. In addition, the Commission found that the setting of freight
rates for coal by government enterprises in New South Wales and Queensland was
not transparent. A set of principles and practices need to be developed in each State
which generate efficient prices and provide the coal industry with confidence in the
fairness of prices (PC 1998a).
In investigating access pricing for the Hunter Valley coal network, the Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal has recommended the asset valuation methodology
be changed and that the pre-tax real return on these assets be reduced to 8 per cent
(1999c).
Chapter 8 discusses the pricing of rail services further.
Problems emerging since 1991
In addition to the problems raised in 1991, new problems have arisen with regard to
access, and safety regulation and operating requirements.
Access to rail infrastructure
Train operators and mining companies are critical of current access arrangements
being implemented by governments. Problems identified include a lack of
transparency, complexity and inappropriate implementation. The criticism of access
arrangements extends to both intrastate and interstate networks.
With regards to the interstate network and operations of the ARTC, SCT
commented that:
The original concept of the ARTC appeared to be a vast improvement on what was in
place at the time but in reality what we now have is nothing more than a token gesture
of reform in this area. (sub. 37, p. 1)RAIL REFORM IN
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The NSW Minerals Council was highly critical of the development of the NSW rail
access regime:5
The Regime was developed with no public consultation whatsoever. The Regime does
not comply with the Competition Principles Agreement. (sub. 39, p. 7)
A similar view was also presented by the Queensland Mining Council in the course
of the black coal inquiry.
The need for governments to introduce seamless and effective access to rail
infrastructure was reported in the Commission’s Stocktake in Progress in
Microeconomic Reform (PC 1996).
Chapter 8 considers the role of access in promoting efficiency improvements within
Australia’s railways.
Safety regulation and operating procedures and standards
The establishment of the NRC and entry of private operators has highlighted the fact
that each jurisdiction had developed (historically) its own safety regulations and
operating procedures and standards. These inconsistencies can be an impediment to
efficient interstate rail operations and to entering rail markets in different
jurisdictions. While progress has been made in improving the situation, many in the
industry have indicated that more needs to be done.
Chapter  9 and appendix  G discuss the processes currently being undertaken to
address the remaining problems and suggest further reform measures.
Overall assessment of reform to date
A number of important reform initiatives have transformed the structure and
operation of railways since 1991. There is greater participation by the private sector
through the privatisation of some government-owned railways and the entry of new
private operators. Both government and non-government train operators now
specialise in the delivery of rail services in particular freight and passenger markets.
In some instances, particularly on the East-West corridor, private and government
operators directly compete with each other.
                                             
5 The NSW Government (sub. DR128) strongly refuted the claims by the NSW Minerals Council
arguing that the regime, or an aspect of it, was subject to extensive public consultation on seven
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In response to these reforms, participants acknowledged that prices have fallen and
the quality of services improved.
However, some reforms have taken several years to be implemented fully and do not
appear to have been as effective as initially envisaged. As a consequence, many of
the problems raised in 1991 have yet to be fully resolved, while new issues have
arisen.
The NSW Government (sub. DR128) noted a range of transitional issues, relating in
particular to the establishment of access arrangements, harmonisation of safety
regulation, the formation of the NRC and the NSW structural reform program.
These slowed the process both in New South Wales and nationally.
The reasons for the apparent lack of progress are diverse and in part reflect
Australia’s complex system of government. Commonwealth, State, Territory and
Local Governments all influence the development and operation of railways. In
railways, perhaps the greatest influence continues to be exercised by State
Governments through their ownership of railways and policy responsibilities.
Reforms in the 1990s have transformed the structure and operations of
Australia’s railways but progress in some areas has been slow.
The following chapter examines the performance of the Australian rail industry in
the 1990s and in comparison with railways in other countries. This information
provides a context for evaluating the effectiveness of the changes since 1991 and
considering further reforms that may be implemented in future.PERFORMANCE OF
RAIL
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4 Performance of rail
The productivity of Australia’s government-owned railways has improved
significantly during the 1990s. The gap between Australian railways and
those of best practice countries is narrowing, but productivity remains
below that achieved in these countries. Some of the gap is due to factors
which inherently disadvantage Australia, such as scale of operation, but a
substantial proportion is also due to inefficiency.
Australian freight customers have benefited significantly from improved
productivity through reductions in freight rates. On the other hand, moves
to greater cost recovery mean that rail passengers have not, on average,
experienced lower prices. While employment in Australian railways has
declined, remaining workers have benefited through increased wages and
salaries. Shareholders have experienced highly variable and often negative
returns.
The inquiry’s terms of reference require the Commission to undertake a stocktake of
progress in rail reform and to report on international best practice in rail.1 Chapter 3
reviews some of the key reforms implemented across jurisdictions since 1991. This
chapter contains an assessment of performance of Australian railways and compares
overall rail system performance with that of other countries. The Commission’s
approach to undertaking this performance assessment is outlined (section 4.1),
followed by a summary of the rail productivity results (section 4.2) and performance
outcomes for rail stakeholders (section 4.3). The performance of Australia’s
railways is summarised in section 4.4.
The assessment of performance presented in this chapter is supported by a detailed
analysis of performance, contained in An Assessment of the Performance of
Australian Railways (PC forthcoming).
4.1 The Commission’s approach
An important objective of reform is to improve the performance of the rail industry
by creating an operating environment which encourages efficiency and the adoption
                                             
1 Although referred to in the inquiry’s terms of reference, intermodal comparisons were not
included in the assessment of rail performance. Significant differences between the road and rail
sectors make ‘like with like’ comparisons difficult, if not impossible, particularly in the area of
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of best practice. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the performance of the rail
industry in Australia since the Industry Commission (IC) released its report on rail
transport in 1991 (IC 1991b).
Limitations of performance assessment
There are limitations on the extent to which assessments of rail performance can be
used to make judgements about the effect of rail reform and the achievement of best
practice.
In particular, the attribution of changes in performance to specific rail reforms is
difficult. There are many factors, in addition to rail reform, affecting the
performance of railways simultaneously. These include the demand for rail services,
mix of freight traffic and passenger services, technology, managerial decision
making, input markets and competition from other transport modes. This issue is
particularly important when the number of railways in a sample is small. In many
cases, the attribution of specific reforms to changes in performance is speculative.
The degree of comparability between railways can affect how differences in
performance are interpreted, particularly in international comparisons. Railways
operating in different environments often face different constraints affecting the
level of efficiency achievable. Broader policy parameters such as labour market
regulation or competition policy, the price of inputs, population size and density, a
country’s resource base and geography, and the technical characteristics of
infrastructure and production, can all affect performance. International comparisons
are also confounded by exchange rate changes over time.
Further, the availability and quality of data limit the number of comparators used
and the depth of analysis conducted. Rail data are not uniformly collected among
railways in Australia nor among railways overseas. There exists a degree of
uniformity, but often only at a highly aggregated level. Data on the use of many
intermediate inputs to production are not widely reported or disaggregated into
urban passenger, non-urban passenger and freight services. Even where such data
are available, confidentiality concerns may prevent railways making them public.
Performance comparisons need to be treated as broadly indicative rather than
precise indicators of relative performance. The apparent links between performance
and reform should be interpreted cautiously.PERFORMANCE OF
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The framework adopted in this report
The approach taken to performance assessment in this report:
·  focuses on rail system performance rather than the performance of individual
railways; and
·  defines performance to include rail system productivity and performance
outcomes for rail stakeholders.
Several studies of performance advocate a broad approach to performance
assessment, such as that adopted here (Freebairn (1986), Salerian (1993) and Waters
(1998)).2 McKillop expressed a concern that ‘the focus of attention for performance
assessment tends to be on measuring efficiency ... of individual operators’ rather
than measuring the performance of rail systems using a broad set of performance
indicators (sub. 29, p. 1).
From a policy perspective, analysing rail system performance is more informative
about the impact of reform in Australia than concentrating on individual rail
organisations. A rail system combines both above and below track operations to
provide rail services. It may also comprise several railways, depending on the
structure and coverage of the system. The aggregation of performance across a
number of railways within a system nets out the commercial successes and failures
of individual operators, revealing the underlying performance of the system. It is the
performance of the system which government policy seeks to influence.
Until recently, all state-based rail systems within Australia consisted of one rail
entity. For this reason, state-based rail systems are referred to in this chapter as
‘railways’. The term ‘national rail system’ is used to refer to railways aggregated at
the country level.
Analysis of both productivity and performance outcomes provides a more
comprehensive picture of the impacts of reform, than productivity analysis alone.
Productivity indicators have been used to measure the efficiency of rail systems.
Price and quality indicators have been used to reflect changes in performance
outcomes for rail customers, employees and shareholders.
The performance of Australian railways is measured and compared:
·  over time;
·  relative to each other; and
                                             
2 Several other studies have been conducted on railway performance both in Australia and
overseas, for example SCNPMGTE (1998), BIE (1995b), Hensher et  al. (1995), Oum and
Yu (1995), IC (1994b), IC (1991b) and BTCE (1991).62 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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·  with rail systems in other countries.
The assessment is conducted at the railway and national system (or country) level
for the three major types of rail service: freight, urban passenger and non-urban
passenger service. However, due to a lack of data, a complete analysis of
productivity and performance outcomes was not possible for all services at both the
railway and national system level. The productivity analysis covers the freight
services of railways in Australia and North America, and freight, urban and non-
urban passenger services combined at the national system level for 22 countries. The
analysis of performance outcomes covers freight, urban and non-urban passenger
services separately, for railways in Australia and at the national system level for 22
countries.
The period of assessment is 1989-90 to 1997-98 for Australia’s government-owned
railways and 1990 up to 1998 for national rail systems in other countries. This
period follows on from the 1991 review of performance undertaken by the IC (IC
1991b). There are a number of weaknesses in this approach.
First, owing to data limitations the assessment of performance does not include
changes to the structure and ownership of government-owned railways after
1997-98. Some participants expressed concern in regard to this limitation.
FreightCorp stated:
The Productivity Commission has developed its analysis and thinking based on the rail
systems in place in 1991. At this time the country was dominated by the State-based
vertically integrated railway systems ... by 1998 the nature of the railway industry had
significantly altered. (sub. DR123, p. 7)
Second, the effect of any changes occurring within the period may not be fully
captured, given the expected time lags between policy changes and performance.
Finally, the assessment does not include private sector involvement in the rail
industry for any part of the period.
In order to capture these effects, ongoing analysis would be required as appropriate
data become available.
Performance data and comparators
Data were collected from various sources to form a single database. Data sources
include The Performance of Government Trading Enterprises 1991-92 to 1996-97
(SCNPMGTE 1998), various International Union of Railways (UIC) publications,
the Association of American Railroads and Statistics Canada, information sought
directly from government-owned Australian railways and railways overseas, and
railway annual reports. Although not all data requested from railways were availablePERFORMANCE OF
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in a consistent and ideally disaggregated form, a substantial amount of data were
finally made available and used in the assessment.
All government-owned Australian railways provided data. For most of the period of
analysis, Australian railways were made up of a single rail organisation managing
both above and below track operations to provide a combination of freight, urban
passenger and non-urban passenger services in their jurisdiction. However, changes
in structure and ownership over the period have resulted in three main exceptions.3
·  In 1993 the National Rail Corporation (NRC) commenced a progressive take-up
of interstate freight business from Australian National (AN), State Rail Authority
of New South Wales (SRA), the Public Transport Corporation (PTC),
Queensland Rail (QR) and Westrail. This transfer of freight business to NRC
caused a discontinuity in the data series of these railways between 1994-95 and
1995-96.4
·  In 1996-97 SRA was separated into four rail organisations, the Rail Access
Corporation, FreightCorp, Rail Services Authority and a new SRA. Data for
SRA include the operations of these four organisations in 1996-97 and 1997-98.
·  In 1996-97 V/Line Freight was separated from the PTC, followed by the
Victorian Rail Track Access Corporation (VicTrack) in 1997-98. Data for PTC
include the operations of these organisations in 1996-97 and 1997-98.
International data were available for major rail systems in the United States, Canada,
Japan, South Africa, New Zealand, and 16 European countries (appendix E). Some
of these rail systems are made up of more than one rail organisation. Some
organisations provide a single rail service (that is, only freight services or only
passenger services) and some manage a single rail function (that is, a below track or
above track operation). The national rail systems in this study represent the major
freight and passenger operations in each country. Data were not available for
Class II freight railways in the United States and only available at the system level
for Canada (aggregated for all Canadian Class II railways).
Table 4.1 provides a list of rail systems included in the assessment of performance.
                                             
3 Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of the structure of government-owned railways in
Australia.
4 Australian National and the National Rail Corporation (AN-NRC) have been assessed jointly in
this study as the main interstate provider of rail services over the period.64 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Table 4.1 Rail systems included in performance assessment a
Rail systems No. of rail organisations b
Australian railways
Australian National Railways Commission & National Rail Corporation (AN–NRC) c 1
Queensland Rail (QR) 1
TransAdelaide (TA) 1
Westrail (WR) 1
Victorian Public Transport Corporation (PTC) d 3
State Rail Authority of New South Wales (SRA) e 4
International rail systems comprised of one rail organisation
 Austria (Osterreichische Bundesbahnen) 1
 Belgium (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Belges) 1
 Canada (VIA Rail Canada Inc) 1
 Denmark (Danske Statsbaner) 1
 Finland (VR-Yhtyma Oy) 1
 Germany (Deutsche Bahn AG) 1
 Ireland (Iarnrod Eireann) 1
 Italy (Ferrovie dello Stato) 1
 Luxembourg (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Luxembourgeois) 1
 Netherlands (NV Nederlandse Spoorwegen) 1
 New Zealand (Tranz Rail) 1
 Norway (Norges Statsbaner BA) 1
 Spain (Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Espanoles) 1
 United States (Amtrak) 1
International rail systems comprised of more than one rail organisation
 France (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais & Reseau Ferre de France) 2
 Great Britain (British Rail & Railtrack) 2
 Portugal (Rede Ferroviaria Nacional, E.P. & Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses, E.P.) 2
 South Africa (Spoornet & South African Rail Commuter Corporation) 2
 Sweden (Statens Jarnvagar & Banverket) 2
 Switzerland (BLS Lotschbergbahn AG & Schweizerische Bundesbahnen) 2
 Japan (JR Passenger Services & JR Freight) 7
 United States (Class I freight) 9
 Canada (Class I, II, III freight) 36
a  The Australian railways included were all government-owned during the period of analysis; private railways
were not included. International rail systems represent the major freight and passenger railways in each
country. b  The number of rail organisations (below and above track) which comprised the system at the end
of the sample period: 1997-98 for Australia and 1997 for international systems (except for Britain and
Denmark for which data were only available until 1994 and 1995 respectively, and New Zealand and South
Africa where data were available until 1998). c  AN provided Tasmania and South Australia with intrastate
freight rail services until November 1997. The NRC was established in 1991 to take over interstate freight
business from AN, SRA, PTC, QR and Westrail. By 1997-98 all remaining AN operations had been privatised.
Chapter 3 contains a detailed description of the structure of government-owned rail systems in Australia. d  In
1996-97 V/Line Freight was separated from the PTC followed by VicTrack the following year. e  Until  July
1997, all rail passenger and freight services were provided by the vertically integrated SRA, after which time
SRA was separated into the Rail Access Corporation, FreightCorp, Rail Services Authority and a new SRA.




Productivity refers to the relationship between inputs and outputs. Productivity
growth implies an increase in the ratio of outputs relative to inputs. This assessment
adopts a total factor productivity (TFP) approach to measuring rail system
productivity.5
There are any number of potential partial measures of productivity which compare a
single input with a single output. They can be used to shed light on the possible
sources of total productivity changes, revealing the extent to which the use of
particular inputs might be driving productivity changes. However, partial
productivity measures can be misleading about overall performance and a more
comprehensive measure of productivity has been used for this analysis.
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) measures TFP by comparing the ratio of
aggregate outputs with aggregated inputs. It enables each railway to be ranked in
terms of its productivity performance relative to the best performing railway(s). The
change in productivity levels over time can also be measured using this technique.
Differences in productivity are driven by many factors apart from differences in
technical efficiency. Other factors generally relate to differing characteristics of
individual rail systems. Of particular significance are differences in the scale of rail
operations, both within Australia and overseas. Measurement inconsistencies may
also influence ‘measured’ productivity, particularly if the quality or capacity of
inputs used by individual rail systems varies. Box 4.1 provides a brief description of
how factors affecting productivity, unrelated to technical efficiency, have been
controlled for in this study.
The productivity analysis has been conducted at two levels:
·  comparing government-owned railways in Australia with each other and with
selected railways in the United States and Canada, in providing freight services;
and
·  comparing national rail systems — that is, Australia’s rail system with rail
systems in the United States, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa and
16 European countries, in providing freight and passenger services combined.6
                                             
5 Productivity, as measured by TFP, is a measure of gross or overall productivity, capturing all
sources of productivity.
6 ‘Passenger services’ includes all major urban and non-urban passenger services provided in these
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Box 4.1 Explaining differences in productivity
DEA is used to measure the productivity of railways. Productivity captures all sources
of productivity, including those arising from the scale of a rail operation, factors related
to various other railway characteristics and the technical efficiency of a railway. DEA
also captures any measurement inconsistencies which may occur, particularly if the
quality or capacity of inputs used by railways varies.
Technical efficiency
Technical efficiency refers to the ability of railway management to produce outputs with
a given set of inputs. In practical terms technical efficiency is calculated by accounting,
where possible, for all factors affecting productivity. To the extent that all factors are
not accounted for, technical efficiency may be biased.
The scale of rail operations
‘Scale’ refers to the size of a railway’s output and is a factor which is largely out of the
control of railway management. Rail operations of a larger scale may have high
productivity because of scale economies. It may not be technically possible for smaller
scale operations to attain the same levels of productivity as larger railways. DEA can
be used to determine the contribution of scale and technical efficiency to productivity.
Using DEA, productivity is assumed to be a product of scale efficiency and technical
efficiency only.
Other railway characteristics
Traffic density, average length of haul and locomotive load are three factors which
may also contribute to differences in productivity. Greater traffic density indicates that
a railway can transport a greater volume of output on a given length of track. Longer
haul length indicates that a railway can transport a greater volume of output per train
operation. A greater locomotive load indicates that a railway can transport a greater
load of output per locomotive. These factors, like scale, are also sources of economies
in the production of rail services and are to a large extent out of the control of railway
management. Statistical analysis is used to estimate the contribution of these factors
to productivity.
Locomotive power differences
Railways which use different inputs — such as locomotives of different power levels —
may be advantaged or disadvantaged in terms of their measured productivity. The
power of individual locomotives varies across railways, particularly between Australian
and US railways (which tend to adopt higher powered locomotives earlier than
government-owned railways in Australia). An adjustment for differences in locomotive
power was made to the input data for Australian, US and Canadian railways, for the
purpose of freight productivity comparisons.
Source: PC forthcoming.PERFORMANCE OF
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Several sets of productivity results were generated using a number of different
models (box 4.2). Overall, the results indicate that relative productivity levels tend
to vary according to the model used. Productivity growth rates are more robust,
varying less between the different models.
Box 4.2 Models used in the productivity analysis
Five models were used to compare the productivity of Australian and North American
railways in providing freight services. Two models were used to compare the
productivity of Australia’s and 21 other countries’ national rail systems in providing
freight and passenger services combined:
·  model A compares the productivity of Australian, US and Canadian railways in
providing freight services, using DEA;
·  model B identifies the contribution of scale to the productivity levels of Australian,
US and Canadian railways in providing freight services, using DEA (by accounting
for differences in output size in model A);
·  model C estimates the contribution of other railway characteristics to the
productivity levels of Australian, US and Canadian railways in providing freight
services, using statistical analysis (by accounting for differences in traffic density,
haul length and locomotive load in model A);
·  model D standardises model A for locomotive power differences and then compares
the productivity of Australian, US and Canadian railways in providing freight
services, using DEA;
·  model E standardises model B for locomotive power differences and then compares
the scale adjusted productivity of Australian, US and Canadian railways in providing
freight services, using DEA;
·  model F compares the productivity of Australia’s and 21 other countries’ national
systems in providing freight and passenger services combined, using DEA; and
·  model G identifies the contribution of scale to the productivity levels of Australia’s
and 21 other countries’ national systems in providing freight and passenger
services combined, using DEA.
Source: PC forthcoming.
4.2 Productivity performance since 1990
Railway comparisons for freight services
The productivity of government-owned Australian railways in providing freight
services is compared with that of a sample of North American railways. Table 4.2
shows levels of productivity, productivity adjusted for scale, productivity adjusted68 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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for differences in operating environments and productivity adjusted for locomotive
power differences. Table 4.3 shows the corresponding growth rates for each set of
productivity levels, from 1989-90 to 1997-98, for Australian railways and from
1990 to 1997 for North American railways.
Productivity levels
Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) and Canadian
National (CN) achieved best practice productivity levels. North American railways
had an average productivity level of 84 per cent of best practice, ranging from best
practice itself (achieved by BNSF and CN) to 48 per cent of best practice (achieved
by Grand Trunk Western Inc (GTW)). Australian railways had an average
productivity level of 47 per cent of best practice, ranging from 63 per cent of best
practice for AN-NRC to 22 per cent of best practice for PTC.
Technical efficiency — accounting for differences in scale
After accounting for the effect of scale, the technical efficiency of railways was
significantly different from productivity, with all railways in the sample moving
closer to best practice.
PTC, Westrail, GTW, BNSF and CN all achieved best practice levels of technical
efficiency.7 North American railways had an average level of technical efficiency of
89 per cent of best practice (compared to 84 per cent for productivity). Australian
railways had an average technical efficiency level of 70 per cent of best practice
(compared to 47 per cent for productivity). Their efficiency levels ranged from best
practice for PTC and Westrail to 50 per cent of best practice for QR.
                                             
7 Railways which achieved best practice technical efficiency, but which did not achieve best
practice productivity, may have done so because of a lack of similar sized railways in the sample.
That is, they achieved ‘best practice’ using DEA because they were being compared to
themselves (PC forthcoming).PERFORMANCE OF
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Table 4.2 Estimates of productivity levels for freight services in Australia,
the United States and Canada



















AN-NRC 0.63 0.99 0.81 0.63 0.99
Westrail 0.56 1.00 0.77 0.65 1.00
QR 0.43 0.50 0.61 0.52 0.58
SRA 0.35 0.57 0.70 0.35 0.57
PTC 0.22 1.00 0.53 0.29 1.00
Averagea 0.47 0.70 0.69 0.52 0.73
North America (1997)b
BNSF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CN 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
UP 0.88 0.99 0.90 0.88 0.99
CP 0.83 0.85 0.83 0.73 0.74
ICR 0.80 0.96 0.88 0.83 0.96
KCS 0.77 0.94 1.00 0.77 0.94
SOO 0.70 0.87 0.78 0.77 0.90
NSC 0.67 0.68 0.73 0.62 0.63
CSX 0.65 0.66 0.72 0.62 0.62
Canadian Class II & III 0.62 0.72 0.73 na na
CR 0.54 0.55 0.69 0.54 0.56
GTW 0.48 1.00 0.69 0.60 1.00
Averagea 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.83 0.88
a  Weighted by ntkm. b  The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF), Canadian National
Railway (CN), Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP), Canadian Pacific Railway Company (CP), Illinois
Central Railroad Company (ICR), Kansas City Southern Corporation (KCS), Soo Line Railroad Company
(SOO), Norfolk Southern Corporation (NSC), CSX Transportation (CSX), Consolidated Rail Corporation (CR),
Grand Trunk Western Inc (GTW). na Not available.
Data source: PC forthcoming.
Technical efficiency — accounting for other differences in railway characteristics
After accounting for other differences in railway characteristics the technical
efficiency of railways was significantly different from productivity, with all railways
in the sample being closer to best practice (compared to model A).
BNSF, CN and Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCS) all achieved best
practice levels of technical efficiency. North American railways had an average
level of technical efficiency of 88 per cent of best practice (compared to 84 per cent
for productivity). Australian railways had an average technical efficiency level of70 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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69  per  cent of best practice (compared to 47  per  cent for productivity). Their
efficiency levels ranged from 81  per  cent of best practice for AN-NRC to
53 per cent of best practice for PTC.
Adjusting for locomotive power differences
After accounting for differences in locomotive power, on average, productivity
levels and technical efficiency levels for Australian railways were higher than
unadjusted levels (52  per  cent compared to 47  per  cent for productivity, and
73 per cent compared to 70 per cent for technical efficiency).
The ranking of Australian railways by their productivity and technical efficiency
levels did not alter substantially. For productivity, Westrail went from second to first
place and AN-NRC from first to second place. For technical efficiency, QR went
from fifth to fourth place and SRA from fourth to fifth place.
On average, for the North American railways, adjusted productivity and technical
efficiency levels were largely unchanged because of the dominance of best practice
railways (which remained the same before and after the adjustment).
Productivity growth rates
Table 4.3 indicates that productivity growth rates were substantially higher for
Australian railways on average, than for North American railways (8  per  cent
compared to 4 per cent). This was also the case for technical efficiency growth rates
and locomotive power adjusted productivity growth rates (compared with US
railways).
Productivity growth rates for North American railways ranged from a high of
12 per cent per year for GTW to a low of 2 per cent for Soo Line Railroad Company
(SOO). Those for Australian railways ranged from a high of 12 per cent per year for
AN-NRC to a low of 4 per cent for PTC and SRA.
A number of participants argued that inter-jurisdictional comparisons could be
distorted by changes in the mix of freight carried by Australian railways. In
particular, NRC (sub. DR117) and FreightCorp (sub. DR123) referred to the transfer




Table 4.3 Estimates of productivity growth rates for freight services in
Australia, the United States and Canada, 1990 to 1997a



















AN-NRC 11.9 11.2 5.5 4.8 5.7
Westrail 11.6 8.9 5.0 9.0 6.7
QR 6.1 5.5 2.5 4.7 4.4
SRAb 4.3 4.8 3.0 0.1 3.4
PTCb 4.4 9.5 3.3 2.4 8.0
Averagec 8.2 7.6 3.7 4.8 5.4
North America
BNSF 2.5 2.5 2.5 1.8 1.8
CN 7.3 7.1 4.3 5.2 5.1
UP 6.7 8.5 3.6 6.1 7.8
CP 3.4 3.4 -0.3 na na
ICR 4.8 4.0 0.1 4.5 4.0
KCS 4.0 0.3 3.6 3.9 0.3
SOO 1.8 2.8 0.2 1.0 1.7
NSC 3.1 3.1 1.1 1.3 1.4
CSX 3.3 3.4 1.2 1.9 1.9
Canadian Class II & III 2.6 1.9 1.3 na na
CR 4.3 4.2 1.3 2.4 2.5
GTW 12.1 3.1 5.8 10.6 3.1
Averagec 4.4 4.8 2.5 3.4 3.9
a  Growth rates are calculated on an average annual basis. The period for Australian railways is 1989-90 to
1997-98 and the period for North American railways is 1990 to 1997. b   A discontinuity in the series of
productivity levels occurring between 1994-95 and 1995-96 has lowered the productivity growth rate for SRA
and PTC over the period, by shifting a significant part of these railways’ long haul general freight. Under
Model A the average growth rate for SRA was 7.5 per cent from 1989-90 to 1994-95 and 17.7 per cent from
1995-96 to 1997-98 (an average of 11.7 per cent for the two periods). Under Model A the average growth rate
for PTC was 16.8 per cent from 1989-90 to 1994-95 and 14.3 per cent from 1995-96 to 1997-98 (an average
of 15.8 per cent for the two periods). The growth rates of the other models are affected in a similar way.
c  Weighted by ntkm. na Not available.
Data source: PC forthcoming.
Potentially, interstate freight is a more productive business than intrastate freight
because of the often longer average haul lengths. It would be expected that such
transfers (and subsequent discontinuity in the data series) would significantly reduce
productivity growth rates for PTC and SRA.
In order to adjust for this discontinuity, growth rates for SRA and PTC were
assessed separately for the periods before and after the transfer occurred. An72 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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average of the growth rates in each of these periods is a better measure of
productivity growth over the entire period (around 12  per  cent for SRA and
16 per cent for PTC). The discontinuity affects technical efficiency growth rates in
the same way.
National rail system comparisons for freight and passenger services
The productivity of Australia’s national government-owned system in providing
both freight and passenger services is compared with that of a sample of national
rail systems in other countries. Table 4.4 shows levels of productivity and technical
efficiency for 22 national rail systems. It also shows the corresponding growth rates
for productivity levels and technical efficiency levels, from 1989-90 to 1997-98, for
Australia’s national rail system and from 1990 up to 1998 for other countries.
Productivity levels
Australia’s government-owned railways assessed at the national system level (for
passenger and freight combined) achieved a productivity level 64 per cent of that
achieved in the United States, Japan and Canada — the three highest productivity
performers in 1997. Other countries in the sample had productivity levels ranging
between 52  per  cent (the Netherlands) and 18  per  cent (New  Zealand) of best
practice levels.
Technical efficiency — accounting for differences in scale
The level of technical efficiency achieved in Australia was 69  per  cent of best
practice (compared to 64 per cent for productivity). The United States, Canada and
Japan — all of which achieved the highest productivity levels — also achieved the
highest levels of technical efficiency.
However, the levels of technical efficiency for some countries were substantially
higher than their productivity levels. In particular, Ireland and Luxembourg
achieved best practice levels of technical efficiency (compared to 41 per cent and
20 per cent for productivity respectively).
Productivity growth rates
Australia had the highest average rate of productivity growth over the period
(8 per cent per year). This was 51 per cent higher than the next highest growth ratePERFORMANCE OF
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(achieved in Canada).8 Growth rates achieved for other countries ranged between
minus 5 per cent for Portugal to 5 per cent for Norway and South Africa.
Australia’s technical efficiency growth rate was only marginally lower than its
productivity growth rate over the period (both around 8 per cent per year). For some
countries technical efficiency growth rates were substantially higher than
productivity growth rates. For example, Norway achieved technical efficiency
growth of 8 per cent, compared to under 5 per cent for productivity.
Table 4.4 Estimates of productivity levels and growth rates for freight and











United States (97) 1.00 1.00 2.0 1.8
Japan (97) 1.00 1.00 0.8 0.8
Canada (97) 0.98 1.00 5.5 5.5
Australia (98) 0.64 0.69 8.3 7.9
Netherlands (97) 0.52 0.68 1.4 3.6
Ireland (97) 0.41 1.00 1.0 0.5
South Africa (98) 0.39 0.42 4.5 4.7
Sweden (97) 0.38 0.47 1.7 2.9
France (97) 0.38 0.39 -0.4 -0.5
Spain (97) 0.38 0.43 -0.5 0.7
Finland (97) 0.35 0.45 0.2 1.1
Great Britain (94) 0.34 0.43 7.1 12.9
Portugal (97) 0.33 0.63 -4.5 1.6
Italy (97) 0.32 0.33 0.3 0.6
Switzerland (97) 0.32 0.38 3.1 3.7
Germany (97) 0.31 0.32 3.5 3.5
Norway  (97) 0.31 0.74 4.5 7.6
Denmark(95) 0.28 0.60 -1.4 3.4
Austria (97) 0.25 0.27 1.2 1.3
Belgium (97) 0.20 0.24 0.6 1.3
Luxembourg (97) 0.20 1.00 1.5 0.0
New Zealand (98) 0.18 0.73 3.9 3.6
a  Growth rates are calculated on an average annual basis. The period for the Australian national system is
1989-90 to 1997-98. The period for all other national systems is 1990 to the calendar year indicated.
Data source:  PC forthcoming.
                                             
8 The growth rate for Great Britain (7.1 per cent), relating only to the 1990 to 1994 period, was
higher than for Canada (5.5 per cent).74 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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4.3 Stakeholder outcomes since 1990
Although improvements in productivity are important, the outcomes for
stakeholders are equally important in assessing overall performance. There are three
main groups of stakeholders:
·  consumers — users of freight, urban passenger and non-urban passenger
services;
·  shareholders — government and private owners of railways; and
·  labour — people employed in the rail industry.
Outcomes for stakeholders are determined by the prices and quality of rail inputs
and outputs. Consumers are affected by the prices and quality of rail services,
shareholders are affected by the returns earned from rail services and labour is
affected by the wages and salaries paid for employment in the rail industry.
Improvement or deterioration in rail productivity is likely to alter these outcomes.
An increase in productivity could be appropriated by shareholders in the form of
higher dividends, or it could be distributed to consumers in the form of lower prices,
or to labour in the form of wage increases.
Equally, these outcomes can alter without a change in productivity, amounting to a
redistribution between stakeholders — where changes in prices for one group are
directly offset by changes in prices for another group. For instance, dividends to
shareholders can be increased by raising the prices of rail services or reducing
wages to labour.
Consumers
Consumers of rail services are directly affected by the price and quality of rail
services. Consumers benefit when prices fall and/or quality improves. Consumers of
other goods and services are also affected to the extent that prices and quality of rail
freight services are reflected in their final prices.
Freight rates
Freight rates are influenced by many factors which may vary substantially across
countries.9 Not all of these factors are related to railway efficiency and some are
                                             
9 Freight rates are measured as the average selling price of freight services — total freight revenue
divided by ntkm. All rates have been converted into Australian dollars and deflated by the
Australian Consumer Price Index (CPI).PERFORMANCE OF
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non-controllable, at least from the perspective of railway operators. Factors of
particular relevance to freight rates include the size of the freight market, average
haul length, mix of freight traffic10, axle loads and locomotive power.
Australian freight rates
Real national freight rates have declined by 18  per  cent over the period (from
5.4 cents per net tonne-kilometre (ntkm) in 1990 to 4.4 cents in 1997) (table 4.5).11
Freight rate declines occurred in all jurisdictions, although the rate of decline varied
over time and across jurisdictions (figure 4.1).























a  Real freight rates were constructed using total revenue from freight divided by total ntkm in each year and
deflated by the national Consumer Price Index (CPI). b AN provided intrastate rail services for Tasmania and
South Australia until November 1997. c The steep rise in freight rates for SRA, PTC and Westrail in the
middle of the period coincided with the transfer of their interstate freight to NRC. This shifted the composition
of freight carried by SRA, PTC and Westrail to relatively higher priced commodities.
Data source: PC forthcoming.
                                             
10 Movements in freight rates measured as average selling prices do not necessarily indicate an
actual change in the schedule of rates charged to freight customers. A change in the composition
of freight over the period may alter the average selling price.
11 The Australian real freight rate declined further to 3.8 cents in 1997-98, for a total decline of
30 per cent over the period 1989-90 to 1997-98. Due to a lack of international data, the period
for international comparisons ends at 1997.76 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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In addition to the factors listed above, the level of competition is likely to be an
important factor affecting freight rates. Reform in the rail industry has increased, to
varying degrees across jurisdictions, the level of competition both within rail and
between rail and other modes of transport.
International freight rates
Freight rates varied considerably across countries and within countries over time. In
1997 Australia had the fifth lowest freight rate (4.4  cents per ntkm) across
22 countries. Luxembourg had the highest freight rate (20.3 cents per ntkm) and
Canada had the lowest (2.1 cents per ntkm) (table 4.5).
Table 4.5 Real international freight rates (A$ cents per net tonne-
kilometre)a, 1990 to 1997
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Growth rate (%)b
Australia 5.4 5.3 5.1 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.7 4.4 -18.0
United States 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.3 -25.9
Canada 3.2 3.0 2.9 2.9 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1 -32.7
Japan na 7.8 8.3 9.8 10.8 10.7 8.8 7.4 -4.4
New Zealand 13.2 12.2 11.2 11.5 11.5 11.8 11.5 10.2 -22.6
South Africa 2.5 2.9 3.2 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.4 -4.3
Austria 12.5 13.4 14.5 12.2 10.8 10.8 10.2 8.5 -32.0
Belgium 8.2 8.5 8.4 9.5 8.3 9.3 8.3 7.3 -10.2
Denmark 14.8 14.5 14.0 16.9 13.3 14.4 15.1 17.4 17.9
Finland 10.2 10.3 8.5 7.0 6.1 na na 5.4 -47.0
France 9.4 9.6 9.4 10.6 9.3 9.0 8.3 7.0 -25.7
Germany 7.1 12.5 11.5 12.2 10.7 10.8 9.6 7.5 6.8
Great Britain 12.4 13.6 12.1 11.9 10.4 9.0 na na -27.9
Ireland 8.4 8.1 7.9 8.0 8.7 7.8 7.4 na -12.0
Italy 10.5 9.9 8.3 8.7 7.0 6.5 5.9 5.3 -49.4
Luxembourg na na na na 23.6 25.3 22.2 20.3 -13.7
Netherlands 7.2 7.4 8.1 8.9 8.0 9.7 8.2 6.4 -9.9
Norway 11.2 10.9 11.6 8.8 9.5 10.7 na 8.4 -24.6
Portugal 4.4 5.1 5.5 5.8 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.4 0.0
Spain 7.3 7.9 8.3 8.3 6.2 5.9 5.3 4.5 -38.8
Sweden 5.3 5.3 4.9 4.7 5.1 4.6 3.8 3.3 -37.6
Switzerland 15.3 16.7 16.5 17.6 15.3 13.9 13.4 10.8 -29.5
a  Freight rates are measured as the average selling price of rail services. In order to compare price levels
between countries, all overseas rates have been converted into Australian dollars and then deflated by the
Australian CPI. Therefore some of the change in rates may be due to exchange rate fluctuations. b  Total
percentage change in freight rates over the period. na Not available.
Source: PC forthcoming.PERFORMANCE OF
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Productivity differences across countries only partially explain the differences in
freight rates. Differences in freight mix and length of haul are also likely to be an
important factor. Unlike most European countries, Australia’s freight is dominated
by bulk commodities and long haul freight which would tend to decrease the
average freight rate. For this reason, Australian freight rates are more appropriately
compared to countries with similar freight characteristics. Australia’s freight rate
was around double that of Canada, the United States and South Africa.
In growth rate terms, most countries experienced a steady decline in freight rates
over the period. Growth rates ranged from minus 49 per cent for Italy to 7 per cent
for Germany. The decline in Australia’s freight rate was relatively small at
18 per cent.
Government policy changes and the resulting effect on the level of competition in
many countries partially explains the general decline in freight rates internationally.
An important objective of government policy in many countries over the last decade
has been to improve the efficiency of their rail systems (appendix E). The greater
the degree of competition within rail and between rail and other modes of transport,
the greater the incentive for railway managers to reduce their costs and rates.
The US rail freight industry has undergone substantial deregulation since the
enactment of the Staggers Rail Act 1980. Among its many provisions, the Act
allowed rationalisation to occur, which intensified competition in the industry.
Several mergers have occurred since 1992, reducing the number of Class I railways
from 15 in 1989, to nine in 1997. In addition, competition from road transport has
increased, resulting in a declining share of the freight market for rail.
The Canadian rail freight industry has undergone substantial reform since the
enactment of the National Transportation Act 1987. The Act aimed to remove
transport market distortions in an effort to introduce greater competition. In recent
years Canadian railways have been streamlining their operations, resulting in the
privatisation of CN and the rationalisation of uneconomic services  (appendix  E).
Competition between rail and road has intensified as each competes for a greater
share of the north-south market resulting from free trade agreements in the
region (Statistics Canada 1994b).
Passenger rates
Passenger rates are influenced by many factors which may vary substantially across
countries. Not all of these factors are related to passenger rail system efficiency and,
as with freight rates, some are non-controllable from the perspective of rail system78 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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managers. Factors of particular relevance to passenger rates include the level of
government subsidy, size of the passenger market and mix of passenger services.12
Australian passenger rates
Real national urban passenger rates increased by 9 per cent towards the middle of
the period and then fell, to settle 10 per cent lower (from 9.2 cents per passenger-
kilometre in 1989-90 to 10 cents in 1992-93 and down to 8.6 cents in 1996-97).13
Urban passenger rates increased in some jurisdictions and declined in others
(figure 4.2).































a  Real urban passenger rates were constructed using farebox revenue from urban passengers divided by
total urban passenger-km in each year and deflated by the national CPI. b Urban passenger-km data could
not be provided by Westrail. Passenger-km were estimated by extrapolating numbers based on boarding
statistics in Westrail’s annual reports. Data were only available for Westrail from 1992-93. c Data  for
TransAdelaide were only available from 1991-92 to 1994-95.
Data source: PC forthcoming.
                                             
12 Movements in passenger rates measured as average selling prices do not necessarily indicate an
actual change in the schedule of rates charged to customers. A change in the composition of the
type of passenger service provided over the period will alter the average selling price.
13 The Australian urban passenger rate declined further to 8.2 cents in 1997-98, for a total decline
of 10.9 per cent over the period 1989-90 to 1997-98. Due to a lack of international data, the
period for international comparisons ends at 1997.PERFORMANCE OF
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In contrast with freight rates, government policy, rather than competition, is the
dominant factor affecting urban passenger rates. The general trend of increased
urban passenger rates towards the middle of the period may reflect moves by State
Governments to introduce more commercial pricing policies to ensure greater cost
recovery. In 1993-94 the Victorian Government approved a general fare increase of
10  per  cent and the Queensland Government allowed a fare increase and the
removal of half price weekend fares. The 1996 Independent Pricing and Regulatory
Tribunal review of the pricing of urban passenger transport services for New South
Wales was also followed by an increase in some fares.
Real national non-urban passenger rates increased by 21 per cent over the period
(from 10.2 cents per passenger-km in 1989-90 to 12.4 cents in 1996-97). Only non-
urban passengers in Western Australia and Victoria experienced a decline in rates
(figure 4.3).































a  Real non-urban passenger rates were constructed using total revenue from non-urban passengers divided
by total non-urban passenger-km in each year and deflated by the national CPI. b  NRC did not provide
passenger services. c The sharp decline in AN’s rates in 1994-95 was the result of a disruption to its Indian
Pacific service for six weeks due to flooding on the Nullarbor Plain, causing a downturn in passenger service
revenue. d The sharp increase in QR’s rates in 1992-93 was due to strong growth in Queensland’s tourist
industry and the subsequent expansion of its tourist services. e    For Westrail non-urban rail passenger
revenue could only be provided from 1993-94. From 1989-90 to 1992-93, non-urban rail passenger revenue
was estimated by taking the proportion of rail passenger-km to total passenger-km (including buses) and
applying the same factor to total revenue. f  From 1994-95, non-urban passenger-km for PTC were estimated
using boarding statistics. g  Data for SRA and AN were not available for 1997-98.
Data source: PC forthcoming.80 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Competition from other modes has been more relevant in determining non-urban
passenger rates than urban passenger rates. Deregulation of the interstate airline and
road coach industries over the period led to intense price cutting and competition for
regular travel patronage in these industries. In response, most non-urban passenger
rail systems have invested heavily in improving the quality of existing regular
services and in the creation of new services aimed at the tourist market, rather than
cut prices. As a result, towards the end of the period, SRA, QR and AN managed to
reverse the initial loss of revenue resulting from the loss of patronage to road and air
transport.
International passenger rates
Passenger rates varied greatly across and within countries over time (table 4.6).
In 1997 urban passenger rates for Australia were 8.6 cents per passenger-kilometre,
compared to a low of 2  cents for South Africa and a high of 17.2  cents for
New  Zealand. Urban passenger rates increased dramatically (by 43  per  cent) in
South Africa over the period.
In 1997 non-urban passenger rates were 12.4  cents per passenger-kilometre for
Australia, compared to a low of 3.6 cents for South Africa and a high of 18.8  cents
for Japan. Non-urban rates increased by 21 per cent for Australia and 11 per cent for
New Zealand but declined by 25 per cent for South Africa.
A separate analysis of urban and non-urban passengers was not possible for all the
countries in the sample. For the European countries, passenger rates in 1997 (urban
and non-urban) ranged from a low of 4 cents per passenger-kilometre for Portugal to
a high of 21.6  cents for Germany. Growth in passenger rates ranged from
minus 53 per cent for Italy to 60 per cent for Germany over the period examined.PERFORMANCE OF
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Table 4.6 Real international passenger rates (A$ cents per passenger-
kilometre)a, 1990 to 1997
Country 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Growth rate(%)b
Urban passenger rates
Australia 9.2 9.7 9.8 10.0 9.9 9.2 8.9 8.6 -10.4
Japanc na na 12.3 14.7 16.1 16.5 14.0 12.0 -2.4
New Zealandd na na na na 15.7 17.9 17.3 17.2 9.7
South Africa 1.4 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 42.7
Non-urban passenger rates
Australia 10.2 10.4 11.8 12.0 12.8 12.1 12.8 12.4 21.4
United States 15.1 14.1 14.1 15.4 15.0 14.5 15.7 15.9 5.5
Canada 13.9 13.1 13.2 14.7 14.1 12.1 11.4 11.7 -15.4
Japanc na na 19.2 22.9 25.2 25.7 21.8 18.8 -2.4
New Zealandd na na na na 10.3 11.2 11.3 11.4 10.6
South Africa 4.8 6.0 6.4 6.3 4.1 4.8 4.7 3.6 -24.7
All passenger services
Japan na 16.4 17.2 20.5 22.7 23.2 19.9 17.2 4.3
Austria 11.5 12.5 12.0 8.7 8.3 8.3 7.8 9.9 -14.5
Belgium 7.6 8.7 8.9 10.7 9.7 10.4 10.3 9.3 21.7
Denmark 10.7 11.9 12.8 14.2 na 13.5 13.1 15.5 44.9
Finland 14.8 16.4 15.7 13.9 12.3 na na 10.3 -30.4
France 12.2 13.3 10.7 12.8 11.3 11.9 11.6 10.6 -13.1
Germany 13.5 21.3 15.7 18.9 23.8 24.9 23.7 21.6 60.1
Great Britain 15.8 18.5 17.9 18.9 17.8 18.2 na na 14.7
Ireland 22.9 23.2 24.7 26.8 23.4 24.7 23.0 na 0.4
Italy 12.1 12.8 10.8 12.5 10.9 10.6 10.3 5.7 -52.9
Luxembourg na na na na 13.7 15.5 15.1 na 9.7
Netherlands 10.0 8.4 8.7 10.4 10.8 12.8 12.3 11.1 11.1
Norway 15.2 16.0 15.9 17.6 15.7 16.4 na 15.1 -0.3
Portugal 3.2 3.9 4.1 4.6 3.9 4.2 4.3 4.0 24.1
Spain 10.2 11.5 8.7 8.7 7.2 7.5 7.4 6.5 -35.7
Sweden 20.3 21.1 22.4 19.1 17.6 17.0 16.5 14.7 -27.6
Switzerland 12.5 13.1 13.4 15.8 15.6 14.9 14.5 12.2 -2.8
a  Real passenger rates are measured as the average selling price of rail services. In order to compare price
levels between countries, all overseas rates have been converted into Australian dollars and then deflated by
the Australian CPI. Therefore, some of the change in prices may be due to exchange rate fluctuations. b Total
percentage change in passenger rates over the period. c  The urban and non-urban passenger rates for
Japan are for the East Japan Railway Company. d The passenger-km data required to calculate rates were
only available for New Zealand from 1996. Data for 1994 and 1995 were estimated using boarding statistics.
na Not available.
Source: PC forthcoming.
Quality of freight services
The quality of rail freight services can be examined through a variety of82 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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indicators.14 On time running is one measure of the punctuality of services. It
measures the proportion of trips which arrive within a given time of the scheduled
arrival time.
Participants expressed reservations about using on time running as a measure of
freight service quality (box  4.3). In particular, some would prefer to use freight
availability, which measures the percentage of occasions when customers receive
delivery of their freight at the time they were promised by the rail operator.
Box 4.3 Problems with on time running as a measure of service quality
For freight services, on time running measures the proportion of trains which arrive
within thirty minutes of the scheduled arrival time. Some of the perceived deficiencies
of this indicator are:
·  it is not equally important for all freight traffics. Westrail noted:
We accept in intermodal (and particularly interstate) freight that it is critical that freight is
delivered on time but it is not the most important and best measure especially in bulk traffics.
(sub. DR107, p. 3)
… to most of our bulk customers on-time running is somewhat of an irrelevancy and our
principal measure for them is tons delivered as against programmed tons. (trans., p. 747)
·  it is more important for ‘internal management control’ than as a measure of
customer service. As NRC noted:
The arrival time of trains can vary substantially from these [scheduled] times, eg when freight
is promised to be available at 6 am, and owing to timepath allocations a train is due to arrive
in the terminal at 3 am. If the train arrives late at, say, 4.30 am, this will not normally affect
on-time availability of the freight on the train. (sub. DR117, p. 11)
·  expected arrival times can be adjusted to allow for (deteriorating) track conditions,
thus improving on time running although service may be deteriorating. According to
the Australian Rail Track Corporation:
… it is a practice in some railways to declare long standing temporary speed restrictions as
permanent and incorporate resultant delays into the train timetable … result[ing] in trains
meeting a timetable more regularly … A comparison of service quality considering on-time
arrival (or availability) should be accompanied by … trends in transit times. (sub. DR97, p. 7)
Source: sub. DR97; sub. DR107; sub. DR117.
On time and availability statistics can provide different indications of service quality
(BTCE 1997a). Unfortunately, availability statistics are not consistently reported by
railways. While recognising the limitations of on time running as an indicator of
                                             
14 BTCE (1997a) found that the service characteristics most highly valued by freight forwarders
were punctuality of trains, care of cargo and containers, rail terminal efficiency, wagon capacity
availability and staff quality.PERFORMANCE OF
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quality, it is used to give some indication of the comparative reliability of freight
services across jurisdictions.15
On time running of freight services is influenced by a number of factors, including
average haul length, mix of freight traffic, track quality, track work and
maintenance, traffic congestion and availability of rollingstock.
All jurisdictions, apart from Victoria, experienced on time running rates below
90 per cent in 1997-98. However, freight customers in both New South Wales and
Queensland experienced significant improvements over the period, although they
started from a relatively low base and remained well below Victoria. Western
Australian customers have experienced a decline in on time running, while
Victorian and AN-NRC customers have experienced fluctuating service over the
period (figure 4.4).






















a  On time running for freight services measures the proportion of trips arriving within thirty minutes of the
scheduled arrival time.   b   Data were only available for QR from 1993-94. QR’s service in 1994-95 was
affected by the Mainline Upgrade Project which began in 1993. This involved major track and bridge
upgrading works which created short term service disruptions.  c  Data were only available for Westrail from
1991-92 to 1993-94 and 1996-97. d  On time running for AN-NRC relates only to AN between 1989-90 and
1992-93. From 1993-94, AN-NRC on time running is a weighted average of AN and NRC measures (weighted
by the share of ntkm). e  Data for AN-NRC were not available for 1997-98.
Data source: PC forthcoming.
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The generally higher on time running for PTC may partly reflect the shorter freight
trips in Victoria. Shorter trips may make it easier to reach a destination within a
scheduled time although, as noted by the Australian Rail Track Corporation, ‘a late
train also has less opportunity to recover over a short journey’ (sub. DR97, p. 7).
Quality of passenger services
As with freight services, there are a number of indicators of the quality of passenger
services, in addition to on time running. Among these indicators are the number of
services run, the proportion of services which are cancelled and the capacity of
services. On time running is the indicator reported most consistently by railways.
The factors which influence passenger on time running rates are similar to some of
those which affect freight on time running, including track quality and traffic
congestion.
In all jurisdictions, there has been a slight improvement in the on time running
performance of urban passenger trains during the period examined (figure  4.5).
Urban passengers in Victoria and Western Australia have consistently experienced
the most timely urban passenger services, with on time rates above 90 per cent.






















a On time running for urban passenger services measures the proportion of trips arriving within three minutes
of the scheduled arrival time. b  Data were only available for QR from 1991-92. TransAdelaide data were not
available.  c  On time running for QR in 1994-95 was affected by network track upgrading and lower
rollingstock availability due to the extension of rail services to the Gold Coast.
Data source: PC forthcoming.PERFORMANCE OF
RAIL
85
Non-urban passenger on time running rates are presented in PC (forthcoming).
Shareholders
Shareholders are generally interested in the financial returns generated by their
investments. Where Governments are shareholders, returns of a purely financial
nature may not be the only consideration, as social and environmental objectives are
also likely to be important (chapter 11). Although suggested by the NSW
Government (sub. DR128), the costs and benefits of these other objectives have not
been included due to difficulties in measuring them.
Returns to shareholders
Return on assets (ROA) is one measure of financial returns and is affected by a
number of factors which may vary substantially across countries.16 These factors
include the type of service provided (passenger services tend to provide lower
financial returns than freight services), scale and density of operations, level of
government funding, and other government policies (for example, those affecting
competitive neutrality between road and rail (chapter 10)).
In addition, reported returns may be influenced by abnormal (accounting) items and
differences (or changes) in asset valuation techniques. These factors make it
difficult to compare ROA consistently over time.
Australian return on assets
Australian government-owned railways, apart from SRA, have displayed an upward
trend in ROA over the period. ROA was positive for QR, Westrail and
TransAdelaide, but tended to be negative for SRA and PTC (figure 4.6). The returns
of AN-NRC fluctuated substantially. Fluctuations in returns for all railways tended
to be due to the impact of abnormal items on profits.
Comparisons of financial performance over time are made difficult by differing
government funding policies across jurisdictions. For instance, towards the end of
the period, community service obligations (CSOs) for QR and Westrail were
explicitly funded. However, according to QR, ‘acceptance of lower rates of return
                                             
16 Return on equity (ROE) is the ideal measure of shareholder returns. However, where shares are
not publicly traded, equity must be treated as the residual of total assets and liabilities and may
be negative. Where equity is negative, ROE cannot be used. Hence, ROA (measured as earnings
before interest and tax divided by total assets) has been used instead.86 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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[as a type of CSO] remains endemic and would directly affect return on assets’
(sub. DR122, p. 2). QR argued further:
Until … transparency is achieved it remains very difficult to evaluate the financial
performance of the rail sector. (sub. DR122, p. 2)






















a  Return on assets is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets. Profit
includes CSOs and other government payments. Return on assets cannot be calculated on a strictly
comparable basis because of revaluations and abnormal items during the period.  b  SRA  includes
FreightCorp, RSA and RAC for 1996-97 and 1997-98. c   PTC and TransAdelaide include all operations,
including buses and trams, in addition to rail.  The results presented here probably overestimate the returns
to rail. d  The large rise in ROA of AN-NRC in 1996-97 and the subsequent fall in 1997-98 are due to large
abnormal revenues and expenses for AN in the respective years.
Data source: PC forthcoming.
International return on assets
Return on assets was highly variable both between countries and within countries
during the period examined (figure 4.7).
Australia’s rail system experienced fluctuating but generally negative or low returns
for most of the period monitored. This is in contrast to the positive returns earned by
US Class I freight railways and in New Zealand, Japan and South Africa. The non-
urban passenger services in the United  States and Canada consistently provided
negative returns, while the positive returns to South Africa’s urban passenger
system were highly dependent on government subsidies.PERFORMANCE OF
RAIL
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Abnormal items, such as restructuring costs, account for much of the variability
within countries over time.
Figure 4.7 Return on assets by country disaggregated by type of






















































































































































































































a Return on assets is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets. Profit
includes revenue from government subsidies. b  Japan only includes (urban and non-urban) passenger
services.   c South Africa (urban pass) refers to the South African Rail Commuter Corporation (SARCC).
South Africa (Spoornet) includes non-urban passengers and freight.  d The lower ROA figures for Japan after
1990 were caused by an increase in the asset base of JR Central and JR West as the Japanese Government
transferred ownership of Shinkansen railway assets. e  The large fall in ROA of South Africa (urban pass)
was due to a large fall in subsidies in 1990. SARCC data were only available from 1990 to 1993. f The large
rise in ROA of New Zealand in 1995 was due to a large abnormal revenue item. 
Data source: PC forthcoming.
Labour
The interests of employees in an industry can be defined at a number of levels
including numbers employed, wages and other financial benefits (remuneration),
and non-financial considerations such as conditions of employment, job security,
training and professional development, and work safety issues. The most easily
quantifiable is remuneration.88 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Remuneration
Employee remuneration includes wages and salaries as well as non-wage
components such as superannuation. Due to difficulties in obtaining this
information, a proxy for remuneration has been used. The most readily available
proxy was labour costs (including on-costs).17 In order to gain an insight into how
payments to workers, on average, may have changed, labour costs per employee18
(average labour costs) are examined.19
Changes in average labour costs may not be indicative of the actual changes in the
direct remuneration of workers for several reasons:
·  labour costs include payments such as workers compensation premiums and
payroll tax which workers do not directly receive. However, wages and salaries
account for a large proportion of labour costs;
·  the composition of labour costs varies between railways and, in some cases, over
time within the same railway. Thus, care must be taken in comparing levels
across railways, as well as rates of change; and
·  a number of factors, in addition to changes in wages and salaries, may influence
movements in average labour costs, for example, changes in staff composition.
Remuneration of Australian employees
Real average labour costs have risen to varying degrees in all jurisdictions
(figure 4.8). AN-NRC experienced the largest rise in real average labour costs of
about 65 per cent over the period. Only SRA and PTC, which have experienced the
most volatility in their real average labour costs, have not shown a clear upward
trend. The Rail Tram and Bus Union (RTBU) noted:
the large rise in … average labour costs, is quite different to an analysis as to how the
workforce has fared over the period of the 1990s. (trans., p. 867)
                                             
17 On-costs generally include payments such as superannuation, payroll tax, annual leave
entitlements, workers’ compensation premiums and redundancy payments.
18 The average number of employees rather than the number of employees at the end of the year
has been used to calculate average labour costs. Using end of year figures would tend to
overestimate average labour costs when large reductions in staff occur during the year.
19 The purpose of this is to measure outcomes for employees. The NSW Government (sub. 128)
suggested using labour costs per unit of output. However, while instructive for measuring
outcomes  from a railway’s perspective, this does not reflect outcomes for workers.PERFORMANCE OF
RAIL
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a  Real average labour costs were calculated by dividing real total labour costs (including on-costs) by
average employee numbers. Real labour costs are nominal costs deflated by the national CPI. b QR moved
from cash to accrual accounting in 1992-93. c NRC is only included in the AN-NRC data from 1995-96. AN is
only included until 1996-97. The sharp rise in average labour costs of AN-NRC since 1995-96 can be
attributed partially to the different composition of the NRC labour force compared with AN. d PTC data were
only available from 1991-92 to 1996-97.   e  TransAdelaide data were only available from 1990-91 until
1996-97.
Data source: PC forthcoming.
Information provided by the RTBU shows that a rise in average labour costs may
overstate pay outcomes for workers under Enterprise Bargaining Agreements
(EBAs) in some jurisdictions (sub. DR114). EBAs for SRA resulted in a total pay
increase of 20 per cent between 1992 and 1998 (compared to an increase in real
average labour costs of 23  per  cent). However, real average labour costs for
TransAdelaide rose by 41  per  cent but salaries rose only 9  per  cent during this
period.
The apparent divergence between outcomes represented by real average labour costs
and EBAs might in part be explained by the effect of changes in the composition of
workers.20 In the case of TransAdelaide, this may not only have been the result of
contracting out of jobs performed by lower paid workers but also the reallocation of
                                             
20 For those Australian railways which provided a detailed breakdown of their labour costs, the
divergence is unlikely to be attributable to changes in the components of labour costs, such as
workers’ compensation payments or payroll tax.90 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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higher paid workers from the bus to the train business of TransAdelaide. Changes in
reporting methods may also have been a factor.
International remuneration21
Real average labour costs in Australia fluctuated during the period studied, as they
did to a lesser extent in both Canada and New Zealand. Fluctuations were smaller in
Japan and the United  States (figure  4.9). The overall increase in Australia of
27 per cent was lower than the 36 per cent increase experienced in South Africa, but
greater than that experienced in the other countries examined.
































a  Index constructed on the basis of real average labour costs valued in the currency of the country in
question. Real average labour costs are calculated by dividing real total labour costs (including on-costs) by
average employee numbers. Real labour costs are nominal costs deflated by national CPI. b The Australian
total does not include TransAdelaide in 1989-90 or 1990-91 when data were not available. NRC is only
included from 1995-96. c A large rise in real average labour costs in Canada in 1992 was due to a large rise
in payments classified as employee benefits due to labour force restructuring.  d  Japanese real average
labour costs include those of two companies for which labour cost data were available: East Japan Railway
Co. and Hokkaido Railway Company, which account for 53 per cent of employees hired by the six Japanese
passenger rail companies. e The results for New Zealand before and after 1993 are not comparable due to
changes in accounting policy which occurred in 1993.
Data source: PC forthcoming.
                                             
21 An index is used to compare trends, rather than levels, across countries. The index is based on
average labour costs valued in the currency of the country concerned. This avoids variations
caused by exchange rate fluctuations.PERFORMANCE OF
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Apart from the sharp rise in Canada in 1992 (caused by labour force restructuring),
there was a slight rise in real average labour costs of around 10 per cent over the
period. The wages component rose by about 12 per cent in real terms between 1991
and 1996.
In contrast, real average labour costs in the United States have been fairly constant.
Only in New Zealand have real average labour costs fallen, but mainly towards the
end of the period. This is likely to reflect partially a redefinition of labour costs.
4.4 Summary of performance
All government-owned railways in Australia experienced substantial productivity
improvements in providing freight services over the period. They improved at
greater rates than their counterparts in North America, but were only half as
productive. After allowing for differences in scale and other railway characteristics,
which generally advantage North American railways, the technical efficiency level
of Australian railways was around two thirds that of the most technically efficient
North American systems.
Assessed at the national level, Australia’s rail system also experienced substantial
productivity improvements in providing freight and passenger services, and at
greater rates than in other countries. The productivity level of Australia’s rail system
was around two thirds that of the best performing countries in the study in 1997.
Some of the difference is due to factors which inherently disadvantage Australia,
such as scale of operation. However, in 1997 technical efficiency (productivity
adjusted for the effect of scale) remained 30 per cent below the best performing
countries in the study.
Consistent with the improvement in Australia’s productivity performance, freight
rates in Australia have declined by 18 per cent from 1990 to 1997. This decline was
less than that experienced in some other countries, but rates in 1997 were among the
lowest of the countries studied. Differences in productivity, level of competition and
inherent railway characteristics are among the factors likely to explain differences
between countries. Measures of freight service quality indicate that in some
Australian jurisdictions on time running remains poor, although it improved in New
South Wales and Queensland.
Australia’s rail passengers have not benefited significantly in terms of passenger
rate reductions. After initial price rises, urban passenger rates finished 10 per cent
below their initial levels, while non-urban rates rose 21 per cent. In most countries
studied, passengers have not experienced rate reductions to the same extent as
freight customers.92 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Despite productivity improvements, many government-owned railways in Australia
are either making a loss or are barely viable. Returns to government shareholders
were often negative and highly variable over the period. However, there did appear
to be some improvement in return on assets in most jurisdictions. Returns in other
countries also tended to be variable, with freight systems usually earning higher
returns in purely financial terms than passenger services.
It appears that labour employed by government-owned railways in Australia has
gained to some extent from improvements in productivity. Real average labour
costs, as proxy for remuneration, increased by 27 per cent over the period. However,
only some of this would have benefited employees through wage rises granted as a
result of enterprise bargaining agreements. Some of the increase in average labour
costs was due to a reduction in the proportion of lower paid workers employed by
railways and an increase in redundancy payments. Real average labour costs per
employee remained relatively stable in the United States and Canada, increased in
Japan and South Africa, and declined in New Zealand.THE COMMISSION’S
APPROACH
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5 The Commission’s approach
Jurisdictions have undertaken a range of reforms intended to improve the efficiency
and performance of their railways (chapter 3). The experience to date indicates there
has been improvement in performance as discussed in the previous chapter
(chapter  4). However, there are also indications that there is scope for further
improvement with a number of impediments remaining, as outlined in chapter 3.
This chapter outlines the Commission’s framework for analysing and identifying the
best policy responses likely to overcome these impediments.
5.1 Objectives of reform
The overall objective of reform is to move towards an efficient transport system,
which meets Australia’s freight and passenger transport needs. Along with
technological development, future reform will determine the extent to which rail is
an integral part of the transport system in the 21st century.
In such a system, customers will be able to choose which transport mode best meets
their needs on the basis of price, service quality and a range of other characteristics.
Rail will simultaneously compete with other modes for business, and complement
them in providing a seamless transport service for customers.
Governments and the community are likely to continue to have non-commercial
objectives, both social and environmental. The Commission’s proposed policy
framework also takes these objectives into consideration.
Sources of efficiency improvements
In order to take its place in an efficient transport system, railways must continue to
improve their performance. Improvements in the efficiency of railways — and
ultimately the transport system as a whole — can occur in three broad areas:
·  making better use of the existing equipment and infrastructure;
·  introducing the most appropriate infrastructure, rollingstock, and technology; and
·  optimising the use of rail in the transport logistics chain.94 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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This is consistent with the view expressed by National Rail Corporation:
... there is a phase, which I think we have almost got all the way through ... which is
about the inefficient use of resources within the present production function. There is
too much fuel consumed, there are too many wagons in use, too many locomotives, too
many people and so forth ... The second area of change is changes in the production
function, which is what I’ve concentrated on in my comments — by changing things
like axle load limits, train length limits, train height limits for double stacking and so on
... The third stage of productivity improvement is where the railway system starts to
integrate itself very much more thoroughly into the total logistics chain.
(trans., pp. 1001, 1002)
To some extent, the ‘easy gains’ have been realised by the reforms undertaken to
date. There is scope to improve the performance of railways further by
implementing an appropriate mix of other policy reforms.
It is considered that most of the improvements in performance achieved since 1991
have come from the first source. Realising efficiency gains from the second and
third sources will be more difficult than those generated by improving the efficiency
of the existing rail system. These additional gains will take longer to achieve and
will rely on adopting a package of reforms.
Achieving the more difficult efficiency gains will require working through a logical
framework of analysis in order to implement the most appropriate combination of
reforms to deal with impediments to performance (box 5.1).
Box 5.1 Impediments to improved performance
Impediments to improved railway performance identified by participants include:
·  a lack of commercial focus and government involvement which interferes in the
operation of some government-owned railways;
·  inadequate investment in rail infrastructure;
·  a lack of competitive neutrality between transport modes and between government
and privately-owned railways;
·  the extraction of monopoly rents from the coal networks;
·  complex and multiple arrangements for access to rail infrastructure; and
·  inconsistent and complex safety regulation and operating requirements.
5.2 Areas of potential reform
Some of these impediments have been addressed by governments to varying
degrees, particularly those relating to monopoly rents, safety regulation and taxationTHE COMMISSION’S
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arrangements affecting competitive neutrality. However, the potential exists to
undertake further reform across a range of areas to deal with those that remain:
·  railway structure — including consideration of vertically separating track and
train operations and horizontally separating railways geographically or by
function;
·  ownership — exploring a spectrum of options from commercialised or
corporatised government-owned railways through to franchising and full
privatisation;
·  access arrangements — examining whether they should be light-handed or strong
and prescriptive;
·  operating procedures and standards — removing remaining inconsistencies and
duplication to improve the efficiency of rail operations; and
·  competitive neutrality — addressing a range of outstanding issues both within
the rail industry and across transport modes.
5.3 Railway networks
The Commission has identified three broad types of rail networks in Australia,
interstate, regional and urban passenger (chapter 2). The identification of these
network types is important because the nature of the businesses and impediments to
improved performance differ between these networks.
Differences between networks can be characterised by the extent of interface
problems, actual or potential rail competition (both for the market or between train
operators), intermodal competition, and by their commercial sustainability
(chapter 2).
The nature of the problems and impediments to improved performance will also
differ between networks (chapter 3).
Thus a range of reforms will be required to achieve the overall objective of an
efficient transport system. Reform in a single area (eg structure or ownership) is
unlikely to achieve this objective.
Reform packages
The Commission’s approach is to target reforms to specific problems and
performance impediments facing each rail network. This can be achieved by
developing a reform package for each network, selecting the most appropriate96 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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reforms from the available options. While some elements of each package may be
similar — reflecting a broad systemwide approach — it is likely that the package for
each network will not be uniform across railways because of differences in markets,
network characteristics and the differing nature of impediments to improvement.
In developing each package, the Commission intends to identify those reform
elements which are most likely to create an environment that will yield the greatest
gain (box 5.2).
Box 5.2 Getting the environment right
The reform packages should contribute to an environment within which commercially
focused railways are able to compete with, and/or complement, other modes of
transport. Important elements of this environment are:
·  Competition — which can take several forms including competition for the market
and competition in the market. Intermodal competition can also influence rail
performance;
·  Commercial focus — a spectrum of approaches from commercialisation and
corporatisation to privatisation can improve performance and provide railways with
the freedom to make timely business and investment decisions;
·  Community service obligations — can be accommodated within a commercial
environment through the rigorous implementation of a purchaser-provider
framework;
·  Consistency in access and safety regulation — to reduce costs, increase certainty
and promote innovative and competitive behaviour; and
·  Competitive neutrality — both within the rail industry and between rail and road
transport so that railways are free to compete on the basis of price and service
quality.
5.4 Subsequent chapters
The following chapters consider the appropriate reforms for each of the three
railway networks, and where appropriate, the systemwide reforms. Each of the
potential reform areas are discussed in turn:
·  structure (chapter 6);
·  ownership (chapter 7);
·  access arrangements (chapter 8);
·  safety regulation and operating procedures (chapter 9); and
·  competitive neutrality (chapter 10).THE COMMISSION’S
APPROACH
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The social dimensions of railways, including consideration of appropriate
mechanisms for pursuing non-commercial objectives are considered in chapter 11.
Finally, chapter 12 draws the preceding discussion together to outline the reform





In an effort to encourage better performance, many governments are re-
examining the structure of their railways. In general, differences in the
characteristics of networks, transport markets, and impediments to
performance confronting the industry mean that different structures are
appropriate for interstate, regional and urban passenger rail networks.
A number of governments have examined the scope for using structural reforms to
address the diverse problems confronting railways and impeding their performance.
In essence, structural reform involves breaking-up established railways into separate
trading entities, with separation occurring on a geographic, functional (track,
rollingstock and maintenance) or product (passengers and freight) basis. Although
there are numerous ways in which railways can be (and have been) restructured,
there are some important threshold issues.
A critical question for governments to consider is the type of structural separation
which would deliver the greatest gains to the community. Answers to this question
depend upon the characteristics of the railway network, the markets in which
railways operate and the nature of the problems confronting the industry.
Structural separation is not a panacea for the problems facing railways. Indeed
structural reform is likely to be only part of the solution to improving the
performance of rail and the efficiency of transport more generally. It is more
appropriate to view structural separation as part of a broader package of reforms,
such as changes in ownership arrangements (chapter 7) or the application of the
purchaser-provider framework to fund non-commercial services (chapter 11).
In line with the terms of reference, this chapter examines:
·  how structural reform may help address the problems facing railways;
·  options for restructuring; and
·  the appropriate structure of different rail networks.
Section 6.1 defines structural separation and describes the major structural models
applied to rail in Australia and internationally. Section  6.2 then describes how
structural separation may be used to improve performance. Section 6.3 discusses the
costs of introducing structural separation. Drawing on the networks outlined in100 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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chapter 2, section  6.4 identifies the preferred structure for urban passenger,
interstate and regional rail networks. Section 6.5 concludes the chapter.
6.1 Structure of rail authorities
Historically, Australia’s government-owned railways were integrated both vertically
and horizontally. This meant a single government agency controlled activities such
as train operations, track provision, maintenance, signalling and train timetabling.
During the 1990s, several railways in Australia and other countries were structurally
separated (box 6.1). Chapter 3 and appendix D discuss these reforms in more detail.
Box 6.1 Definitions relating to structural separation
Structural separation: businesses are separated into discrete legal entities.
Horizontal separation: occurs either by product (freight and passenger services) or
by geographic area (interstate, regional and urban railways).
Vertical separation: functional levels are separated (track infrastructure and train
operations).
Above track or train operations: the provision of rail freight and passenger transport
services involving locomotives and other rollingstock.
Below track or track infrastructure: physically fixed rail facilities such as track,
sleepers, signals, terminals and yards.
Australian experience
Currently, Australia’s railways are structured in one of three broad ways
(figure 6.1). The Commonwealth and NSW Governments are positioned at one end
of the structural spectrum. The Commonwealth has created a separate track
infrastructure provider, the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) to own and
manage key elements of the interstate network. A separate body, the National Rail
Corporation (NRC), provides interstate and intrastate freight services and is jointly
owned by the Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments.
New South Wales has separated the former State Rail Authority (SRA) into four
businesses:
·  Rail Access Corporation (RAC) — track infrastructure provider;
·  FreightCorp — primarily an intrastate freight train operator;
·  Rail Services Australia (RSA) — the maintenance business; and
·  State Rail Authority (SRA) — urban and country passenger train operator.STRUCTURAL
REFORM
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At the other end of the spectrum, Queensland Rail (QR), Westrail and Tasrail are
horizontally and vertically integrated businesses. Western Australia plans to
horizontally separate Westrail into freight and urban passenger businesses by the
end of 1999, with the freight business to be sold as a vertically integrated railway.
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a States have been classified as vertically integrated if one of the train operators on a network also has
control of the network, through ownership or leasing. b Private railways are included where they are the result
of government railways being restructured and privatised.
Victoria and South Australia have applied an intermediate approach whereby the
intrastate railways have been horizontally separated but remain vertically integrated.
In South Australia, separate entities provide urban passenger transport
(TransAdelaide) and the intrastate freight services (Australia Southern Railroad
(ASR)). In Victoria, freight services (Freight Victoria) and urban passenger services
(Bayside and Hillside Trains) are operated by separate vertically integrated
organisations.1 Non-urban rail passenger services are provided by V/Line Passenger
(VLP) and West Coast Railway (WCR).
                                             
1 The franchises for Bayside Trains and V/Line Passenger were awarded to National Express in
June 1999. The franchise for Hillside Trains was awarded to Melbourne Transport Enterprises in
July 1999.102 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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International experience
A variety of structural configurations also exist in other countries. For instance,
some European railways (Netherlands, Sweden and Britain) have been separated
horizontally and vertically. Also, directives from the European Commission
(EC Directives 91/440/EEC, 95/18/EC and 95/19/EC) require member countries at
least to undertake separation of accounts for all rail enterprises. Germany has
applied this approach. Railways in the United States, Canada and New Zealand
operate as vertically integrated businesses. A mixed model, combining horizontal
separation (by geography and function) and vertical integration has been applied in
Japan and Argentina (appendix E).
6.2 Why consider structural separation?
Structural separation may contribute to improving the performance of railways by:
·  promoting competition:
-  ‘in’ the market; or
-  ‘for’ the market;
·  facilitating the regulation of the natural monopoly elements of railways; and
·  implementing appropriate policies in different markets.
Promoting competition
Structural separation has been used by governments to promote competition. Under
National Competition Policy, governments have agreed to review structural
arrangements where they are considering introducing competition (chapter  3,
box 3.2). The Victorian Government argued that the:
... introduction of competition wherever possible will secure the largest gains in terms
of efficiency. (sub. DR118, p. 3)
However, the notion of competition is more complex than the widely accepted view
that it relates to competition between train operators within a certain market. It may
also involve operators competing to get access to the market as a monopoly provider
or operators competing with other modes of transport.STRUCTURAL
REFORM
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Promoting competition ‘in’ the transport market
Competition in the transport market may contribute to the improved performance of
railways. Structural separation may be used to facilitate greater competition:
·  between train operators and other modes;
·  between train operators for the same customers; and
·  between train operators for train schedules.
Between train operators and other modes
The transport sector provides a diverse set of services, reflecting different customer
requirements in terms of time sensitivity, technology and the logistics of production
and distribution. Vertical separation may promote greater differentiation of services
by train operators than might occur from introducing open access alone. The ARTC
commented that:
In essence, the separation of above and below rail activities combined with the
introduction of an open and robust access pricing regime has encouraged competition
on the East West corridor; the consequence of this has been some segmentation of the
market, a fall in prices and an increase in quality of service. The evidence would
therefore suggest that the reforms introduced to date have been successful in altering
the fundamental dynamics of the industry. (sub. 74, p. 5)
There is evidence that market segmentation and product differentiation have
occurred in the interstate market following structural separation. Such segmentation
may facilitate opportunities for competition between rail and other transport modes
such as road and sea (NCC 1998a, subs. 3, 25 and 80). For instance, NRC Trailerail
bimodal service competes with road on the East-West corridor. Rail 2000 argued
that the:
... greatest benefit (from competition policy) is from competition between modes.
Competition within rail (vertical separation) will lead to efficiency but not grow the
business. (Rail 2000 Newsletter, No. 51, May 1999, p. 5)
However, Patrick provides an example of how rail can also integrate into the
transport chain and complement other transport modes. Patrick is using rail services
between Adelaide and Melbourne to provide its Adelaide clients with seamless
service through the Port of Melbourne. The Local Government and Shires
Associations of New South Wales supported the complementary nature of road and
rail transport:
The two modes should not be viewed as separate and competing forms of transport but
complementary in delivering transport services for industry and regional communities.
(sub. 71, p. 2)104 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Between train operators for the same customers
Vertical separation of train operations from track infrastructure may facilitate
competition between train operators for the same customers.
Although a vertically integrated railway may provide some access, vertical
separation may be considered necessary to remove the favourable position of the
operator who has control of the infrastructure (chapter 8). This concern was echoed
by several participants (ARTC, Shell, Queensland Mining Council, National
Competition Council, Rio Tinto, Tourism Council of Australia and the
Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries). For instance,
the Tourism Council of Australia noted:
Some argue that access regulation and vertical separation increase effectiveness by
removing the conflict of interest an integrated railway has over allowing competitors
access to its track ... (sub. DR121, p. 3)
There is evidence that vertical separation of rail authorities into train operations and
track infrastructure may promote competition in some markets. However, this is not
always the most appropriate strategy (box 6.2).
Between train operators for train schedules
In order for competition between operators to be effective in terms of the range of
services operating over the network, there also should be competition between train
operators for train schedules. There may be greater competition for train schedules
with vertical separation than under vertical integration and open access alone. Some
suggested methods of introducing competition for the allocation of train schedules
are outlined in chapter 8.
Promoting competition ‘for’ the market
Allowing competition for the market may be possible in situations where the nature
of the market is such that sustainable competition between train operators is
unlikely. Competition for the market occurs where the provision of rail services is
subject to a competitive process, such as competitive tendering and contracting or
franchising (chapter 7). Demsetz described the competitive effects of franchising as
follows:
Even though but one firm would survive this competition in a given market,
competition for the field [market] should dissipate monopoly rent through price cutting,
yielding a competitive outcome for the one-firm industry that emerges.
(Demsetz 1989, p. 87)STRUCTURAL
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Box 6.2 When to introduce vertical separation to promote competition
The economic efficiency of railways is enhanced by introducing competition through
vertical separation when:
·  rail networks possess natural monopoly characteristics such as economies of scale
and have effective market power (the network can earn monopoly profit);
·  train operators are able to compete on a commercially sustainable basis; and
·  track infrastructure and train operations are relatively independent so that the costs
of separation are small in relation to the gains from competition and efficient
economic regulation.
Effective market power is determined by the ability of the rail operator to receive
revenues significantly greater than the total (stand alone) cost. In relation to access
charges, the OECD observed:
The incumbent should not be able to charge less than the incremental cost of providing the
access service and should not be allowed to charge more than the stand alone cost of
providing that service. (p. 156)
Market power is unlikely to eventuate when there is intermodal competition or
competition in the downstream markets. The OECD argued:
If it is true that rail faces significant intermodal competition, the opportunities for profitable
competitive entry will be relatively limited. Viewed in this light, the policy option of vertical
separation is a relatively significant regulatory intervention for relatively little gain.
(pp. 157-158)
Vertical separation may complicate the application of efficient Ramsey pricing and
cause a network to be commercially unsustainable.2 The OECD stated:
... in most instances, the recovery of the roadbed costs will require price discrimination, ie it
will require some type of Ramsey efficient pricing. The separation of track from services will
make the application of the Ramsey efficient pricing very difficult, if not actually impossible.
(p. 176)
Consequently, there may be a trade-off between commercial sustainability and
competition. The OECD noted:
The challenge then, is to make sure that there is sufficient competition in the market to
ensure that there is efficiency without there being wasteful competition. Open access is not
likely to be appropriate where there is an unsustainable natural monopoly, that is, one that is
vulnerable to cream-skimming. (p. 183)
Source: OECD 1999.
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A competitive tendering process may be used to promote competition by awarding
contracts for the right to supply rail services. Tenders may be awarded on the basis
of selection criteria that may differ depending on whether the railway is commercial
or non-commercial.
·  For commercial railways, the criteria may include the lowest total cost of service
provision over a relevant period at an acceptable level of risk. This approach was
adopted by Flinders Power in South Australia in awarding a coal haulage
contract to FreightCorp.
·  For non-commercial railways, the criteria may include the lowest subsidy
required. This approach was applied by the Victorian Government when
franchising urban passenger services.
Promoting competition for the market may deliver added benefits through, for
instance, facilitating yardstick competition.3 The Victorian Government intends to
compare the performance of Bayside Trains, Hillside Trains and trams and buses in
Melbourne (sub. 82). Such comparisons put pressure on the individual franchisees
to improve their performance.
Regulating natural monopoly elements
Structural separation may assist governments in regulating the natural monopoly
elements of railways. Rail track has been considered a natural monopoly as
customers are served at least cost by one firm providing the service (IC 1991b).
Regulation of some form is likely to be required where the rail businesses possess
significant market power which they are able to use to extract monopoly rents
(excess profits). For instance, if intermodal competition is limited and there is
limited competition in downstream markets, the train operators and/or track
infrastructure providers may have the potential to charge excessive prices resulting
in revenue exceeding stand alone cost. RAC argued:
Under a vertically integrated model, an incumbent owner-operator could have stifled
such access by unfairly leveraging its infrastructure ownership as a barrier to entry.
Access charges could be set at an oppressive rate for competitors and restrictions on
conditions of access could be set; any or all of these factors would effectively stifle
competition in market segments. (sub. DR102, p. 3)
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Structural separation may reduce the regulatory burden by isolating (via horizontal
separation) the monopoly network from the rest of the network, or through vertically
separating the (natural monopoly) track, from the rest of the system.
Implementing different policies in different markets
The rail industry encompasses a number of businesses that may be separate in terms
of geography, function and type of service. Governments may choose to apply
different packages of reforms to different parts of the rail network. For instance,
they may introduce a purchaser-provider framework and competition for the market
for urban passenger services, while promoting competition in the market for the
interstate network.
The horizontal separation of the interstate, regional and urban passenger rail
networks may improve the monitoring of performance and increase the transparency
of outcomes in each market. The vertical separation of track infrastructure and train
operations may improve the administration of subsidies, while promoting
competition between train operators. For instance, vertical separation allows
subsidies to be directed to track infrastructure (Sweden) or train operations
(Great Britain).
6.3 The costs of structural separation
Even when structural separation is well designed and implemented, it may still
involve costs. Participants (such as Australian Transport Network, CRT Group and
Rio Tinto) argued that structural separation imposes large costs. Australian
Transport Network submitted that:
... heavy transaction costs of separation, both in setting up an infrastructure company,
organising and formalising its myriad interactions with operating companies, and in its
everyday running, also penalises rail in relation to its main competitors. The heavy cost
of setting up Railtrack in the United Kingdom, for example, is effectively borne (where
there are not subsidies) by the railway operators and their customers. (sub. 25, p. 4)
The potential costs of structural separation in the rail sector have been discussed
widely. It has been suggested that costs may arise from:
·  a lack of coordination between separated rail entities, both in terms of above and
below track businesses and between geographically separated entities. This may
result in inappropriate investment decisions;
·  ‘interface issues’, such as difficulties associated with a train operator traversing
different networks with multiple owners and managers;108 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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·  complications associated with timetabling, train schedule allocation and capacity
management;
·  the loss of some economies of size, scope and density;
·  added complexities in the administration of prices and services, such as
ticketing;
·  the high initial cost of separation;
·  high transaction costs of acquiring full information necessary for train operators
and track providers to undertake long term investment planning;
·  the loss of the ability to price discriminate (to use Ramsey pricing) and therefore
recover the cost of track infrastructure; and
·  greater regulatory intervention.4
Before any structural reform is considered there needs to be systematic analysis of
the ‘problem’ and whether structural separation should be part of the solution. The
Rail Bus and Tram Union cited the International Labour Organisation which noted:
It has become increasingly clear that most railways cannot continue to operate
successfully under the legal, administrative and financial regimes of the past. But it is
equally true that, at the national level, the arguments in favour of restructuring are often
not based on systematic analysis of the problems. (sub. DR114, p. 6)
Systematic analysis of structural reform options would involve assessing the
relevance and likely magnitude of the costs of structural separation and comparing
them with the benefits, including potential gains from facilitating competition and
improved regulation and monitoring.
The benefits and costs of structural separation are likely to differ between
networks and depend upon the characteristics of the transport market.
6.4 Which structures are appropriate?
This section considers structural issues relating to the urban passenger, interstate
and regional rail networks, drawing on the principles set out in the previous sections
and the characteristics of the rail networks defined in chapter 2.
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Governments generally support urban rail passenger services as an important
component of the transport system in cities. They may also use urban transport to
address environmental and social policy goals, such as reducing congestion and
pollution.
Urban passenger transport systems are non-commercial and would not exist in their
present form and at current levels of service without government subsidy
(PC 1998c). An increase in commercial focus would result in more efficient services
and minimise losses. However, even with a commercial focus, it is anticipated that
urban passenger services would remain non-commercial and require continued
government support.
There is scope to improve the performance of these services by improving:
·  transport planning by governments (such as the choice and mix of urban
passenger systems including rail) (chapters 10 and 11); and
·  the efficiency with which rail services are provided as part of the urban transport
system.
Improvements in performance are best achieved by separating urban passenger
networks from other railway businesses as vertically integrated businesses in order
to improve the application of the purchaser-provider framework (chapter 11).
The case for horizontal separation
The horizontal separation of urban passenger networks from other rail networks
(such as regional and interstate networks) should improve the focus of governments
on the choice and mix of transport services purchased in Australia’s major cities and
the efficiency with which they are provided. It should also encourage greater
transparency.
Many participants raised concerns regarding the practicality of horizontally
separating urban passenger networks (including RAC, Commonwealth Department
of Transport and Regional Services (DTRS) and NSW Minerals Council). Their
main concern related to interface issues whereby other trains traverse over urban
networks (chapter  2). The significance of these issues depends on the physical
complexity of the network and the degree of congestion.110 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Westrail commented that while Western Australia does not have urban interface
problems, there are problems in other jurisdictions:
We don’t have an urban interface with our interstate business but it certainly causes us
major headaches because the entry and exit times for the trains out of Sydney and
Melbourne … control how you manage across the network. (trans., p. 757)
RAC also noted that interface issues are a significant concern in Sydney:
In the case of Sydney (and to a lesser extent some other major cities), there is
considerable overlap of markets that make horizontal separation impractical.
(sub. DR102, p. 14)
However, some of these problems can be overcome through contractual
arrangements. Under horizontal separation the provider of urban passenger services
would control the urban network. Freight and non-urban passenger trains could then
negotiate contracts for access to the urban network. In most Australian cities the
simple network configuration and low degree of congestion would make this
possible. ARTC noted:
... I wonder if it’s worth just looking at other industries for a second and reflecting on
those interfaces ... local ... state ... and you have federal government investment in a
whole range of roads. For some unknown reason they actually do interconnect, and for
some unknown reason they actually are all run smoothly even though you’ve got five or
six different participants playing on them ...
But let’s look at one other example in Australia, the electricity industry. The electricity
industry is really made up of a whole set of grids and transmission lines with a whole
range of input providers of electrons from a whole range of generating frameworks.
Those grids are under a range of different people’s controls and they range from high
voltage, medium, through to low voltage. They seem to be able to interconnect, they
seem to be able to get the interfaces right and they do seem to be able to get their billing
and structures right around it. (trans., p. 808)
There are many examples of contractual arrangements overcoming interface
problems in Australia and internationally. In Victoria, contractual arrangements
between Bayside Trains and interstate and regional operators in Melbourne permit
non-urban passenger and freight trains to traverse the urban network. Similar
arrangements (such as trackage rights) exist in the United States (appendix  E,
box E.4).
In some urban networks congestion may be a problem, particularly at peak periods.
In these circumstances governments may consider:
·  augmenting capacity by investing in a freight bypass or other infrastructure
projects (chapter 10); and/orSTRUCTURAL
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·  managing demand by adopting appropriate pricing strategies such as auctioning
train paths (chapter 8).
While there are difficulties associated with horizontal separation of urban transport
networks, there are practical solutions to these problems. Moreover, these problems
and costs are considered small in relation to the efficiency improvements achieved
through the use of competitive tendering and franchising processes to award the
right to provide services (chapter 7) and from focusing governments on purchasing
and planning of urban transport systems. The benefits from horizontal separation far
outweigh the costs associated with interface issues.
There are demonstrated and practical solutions to interface issues arising from
horizontal separation of urban passenger networks.
The case for vertical integration
Urban passenger services require that trains run frequently and to a complex
timetable. Coordination of services to meet the timetable is likely to be more
effectively undertaken by a single operator.
Most urban rail networks in Australia are vertically integrated (with the exception of
those in New South Wales). There is no competition between urban passenger train
operators for the same customers, but there may be some competition between urban
passenger, non-urban passenger and freight train operators for train schedules. Train
scheduling is undertaken by the vertically integrated urban passenger operator(s) in
all states except New South Wales. In Melbourne, Bayside and Hillside Trains
undertake train scheduling for their own networks, which are independent of each
other.
The relatively small size of many urban passenger markets in Australia is likely to
limit the scope for competition between train operators for customers. In these
circumstances, implementing competition for the market through contracting or
franchising of vertically integrated businesses is more likely to generate
improvements in efficiency of the urban passenger railway than the promotion of
competition between operators through vertical separation.
RAC opposed the vertical integration of urban rail networks arguing that:
If the Sydney network were reintegrated vertically, access requirements of freight
operators would mean that SRA would need to either create an access unit and thereby
introduce further jurisdictional boundaries for operators, or it would need to establish a
retailing arrangement with RAC and/or other access providers. (sub. DR102, p. 14)112 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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DTRS also opposed the vertical integration of urban networks, arguing that the
greatest benefits would be generated from competition between urban train
operators:
We also think that the vertical separation model remains the best approach for urban
systems where competition must be encouraged if urban transport is to fulfil its
potential role in our cities in the future. (sub. DR125, p. ii)
However, while vertical separation has been successfully implemented for urban
railways in Great Britain, there are still interface issues associated with congested
networks. When the British Government decided to transfer part of the (vertically
integrated) London Transport (LT) network to Railtrack, concerns were raised that
congestion on some LT rail lines made separation inappropriate:
LT has studied the proposal to run through trains on the northern section of the Circle
Line between Paddington and Aldgate in detail. The scheme doesn’t work because this
section of the underground is used so intensively — as anyone who travels on it will
recognise — that  there  are  no  spare  ‘slots’,  and  re-engineering  the  line  would  be
enormously disruptive. (Ford, P. 18/6/99 in The London Evening Standard)
In these circumstances alternative solutions may be appropriate. The access
conditions for non-urban passenger and freight trains could be built into the
contracting or franchising arrangements for the urban transport system, as they are
in the Victorian approach. Franchise agreements could have terms and conditions
that give the franchisees incentives to deliver the urban services more effectively
and provide paths for other operators.
Urban rail networks should be vertically integrated and horizontally separated
from other rail networks.
To achieve the full benefit of horizontal separation, it should be combined with
competitive tendering and contracting using the purchaser-provider framework
(chapters 7 and 11).
Interstate network
The interstate network is already horizontally separated in terms of operations.5
Currently four authorities are responsible for the administration of access, five
authorities have a role in allocating train schedules and five authorities undertake
investment in the network (chapters 3, 7 and 8). In Western Australia, the network is
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owned by a train operator (Westrail); while elsewhere, the track infrastructure is
separated from train operations.
Multiple sub-network managers impose costs on the interstate network. Train
operators have faced significant financial and time costs in negotiating access
charges and train schedules with numerous owners. ARTC was established to
overcome these problems by providing rail operators with a one stop shop.
The competitiveness of the interstate network may be best improved through
vertically separating the interstate network and having a single network manager.
The case for horizontal integration of network management
The management of the interstate rail network is currently separated on a
jurisdictional basis. In the Draft Report the Commission proposed horizontal
integration of network management for the interstate network. The interstate rail
network manager would not own the interstate network. Rather, its primary role
would be to manage the network on behalf of the train operators and track owners
according to a set of rules.
Many participants commented on the draft proposal. Once again some were
concerned with the interfaces between the interstate and regional networks. DTRS
submitted:
... the primary concern of States and State track owners is that the costs to the intrastate
rail sector of vertical separation and horizontal integration of the interstate network
under a single network manager, may outweigh the benefits they would realise from
improved access arrangements to the interstate rail market. (sub. DR125, p. 2)
Westrail argued regardless of the structural model adopted interface issues would
always exist:
Whilst there is continued discussion with respect to the interstate network whatever
structural model is introduced will require extensive interfaces and this will create
issues for operators. (sub. DR107, p. 5)
NRC concurred:
The problem comes with that interface where you’ve got a train path which crosses that
interface and you’ve got two organisations who have to coordinate those train paths, but
that problem is going to exist in New South Wales wherever you go until there is a
freight network that goes either through or around the city on its own exclusive track.
(trans., p. 1029).114 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
As noted earlier, ARTC has used the experience of other industries relying on
networks, such as roads, airports and the electricity industry, to explore interface
issues and concluded that there were ways to overcome them (trans., p. 808).
A single network manager could assist in overcoming interface issues if it had full
control. NRC noted:
The manager concept will work only if on any given part of the network there is one
organisation which is undoubtedly fully in charge, is able to contract the service and
guarantee a level of performance, without having to go another layer, if you like, of the
contractual arrangements to require that performance from somewhere else. It’s got to
be a one-to-one total control management situation, otherwise we’re dealing with —
 once again we’re dealing with a middleman who has no ability to affect the quality of
the service that we get. (trans., p. 1029)
A network manager for the interstate rail network could play a similar role to that of
the National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) in the national
electricity market (box 6.3) or VENCorp in the Victorian electricity and gas market.
A similar approach is adopted in the Netherlands by Railned and
NS Verkeerleiding — the rail network and signalling and systems control managers
respectively (appendix E).6 This model can be distinguished from current
arrangements under which ARTC operates (appendix F). ARTC owns and manages
the former Australian National track. In the model proposed by the Commission the
network manager would not own track infrastructure.
The horizontal integration of rail network management would allow coordinated
management of the interstate network. In particular, the network manager could be
responsible for determining and administering access and allocating train schedules
(chapter 8). The network manager would also be able to facilitate the appropriate
level of investment and maintenance to benefit all users of the interstate rail network
(chapter 10). A code of conduct would need to be developed setting out the role and
functions of the network manager (chapter 8).
Network manager models, such as the National Electricity Market Management
Company Limited (NEMMCO), provide a useful basis for examining the potential
for the horizontal integration of rail network management and determining the
role and functions of a single interstate network manager.
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Box 6.3 National Electricity Market Management Company Limited
(NEMMCO)
The National Electricity Market (NEM) is a wholesale market for the supply and
purchase of electricity, combined with an open access regime for use of the
transmission and distribution networks in the participating jurisdictions of the Australian
Capital Territory, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia and Victoria.
The NEM arrangements are defined in the National Electricity Code (NEC). The NEC
includes the rules and procedures for the wholesale electricity market and access
regime for the electricity networks. NEMMCO manages and facilitates the wholesale
electricity market while the National Electricity Code Administrator (NECA) supervises,
administers and enforces the Code. The access regime for electricity networks is
regulated by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and jurisdictional
regulators.
The objectives of NEMMCO are to:
·  conduct the wholesale electricity market efficiently on a self funding/break even
basis;
·  promote the ongoing development of, and changes to, the wholesale electricity
market with the objective of improving its efficiency; and
·  undertake responsibility for coordination of power system planning for the wholesale
electricity market as defined by the Code.
Source: NEMMCO 1998.
The case for vertical separation
On the interstate network there has been vertical separation into track infrastructure
and train operations, except in Western Australia where the track from Perth to
Kalgoorlie remains with Westrail.
Vertical separation of the interstate network has facilitated some intermodal
competition through market segmentation and product differentiation. Specialized
Container Transport now offers a regular service for transporting beverages and
foodstuffs between Sydney and Perth, and Melbourne and Perth. Previously many of
these items were transported by road.
While vertical separation could promote new entry into other market segments of
the interstate track, its extent may be limited. For instance, if train operations in
niche markets are characterised by economies of scale, only one train operator may
ultimately provide that service. Nevertheless, where product differentiation and
market segmentation occur on a sufficiently large scale, the volume of goods
transported on the interstate network may increase. Increased capacity utilisation116 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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may then reduce unit costs for operators on the network. There is some evidence of
competition between train operators for the same customers, for instance between
Toll and NRC in the freight forwarding market between Melbourne and Perth.
Another way vertical separation of the interstate track can deliver benefits is through
promoting competition between train operators for train schedules. The efficient
allocation of track infrastructure requires that train schedules should be developed
and allocated in a manner that closely reflects their value to train operators
(chapter 8). For instance, FreightCorp suggested that:
The structure of a vertically separated rail network means that operators wishing to
enhance the network need to be willing to pay. (sub. 55, attach. 2, p. 17)
However, an appropriate coordinating mechanism is required to create an efficient
system for allocating train schedules in conjunction with access charges over the
entire interstate network. This mechanism is particularly important for the pricing of
peak loads and reducing congestion. Currently, the owners and users of the
interstate network may place different values on the same train schedules and a
mechanism for revealing whether the allocation of train schedules adequately
reflects the highest valuations does not exist. (This is discussed in detail in
chapter 8, section 8.3.)
Vertical separation has resulted in greater competition on the interstate network and
also encouraged niche players to integrate into the transport logistics chain.
It would be desirable for the remainder of the interstate network in Western
Australia to become vertically separated.7 This implies that the sale of Westrail
would exclude the interstate track from Perth to Kalgoorlie.
Train operations should be vertically separated from track infrastructure on the
entire interstate network. The infrastructure should be managed by a single
network manager.
A process involving the Commonwealth and affected States should be established
to determine the roles and functions of the network manager and develop a code
of conduct.
                                             
7 Vertical separation would help remove any incentives or opportunities for Westrail to exert





Regional rail networks are defined as all railways in Australia excluding the
interstate and urban rail networks. As described in chapter 2, there are two types of
regional networks:
·  those without market power, such as ASR, Freight Victoria and Tasrail, as well
as small branch lines; and
·  those with market power, such as the main coal lines centred around the
Hunter  Valley in New South Wales, and Goonyella and Blackwater in
Queensland.8
Regional rail networks without market power
Regional rail networks without market power are usually subject to strong
intermodal competition. Impediments to improving their performance have included
a lack of commercial focus, inadequate investment in track infrastructure and a lack
of autonomy.
Consequently, there is a need to address these impediments in order to improve the
performance of these networks and allow them to compete more effectively with
road transport. They also need to be able to price discriminate in order to cover
fixed costs and therefore become commercially sustainable.
Improving the performance and competitiveness of regional rail networks is best
achieved by separating them from other rail networks and allowing them to operate
as vertically integrated businesses.
The case for horizontal separation
Many regional networks without market power are particularly suited to horizontal
separation because they are regionally based and largely radial. There is evidence
that regional rail networks which have been horizontally separated (and privatised)
are being transformed from loss making businesses requiring government subsidies
into commercially independent businesses (for example, Freight Victoria, ASR and
Tasrail) (chapter 7).
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However, like urban rail networks, there may be some interface issues associated
with horizontal separation of regional networks. RAC observed that:
Standard gauge lines in Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia, which either
have been or are about to be privatised as vertically integrated entities, are integral parts
of the standard gauge network … The NSW, Queensland and narrow gauge Western
Australian systems all enjoy a healthy mix of traffics from high volume bulk
movements to low volume tasks. In each case there is considerable movement of
traffics between high and low volume lines. (sub. DR102, p. 15)
Interface issues occur at the point where regional networks join the interstate
network or urban networks. Many regional trains need to traverse the interstate
network. In these cases, regional trains would be treated like any other train
operating on the interstate network. As noted earlier, there are demonstrated and
practical solutions to the interface problems of regional trains traversing urban
networks.
The case for vertical integration
The nature of the problems facing regional rail networks without market power
needs to be considered in assessing the case for vertical separation. Vertical
separation is unlikely to deliver any further competitive gains for these networks
because they already face strong intermodal competition and strong competition in
downstream markets. Maddock concluded:
If rail faces strong competition from road, so strong that it does not earn a commercial
return, then we should not be treating rail as a natural monopoly. It may involve the
technology of natural monopoly but there is no scope for this to provide for monopoly
exploitation because of the intermodal competition. The correct policy position at the
first level would thus seem to be to remove regulation, and to remove third party access
requirements, since these will not produce efficiency gains. (sub. 40, pp. 3-4)
King and Maddock argued further:
In terms of pro-competitive reforms then, there is probably not a lot that needs to be
done. Rail suffers from an excess of competition.
The principal manifestation of the competitive pressure on rail is the large accumulated
and ongoing deficits of the sector and of its failure to provide an adequate return on
investment. Pro-competitive reform is designed to [prevent] monopolists setting prices
too high in search of excess profits. This is clearly not the problem with rail. (King and




Vertical separation as a means of competition overlooks the importance of intermodal
competition as a market-based mechanism for providing efficiency incentives.
(sub. 59, attach. 1, p. 2)
The WA Government concurred:
In the case where density is light and intermodal competition is high such as the
Westrail grain lines, vertical integration enables the railway to maximise efficiency.
This may be of advantage in being able to compete effectively with other modes.
(sub. 60, p. 4)
Kessides argued against vertical separation where markets are thin:
... in many countries, many markets are thin and separation might not actually lead to
actual and potential competition in rail services. The primary benefits might not be
obtained because the size of the market is small. (OECD 1999, p. 176)
In these circumstances the commercial sustainability of regional rail networks could
be compromised. Instead of improving the performance of these networks, vertical
separation may actually impair it. Hearsch concurred:
In these situations, the total available business can barely support one rail operator and
the notion of any form of ‘on rail’ competition has nothing to commend it.
(sub. DR120, p. 23)
Further, the introduction of competition between trains could reduce the ability to
price efficiently, increasing the likelihood that the provision of track infrastructure
would depend on government subsidies (box 6.2).9
Some participants suggested that the commercial sustainability of regional rail
networks is driven by the ‘control’ of train operations and track infrastructure.
Australian Transport Network argued:
In an integrated railway we can readily identify the problem, take responsibility for it,
and deal with it. In a separated model, either there is an artificial division of primary
responsibility, and later debate and settlement; or the prospect of litigation and
significant costs. (sub. 25, p. 4)
A ‘loss of control’ could have implications for future investment in both
rollingstock and track infrastructure (CRT Group, sub.  20). A single operator is
likely to have better access to capital because the overall risks would be lower. Loss
of control is minimised when regional rail networks are vertically integrated.
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The strength of intermodal competition combined with the need to control train
operations and track infrastructure suggests that it is most efficient for one operator
to meet the needs of markets served by these regional rail networks.
Regional rail networks without market power should be horizontally separated
from other networks and vertically integrated.
Regional rail networks with market power
A small number of regional rail networks possess market power because of the
monopoly provision of track infrastructure and the lack of intermodal competition.
They include those rail networks centred around the Hunter Valley, Goonyella and
Blackwater regions (the main coal lines).
Historically, the lack of competition in these railways has enabled the NSW and
Queensland Governments to extract monopoly rents by setting high coal freight
rates (PC  1998a, subs. 36, 39, 50, 58, 59 and 77). For instance, Rio Tinto
commented:
... that the authorities or their owning governments exploited their monopoly power, a
power often buttressed directly or indirectly by legislation, to levy charges
incorporating a sizeable monopoly rent component. It was widely acknowledged that
rail charges incorporated a ‘royalty’ component. (sub. 58, p. 6)
The lack of competition has allowed inefficiencies in the transportation of freight to
develop (chapter  4). In a submission to the Commission’s (1998a) report, The
Australian Black Coal Industry, Exxon argued:
The high cost of transport of black coal in New South Wales is well known and
documented as being significantly out of step with world’s best practice. (Exxon
submission to The Australian Black Coal Industry inquiry, sub. 3, p. 10)
Eliminating any ongoing monopoly rent and improving the efficiency of the main
coal lines may be best achieved by horizontally separating them, leaving track and
train operation vertically integrated and promoting competition for the market
through franchising.
The case for horizontal separation
In the Draft Report the Commission argued that high volume regional (coal) rail
networks should be horizontally separated from other rail networks because of their
market power. The Queensland Mining Council supported this approach:
Profitable heavy-haul railways are very different in nature to loss-making passenger and




the very least organisationally — so that they are managed separately and have separate
accounts. (sub. DR127, p. 1)
As with other rail networks, some participants commented that horizontal separation
may prove difficult because of interface issues. In commenting on high volume
regional networks, the NSW Minerals Council submitted:
... we believe it does not seem a good idea for the Hunter. It has features such as, first,
it's a network that at the hub includes urban passenger, interstate freight, high-volume
regional and low-volume regional traffic. Second, the bulk of its traffic is obliged to use
rail, so there is no intermodal competition for that traffic. Third, it would be desirable
for non-coal traffic that has its origin or destination outside the Hunter network to be
able to deal with a single infrastructure owner. Creation of regional networks would
require a body equivalent to the ARTC to provide a one stop shop for intrastate traffic,
as well as increasing complications for interstate traffic.
There would undoubtedly be benefits, in particular greater transparency, but this would
appear to be attacking the symptoms of the problem rather than the problem itself.
(trans., p. 692)
By confining these regional rail networks to the main coal lines, any interface issues
would be minimised. As with other rail networks, there are demonstrated and
practical solutions to overcoming any remaining issues.
The horizontal separation of the main coal lines is fundamental to reducing market
power, facilitating improvements in transparency and independence. As Shell Coal
submitted:
Where there is no transparency and the owner of railway infrastructure has a natural
monopoly, the customer (eg coal producer) cannot know whether the monopolist is
using market power to recover inefficient operating costs and excessive overheads, or
to hide poor investment decisions. There is no way to calibrate cost efficiency against
world best practice without transparency. (sub. 36, p. 3)
Horizontal separation would generate further benefits through the facilitation of
competition for the market  —  through franchising or competitive tendering and
contracting. Such benefits are likely to outweigh the costs associated with interface
issues.
Regional rail networks with market power (the main coal lines) should be
horizontally separated from other networks.
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The case for and against vertical integration
Consideration of vertical restructuring of the main coal lines depends on the best
way to eliminate monopoly rent and increase service levels. McKillop noted:
Eliminating monopoly rent and improving the efficiency of these railways are the key
issues to be addressed. (sub. DR90, p. 6)
In the Draft Report the Commission sought participants’ views on the
appropriateness of vertical separation for the main coal lines. In response, some
participants argued in favour of vertical separation, primarily because they believed
that regulation of track access charges and competition between operators was the
best way to eliminate monopoly rents. For instance, RAC noted:
As volumes and the number of customers increases, the importance of competition also
grows and the presumption in favour of competition should also grow. (DR102, p. 16)
NRC argued that:
Vertical separation of high volume regional railways is essential to achieving the
benefits of competition for customers using these railways. (sub. DR117, p. 12)
The NSW Minerals Council also argued in favour of vertical separation, noting that
vertical separation was particularly important where track infrastructure is not
owned by the coal industry:
If it is assumed that the rail infrastructure is not owned by the coal industry, then for the
Hunter rail network vertical separation has advantages that outweigh the disadvantages.
(sub. DR104, p. 4)
Similarly, Queensland Mining Council preferred vertical separation for the main
coal lines:
These considerations lead our Council to prefer a structure for QR that reflects:
separation of coal and minerals from the rest of the network, to provide managerial
autonomy and transparency; [and] vertical separation of coal and minerals into above
and below track services to facilitate competition and monopoly price and incentive
regulation. (sub. DR127, p. 2)
Vertical separation and the promotion of competition between train operators can
result in lower freight rates. However, the lower costs of train operations may not
necessarily be accompanied by lower fees for track access. For instance, in
New South Wales vertical separation initially resulted in lower freight rates and the
transfer of monopoly rent from train operations to track infrastructure (PC 1998a).
Although there are benefits from vertical separation, there is still the potential to
extract monopoly rents because track infrastructure is provided by a monopolist.




On the other hand, Westrail argued in favour of vertical integration:
Clearly, Westrail believes that the appropriate model for high volume regional railroads
is a vertically integrated railway with an effective access regime to prevent monopoly
rents and provide competition in above rail services. (sub. DR107, p. 5)
One important advantage of vertical integration is the increased ability to focus on
the logistics and optimisation of the entire production and transport process.
Rio Tinto argued that for its Hamersley iron ore operation:
Hamersley has moved from operating each mine as a stand alone operation to an
integrated production system with substantial benefits to capital and manpower activity.
Integral to this is the ability to schedule rail movements freely to achieve the correct
quality of blend. Optimisation of the total system rather than the mine or rail system
alone requires meticulous planning and rigid adherence to mining sequence and
delivery schedules. Carriage of third party traffic on a single track system would put
this in jeopardy. Because of this close integration, the rail system plays the same role in
the production process as a shovel, a drill or a reclaimer. (sub. 58, pp. 10-11)
Moreover, ARTC argued that:
It is accepted that in a few limited circumstances the railway line may be so entwined in
the overall production process of a single company that the introduction of a third party
train operator on the line may be severely detrimental to the competitiveness of the
track owner. In many cases, the owner is operating in international markets in which
strong competition already constrains pricing and necessitates efficiency.
(sub. DR97, p. 7)
However, Queensland Mining Council argued that Queensland’s situation with a
‘government-owned multi-user monopoly’ differed from the Hamersley example
(sub.  DR127,  p.  2). While not denying the importance of the interdependencies
between the different elements of the transport chain it gave greater weight to the
need for competition (in the market) and transparent access regulation.
One strategy to retain the benefits of vertical integration while ensuring the
elimination of monopoly rents and improvements in efficiency would be to promote
competition for the market by franchising the network and its operations
(chapter 7).10 Greater transparency can promote efficiency. As noted by the OECD:
Franchising also removes the power of the monopoly of information. Under traditional
forms of regulation firms have the information, regulators do not. Under a franchising
scheme that monopoly information is removed. (OECD 1999, p. 182)
Monopoly rents can be reduced in the bidding process by awarding the franchise on
the basis of the lowest freight rate. Periodic retendering of the franchises will also
assist in reducing monopoly rents:
Competitive pressure can also be introduced into a monopoly or near monopoly activity
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through periodic tenders for the franchise. (Viehof and Jones 1995, p. 1)
Franchising can also promote greater fairness. For instance:
... bidding schemes can make the rules of the game between incumbents and entrants
fairer, as an efficient new entrant can take on the whole market immediately, rather than
try to win market share gradually in a battle with the incumbent operator.
(OECD 1999, p. 182)
The bidding process may be designed so that it includes transferring assets (such as
rollingstock), thereby removing a substantial barrier to entry and making the market
more contestable. The OECD stated:
... franchise bidding is going to make a market much more contestable than it would
otherwise be, by separating out, from the competition, at least some of the sunk costs,
thus lessening the entrant’s need for a prior commitment, pushing the market thereby
closer to perfect contestability. (OECD 1999, p. 182)
Further competitive pressure can be applied by franchising individual networks to
different operators (for instance, the main coal lines around Goonyella and
Blackwater), thus encouraging yardstick and interregional competition. Growing
pressure from downstream markets would enhance competition between regions.11
The preferred approach for enhancing efficiency and addressing market power in
the main coal lines is through vertical integration and the application of
competition for the market using franchising.
6.5 Conclusion
The appropriate structures in interstate, regional and urban passenger rail networks
will differ. Each railway has different characteristics, depending on the strength of
intermodal competition, the degree of market power, the degree of competition in
downstream markets and traffic density. The gains from structural reform therefore
will vary between the different rail networks. Its effectiveness in promoting
competition will also depend on ownership arrangements, especially ownership of
rollingstock. Structural separation should only be implemented when the gains from
removing impediments to performance exceed the costs. There may be other ways
of capturing some of the potential gains from structural reform without incurring the
costs associated with restructuring (chapters 7, 8 and 10).
                                             
11 Competition in downstream markets refers to the competition Australian coal exporters
experience on the world market from other international suppliers. Such competition reduces the




7 Public and private participation
Although government-owned railways have improved their performance
since 1991, they still lack a full commercial focus and suffer from
inadequate investment. These problems stem from weaknesses in the
corporatisation model. Refinements to this model may lead to some
improvement in commercial focus. However, given the limitations of the
model and the challenges facing the rail industry, alternatives to
government provision need to be considered.
The inquiry’s terms of reference require the Commission to examine the role of the
Commonwealth, States and private sector in rail operations and ownership.
In this chapter, the key issues of commercial focus and investment within the rail
industry are outlined (section  7.1). A number of different models of rail service
provision, ranging from government department to private ownership, are examined
(section 7.2). Taxation arrangements which may affect private sector involvement in
railways are also discussed (section 7.3).
7.1 Objectives and the role of government
Private enterprise was responsible for the introduction of railways in Australia in the
mid-nineteenth century. Governments initially became involved because private
investors wanted governments to guarantee dividends and provide further capital to
complete lines. When these private railway companies encountered difficulties,
governments took over ownership to protect themselves from financial exposure
(appendix C).
Until recently, all major state-based rail systems and interstate operations were
government-owned and operated. Historically, governments used their railways to
pursue objectives other than commercial viability. Goals such as income
redistribution, regional development and employment creation have underpinned the
provision of some train services and associated infrastructure. However, the pursuit
of social or political objectives has often been at the expense of efficiency. Apart
from these non-commercial objectives, governments own railways as an alternative
to regulating private monopolies and as a means of addressing externalities, such as
traffic congestion in urban areas.126 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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During the 1990s, there has been a change in emphasis with governments according
greater weight to improving the efficiency and financial viability of their railways.
The focus on efficiency stems from the relatively poor performance of government-
owned railways in the 1970s and 1980s. In its 1991 inquiry into rail transport, the
Industry Commission (IC) attributed the large and persistent rail deficits during this
period to government intervention in railway operations for non-economic reasons
(IC 1991b).
Other factors have also had a bearing on the increasing focus of governments on the
performance of their railways. Importantly, the nature of the transport market has
changed considerably in the 1990s. Competitive pressures have intensified with the
entry of private sector operators. Moreover, the rail industry faces significant
competition from a road transport sector, characterised by a high degree of
flexibility and innovation, and the potential for greater competition from sea
transport.
Against this background, most government-owned railways have been
commercialised or corporatised to address some of the problems identified in
IC  (1991b) (chapter  3). Notwithstanding these reforms, many participants in the
current inquiry (including the Australian Wheat Board, Australia Southern Railroad
(ASR), Forsyth and Trace, Maddock, the NSW Minerals Council and Queensland
Rail (QR)) have pointed to difficulties facing railways under government ownership.
Two key issues raised by participants included:
·  the lack of a full commercial focus; and
·  inadequate investment and maintenance funding.
Given these concerns, this chapter examines recent reforms to government-owned
railways and explores different models of rail service provision. Aspects of the
competitive environment are also discussed, though they are addressed more fully in
chapters 6, 8 and 10.
7.2 Public/private sector models
There are a number of forms (or models) of rail service provision, ranging from
government department to private enterprise provision. Under the departmental
model, government is responsible for virtually all aspects of provision including
planning, design, financing and funding, construction, operation, maintenance and
regulation1 (table  7.1). Under the private enterprise model, the owners or their
                                             
1 Regulation covers economic regulation (such as price and service regulation) as well as safety
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agents are involved in most aspects of provision except for regulation and the
funding of community service obligations (CSOs).













Planning G G G/P G/P G/P
Design G G/P G/P G/P G/P
Construction G G/P P P P
Operation G G/P P P P
Maintenance G G/P P P P
Ownership c GG P   È G G/P P
Payment for
service
G/C G/C G/C G/C G/C
Regulation G G G G G
a    G represents government, P the private sector and C consumers. b    Traditional, commercialised or
corporatised.  c  Although franchisees own the right to operate an enterprise for a fixed period, government
may retain ownership of some assets. Ownership of private enterprises is on an indefinite basis.
Source: Adapted from EPAC 1995a.
Between departmental and private enterprise provision are different mixes of public
and private involvement, such as commercialised or corporatised government
enterprises, build-own-operate-transfer (BOOT) projects and franchises. The models
in table 7.1 are stylised representations and involve a degree of abstraction. Moving
along the spectrum of models towards private enterprise, more of the responsibilities
and risks are borne by the private sector. In addition, the degree of independence
from executive government (that is, cabinet ministers) normally increases.
Government-owned railways
Since 1991, government-owned railways have been subjected to various kinds of
administrative and structural reforms. In most jurisdictions, reforms have involved
either commercialisation or corporatisation. These programs have generally aimed
to lift the performance of government railways and to promote competitive
neutrality between government and private operations. In some jurisdictions, such
reforms have been used to prepare railways for sale to private sector entities. Key
reform initiatives in railways are summarised in chapter 3 and appendix D.128 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Commercialisation and corporatisation
Reforms involving commercialisation and corporatisation seek to introduce
commercial disciplines and practices into the operation of publicly owned
enterprises. These reforms require public enterprises to adopt objectives and
incentives that emulate those facing private firms. Corporatised enterprises are
expected to focus more on cost minimisation and efficient pricing. They are also
required to introduce performance-based systems of rewards and sanctions for
directors and managers. The IC (IC  1991a) set out a general model of
corporatisation as a guide for governments (box 7.1).
Box 7.1 General model of corporatisation
·  Provide clear, non-conflicting objectives relating to commercial performance only.
·  Identify, cost and directly fund any CSOs from the government budget.
·  Vest management in a commercial board of directors accountable to parliament
through a minister.
·  Introduce a system of rewards and penalties for managers related to performance
and introduce performance-monitoring systems.
·  Require the adoption of uniform and commercial accounting practices.
·  Make authorities liable for all taxes and government charges and make dividends
payable at levels equivalent to similar private companies.
·  Remove constraints such as government employment policies and advantages
such as government borrowing guarantees.
·  Make corporatised authorities subject to the Corporations Law.
·  Separate out regulatory functions, introduce effective natural monopoly regulation
and remove exemptions from the Trade Practices Act that do not apply to private
companies.
·  Remove regulatory and legislative barriers to entry.
Source: IC 1991a.
Corporatisation has been subsequently encompassed by the National Competition
Policy (NCP). The Independent Committee of Inquiry into NCP (Hilmer et al. 1993)
outlined a number of key principles for corporatisation. The Hilmer Committee gave
particular emphasis to achieving competitive neutrality between government and
private enterprises.
The main difference between commercialisation and corporatisation lies in the
legislative framework. Corporatisation generally involves legislation which
specifies the powers and responsibilities of the government enterprise (through itsPUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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board of directors) and executive government as the dominant shareholder. The
legislation aims to remove government from day-to-day control of the enterprise.
The enterprise may be established under the Corporations Law, or as a statutory
authority under its own or ‘umbrella’ legislation (NCC 1997c). Commercialisation
does not usually have an equivalent legislative basis.
Most jurisdictions have established umbrella legislative frameworks for the
corporatisation of government-owned railways. Since the mid 1990s, a number of
public rail entities in New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland have become
subject to such legislation (chapter 3).
The National Rail Corporation (NRC) and Australian Rail Track Corporation
(ARTC) are the only government-owned rail organisations that have been
incorporated under the Corporations Law, as recommended by the IC (IC 1991b).
NRC contended that the ‘standards of commercial behaviour required of such
entities is more strictly sanctioned than in any special legislation’
(sub. DR117, p. 13).
In the case of Westrail, the WA Government did not adopt the legal structure for
corporatisation recommended by the Independent Commission to review Public
Sector Finances in Western Australia (McCarrey et al. 1993) or the IC (IC 1991b).2
The WA Government considered that some provisions of the Corporations Law
were not appropriate for Westrail. In place of legislation, a formal performance
agreement was reached between Westrail management and the State Government.
In principle, corporatisation is a more transparent and accountable way to pursue
competitive neutrality and other objectives than commercialisation. That said, the
commercialised Westrail has performed strongly compared to its corporatised
counterparts in the 1990s (chapter 4). While a range of factors can influence relative
performance, the selective adoption of specific elements of corporatisation and the
relationship between Westrail management and executive government may have
contributed to this positive outcome.
Is corporatisation sufficient?
As noted above, most government-owned railways have been commercialised or
corporatised since the late 1980s. Despite achieving significant improvements in
productivity between 1991-92 and 1997-98 (chapter 4), government railways still
                                             
2 The McCarrey Commission considered the merits of two legislative frameworks. On balance, it
supported the corporatisation of government enterprises under state statute but where the
enterprises are being prepared for privatisation, provisions of the Corporations Law were thought
to be more appropriate. The Commission identified Westrail as a candidate for corporatisation.130 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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face several problems relating primarily to a lack of a full commercial focus and
inadequate investment in the rail network. This suggests further gains are possible.
The limitations of corporatisation may stem from the way it has been implemented.
Alternatively, there may be limitations to the model itself. Evidence to this inquiry
provides support for both these possibilities.
A number of governments do not appear to have implemented the model as it was
originally intended. Problems relate specifically to the objectives imposed by
governments on their railways, the way in which CSOs have been specified, and the
commercial freedom of boards to pursue profitable opportunities or cease
loss-making activities.
Corporatisation was intended to strengthen the commercial focus of government
railways. There was agreement among numerous participants (including Forsyth and
Trace, FreightCorp, Tourism Council of Australia, Victorian Government and
Westrail) that an increased commercial focus was still needed and was central to
achieving further improvements in the rail industry.
Under corporatisation, governments are meant to provide rail enterprises with clear
and non-conflicting objectives. This allows boards to focus on achieving those
objectives and to be held accountable for their performance. It would appear that
governments subject their railways, implicitly or explicitly, to multiple objectives.
QR stated that:
It is particularly important to recognise that probably the most significant factor
contributing to rail inefficiencies is the tendency for the rail industry to be bound up in
certain political processes. These have objectives other than pure transport outcomes –
ie social welfare, employment and regional development objectives.
(sub. 59, attach. 1, p. 2)
Further, in 1996, the Queensland Commission of Audit (1996) concluded that the
performance of QR was constrained by government commitments and public
expectations.3 As a result, it found that the corporatisation process — at that time —
had not been effective in achieving the desired outcomes of introducing ‘arm’s
length’ commercial relationships between Government and QR.
Introducing commercially-oriented charters does not preclude government-owned
railways from delivering CSOs. If governments wish to pursue non-commercial
objectives, this should occur on a transparent, contractual basis between government
                                             
3 QR was required to provide services to communities in all parts of the State served by the rail
network, contribute towards the fulfilment of the Government’s policy agenda and honour
commitments to its workforce precluding retrenchments and relocation
(Queensland Commission of Audit 1996).PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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and the railway. The purchaser-provider framework required is discussed further in
chapter 11 and appendix I.
While governments have implemented some reforms in identifying and explicitly
funding CSOs (chapter  11), several participants have expressed concerns about
cross subsidisation between profitable and unprofitable activities. Rio Tinto stated
that:
The NSW government now provides some explicit subsidies to enable otherwise
uneconomic passenger services to access the track, but suspicions about a ‘cross
subsidy’ element remain. (sub. 58, p. 6)
The Rail Access Corporation (RAC) confirmed that, in 1996-97, access charges to
the State Rail Authority of New South Wales (SRA) did not recover the costs of
providing access and an effective cross subsidy was required from the Corporation’s
more profitable activities (RAC 1997).
Similarly, commenting on the level of disclosure, the Queensland Mining Council
stated that:
QR will tell you, ‘We've been corporatised. We calculate our CSOs correctly. We do
not cross subsidise across the organisation and the rules are there to see in black and
white.’ Our point is: if that's the case, put the numbers on the table … (trans., p. 624)
Another element of corporatisation is competitive neutrality — ensuring  that
government operators are not competitively advantaged or disadvantaged compared
to their private sector rivals. As discussed in chapter 10, a number of participants
expressed considerable doubts about whether government-owned railways operate
on a competitively neutral basis. Some claimed that government railways have taken
actions which could not be supported in a commercial environment. At a broad
level, this indicates potential difficulties in achieving a commercial focus within
government-owned railways.
There are also concerns that corporatisation has not ensured adequate levels of
investment in railways. While investment has been occurring (for example, the
mainline upgrade in Queensland), there is evidence that some government railways
have not made, or been able to make, sufficient investment in rail infrastructure
from a commercial standpoint (chapter 10).
At the same time, FreightCorp and RAC contended that commercial imperatives do
apply — that is, investment is undertaken where adequate returns are expected.
RAC argued that:
The real difficulty with investing in rail is not that there isn’t money. Rail Access
Corporation has a very sound balance sheet and free cash flows, significant free cash
flows to invest in the system. As a state-owned corporation we can invest where we’re132 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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going to get a reasonable commercial return.  …   There aren’t very many profitable
opportunities for investment, and so that’s at the core of the problem. (trans., p. 651)
However, the findings of recent reports (HORSCCTMR 1998b, Maunsell 1998, Rail
Projects Taskforce  1999) and evidence from participants (for example, Westrail)
indicate that a major constraint facing government-owned railways is the lack of
access to capital. As a result of this constraint, there are long delays before projects
proceed or they may proceed in a piecemeal manner over a number of years as
funding permits.
There are a number of possibilities as to why government railways may be capital
constrained. In some cases, government railways may be subject to overall State
borrowing limits constraining their ability to incur debt. Also, faced with large
operating deficits for urban passenger services and observing generally poor returns
in freight operations, State treasuries and ministers may consider that further equity
funding cannot be justified. Poor returns could be exacerbated if rail owners are
recording assets in their accounts at values in excess of their market value. Such
practices could create an artificially high asset base making the financial
performance of government-owned railways appear poorer than is actually the case.
Ultimately, the source of the capital constraint on government railways is not as
important as the fact of its existence. Corporatisation is intended to allow
government-owned enterprises to establish commercial capital structures and make
investment decisions like any equivalent private corporation. Evidence that they are
unable to do so points to problems with its implementation.
The commercial focus of government railways would be improved if they operated
more in line with the original intent of the corporatisation model.
This would involve a number of changes to the current relationship between
railways and government shareholders — the most important being a preparedness
by governments to provide equity funding and/or allow railways to borrow on their
own behalf for investment in rail infrastructure.
Limitations of the corporatisation model
Notwithstanding the gains which may be possible from a stricter application of the
corporatisation model to government railways, the preceding discussion raises the
issue of whether the rail industry tests the limits of this model. Compared to private




Separation of ownership and control is characteristic of most larger private
companies as well as government enterprises. Under the corporatisation model,
performance monitoring by units within central agencies is intended to emulate, by
administrative means, the performance assessment role fulfilled by debt and equity
markets. In general, units monitoring performance within government operate with
fewer resources and less information than that available to capital markets. As the
original intergovernmental task force that codified the corporatisation model noted:
…    none of the monitoring devices [of government] provide the continuous and
unrelenting scrutiny which characterises private sector monitoring.
(TOIRGTE 1991, p. 26)
Measurement issues aside, there are questions about how governments interpret
performance data and the extent to which they act upon this information. For
instance, governments may be content to accept lower financial returns from their
railways (and therefore refrain from enforcing sanctions) because there are
compensating political benefits. Where such trade-offs are made, railways are not
exposed to the same kind of commercial pressures and disciplines that confront
private enterprises.
It is often difficult, and possibly unrealistic, for a minister or government to act in
the same way as a commercial shareholder (notwithstanding the framework for
delivering CSOs). The nature of the political process itself, and the expectations of
the community, can mean that ministers seek to be involved, or are drawn into
matters that are the proper responsibility of boards.
The shortcomings of the corporatisation model were discussed by some participants.
John Hearsch Consulting noted that:
Corporatisation and the appointment of ‘commercial’ Boards of Directors has been
implemented in some instances with a view to the interface with government being at
arm’s length. However, experience would suggest that this objective is rarely achieved
in practice unless the politicians and bureaucrats concerned exhibit uncharacteristic
restraint! (sub. DR120, attach. 1, p. 24)134 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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And the Victorian Government argued that:
…  even if corporatised entities are set up on a sound commercial/company basis and
even if politicians do not interfere, the ultimate discipline of a stock market price is
lacking. A falling share price is a warning to managers that they must lift their
performance or face the threat of take-over and hence loss of their jobs. There is no
equivalent with a government owned business. (sub. DR118, p. 6)
The corporatisation model has inherent limitations, such as the inability of
governments to behave in a commercial way and remain at arm’s length from
their railways. As a result, the commercial incentives and disciplines confronting
corporatised railways are diluted.
Government procurement
Under the traditional departmental or government enterprise model, governments
both funded and provided rail services. In the past decade, however, there has been
a move away from exclusive in-house provision. Under the procurement model,
governments purchase services from public enterprises or the private sector under
contract. These issues have been addressed in an inquiry conducted by the IC in
1996 into the use of competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) by public sector
agencies (IC 1996).
Government-owned railways have increasingly adopted CTC in the 1990s. A
number of services are now provided by the private sector. Although contracting out
has occurred primarily in the area of maintenance, some ancillary services, such as
cleaning and catering, have also been outsourced (table  7.2). There has been
subcontracting of some rail operations, for example, Northern Rivers Railroad hauls
wagons containing fly-ash between Grafton and Murwillumbah as a subcontractor
for FreightCorp (Network Rail, Dec/Jan 1998, p. 17).
CTC is a means of introducing market pressures into areas where competition was
previously absent. Competition is introduced through the bidding process and drives
providers — be they public or private — to adopt efficient methods of service
delivery. Even where contracts are awarded to in-house bidders, the threat of
competition can provide powerful incentives to improve cost-effectiveness
(Rimmer  1994). The main benefits of CTC are argued to include lower costs,
improved service delivery and quality, and greater flexibility (King 1994).
Contracting with the private sector generally involves the transfer of some
commercial risk from government (such as the risks associated with the cost of
construction and/or operation). There are likely to be stronger incentives to contain
costs under contracted private provision where contracts are properly specified.PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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Table 7.2 Competitive tendering and contracting by government-owned
railways, 1991 to 1999a
Jurisdiction Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
New South
Wales
1992 Service contract let for the provision of locomotive services. The private
sector to own and maintain the locomotives and the SRA to lease them
on a per kilometre basis.
1992-93 Proposed private sector maintenance of Endeavour/Xplorer diesel
railcars with potential for extension to XPTs.
1993 Maintenance of electric passenger rollingstock at the SRA Clyde/Elcar
workshop contracted out to the private sector.
1993-94 Government released its contracting and market testing policy to
encourage the adoption of contracting in the public sector.
1996 Catering services on Countrylink trains outsourced.
1997-98 RAC let several contracts for maintenance work on the state rail
network.
1998 Northern Rivers Railroad contracted to haul fly-ash in northern
New South Wales.
Victoria 1992 Public Transport Corporation allowed to bid for NRC contracts.
1996 Operation of Bendigo railway workshops contracted out.




1992-93 Instruction circulated to all public sector agencies to identify and pursue
opportunities for letting services to competitive tender.
1996 Westrail contracted out track maintenance and development work.
Major locomotive repairs and servicing of locomotives and wagons
contracted out.
1996-97 Cleaning of all country passenger rollingstock, catering and
maintenance of Prospector railcars and refurbishment of Australind
railcars transferred to the private sector.




1995 Some public transport services competitively tendered.
TransAdelaide track re-sleepering activities contracted out.
1996-97 Service area franchise contracting for all metropolitan public rail
services implemented.
Commonwealth 1993-99 NRC outsourced locomotive maintenance, some wagon maintenance,
terminal equipment maintenance, information technology development
and operations, and a number of corporate functions.
1998-99 ARTC contracted out track maintenance.
a  This list is not exhaustive and not all contracts were tendered.
Sources: ARTC, sub. DR97; IC 1991a (various years); Network Rail, Dec/Jan 1998, p. 17; NRC, sub. 53 and
sub. DR117; PC 1998c; WA Government, sub. 60.136 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Several participants pointed to cost savings from the use of CTC in railways. NRC
attributed productivity gains to several initiatives including outsourcing of most
non-core functions (sub.  53). The Victorian Government noted that the Public
Transport Corporation had achieved gains from the contracting out of non-core
activities such as information technology (sub.  82). And ARTC outsources a
significant proportion of its activities to the private sector:
…  the result of which is an ability to reduce access pricing by an average of 7 per cent
in real terms since the advent of ARTC’s predecessor (AN Track Access) in 1995.
(sub. DR97, p. 9)
According to ARTC, other gains from a commercially focused maintenance and
network management effort have included increased network capacity, improved
service quality and changes in train operating parameters (such as increased train
length) which enable operators to derive above rail productivity benefits.
In New South Wales, a strategic review of RAC revealed that ‘substantial cost
reductions could be achieved from productivity gains and other efficiencies in the
Infrastructure Works and Maintenance Program’ (RAC  1997,  p.  9). A priority of
RAC has been to introduce contestability into this program. However, in July 1998
the NSW Government instituted a one year moratorium on the contestability
program to allow Rail Services Australia time to implement the necessary structures
to enable it to compete on an even footing with the private sector (sub. DR102). In
June 1999, the Government partially lifted the moratorium by allowing competition
for the provision of maintenance services on the Bondi Junction to Waterfall line in
Sydney and the Hunter Valley lines.
While several government-owned railways have applied CTC to some of their
activities, QR has taken a different approach:
Just as we went against the general trend in Australia on the subject of integration, so
too we went against the trend by investing in core activities like workshops and track
maintenance. Retention of a full range of railway technical support services has been a
major plank in our strategy to remain competitive …  (O’Rourke 1999, p. 4)
The potential benefits available from CTC are not guaranteed. In some cases, the in-
principle advantages of contracting out may be dissipated by a greater degree of
contractual dispute (EPAC 1995b). For instance, a low bid may win a contract but
subsequent renegotiation may raise the final cost. Another issue is the period of the
contract which determines the frequency of competitive bidding. Aside from price,
it is important that contracts contain appropriate incentives or conditions to ensure
service quality. Governments may also need to retain the requisite skills in-house to
supervise the performance of service providers against contractual commitments.
Most of these issues can be addressed by well designed contracts, tendering systems,
and monitoring processes.PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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The employment and regional impacts of using contracting out in government
railways are discussed in chapter 11.
Providing that tendering systems, monitoring processes and contracts are well
designed, the application of contracting out in rail transport can lead to
improvements in efficiency because of the stronger commercial disciplines
confronting the private sector.
BOOT-based approaches
Under BOOT based approaches, the private sector finances and builds an
infrastructure facility in return for the right to operate the facility and charge users a
fee. The fees or user charges are usually approved and regulated by government.
The use of BOOT-based approaches in rail transport is a recent phenomenon in
Australia with only a small number of projects currently operating or under
construction.
There are a number of key variants within BOOT-based approaches, including
Build-Own-Operate (BOO), BOOT and Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO).
·  BOO projects remain privately owned facilities in perpetuity. An example is the
Skitube in the Snowy Mountains in New South Wales (HORSCCTMR 1998b).
·  Ownership of a BOOT project transfers to government at the end of a
pre-determined period. The New Southern Railway and the Brisbane Airtrain are
examples of such projects (box 7.2).
·  Under a BTO scheme, the government takes ownership of the project on
completion and leases it back to the private sector.
The key difference between BOOT-based approaches and contracting out under
public ownership is that, under a BOOT structure, the private sector provides at
least some of the finance for the venture and assumes some part or all of the
project’s risk. The allocation of risks between the private sector and government is
normally specified in the contract. BOOT-type projects may be characterised as
project rather than network privatisations. These approaches can be used to upgrade
existing infrastructure or to add new segments to networks.
BOOT-type projects appear to overcome some of the limitations of contracting out
under public ownership, especially access to adequate capital (either debt or equity)
and the incentive to dispute contract provisions. As noted earlier, the public sector
may have difficulty in providing dedicated funding for large scale infrastructure
projects stemming from budgetary or borrowing constraints.138 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Compared to the contracting out approach, BOOT-type projects provide secure
funding, bring generally sharper incentives for efficiency and generate synergies
from bundling construction and operation with finance. As equity partners, BOOT
contractors have the incentive to avoid excessive contract disputation and to
consider the life cycle costs of the asset (EPAC 1995a).
Box 7.2 BOOT projects: airport rail links
New Southern Railway
The $800 million Sydney Airport Rail Link is Australia’s largest BOOT railway project. It
has a five year construction time table which commenced in July 1995. The project is a
ten kilometre railway, mostly underground, running from Central Station to Sydney
Airport, then joining the CityRail Illawarra and Glenfield lines at Turrella.
The project involves public and private sector collaboration in ownership, operation,
cost and risk of development. The NSW Government will fund and own the tunnel,
track, signalling and communications systems at a cost of about $540  million. The
track will be owned by the Rail Access Corporation and the rollingstock owned and
operated by the State Rail Authority of New South Wales (SRA). Transfield and
Bouygues through the Airport Link Company will fund, own and operate the four
underground stations (costing around $250  million) for 30  years after completion in
2000.
The fares applying to the Sydney Airport Rail Link will be in two parts: a train fare and
a station fare. The train fare is the normal SRA fare (which is subject to review by the
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal); concession fares continue to apply. The
station fare is a special fare which provides the revenue for the Airport Link Company.
All fares will be contained in the one ticket. There will be no extra charge for through
passengers travelling on the link as part of the integrated CityRail network.
Brisbane Airtrain
The $190  million Brisbane Airport rail link will be Queensland’s first BOOT rail
development. Transfield in partnership with Macquarie Bank has formed the Airtrain
Citylink consortium to build, own and operate an 8.5 kilometre rail link providing direct
passenger services from Brisbane Airport to the Brisbane CBD and the Gold Coast. It
links into the Citytrain network run by Queensland Rail.
Transfield will be responsible for design, construction, operation and maintenance.
Design work began in early 1999. Construction is expected to begin later in 1999 and
take just over two years to complete. Airtrain Citylink will own, operate and finance the
project for 35 years after which the asset will revert to the Queensland Government at
no cost. There is no government contribution or support of revenue streams.
Sources: Office of the Queensland Premier  1999; Transfield Maintenance, Melbourne, pers. comm.,
March 1999; Transit Australia, May 1998, pp. 99-102.PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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The efficiency incentives facing BOOT contractors will depend on revenue
arrangements and the associated risk exposure. Regulation of fares and payment of
subsidies, for example, can affect contractors’ incentives to seek cost savings and
encourage growth in patronage. The Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) noted that
price caps (which restrict fare increases to the rate of growth in the consumer price
index less a productivity factor) can introduce incentives to operate at least cost
while limiting the scope for monopoly pricing (BIE 1995a).
Financial costs, including the cost of capital and transaction costs, are an important
consideration in selecting the form of provision. Network risks for BOOT projects
in particular may add to the cost of capital. Because a BOOT project is often part of
a wider infrastructure network, changes in other segments of the network may affect
the project’s traffic flows and revenue. The Commonwealth Department of Finance
and Administration noted that BOOT contracts tend to protect against competition
from alternative routes (sub. 65). Moreover, transaction costs are typically high for
BOOT projects because of the legal and financial complexity of contractual
arrangements between numerous parties (EPAC 1995a).
Transaction costs are also a key consideration in selecting between BOOT or BOO
projects. Contracts for BOOT projects will need to specify the condition of assets at
the time of transfer back to government. Otherwise, the operator may be reluctant to
maintain or replace assets as the transfer date approaches. BOO projects do not
require these additional contractual provisions and therefore have greater flexibility
in terms of investment and maintenance than BOOT schemes.
Under BOOT-type arrangements, there may be additional efficiencies compared
to contracting out resulting from synergies created by combining construction,
operation and finance.
Franchising
Another model of service delivery is franchising.4 Under this approach, government
grants the right to operate a service for a fixed period to the franchisee. The right is
usually won through a competitive bidding process.
Where transport markets exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, franchising may
be a way of introducing competitive pressures. This occurs through periodic
competitive bidding for the franchise. That is, an exclusive franchise is established
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and firms compete for the right to serve the franchise area. This is known as
competition for the market, as distinct from on-going competition within the market.
There has been a recent international trend towards the franchising of rail services.
A number of Latin American countries (including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile
and Mexico) have applied franchising to railways, as have some African countries
and Great Britain. As the franchising of passenger services in Victoria has only
recently commenced, the overseas experience — particularly in Argentina and Great
Britain — is used as a guide to the potential outcomes of franchising.
International experience
Proponents of franchising contend that the potential benefits include enhanced
efficiency in operations and maintenance, improved service quality, greater
innovation, market development and revenue growth, increased investment and
reduced government financial support.
Many of these benefits have been realised in Argentina where rail services were
franchised in the early 1990s (appendix  E). The World Bank, which has been
involved in rail reform in Argentina and elsewhere, examined the early performance
of the franchises. According to Carbajo and Estache (1996), the overall results have
been positive — many services have improved, traffic volumes have increased, and
subsidies have been reduced (box 7.3).
In Great Britain, passenger train franchises began operating in the mid-1990s. The
Office of Passenger Rail Franchising reported that the two key measures of train
operators’ performance — reliability and punctuality — had generally improved in
1996-97 compared to 1995-96. However, punctuality has since deteriorated whereas
reliability has been broadly maintained. Strong growth in passenger numbers has
also led to overcrowding on some commuter trains serving London (OPRAF 1999a,
1999b and 1998).
The infrastructure owner, Railtrack, improved network performance in terms of
train delays attributable to Railtrack between 1995-96 and 1997-98. But, its activity
in renewing assets (including some track components, signalling and stations) has
been below expectations and there has been little increase in network capability
(Booz-Allen & Hamilton 1999).PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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Box 7.3 Rail franchising: The Argentine experience
Before recent reforms, Argentina had a large public sector railway, Ferrocarriles
Argentinos, which operated a national network of 35  000 kilometres and employed
92 000 people. By 1990, the railway was losing about US$1.4 billion a year (1992 US
dollars) and its fixed assets were in poor condition. Much of the track was in a fair to
bad state and only half the locomotives were available for service. As a result, the
railway was losing traffic and market share.
In 1990, the Argentine Government and the World Bank agreed on a plan to
restructure the railway into several separate freight and commuter rail networks,
concessioning (that is, franchising) the networks, rationalising intercity passenger
services, and other measures (appendix E).
Operating as franchises, most of the rail freight businesses appear stable but none are
highly profitable as traffic density on Argentina’s freight railways is low. Traffic has
grown in rail freight services. However, because demand for these services will not be
sufficient to justify promised investment, the level and timing of the investment
program are being renegotiated. That said, the freight businesses have recorded
strong improvements in performance in terms of labour productivity, service quality
and freight rates. There has also been a reduction in the public deficit of about
US$600 million a year.
Traffic growth following franchising in Argentina
Freight volume, major lines, 1990–1995 Passengers carried, 1993–1995
Per cent Per cent
Nuevo Central Argentino 40 SUBTE (subway) 28
Ferrocarril Mesopotamico 50 Urquiza 36
Buenos Aires al Pacifico 92 San Martin 64
Ferroexpreso Pampeano 130 Belgrano Sur 69
Ferrosur Roca 160 Mitre 74
Roca 83
Belgrano Norte 408
The franchising of urban passenger services has seen recorded patronage grow
strongly. Suburban and metropolitan demand for passenger rail services is much
greater than anticipated and the government specified investment program is proving
to be inadequate. On the other hand, most intercity rail passenger services have
ceased operating.
Sources: Thompson 1997; Thompson and Budin 1997; Carbajo and Estache 1996.
Recent assessments have pointed to a number of problems with rail franchising and
privatisation in Great Britain including inappropriately set performance benchmarks,
shortcomings in liability regimes and weak or nonexistent incentives to invest in
infrastructure and rollingstock (The Economist,  3 July 1999,  pp. 57–60;
Trace 1999).142 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Franchising processes
The franchising process involves drafting contracts, designing the tendering system,
and developing procedures for monitoring contracts.
Contract specification
Designing the franchise contract requires consideration of the period of the
franchise as well as the responsibilities of the franchisee and government.
The period of the franchise contract is an important parameter which can affect
incentives to invest. In general, the private sector will not finance assets whose
service lives exceed substantially the franchise period (Thompson and Budin 1997).
Kain argued that, in Great Britain, franchisees have little incentive to invest
voluntarily in rollingstock:
… a standard franchise length of seven years, the acquisition lead time and the high
cost of trains work against investment in rollingstock purchase. The payback period is
far longer than the standard franchise length, which adds to the investment risk, as the
TOC [Train Operating Company] must bear all the risk of a low resale value at the end
of a franchise period on the premise that the TOC can fail to re-win its franchise.
(Kain 1998, p. 256)
The key advantage of short franchise periods is that they allow more frequent
competition for the market, thereby maximising the competitive pressures on the
incumbent to perform (Jones et al. 1993). On the other hand, franchisees with long
term contracts normally face fewer constraints to investment and innovation. In
deciding the terms of franchises, governments need to weigh up the benefits from
the frequency of competitive bidding against the possible effects on investment risks
and incentives.
The responsibilities of government (the franchisor) and the franchisee are specified
in the contract. Franchising generally involves the transfer of commercial risk to
private firms, thus differentiating it from contracting out. In the case of franchises in
Great Britain, Kain noted that:
Franchisees shoulder the commercial risk, that is, both cost control and revenue box
risk. In this sense, the government has shifted the risk to the private sector    …
(Kain 1998, p. 256)
If overly prescriptive or regulated, franchise contracts may stifle private sector
innovation and investment, and reduce potential efficiencies. Poorly designed
contracts may see private operators engage in opportunistic behaviour, such as
allowing assets to run down towards the end of the franchise period.PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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Tendering and monitoring systems
The winning bid may be selected on the basis of the highest positive bid, lowest
subsidy requirement from government (that is, minimum negative bid), lowest tariff
structure and/or other criteria. Governments can choose between bidding in a single
round or bidding in stages — a pre-qualification round followed by shortlisting and
final bids.
There is also the issue of whether to allow cross ownership of bus, tram, ferry and
rail services. The level of competition between modes may diminish where a
company operates different services in the same geographic area.
Once franchises have been awarded, governments will need to monitor the
performance of rail services against contractual commitments. Contracts may
include rewards and penalties where performance exceeds or falls short of that
promised. In Great Britain, passenger franchises incur financial penalties for poor
running times. The responsibility for monitoring contracts may require the creation
of a new body or be given to an existing agency.
Asset transfer arrangements are crucial to facilitating competitive outcomes in
subsequent rounds of tendering. Where the franchisees own assets (such as
rollingstock), there is a risk that they may refuse to sell the assets or ask too high a
price if they are unsuccessful in the next bidding round. To avoid such situations,
governments need to consider how asset transfer will occur at the end of franchise
periods and draft contracts accordingly.
The Victorian model
The Victorian Government is seeking to achieve further improvements in the
passenger rail system in Victoria through franchising. It stated that:
The proposed franchising structure helps overcome the lack of competition inherent in
the urban rail system because of its natural monopoly characteristics. Competition in
the bidding stage for exclusive franchise rights substitutes for competition in the retail
end of the market. (sub. 82, p. 7)
The Government studied the lessons from rail franchising in Great Britain and
developed its own ‘franchising and leasing model’. Under this model, the urban
train system was horizontally separated into two franchises (Bayside Trains and
Hillside Trains) to optimise scale economies and permit ‘competition by
comparison’. These franchises are vertically integrated operations; that is, the train
companies will control both the rollingstock and infrastructure (track, signalling and
stations) for the life of the franchise, unlike the British model under which Railtrack
owns and manages the infrastructure.144 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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As the passenger businesses in Victoria were loss-making and required government
subsidies, the Victorian Government considered that a conventional sale might not
be appropriate and negative bids should be sought. The successful bidders for the
rail franchises (Bayside Trains, Hillside Trains and V/Line Passenger) were
announced in June and July 1999 (chapter 3). They will operate train services, invest
in rollingstock and receive subsidies during most or all of the franchise periods.5
The franchisees have entered into franchise agreements with the Victorian
Government. The agreements include requirements for passenger service levels, first
and last services, maximum fares, service intervals and operational performance (in
terms of punctuality and reliability, capacity, quality of service and journey times).
In the case of the urban train franchises, the infrastructure will be leased from the
Victorian Government. The leases set out the terms upon which the franchisees use
the infrastructure (sub. 82). The franchisees will also be accountable for maintaining
and renewing the track and signalling (sub.  DR118). In the case of V/Line
Passenger, the franchisee will lease the main country stations and enter into track
access arrangements with Freight Victoria.
The Victorian model incorporates an operational performance regime under which
franchisees can earn bonuses or incur penalties based on their actual performance in
relation to punctuality and reliability benchmarks. The model contains tougher
penalties than exist in Great Britain (sub. DR118). In addition, there are financial
incentives for increasing patronage; that is, franchisees can receive payments from
the Government for achieving passenger growth above specified threshold levels.
Fare regulation and the declining pattern of subsidies are also expected to generate
pressures to achieve cost efficiencies and growth in patronage.
The franchisees will invest in new rollingstock, upgrade the existing train fleets and
undertake some investment in infrastructure. At the expiry of the franchises, the
rollingstock will revert under lease to the Government so that it can be transferred to
the winners of the second round of bidding, if required.
The State Government expects that franchising will result in improved service
quality, increased service levels, patronage growth and a significant reduction in
government financial support. The Victorian Auditor General (1998) noted that the
content of the contracts will largely determine the success of a franchised public
transport system. The franchising process in Victoria and the subsequent
performance of franchisees will provide guidance on the usefulness of this approach
for rail operations elsewhere in Australia.
                                             
5 National Express is expected to make payments to the Government in the last four years of its
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Franchising may generate further gains compared with contracting out because
franchisees usually bear revenue risk, enhancing their incentives to expand the
market.
Privatisation
The term ‘privatisation’ has been used to describe various forms of private sector
involvement in activities previously dominated by government. In this chapter, it
refers to the sale of government-owned rail operations (and transferring control of
these assets) to the private sector.
The Commonwealth Government has divested itself of a significant part of its
investment in railways, whilst retaining the debt. Several component assets of the
former Australian National Railways Commission (AN) were sold to private sector
interests in November 1997. In February 1999, the Victorian Government sold its
V/Line Freight business (table 7.3).
Table 7.3 Privatisation of rail assets, Australia, 1997-98 to 1998-99
Assets Sale price Private operators
$m
Victorian freight 163 Freight Victoria a
SA freight 57 Australia Southern Railroad b
Tasmanian freight 22 Tasrail c
Interstate passenger 16 Great Southern Railway d
a    Owned by RailAmerica.    b    Owned by Genesee & Wyoming.    c    Owned by the Australian Transport
Network. Shareholders include Wisconsin Central Railroad and Tranz Rail.   d   Consortium includes Serco
Asia Pacific and GB Railways Australia.
Sources: Australian Financial Review, 23 February 1999, p. 5; Harris 1998.
Some State Governments and the Commonwealth Government are intending to sell
other rail freight operations in 1999. NRC is being prepared for sale and the WA
Government is planning to sell the freight operations of Westrail.
Private firms apply a commercial approach to the provision of services. That is, they
will only provide services or invest in new capacity if commercial returns are
expected. Their primary focus is on improving performance, profitability and the
market value of their assets.146 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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As discussed earlier, governments often direct their businesses to pursue a number
of objectives which may impinge on their commercial focus and performance. The
Commonwealth Department of Finance and Administration noted that:
One of the causes of AN’s debt, is its operation of non-commercial services. Selling
AN to the private sector will ensure that a commercial discipline is applied to rail
services and activities. (sub. 65, p. 17)
Some participants argued that the incentives facing private firms are stronger than
those for corporatised enterprises. Australian Transport Network (ATN) stated that:
…  under private ownership greater incentives and accountability can be ensured
through management shareholding and bonus payments on the performance of the
company. Ownership becomes contestable with access to the capital markets for equity
funding and the company’s board and management are exposed to the scrutiny of
stockbrokers and analysts. (sub. 25, p. 2)
As noted by McKillop, freight markets are evolving towards the provision of
completely integrated services (sub.  DR90). However, retaining rail freight
operations under government ownership may limit their ability to further integrate
into the logistics chain. NRC argued that such integration is not possible without
substantial privatisation:
…  in order to be integrated into the logistics chain, it is going to be necessary for
mergers and alliances and associations to be built between corporate entities who are
now responsible for and control parts of that logistics chain    …    Under public
ownership all of those sort of changes in the corporate boundaries and structures are
extremely difficult. (trans., p. 1002)
Privatisation also creates opportunities to change the leadership and culture of rail
enterprises. The Victorian Department of Infrastructure contended that the
leadership of some government-owned rail organisations is an impediment to further
improvements and that a change in ownership offers a solution, by introducing new
people and a new mindset into railways (trans., pp. 952-953).
From the perspective of governments, privatisation may be of benefit as it transfers
commercial risk to the private sector.
Recently privatised railways in Australia — based on early indications — appear to
have improved their performance compared to the government-owned railways they
replaced. According to the CRT Group, the initial evidence suggests that
privatisation has led to actions to ensure profitability, an immediate assessment of
the prospects of contracting out non-core elements, injection of private capital and a
more aggressive approach to innovation — both technical and managerial (sub. 20).PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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The private owners of Tasrail have increased traffic volumes and are actively
seeking new contracts. They are investing in rollingstock and infrastructure and
have introduced new labour arrangements (box  7.4). The Commonwealth
Department of Transport and Regional Services noted that Tasrail is profitable for
the first time in 130 years (sub. 76).
Box 7.4 Rail privatisation: Tasrail
ATN purchased the Tasmanian rail system from the Commonwealth Government as
part of the AN sale. ATN has been operating Tasrail since November 1997. Tasrail’s
revenue has increased by approximately 50  per  cent, returning the business to
profitability. ATN announced an operating profit of $1.2  million for its first seven
months of operation.6 The improved profitability reflects revenue growth and cost
reductions.
Tasrail has increased its traffic volumes significantly. It has won contracts to haul logs
and containers. Some of the revenue growth stems from its purchase of the Emu Bay
Railway for $7.8 million from Pasminco in 1998. It is also exploring opportunities for
transporting dairy, mining, pulp and paper products.
Tasrail has commenced an investment program aimed at improving reliability of
service and lowering operating costs. It plans to invest about $40 million by 2001. A re-
sleepering program was initiated immediately after purchase and a new state-wide
communications system was installed. Twenty six refurbished locomotives equipped
for driver only operation, will replace the ageing Tasrail fleet. Additional wagons have
been purchased and many existing wagons are being modified. Following some tunnel
and bridge repair work, the Scottsdale line in north-east Tasmania was reopened to
meet expanding forestry and mining industry demand. The Wiltshire branch line from
Burnie to the north-west has been reopened.
Tasrail, which employs about 200 people, has also changed labour arrangements. It
has introduced driver only operation, individual contracts and bonuses.
Sources:  ATN,  sub. 25;  ATN 1998;  Daily Commercial News,  4 June 1999,  pp. 9-10;  Network Rail,
Oct/Nov 1998,  p. 17;  Network Rail,  Feb/Mar 1998,  p. 17;  Harris 1998;  Rail 2000  Newsletter,  No. 49,
January 1999, pp. 5-6.
ASR, which purchased the mainland freight assets of AN, has also introduced new
labour arrangements such as multi-skilling and incentive schemes such as profit-
sharing. At ASR, employees perform a range of tasks:
… drivers, for example, start and inspect their own locomotives in many cases. They
also plan their shunting work, interact with the customers and do minor field repairs on
the locomotives and wagons. (Chabot 1998, p. 3)
                                             
6 Up-to-date information on financial performance is not available.148 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
ASR has committed to spending $62 million on locomotives, track and rollingstock
over five years (Harris 1998).
Great Southern Railway (GSR), which operates passenger services, employs around
270 people for station and on-train services. A further 100 people are employed full-
time by subcontractors who provide catering, laundry, cleaning and maintenance
services. While GSR’s Overland service continues to make losses, the Ghan and
Indian Pacific services now generate positive margins which are sufficient to cover
fixed costs. GSR expects to become profitable in the next year (sub. DR95).
These initiatives follow a similar pattern to that observed in New Zealand where the
railway was privatised in the early 1990s. Although the corporatisation of the
New  Zealand railway generated significant improvements in performance,
privatisation led to further gains (box 7.5).
In the Australian context, the fact that private consortia have purchased generally
loss-making government railways without public subsidies (and in some cases for
relatively high prices) suggests the new owners expect to achieve gains in
efficiency.7 That is, when the sale value exceeds the present value of the profits (or
losses) under government ownership, this differential is an indication that enterprise
performance is likely to improve under private management.
Rail privatisation in Australia has seen smaller assets being sold first. In these initial
sales, vendor governments have had to deal with a range of often complex issues.
This experience and the lessons learned may prove useful to governments intending
to privatise larger rail operations.
When contemplating privatisation, governments need to be aware of the trade-off
between maximising sale value and promoting competition. Government enterprises
which earn monopoly profits are likely to fetch a higher price than if they faced
competition. As Baumol stated, when a government-owned enterprise is put up for
sale:
…  those who are responsible for overseeing the transaction are likely to consider
themselves obligated for the sake of the public interest to seek to obtain for the property
as high a price as can be gotten. But it is obvious that higher price bids can be elicited if
the property is offered along with a monopoly license that is protected against the entry
of rivals. (Baumol 1993, p. 7)
                                             
7 Both AN and V/Line Freight were loss-making businesses before privatisation. AN recorded an
operating loss (before abnormal items) of $57 million in 1996-97 (AN 1997) and V/Line Freight
reported an operating deficit (before abnormal items) of $15  million for 1997-98 (V/Line
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Box 7.5 Rail privatisation in New Zealand
In 1982, responsibility for managing the New Zealand railway was shifted from a
government trading department to a statutory corporation with largely commercial
objectives. It later became a state-owned enterprise. In the early 1990s, the
New Zealand Railways Corporation underwent financial restructuring. The Government
formed a new company, New Zealand Rail Limited, to run the core rail freight, rail
passenger, and inter-island ferry services previously owned by the New Zealand
Railways Corporation.
New Zealand’s rail system achieved significant improvements in customer focus,
efficiency and financial performance over the 10 years from the time the business was
corporatised. Between 1983 and the early 1990s, rail freight rates were reported to
have declined by around 50  per  cent in real terms, customer surveys indicated
improvements in service quality, and employment had fallen by more than 70 per cent.
New Zealand Rail was sold to a New Zealand-US consortium in 1993 and now
operates as Tranz Rail. Since privatisation, the company has introduced new labour
agreements and work practices, sold non-core assets, re-branded its corporate
identity, worked to improve customer satisfaction and upgraded its technology and
asset base. Significant investment in infrastructure, equipment and technology has
allowed the company to improve its service delivery by reducing freight transit times,
increasing freight capacity and increasing operational efficiency. Labour productivity,








a  Number of trips per month for freight cars.
Sources: ATN, sub.  25; Duncan and Bollard 1992; Small 1998.
Thus, governments should consider the competitive environment within which their
railways operate, including the structure of enterprises, access regimes and the
degree of competition from other modes. Selling a monopoly business without
effective regulation or adequate track access arrangements may artificially inflate
the sale price, but may ultimately impose costs on industry and the community.
Regulation issues are discussed in chapter 8.
In many freight markets in Australia, rail operators face competition from other
operators and/or transport modes. Given this environment and considering the
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are strong candidates for privatisation. The experience to date with the recently
privatised rail operators in Australia has been encouraging.
In the case of the main coal lines in New South Wales and Queensland (where
market power exists), governments could introduce periodic competitive bidding
among private sector entities for the right to haul coal (chapter 6). To allow for
franchising, privatisation of government-owned freight operations in these States
would require specific arrangements for reserving the rollingstock used on the coal
lines. As discussed above, it is essential that governments resolve asset transfer
issues to ensure competitive outcomes in subsequent bidding rounds.
In addition to budgetary effects, governments should take account of the broader
costs and benefits that are likely to result from selling their railways. Although
privatisation of a railway may generate an overall gain to the economy, it could still
have adverse impacts on railway employment and regional communities. In these
situations, adjustment issues will need to be considered (chapter 11).
Once the decision to privatise is taken, it is important that governments specify the
time frame within which privatisation will occur. Failure to do so may generate
uncertainty and reduce investment in the rail industry. Some private operators are
waiting for privatisations to occur before making further investments. In the case of
NRC, some participants (Capricorn Capital Limited and the Austrac Group;
Specialized Container Transport) have expressed concerns about the retention of
assets in excess of NRC’s requirements.
In deciding to privatise railways, governments need to consider the competitive
environment, including the extent of intermodal competition and the effectiveness
of regulation. There is a strong case to privatise rail services operating in
competitive transport markets.
To sum up, private sector involvement in railways can take a variety of forms,
including through CTC, BOOT-type schemes, franchising and full privatisation. The
appropriateness of different forms of private sector involvement will differ,
depending on the characteristics of the specific rail network and transport market.
Private sector participation has the potential to deliver net benefits to industry and
the wider community, provided that governments pay adequate attention to contract
specification, bidding processes, monitoring systems and regulation. Governments
should also consider labour and regional adjustment costs (chapter 11).PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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Governments which own railways should pursue further private sector
involvement (through contracting out, BOOT-type arrangements, franchising or
privatisation) as an integral part of their approach to rail reform.
All remaining government-owned freight operations should be privatised, with
special arrangements for the rollingstock used on the main coal lines.
7.3 Taxation issues
The extent and form of private sector involvement can be influenced by taxation
arrangements. Participants’ concerns in this area centred on:
·  the Infrastructure Borrowings Tax Offset Scheme; and
·  s.51AD of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cwlth).
Infrastructure Borrowings Tax Offset Scheme
Several participants (including Patrick, QR and the WA Government) supported the
use of tax incentives as a mechanism to encourage private sector investment in rail
infrastructure. Patrick stated that:
If the government wishes to foster the growth and development of rail, then tax
incentives and BOOT schemes would induce more participation from the private
sector. (sub. 63, attach. 1, p. 13)
Infrastructure projects, such as BOOT schemes, are normally undertaken by stand-
alone companies, usually formed as a joint venture between several parent
companies. Under the stand-alone company structure, tax losses can only be offset
against income earned by the project and not against other income earned by the
parent companies. As infrastructure projects are often characterised by long
construction and start-up periods before any income is earned, any tax losses must
be capitalised and offset against future income earned.
However, the real value of the tax losses (when carried forward) will be lower than
when they were initially incurred, especially in periods of high inflation. Some have
argued that stand-alone companies are tax disadvantaged due to their inability to
access tax losses during the construction phase of projects.
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To address this perceived tax disadvantage, the Commonwealth Government in
1992 introduced the infrastructure borrowings program. In 1997, this program was
replaced by the Infrastructure Borrowings Tax Offset Scheme which aims to
encourage private sector investment in land transport infrastructure by reducing
finance costs. The scheme allows infrastructure proponents to apply:
…  for a tax rebate, described as a tax offset within the ITAA [Income Tax Assessment
Act] 1997, which is provided to the project’s resident infrastructure lenders. In return
the infrastructure proponent (the borrower) receives a reduction in finance costs in the
form of lower interest rates or other benefits, and forgoes tax deductibility on interest
payments associated with the loan. (DTRS and the ATO 1998, p. 1)
Rail projects that have applied for the rebate include the Alice Springs-Darwin
Railway, Bondi Rail Extension, Chatswood-Parramatta Rail Link, Snowy Mountains
Railway, Surat Basin Rail Link and Sydney-Canberra Very High Speed Train
(sub. 76). Rail projects were not among the first projects that qualified to receive
assistance under the rebate scheme. The Commonwealth Government is in the
process of assessing another round of applications.
However, some studies have placed the rationale for such tax concessions under
question. Freebairn doubts that tax losses represent a convincing argument for
special concessions to infrastructure investors:
Because over a half of other investors [apart from infrastructure investors] also have to
carry forward measured tax losses, and because the effect of loss carry-forward is to
increase effective tax rates by only a few percentage points, even stand-alone project
infrastructure investments are unlikely to face effective tax rates much above the
average for other corporate investments. (Freebairn 1995, p. 16)
And, Sieper  (1995) estimated that effective tax rates are broadly equivalent for
stand-alone infrastructure projects, other infrastructure projects, and plant and
equipment with effective lives between 5 and 30 years.
Both Freebairn and Sieper argued that, while stand-alone companies cannot access
tax losses during the construction phase, this disadvantage is largely offset by the
impact of accelerated depreciation and the fact that the tax system does not tax the
appreciating value of a project during the construction period (EPAC 1995a).
A range of criticisms has also been levelled at the offset scheme. Specifically,
Green  (1998) argued that, compared to the former infrastructure borrowings
program, the new scheme is worse in a number of respects — the type of projects
considered is narrow, the guidelines appear to be subjective, eligibility is less certain
and there is no avenue to appeal decisions. Submissions to the Rail Projects
Taskforce (1999) criticised the limited funding for the scheme which is capped at
$75 million a year. The Taskforce noted that the scheme favours well-developedPUBLIC AND PRIVATE
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projects that are near financial close and commencement of construction rather than
projects still in the development phase.
There are doubts about the effectiveness of the Infrastructure Borrowings Tax
Offset Scheme in the context of the rail sector. In general, the scheme appears to
assist projects that would have proceeded anyway.
Section 51 AD
Section  51AD of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997 (Cwlth) was originally
introduced to prevent ‘sale and lease back’ arrangements between State
Governments and the private sector. Under these schemes, a (tax exempt)
government body would sell infrastructure assets to a private entity which would
then lease the assets back to the government body. In this way, the private entity
could claim tax deductions on depreciation and interest expenses while the
government body retained effective control over the infrastructure. As noted by the
ARTC, such arrangements were ‘at the expense of the Commonwealth tax revenue’
(trans.,  p.  807). Section  51AD disallows these tax deductions, reducing the
attractiveness of sale and lease back schemes.
A number of participants (including Australasian Railway Association, ARTC,
NSW Government, Queensland Transport, QR and Victorian Government)
expressed concerns about s.51AD. QR argued that it is a significant impediment to
private sector investment in rail infrastructure:
…  this Section makes it difficult (if not unprofitable) for the private sector to directly
finance and own a major railway deviation. The effect for private sector rail
infrastructure owners is their costs may not be deductable if the railway operators using
that infrastructure are tax exempt bodies and are deemed to control the use of the
railway. (sub. 59, attach. 2, pp. 22-23)
The NSW Government contended that the discretionary powers under s.51AD
introduce a level of uncertainty for State Governments that disadvantages BOOT-
type projects:
Given the level of State Government financial support for the rail industry, the private
sector would generally fail the ATO’s ‘control’ test when applied to BOOT projects. In
fact, ATO clearance of the BOOT component of the New Southern Railway project
came only after lengthy negotiations over the amount of ‘control’ exerted by the State
Government in the contract arrangements with the private sector developer.
(sub. DR128, pp. 42-43)
The Private Infrastructure Task Force (EPAC 1995a) concluded that there was little
justification for retaining the anti-avoidance tax provisions (s.51AD and
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projects to avoid the provisions was also found to be costly and time consuming.
The Task Force recommended that the provisions either be abolished or redrafted.
Its preference was to replace the existing provisions with new general leasing
provisions.
Section 51AD and other business tax issues are being considered by the Review of
Business Taxation (RBT 1999). The RBT noted that s.51AD and Division 16D are
complex in their application of the effective control test, but the complexity of
s.51AD is exacerbated by the severity of its application — it disallows deductions
relating to assets completely while all income remains taxable. The provision has
become more problematic with the privatisation and contracting of government
activities that were not contemplated when it was first conceived (RBT 1999). The
RBT will submit its final recommendations to the Commonwealth Government in
August 1999.
The anti-avoidance provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act (section 51AD
and Division 16D) may act as impediments to private sector investment in rail
infrastructure.ACCESS 155
8 Access to rail infrastructure services
Regulating access to rail infrastructure services is one way governments
can ensure that train operators have the right to seek access on terms and
conditions that do not disadvantage them relative to their competitors.
Access regulation is most likely to be relevant in markets where it is
desirable to promote competition between train operators and where this
cannot be achieved more effectively through other reform measures.
A well designed access regime offers a workable framework in which track
owners and train operators can reach agreements regarding access to
track, while minimising the regulatory cost of doing so.
Existing railways facing limited competition are able to raise prices or lower the
quality of service to increase revenue. In contrast, increased competitive pressure
may improve market outcomes because competition, or the threat of competition,
puts pressure on railways to operate more efficiently, look for innovative ways to
respond to customer needs, improve quality and/or lower prices.
Competitive pressure can be generated from within the market (rail-on-rail
competition), competition for the market (through franchising) or from other forms
of transport, particularly road and sea transport (chapters 2 and 6). Effective
competition within the rail industry may be blunted if potential rail operators cannot
gain access to track, or can only gain access subject to unfavourable prices,
scheduling or other conditions.1
To create the right to seek access to infrastructure and so encourage competition,
most governments have introduced legislative access regimes which set out:
·  the terms and conditions for gaining access to the track; and/or
·  the processes that determine these terms and conditions.
The terms of reference direct the Commission to consider the operation of access
regimes in relation to the interstate and intrastate rail freight networks, although
                                             
1 Although the Commission will focus on gaining access to track, the general principles may be
extended to other associated rail infrastructure services (such as workshops, stations and
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passenger operations are also affected.2 In doing so the Commission examines the
institutional arrangements that governments have introduced (section 8.1). It then
considers the markets where access regulation may improve industry performance
and the principles underlying well designed regimes in these markets (section 8.2).
The problems of developing and implementing effective regimes, including the
costs of access (section 8.3), pricing and allocating train schedules (section 8.4),
costing methodologies (section 8.5) and the complexity of operating on the interstate
network (section 8.6) are also discussed.
8.1 Australian access regimes
In its 1991 inquiry into rail transport, the Industry Commission (IC) recommended
that track owners be required to allow other organisations track access subject only
to capacity being available and the negotiation of a commercial agreement.
Since then there have been significant changes in the institutional arrangements
which facilitate access to a range of rail infrastructure services (chapter 3 and
appendix D). The details of current Australian access regimes are presented in
appendix F.
In 1995, the National Access Regime was introduced under Part IIIA of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (TPA) as part of the National Competition Policy Package.
Under the regime, new and existing rail operators can:
·  request that the National Competition Council (NCC) recommend that the
relevant Minister ‘declare’ access to the services of a particular infrastructure
facility. If the facility is declared, the parties enter into negotiation, supported by
legally binding arbitration, in order to reach agreeable terms and conditions;
·  negotiate within the provisions of a legally binding ‘undertaking’ registered with
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC); or
·  negotiate within the provisions of state-based access regimes which may, or may
not, be certified as being ‘effective’ following a recommendation by the
NCC (figure 8.1).
                                             
2 In many instances, the provisions within access regimes are equally applicable to both freight
and passenger businesses. However, some regimes include specific terms and conditions for
certain types of business. The NSW rail access regime includes specific pricing principles for
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Figure 8.2 Alternative ways to seek access
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a  However, parties can appeal the decision to the Australian Competition Tribunal.
Sources: IC 1995a; NCC 1996b; ACCC 1997b.
Most State Governments have proclaimed access regimes for rail infrastructure
services, but these have not been certified as effective (chapter 3).3 The access
regimes differ, both in terms of their coverage (types of track, such as intrastate and
interstate) and the provisions that they contain. The NSW and WA regimes cover
both interstate and intrastate networks, and the Queensland, SA and Victorian
regimes apply only to the intrastate network (table 8.1).
                                             
3 Some of these are rail specific and others are more general, applying to major infrastructure
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Each regime contains provisions setting out the principles for access seekers to
negotiate with the access providers to reach agreeable terms and conditions.
However, the pricing principles and the restrictions on negotiation can vary
significantly (box 8.1). Similarly, although each regime contains provisions and
mechanisms for dispute resolution, these can vary in terms of the independence of
the arbitrator, the transparency of arbitrated decisions, and the scope to appeal
decisions (appendix F).
Currently, if operators are unable to gain access under agreeable terms and
conditions, they may seek a declaration under the provisions of the National Access
Regime. The NCC has received applications from five operators seeking declaration
of certain rail infrastructure services (table 8.2).
All but one of these have been assessed by the NCC, and recommendations made to
the relevant Minister. In each case the service was deemed by the relevant Minister
not to be declared. And in each case the appeals process through the Australian
Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal) was invoked.
In some instances the declaration process stimulated further negotiations between
the parties, leading to agreement being reached.
One application (the Hamersley Iron rail service in the Pilbara) was terminated,
following a decision by the Federal Court in June 1999 regarding the NCC’s
jurisdiction to accept or review the application or make a recommendation on the
matter. The court ruled that the Hamersley Iron rail service was integral to the
production process and should therefore not be subject to access by Hamersley
Iron’s competitors. In July 1999, the NCC and Hope Downs Management Services
appealed the decision.
The ACCC has not received any undertakings for rail. However, the Australian Rail
Track Corporation (ARTC) has indicated that it intends to develop an industry code
to form the basis of an access undertaking to be submitted to the ACCC in the future
for the interstate track under its control (trans., p. 570).ACCESS 159
Table 8.3 Coverage of state access regimes for raila
State Interstate Intrastate
NSW NSW Rail Access Regime NSW Rail Access Regime
Vic na Rail Corporations (Amendment) Act 1998 b
Qld na Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997
Queensland Competition Authority Amendment
Regulation (No. 1) 1998
SA na Railways (Operations and Access) Act 1997
WA Government Railways Act 1904
Government Railways (Access) Bill 1998
Government Railways Act 1904
Government Railways (Access) Bill 1998 c
Tas d na na
a   As no jurisdictions have certified rail access regimes and no undertakings are currently in place, an
operator may seek a declaration through the National Access Regime (under Part IIIA of the TPA) on all parts
of the Australian rail network. b   The regime covers the Freight Victoria country network (sub. 82). c  The
regime currently applies to the government owned freight network and excludes the private iron ore railways
in the Pilbara area. d There is no specific access legislation. Tasrail, as owner of the track is required to enter
into negotiations with other operators under its contract of sale. na Not applicable.
Source: Appendix F.




NCC recommended that the service not be declared.
Queensland Premier did not declare the service.




NCC recommended that the service be declared.
NSW Premier did not make a formal decision, so the service was deemed
not to be declared.
An appeal lodged with the Australian Competition Tribunal was withdrawn
after the parties reached an agreement.
Hunter Valley rail
service
NCC recommended that the service be declared.
NSW Premier did not make a formal decision, so the service was deemed
not to be declared.
An appeal to the Australian Competition Tribunal is in progress.
WA rail and freight
support services
NCC recommended that the rail service be declared but that the freight
support services not be declared.
WA Premier did not declare the rail line service or the freight service.
An appeal was lodged with the Australian Competition Tribunal, but was
withdrawn after the parties reached an agreement.
Hamersley Iron ore
rail service in the
Pilbara
Hamersley Iron applied to the Federal Court requesting that the NCC be
restrained permanently from both considering the Robe River application any
further and making a recommendation to the Commonwealth Treasurer. In
June 1999, the Federal Court ruled in favour of Hamersley Iron arguing that
the rail line was integral to the mine’s production and therefore should not be
subject to third party access under Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act.
In July 1999, the NCC and Hope Downs Management Services (a
prospective iron ore company) appealed the decision.
Sources: NCC 1998d; NCC 1997a.160 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box 8.2 Access pricing arrangements
The NSW rail access regime was gazetted in February 1999. The access regime sets
pricing principles for both general usage and coal freight.
General usage access prices are negotiated between a ‘floor’ and a ‘ceiling’.
·  The floor requires that:
– any access revenue must at least meet the direct costs imposed by the access
seeker(s); and
–  sectors should recover their incremental costs, including incremental fixed costs.
·  The ceiling requires that any access revenue must not exceed the full economic
cost of the sector(s) for which access is required on a stand alone basis.
In addition, Rail Access Corporation’s total revenue must not exceed the stand alone
full economic cost of the entire network.
Access prices for coal freight are on an origin-destination basis. On some routes the
access price is negotiated as for general usage. On others, the access price is set as
the ceiling price plus an adjustment component that reflects the amount that rail freight
haulage revenue exceeded costs (access and rail operations) on that line in 1996-97.
Coal specific pricing principles are currently being phased out, expiring on
30 June 2000.
Under the SA rail access regime, negotiation to gain access to the intrastate network
is subject to ‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’ prices.
·  The floor reflects the lowest price at which the access provider could provide the
relevant services without incurring a loss.
·  The ceiling reflects the highest price that could fairly be asked by an access
provider for provision of the relevant services.
The Queensland rail access regime allows for ‘access undertakings’ which contain a
framework of terms and conditions under which access will be provided.
Queensland  Rail (QR) has developed a draft undertaking based on a ‘constrained
market approach’ that allows QR to discriminate between railway operators competing
in different markets (sub. 59).
The pricing principles for government-owned railways in Western Australia are being
developed as part of a Rail Access Code.
Under the Victorian regime, negotiation is not limited by defined floor and ceiling
prices, although guidelines exist regarding prices determined as part of arbitrated
decisions (through the Office of the Regulator General) (sub. 82).
On the interstate network, the ARTC publishes prices and terms and conditions for
gaining access to the track which it owns (mainly South Australia) or manages
(Victoria). In New South Wales, Queensland and Western Australia, the ARTC is
negotiating specific train paths with the relevant track access body which it will on-sell
to potential train operators.
Sources: Appendix F; subs. 59; 82; DR102.ACCESS 161
8.2 Regulating access in rail markets
The appropriateness of access regulation depends on:
·  the objective of regulating access;
·  the characteristics of the railway network and markets; and
·  the type of regime that is implemented.
The implications for the appropriate access regime for each of the interstate,
regional and urban rail networks is summarised at the end of the section.
Why regulate access?
Competitive pressure in rail markets can influence the behaviour of existing
operators, leading ultimately to improved market outcomes. In some rail markets,
productivity benefits can be generated by creating an environment which
(chapter 6):
·  increases the potential for competition in the market;
·  encourages market segmentation and product diversity; and/or
·  prevents the infrastructure provider from abusing its market power to make
monopoly profits.
One way to create such an environment is to provide opportunities for new operators
to gain access to track on terms and conditions that do not disadvantage them
relative to their competitors. Access regimes also place bounds on returns available
to the track owner to prevent the earning of monopoly profit.
However, the potential benefits of access regulation should be balanced against the
sometimes significant costs of regulation (section 8.3).
The potential benefits of access regulation should also be considered in the context
of other institutional, structural and regulatory reforms in rail markets. In many
cases other reforms address the problems facing the industry more effectively, either
by providing better solutions or achieving a similar outcome at lower cost. An
increased commercial focus may lead to improvements in efficiency by changing the
incentives facing managers and reducing the scope for government interference in
business decisions (chapter 7). Such reforms are particularly relevant in the black
coal markets. Equally, in interstate markets, reform to address inconsistencies
between the systems in terms of technical specifications and operating procedures
will reduce costs and uncertainty for existing and potential operators (chapter 9).162 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Which markets?
In some rail markets the case for or against access regulation is clear.
It is unlikely that access regulation will be relevant in markets where the potential
benefits of competition between rail operators arising from access regulation are
small and/or the costs of regulation are large, or where the track infrastructure is
struggling to be viable. An example is where it will only ever be cost effective for
one train operator to provide services over a line — given the nature of the market
and the large competitive pressures from other transport modes (such as a suburban
passenger route or various regional networks carrying low volumes) (chapter  2,
chapter 6, box 6.2).4 As Rail 2000 noted:
There are certain branch lines that if you have an open slather, open access policy, are
never going to turn a dollar. (trans., pp. 9-10)
Maddock expressed a similar view:
If rail faces strong competition from road, so strong that it does not earn a commercial
return, then we should not be treating rail as a natural monopoly … The correct policy
position at the first level would thus seem to be to remove regulation, and to remove
third party access requirements, since these will not produce efficiency gains.
(sub. 40, pp. 2-3)
King and Maddock argued that in relation to low volume intrastate railways:
Since we can rely on road transport to impose competitive pressure on such intrastate
rail there is probably no need to regulate it at all. The key policy issues are for State
governments to determine the appropriate mechanisms to induce the managers of such
systems to operate them as efficiently as possible. (King and Maddock 1999, p. 12)
Similarly, formal access regimes are likely to be unnecessary in markets where
existing train operators and track owners have reached private agreements.
Access regulation is more likely to be relevant in markets where it is desirable to
promote competition between train operators (either for customers or for the use of
the track) and/or prevent market power in track infrastructure being used to inhibit
competition. Access regulation may be appropriate where these objectives cannot be
achieved more effectively through other reforms.
There is some evidence that the potential for increased competition in some main
coal railways in regional Queensland and New South Wales has generated
significant benefits, in terms of efficiency improvements by freight carriers and
lower freight prices. Competitive pressures on coal rail freight in the Hunter Valley
                                             
4 Although potential operators in these markets may seek access to a specific part of the route or
infrastructure, for example, the central train station.ACCESS 163
have led to reductions in rail freight rates of around 25 per cent between 1995-96
and 1997-98 (NCC 1998a). It is difficult to identify the contributions of the threat of
competition between train operators and other factors, such as the phasing out of
monopoly rents and contracting out of maintenance services, in the freight rate
reductions.
The nature of the downstream markets into which coal is sold may also limit the
ability of rail operators to extract monopoly rents. Maddock noted that:
Even in the case of coal and other mineral lines on which there may be some degree of
monopoly power, the prices concerned are set on the international market which again
provides a check on the ability of the rail operators to extract monopoly rents.
(sub. 40, p. 3)
It seems that there are still significant opportunities to drive efficiency gains further
and improve performance of freight operations through competition, particularly
‘for’ the market in coal railways. Rio Tinto noted that in the Hunter Valley:
… there has been some improvement in focus … [but] in terms of delivering anything
like the efficiencies we see in other railway systems in this country and overseas,
there’s a long way to go. (trans., p. 545)
Similarly, the NSW Minerals Council noted:
There are gains to be obtained from increasing competition … Those who would be
advantaged by increased competition include the NSW coal industry, which would
benefit from rail freight rates at world best practice levels, through a stronger industry
which would be better able to compete in international coal markets. (sub. 39, p. 14)
There also is some evidence of benefits from increased competition among rail
operators and increased market ‘segmentation’ in the interstate market. For example,
the Specialized Container Transport (SCT) service between Melbourne and Perth
commenced as a niche operation which focused on van traffic following the
withdrawal of the National Rail Corporation (NRC) from this type of traffic
(sub. 76). Other examples are provided in chapters 3 and 6.
In some rail markets, it is not clear whether access will enhance or diminish industry
performance. Mandated access to the privately owned integrated railways
supporting large export operations (like the Pilbara iron ore operations) may benefit
new mining operations but this may be at the expense of incumbents and the
national interest as a whole (box 8.2). When incumbent track owners lose their
ability to act in their own commercial interest they may withdraw from future
investment.164 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box 8.2 Privately owned iron ore operations
A number of privately owned rail systems operate in the Pilbara, Western Australia.
The operations are designed as integrated components of iron ore production —
mining, hauling, blending and shipping the ore (Rio Tinto, sub. 58).
To transport iron ore to the port, a new mining operation situated close to an existing
track could either:
·  develop its own integrated operation by duplicating the existing infrastructure; or
·  seek access to the existing infrastructure and so increase rail usage along a track.
In either case, the increased supply of the product from the new operations may
depress world prices for both existing and new operations.
A commercially focused new operator would only build its own integrated operation if
its expected revenues are greater than the cost of building and maintaining its track. It
would prefer to use existing track if the costs of building and maintaining its own track
are greater than the costs of negotiation and the access price agreed with the existing
infrastructure owner.
If spare capacity exists along the line, then the existing owner would only deny access
to a new operator if:
·  the new operator imposed additional costs on the existing operator, for example
through damaging the track; and
·  the existing operator was not able to negotiate an access fee large enough to
compensate for the additional costs or the revenue forgone; or
·  lower world prices from additional competition impaired the viability of existing
operations.
Denying access implies that the access charge (reflecting the anticipated benefits to
the new operator) is insufficient to compensate the existing owner and cover the costs
of negotiation. The commercially negotiated outcome (no access) would coincide with
the national interest because either the new operator builds its own line or the proposal
was not viable. Mandatory access would therefore not improve national welfare and
may in fact prove to be harmful.
Sources: sub. 58; IC 1995a.ACCESS 165
Access regulation may improve the performance of some rail markets, including
interstate freight, where the benefits of increased competition, particularly
through market segmentation, are expected to outweigh the costs of the access
regime.
Access regulation is unlikely to improve performance in rail markets where there
is no effective market power due to:
·  significant intermodal competition;
·  competition in downstream markets; and/or
·  little congestion on track infrastructure.
In these circumstances it is likely that very few train operators would seek access
and that commercially driven railways will be able to reach private agreements.
Characteristics of well designed access regimes
A well designed access regime should offer a workable framework to address key
problems in the market, while minimising the regulatory cost of doing so. It should:
·  provide for an appropriate level of flexibility in terms of the ability of owners
and operators to negotiate terms and conditions as market opportunities change;
·  be transparent and administered independently; and
·  reflect the institutional structure and arrangements governing the management
and operation of the market.
An appropriate level of flexibility
An access regime can:
·  provide for flexible outcomes within broad guidelines; or
·  be highly prescriptive, specifying terms and conditions under which access can
be made, for example through the use of posted prices (box 8.5).
Flexibility in setting terms and conditions is important when there is limited
information about existing and future opportunities in the market because it allows
owners and operators to respond to changing circumstances as they occur. In
contrast, prescriptive regimes may establish rules that unduly restrict or prevent
commercially driven outcomes.166 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Flexibility may also be desirable in markets with high fixed costs, like railways. In
these markets significant benefits are generated by encouraging optimal utilisation
of the track.5 This can be achieved by discriminating between operators so that
those operators (or outputs) that are marginally profitable, but would be lost if
charged higher prices, pay less than other operators but still make some contribution
towards the long run costs attributable to them.
However, several participants noted their concern that such flexibility can allow
track owners to discriminate inappropriately between operators, disadvantaging one
relative to its competitors. As SCT noted:
Without openness of pricing, there is always the suspicion that someone else has been
given a better deal. (sub. 37, p. 3)
An undesirable form of price discrimination is the cross-subsidisation of services
which do not cover their own costs. In its report into The Australian Black Coal
Industry, the Commission received a number of complaints of cross-subsidies from
coal freight to other freight and passenger services in other networks (PC 1998a).
These complaints were reiterated by several participants to this inquiry.
In addition, increased flexibility may be at the expense of certainty which may
inhibit potential operators from taking advantage of market opportunities at the time
they arise. If a negotiated outcome cannot be reached, potential operators can seek
redress or resolution though arbitration or litigation. However, this can take time. As
Great Northern Rail Services (GNRS) noted:
… the time required for the resolution will effectively mean that the operator will have
lost the job because of the inability to meet contract conditions within acceptable time
scales. The whole dispute resolution process is by its nature, long and involved and the
realities of the industry make that a commercial nonsense. (sub. 46, p. 9)
Increased flexibility may also increase transaction costs when large numbers of
potential or actual operators individually negotiate terms and conditions with the
access provider. However, it is unlikely that this will be a problem in many rail
networks given the generally agreed view that most can only support a small number
of operators (chapter 2).
Prescriptive access regimes may address some of these issues. If the prescriptive
regime reflects efficient pricing principles and is seen to be transparent and
independent, then operators may be confident that they are being offered fair and
reasonable terms and conditions. However, the cost of getting the principles wrong
                                             
5 Indeed, the so called economies of density may have a significant influence on network costs
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can be high. In addition, such regimes may involve greater direct regulatory input
(and consequently have higher regulatory costs) than flexible regimes.
Flexibility in access regimes is required to ensure the optimal utilisation of the
track, but this needs to be balanced against the potential costs:
·  if it allows infrastructure owners to inappropriately cross-subsidise between
operators; and/or
·  there are high transaction costs.
Transparency and independence
Well designed access regimes should facilitate increased transparency. Several
participants commented on the lack of transparency in access decisions in existing
regimes and the difficulties that this presents to both track owners and train
operators. With regard to access prices, Shell Coal suggested:
Where there is no transparency and the owner of railway infrastructure has a natural
monopoly, the customer (eg coal producer) cannot know whether the monopolist is
using market power to recover inefficient operating costs and excessive overheads, or
hide poor investment decisions. (sub. 36, p. 3)
Similarly, Rio Tinto suggested:
… there is an inability of all customers to get from Queensland Rail a breakdown of the
freight rates into the access charge and the hauler’s charge, and that makes it very
difficult once again to evaluate any competitive alternative. (trans., p. 543)
Some participants also commented on the lack of transparency in determining and
publishing costs. Rio Tinto suggested:
The industry has found it impossible to date to obtain any information at all on asset
valuations. By contrast, Queensland coal producers have been able to obtain asset
valuations for other public infrastructures such as the ports that we deal with, and the
government-owned corporation there has made balance sheets available. Queensland
Rail have made no information available. (trans., p. 543)
Similar concerns have been expressed by participants in the Commission’s report
into The Australian Black Coal Industry (PC 1998a). The Independent Pricing And
Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales (IPART), in its review of aspects of the
NSW rail access regime, recommended that asset valuations be undertaken by an
independent consultant. The process should include provision for stakeholders to
comment on a draft valuation prior to the consultant establishing a final value
(IPART 1999c).168 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
Transparent pricing principles and cost methodologies within access regimes are
highly desirable. Access to appropriate information may improve the efficiency of
the price setting process and give potential train operators more confidence that they
are being treated fairly. This is particularly important in markets with vertically
integrated infrastructure owners (discussed below). As the NCC noted, for vertically
integrated organisations it is important that:
… there were some mechanisms to ensure transparency in those arrangements and to
ensure that there wasn't the opportunity to, in effect, provide better internal pricing than
would be available to other participants in the competitive market. (trans., p. 591)
The NSW Government regarded vertical separation as the key to facilitating
transparency. It argued that:
Open access and vertical separation have the potential to deliver significant benefits to
the community … Also important is the creation of full transparency and the generation
of commercial or market based pressures in all parts of the rail transport chain, neither
of which may be achievable in a vertically integrated structure. (sub. DR128, p. 27)
Greater transparency in price setting is somewhat more complicated when train
operators and track owners reach commercial agreements. In these cases the
arguments for transparent pricing principles remain strong, although there will be
less disclosure regarding the actual access charges facing individual operators.
It is also important to have independent arbitration and appeal mechanisms to limit
any potential conflict of interest between the role of an infrastructure owner, the
arbitrator and regulator. As the Queensland Commission of Audit noted:
Given the incentive that exists for Queensland Rail to discourage competitors from
operating on its network, the effectiveness of the regime will be limited unless it is
enforced by an independent authority. (Queensland Commission of Audit 1996, p. 162)
Similarly, King noted:
No one is going to fight an incumbent player who is also the industry
umpire. (King 1997, p. 278)
When the possibility of conflict of interest exists it can be overcome by increasing
the independence and transparency of the access regime processes, thereby
providing operators with confidence that they are being treated fairly.
Increased transparency in pricing principles and cost methodologies, and
independent arbitration and appeal processes would provide operators with
confidence in the fairness of access decisions.ACCESS 169
Institutional structure of the market
Well designed access regimes also should take account of any differences in the
institutional structure of activities in the market. Depending on the jurisdiction,
operators seeking to gain access to track can now negotiate with:
·  a vertically integrated organisation with an access regime;
·  a separate ‘ring-fenced’ infrastructure unit within a vertically integrated
organisation; or
·  a separate infrastructure owner.
Several participants commented that, at least in terms of seeking access, dealing
with a vertically integrated organisation or ‘ring-fenced’ unit was unsatisfactory and
that structural separation may deliver better access outcomes.
Vertically integrated organisations and ring-fencing
In vertically integrated railways, a conflict may exist between actions in the interest
of the integrated organisation and any obligations to treat all train operators fairly. In
this circumstance the track owner may also be competing as a train operator with
other operators seeking access. The track owner has an incentive to increase the
access price to the competitor because of its monopoly position. This problem may
be compounded by a lack of transparency in relation to the decision making process.
As the Queensland Mining Council noted:
… invariably, the chief executive and the board of QR will be making decisions about
growing the business on the one hand and decisions about admitting competitors whose
objective is to take away their business … (trans., p. 622)
Gaining access to track in vertically integrated organisations may become less of a
problem when potential train operators intend to operate in market segments that are
not in direct competition with existing operators. Indeed, commercially focused
track owners have strong incentives to set prices and conditions to encourage new
operators in noncompeting markets onto the track as the increased traffic flow will
reduce costs for all operators.
Creating ring-fenced units within the vertically integrated organisation may
contribute to improving the transparency of access decisions and the perceived
fairness of the process.170 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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However, some participants were not convinced that these arrangements would be
sufficient. Shell Coal noted that it:
… strongly disagrees with the decision by the Queensland Government to keep
Queensland Rail a vertically and horizontally integrated corporate entity and to
construct ‘Chinese walls’ between above track operations and the newly formed Access
Unit. The break-up of the NSW State Rail Authority was not easy but the benefits of
putting above track and below track responsibilities into separate corporate entities has
delivered benefits we believe will be much harder to achieve under the Queensland Rail
structure. (sub. 36, p. 5)
Under ring-fencing the track owner may still have strong incentives to introduce
unfavourable scheduling and maintenance arrangements. As GNRS noted:
A direct competitor requiring access to the network for the purpose of running a train
can be effectively ‘frozen out’. This can be achieved ‘legally’ by causing undue delays
in granting access and providing inappropriate paths for the running of
trains. (sub. 46, p. 9)
Similarly, the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services
(DTRS) noted:
… there are much more subtle ways than simply denying someone access to a line
[including] your maintenance work, various requirements you might have of other
players [and] investment priorities.
If you're a vertically integrated operation you'll invest where it will provide the best
commercial return for you and that may or may not suit the commercial requirements of
other operators. (trans., pp. 526-527)
It has been argued that for ring-fencing to be effective the business units must be
independently accountable for their commercial performance. The Commission of
the European Communities’ proposal for the development of the railways within the
Community recommended that:
… to create a solid basis for infrastructure charges, it is necessary to separate both the
profit and loss accounts and the balance sheets of the two activities [being the
infrastructure management and the provision of transport services]. (EC 1998b, p. 12)
However, such measures may not necessarily promote full accountability where the
business units are in a subsidiary relationship to a parent corporation which manages
its subsidiaries to the benefit of the whole corporation.
For vertically integrated railways effective ring-fencing arrangements between
track and other business operations could promote transparency and
independence but may not be sufficient in some circumstances.ACCESS 171
Vertical separation
Access problems are reduced when the track owner does not compete as a train
operator, that is when vertical separation is introduced. As NCC noted:
In the context of access, there are a lot of benefits with separation because you remove
the conflict which exists with a vertically-integrated organisation where they are both a
competitor and a service provider to people who want access. So if you’re looking at
the issue purely in the access context, then I think the benefits of structural separation
there are quite large. (trans., p. 590)
Vertical separation may also facilitate perceptions of fairness. The NSW
Government argued that vertical separation:
… eliminates problems of attempting to ensure that all access seekers are treated fairly
and on a ‘level playing field’. These problems arise when the owner of the
infrastructure is also a major user of the facilities ie when the owner competes with
other access seekers for either use of infrastructure capacity, or in end markets.
(sub. DR128, pp. 8-9)
In addition, the NSW Government argued that:
… if structural separation has occurred, an access regime may improve the relationship
between end market and infrastructure, given that the infrastructure remains a natural
monopoly. (sub. DR128, p. 49)
Vertical separation was adopted in New South Wales in 1996 and for the interstate
network in 1998.6
DTRS considered that this approach on the interstate network could be jeopardised:
Of immediate concern to the Commonwealth is the WA Government’s proposed sale of
Westrail’s freight operations as a vertically integrated package including the Westrail
owned interstate track between Perth and Kalgoorlie. The decision by WA is potentially
the first decision point at which rail reform deviates from the industry structure
envisaged by the Intergovernmental Agreement and puts at risk the chances of success
of the ARTC. (sub. 76, p. 12)
Vertical separation would address any conflict of interest by introducing incentives
for the track owner to encourage more operators onto the track. However, in these
cases track owners may still have an incentive and opportunity to exploit their
market power and make monopoly profits. In this situation a strong access regime
may still be required to regulate monopoly profits. The merits of structural
separation are discussed in chapter 6.
                                             
6 Likewise in some overseas railways, track management, including the administration and
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A strong access regime would be justified where a rail network is vertically
integrated, the incumbent has market power and there is potential for competition
between train operators in the same market.
A strong access regime would not be justified where a rail network is vertically
separated and the track owner has little market power, as there are sufficient
incentives for the track owner to efficiently use its capacity. Where the track
owner has market power a strong access regime would still be required.
Access regimes for different networks
From the preceding discussion it is possible to determine the nature of access
regimes required for each of the three railway networks outlined in chapter 2.
Only light handed access regimes are required for both the urban and regional
networks without market power. In these networks there tends to be strong
intermodal competition and only limited scope for competition between train
operators for the same passengers or freight. Access arrangements for other
operators wishing to use the network could be incorporated in franchise agreements
or contracts.
In the regional networks with market power (the main coal lines) access
arrangements depend, to some extent, upon the structural and ownership reform
undertaken. If, as suggested by the Commission, these networks were horizontally
separated as vertically integrated organisations and franchised, access arrangements
would be included in the franchise agreement. Where there is vertical separation and
considerable market power (as currently exists in the Hunter Valley) a strong access
regime is required.
Although there is strong intermodal competition, there also is some competition
between train operators on the interstate network. The access regime should
encourage market segmentation and the entry of specialised train operators onto the
network. Under current arrangements a strong access regime is required on those
sections of the interstate network that remain vertically integrated (that is, Western
Australia). Under the Commission’s proposal for an interstate manager, the access
requirements for the entire network would be embedded in a code of conduct (rules
governing the operations of the network manager). This code would be approved, as
an undertaking, by the ACCC.ACCESS 173
8.3 Costs of access
The introduction and operation of access regimes is not costless. In determining the
appropriate regime for any network the benefits and costs of the regime must be
assessed. Introduction and operation of the regime includes the costs of:
·  developing the regime;
·  regulating access once the regime is in place; and
·  the appeals process.
An important element of the cost of developing the regime is the time taken for it to
be implemented. Some participants commented on the slowness with which access
arrangements are being established. DTRS noted:
Although bound by the Competition Principles Agreement to providing third party
access to rail infrastructure, the States have been slow to develop rail access regimes
that are acceptable to the NCC. (sub. 76, p. 5)
The NSW Minerals Council has been involved in the process to develop an effective
rail access regime in New South Wales since 1995 (box 8.3). The NSW regime has
still not been certified effective. The NSW Government noted that the NSW
Minerals Council chose to participate in the process of developing the regime, and
hence:
Such costs were not imposed on the NSW Minerals Council. Rather the Council
voluntarily incurred such costs. (sub. DR128, p. 50)
Once the regime has been implemented, train operators face costs associated with
dealing with the regime, including administrative and compliance costs, and
business incentives may be adversely affected (box 8.4).
Costs increase with the complexity of regimes and number of regimes with which
operators are required to negotiate. Several participants noted the complexity of
current access arrangements. Train operators on the interstate network must
negotiate under a multiplicity of regimes. SCT noted:
The difficulty with the state-based arrangements in SCT’s experience with negotiations
has not been that multiple telephone calls were necessary but that each state started out
with different requirements and perceptions. It is the removal of the different
perceptions and requirements that is needed (or the ability to remove the differences)
not limiting the number of people that can be spoken to. (sub. 37, p. 2)174 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box 8.3 The NSW Minerals Council’s experience
The NSW Minerals Council noted that it has cost the Hunter Rail Access Task Force
over $1.9 million since 1995 seeking to have an effective access regime established in
New South Wales (subs. 39 and DR104). This includes:
·  seeking unsuccessfully to contribute to the development of the regime;
·  lodging an application for declaration of the Hunter Valley railway line service with
the NCC;
·  lodging an appeal with the Tribunal against the decision by the NSW Premier not to
declare the service;
·  responding to an application by the Rail Access Corporation in the Federal Court;
·  responding to an application by the NSW Government to the NCC seeking the
‘certification’ of the NSW rail access regime;
·  responding to the NCC’s Draft Recommendation regarding the effectiveness of the
regime;
·  responding to IPART on the proposed terms of reference for a review of the regime;
and
·  making submissions to various inquiries and committees, including several
submissions to the IPART Review of Aspects of the NSW Access Regime.
Source: sub. 39, pp. 20–22; sub. DR104, p. 5.
As noted in section 8.2, different access regimes are required depending upon the
characteristics of each network. However, multiple regimes on a single network,
such as the interstate network, unnecessarily increase the complexity of negotiating
access. The NSW Government argued that:
There may be good reasons for differences among access regimes eg. the amount and
type of traffic on lines … The question of complexity and inconsistency is probably
most relevant in the case of traffic traversing several regimes eg. interstate traffic.
(sub. DR128, p. 49)
In other cases, different track owners within a particular area cause complexity. The
Silverton Tramway Company noted:
In order to access these sidings [near Broken Hill] our movement would commence on
nonessential infrastructure, move onto essential infrastructure, across jurisdiction
borders and onto a potential private siding.
The access process for a 1.5 km journey comprises:
– Siding agreements with [the] State Rail Authority of NSW to move from track
occupied under licence
– Access agreement with Rail Access CorporationACCESS 175
– Access agreement with Australian Rail Track Corporation.
Silverton is still trying to negotiate some sensible arrangements, currently without a
positive outcome. (sub. 54, p. 3)
Box 8.4 The costs of regulation
Even when there are substantial direct benefits from competition between train
operators, care should be exercised in regulating access to track because regulation
itself may also impose significant costs, particularly if it is administered poorly, or
applied too broadly.
Regulation can impose significant administrative and compliance costs on access
providers, train operators and regulators. For example, the regulated access provider
must devote resources to supplying the regulator with information, and the regulator
must in turn be able to independently assess and verify that information. Owners and
operators can also spend significant resources lobbying the regulator which constitutes
another, less transparent, cost.
Significant costs can also arise through regulatory failure since it is unlikely that
access regulation would be perfectly constructed or administered, given imperfect
information available about the market.
As ARTC noted:
Regulators can deal with extremes of behaviour. Subtlety of market behaviour which actually
does dictate end results, is something that a regulator will never capture until a long period of
time of evidence which by that time the damage has really and truly been
done. (trans., p. 572)
Regulation may diminish incentives for business to invest in infrastructure facilities.
The negative impacts on investment are particularly important in the rail industry since
the lack of suitable investment in rail infrastructure is a major factor limiting the
industry’s growth and future prospects.
Sources: trans., p. 572; IC 1995a; IC 1997b.
Several participants noted that existing access arrangements in some jurisdictions
hindered industry performance because they were unworkable or inappropriately
implemented. Rail 2000 noted that:
… open access to the rail network, if this is the desired intent of governments, is simply
just not working. This is either as a result of Claytons Access Regime being
promulgated in some states or unnecessarily cumbersome regimes in
others. (trans., pp. 3-4)
In cases where access regimes are not working, formal proceedings are often drawn
out and can lead to appeals, causing significant costs, delays and uncertainty for
both the track owners and train operators. Moreover, significant resources can be
devoted to lobbying the government about changes to policy (boxes 8.3 and 8.4).176 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Reform to improve access to rail infrastructure has been slow. Current access
arrangements are complex due to the multiplicity of regimes, especially on the
interstate network, and the intricacies associated with each. These are likely to
have imposed significant costs on industry participants.
8.4 Pricing and allocating train schedules
The availability, price and allocation of suitable train schedules is an important
factor that can influence the ability of operators to enter the market and run viable
train services. It is also important in ensuring that incumbent railways and new
entrants are able to respond quickly to the changing needs of customers and compete
effectively with other modes of transport.
Existing access regimes adopt a wide range of approaches to pricing and a number
of innovative approaches have been proposed for the future. ARTC currently uses a
system of posted prices on the parts of the interstate network it owns or manages
and has proposed the use of auctions in the future, while many state-based regimes
provide for prices based on commercial negotiation (and arbitration where
necessary) for access to the state network (box 8.3).
The various approaches to pricing can be grouped into three broad categories —
posted prices, negotiated prices and auctioning mechanisms (box 8.5). Each
provides for different levels of flexibility, certainty and transparency. In addition,
each has different implications for the way that train schedules are allocated to
operators. Posted prices do not provide a mechanism to allocate train schedules so
they must be supplemented with other measures, such as allocation on an
administrative basis, or by operators being able to swap or trade schedules in a
‘secondary market’. In contrast, auctioning mechanisms determine the price and
allocate train schedules simultaneously.
In principle, an efficient pricing and allocation system should set prices and allocate
train schedules reflecting the opportunity cost of the train schedule to all segments
across the entire network. If it does not:
·  operators may not make the best use of existing capacity; and/or
·  track owners may not invest appropriately in the track infrastructure given the
demands for rail use.ACCESS 177
Box 8.5 Approaches to pricing train schedules
Posted prices — ‘Posted’ prices are not negotiable and define exactly the prices, terms
and conditions under which operators can gain access to the track.a
Negotiation  —  A ‘negotiated’ agreement reflects the prices, terms and conditions
reached following commercial negotiations between the access provider and the train
operator. In some cases the negotiated price is constrained by defined upper and
lower bounds. Where capacity transfer arrangements are in place, negotiations may
take place between existing or potential train operators and the current schedule
holder.
Auctioning mechanisms  —  Potential operators bid for segments of track, train
schedules or packages of train schedules and the access provider optimises the
allocation of these subject to the size of the bids, their feasibility and the cost of
service.
a Posted prices can be calculated in a number of ways including as a multipart tariff, using Ramsey
principles, and using the efficient component-pricing rule (the Baumol-Willig rule).
Sources: Jones et al. 1998; Dodgson 1998; Freebairn 1998; Starkie 1993.
Posted prices
There is support for the use of posted prices in some rail markets. ARTC suggested
that for the parts of the interstate network it owns or operates, it:
… chose to have a pricing system which was openly published to all operators, so all
operators operated off the same pricing schedule which was available to anybody that
wanted to see it … What that did was it gave the operators confidence in their
competitive position, as opposed to other people's competitive position and really made
it a level playing field which people could compete on. (trans., p. 568)
While SCT suggested that:
… to be effective an access pricing regime should have transparency as to rates,
although we do not necessarily require there to be transparency of track management
costs and track maintenance costs. (sub. 37, p. 2)
In addition, the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications,
Transport and Microeconomic Reform (HORSCCTMR) suggested that, at least on
the interstate network, posted prices by track segment were appropriate
(HORSCCTMR 1998b).
In evidence presented to the HORSCCTMR inquiry both the Queensland Mining
Council and the NSW Minerals Council argued that access regimes should include
published ‘reference’ prices, although both allow for some limited negotiation
around the published price.178 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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While posted prices may be administratively simple and provide greater certainty to
operators regarding the terms and conditions under which they can gain access to
the network, they have drawbacks which in part reflect imperfect information about
the market. These in turn may prevent the efficient allocation of schedules and
entrench monopoly positions if an existing operator is given a schedule for a long
period.
Posted prices designed to reflect the different valuations placed by users on the track
may require detailed information regarding the responsiveness of operators to
changes in price which may be difficult to obtain given the small number of
operators in most markets. As Easton noted:
Put simply, the rail supplier is not competent to assess relative demand elasticities nor
review changes in those relativities. (Easton 1996, p. 155)
In response to these complications, there can be a tendency for access providers to
rely on arbitrary, administrative mechanisms in setting prices to attempt to capture
differences in valuations of the track. Posted prices may rely on ‘first come-first
served’ arrangements and ‘grandfathering’ of existing schedules. It is unlikely that
such systems will allocate train schedules efficiently, since they do not reflect the
value that new or different operators place on the schedules. Rather it is more likely
that such systems will entrench current operators’ positions in the market. Patrick
noted that in negotiating train paths and rail access on the interstate network during
1996-97:
… existing government rail operators obviously occupied the best train paths, leaving
paths that were slow (long transit time) and sub-optimum in departure and arrival
times. (sub. 63, p. 3)
The efficiency of pricing and allocating train schedules across networks could be
improved under this system if supplemented by market-based arrangements. Posted
prices could be used in conjunction with a secondary market in which operators
trade the right of gaining access to track segments (capacity trading mechanisms are
discussed below). This would ensure that the track segment would be acquired by
the operator who values it the most.
Negotiated prices
Commercial negotiations (with arbitration if necessary) are currently used in most
state-based regimes. When prices are set through commercial negotiation, operatorsACCESS 179
who provide different services can negotiate terms and conditions according to the
value that they place on the track.7
The ability to charge different access prices to different users enables access
providers to put in place incentives to encourage the effective use of track
infrastructure. This may not be possible under a less flexible posted prices approach.
However, commercially negotiated outcomes between parties may be made at the
expense of efficiency (IC 1997b). In the first instance the track owner could abuse
its market power and charge access prices that are too high — above stand alone
cost (the total cost of supplying the infrastructure) — especially when the operator is
in a weak bargaining position and has no other transport alternatives.
Alternatively, when there are significant monopoly profits available in the rail
market (in both above and below track operations), the track owner and train
operator may agree on terms and conditions that promote monopoly profits rather
than economic efficiency.8 As King and Maddock noted:
… firms will negotiate access prices and conditions that suit them, not those which
increase social well being … (King and Maddock 1996, p. 97)
In this case negotiation between the track owner and train operator will involve:
… trying to seize as large a share of monopoly profits as possible, with no party
interested in competition that may benefit consumers but reduce profits.
(King 1997, p. 276)
In addition, commercial negotiations may occur irregularly and may result in
contractual arrangements for specific train schedules over different lengths of time.
Consequently it may be difficult to negotiate with all train operators over all
schedules and segments of the network simultaneously, in order to improve the
efficiency over the entire network.
Market mechanisms
An important element of competition between train operators is competition for
schedules (chapter 6). However, current access arrangements limit this form of
competition.
                                             
7 Under this pricing regime, operators whose derived demand for the service is not responsive to
price changes would be charged higher prices while those operators who are quite price
responsive would be charged lower prices.
8 This is not a likely problem in most rail markets in Australia as very few make significant
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For the interstate network, the ARTC’s ‘one stop shop’ role appears limited to
allocating excess capacity to new entrants. The Rail Access Corporation (RAC)
noted that ARTC and itself:
… each have rights to sell our uncommitted capacity, ARTC for interstate purposes or
RAC for intrastate purposes, and there will be an iterative process in the agreement
under which we negotiate and agree those paths in a practical sense. (trans., p. 1118)
FreightCorp noted that in relation to current approaches:
The issue of allocation of train paths has not been adequately dealt with in any of the
jurisdictions in which FreightCorp currently operates. The solution has generally been
to allow existing users to retain their path allocations (‘grandfathering’), with additional
paths for new entrants fitted around these. (sub. DR123, p. 2)
FreightCorp then argued that:
Grandfathering favours incumbents over new entrants. As the Commission recognises,
in some circumstances this can be a deterrent to the growth of competition from new
entrants … Grandfathering allocations leads to inefficient use of the infrastructure. As
infrastructure owners are unable to amend the paths provided to existing users, new
paths have to be scheduled around these. (sub. DR123, pp. 2,3)
Market-based mechanisms, such as auctioning and capacity transfer arrangements,
can be used to promote competition between train operators for train schedules.
Auctioning mechanisms
Auctioning provides a market mechanism for the initial allocation of schedules to
train operators. Although auctioning is not currently used in Australian rail markets,
it has been proposed as a future option — especially in networks which are or
become more congested as a result of new entry and increased activity. As the
market for schedules develops, the pricing and allocation of schedules is likely to
evolve from posted and negotiated prices to more market-based mechanisms.
The main advantages of auctioning models over the posted price and negotiated
price approaches are that they:
·  allow for greater flexibility in determining prices and conditions;
·  may provide information on the highest value and best use of the track; and
·  provide indicators of where investment in the track may be justified.
For example, in a well designed auction covering interstate operations, bidders
would reveal the true valuation of their use of the track. In principle, this might be
achieved by getting all train operators — both interstate and intrastate users of the
interstate network — to bid simultaneously for individual train schedules they areACCESS 181
seeking.9 This would include simultaneously assessing bids for both the use of the
interstate track by both interstate and intrastate operators and identifying the
operator which values particular schedules most highly.
The bids would include the necessary information for the market manager to be able
to maximise the profit of the entire network by choosing the optimal mix of train
schedules. Information required may include axle load, train speed, origin-
destination and any stopover requirements.
The market manager could use a network optimising program that allocated train
schedules subject to bid prices, the schedules being mutually exclusive and the bid
price exceeding the cost of supplying the service. Bidders could submit a number of
bids, each with different prices and train paths, to reflect their valuation of the
alternative schedules they are prepared to purchase.
There could be spot pricing (through a bidding process and trading) or negotiation
for the short term allocation of remaining schedules. The Commission has also
considered these issues in relation to the pricing and allocation of airline slots
(PC 1998b).
The market manager could also have a role in identifying and facilitating investment
in the network. The market manager could disseminate data regarding network
utilisation and identify areas where additional investment in the network may be
justified (chapter 10).
Several participants were critical of proposals to auction train schedules. The
practical difficulties of auctioning schedules was raised by Great Southern Railway.
It noted that:
… we think it will be difficult to devise a method for bidding for paths, given that
different trains have different characteristics and so require different types of paths …
To our knowledge, no country in the world has devised a working method for selling
train paths by competitive bidding. (sub. DR95, p. 4)
NSW Government noted that establishing an auctioning mechanism would entail
high set up and familiarisation costs.
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NRC (sub.  DR117) acknowledged that in theory auctioning provides information
on the value of paths by actual and potential users. However, it referred also to
practical difficulties as powerful arguments against the auctioning approach. These
included:
·  that where there is a need for a new train path, the market will be such that it will
be rare for more than one operator to be in a position to bid for the path;
·  existing long term business arrangements and contracts would be disrupted
leading to uncertainty; and
·  strong interactions between time-paths on networks make it difficult
coordinating auctions of a continuous path across a corridor.
The NSW Government also noted the difficulty with small numbers of potential
bidders for some paths:
… the benefits in terms of improved allocation of train paths and providing better
incentives for investment in track would not be great, given the small number of
bidders likely to be involved for any given bundle of train paths. (sub. DR128, p. 44)
In cases where there is only one operator seeking a new path, RAC argued that new
paths could be accommodated with only modest investment in the network without
the need to auction paths:
To the extent that the market is not met, this reflects under investment in the network.
The Sydney-Melbourne business provides a good example. Rail currently has
somewhere in the order of 20% of this market. This market share is achieved with a
single 1,500 metre train per day. Even in the unlikely event that rail was able to secure
100% of the market, this would still only represent five 1,500 metre trains per day. If
the assumption is further tightened so that the entire market wanted to be serviced
overnight, this would still only require that the 5 trains leave at half hour intervals. Such
a scenario is readily achievable with modest investment in the infrastructure.
(sub. DR102, pp. 22-23)
The need for greater certainty was raised as an objection to auctioning paths by
several participants. RAC argued that one of its concerns with auctioning was:
… that it may have a negative impact on the market. If a rail operator needs to invest
time and resources in developing a market, it will only do so if it has reasonable
certainty over its train path. Under an auctioning system there is a risk that operators
will be discouraged from market development. (sub.  DR102, p. 23)
Similarly, SCT argued:
The provision of spot pricing, like auctioning, would give rise to a great deal of
uncertainty in the market which in turn would not allow investment to take place in the
rail industry … The use of spot pricing and auctioning techniques could … give rise toACCESS 183
uncertainty insofar as the investment plans of another operator are concerned.
(sub. DR100,  p. 4)
The difficulty of auctioning a continuous path across a corridor is not to be
understated. NRC argued that:
There are strong inter-actions between time-paths on the network, both ‘vertically’
(between time-paths on the same track), and ‘horizontally’ (between time-paths on
adjacent sections of track, which are administered by different access providers). The
practical difficulties of coordinating auction of a continuous path across a whole
corridor (eg Sydney-Perth) would make an auction impossible. (sub. DR117, p. 16)
Auctioning may also be inefficient. Large incumbent operators with ‘deep pockets’
could dominate the market by outbidding smaller or new operators. Although this
may reflect efficient bidding (and therefore efficient outcomes), it may also reflect
the abuse of market power (and therefore inefficient outcomes). SCT concurred:
The Commission is quite correct in pointing out that auctioning may be an inefficient
process because large operators could abuse their market power etc. (sub. DR100, p. 3)
The practical issues raised by participants present challenges to the development of
a path auctioning system. However, they are not sufficient to rule out the concept.
Appropriate design and implementation of an auctioning system can overcome many
of these issues. An effective auctioning system will provide information on
individual users valuation of train paths and facilitate the efficient development of
the rail industry.
Arguments relating to uncertainty are not arguments against auctioning per se, but
for train paths to be allocated for appropriate time periods and to provide protection
for pre-existing contracts. ARTC noted that auctioning processes can be such that:
… the time frames for which paths can be contracted can be quite flexible, subject to
‘use it or lose it’ provisions, enabling certainty of business to be established. Secondary
trading of train paths also enables the owner of the path to enhance the returns available
to the owner from a given path. (sub. DR97, p. 10)
The network manager responsible for the auctioning process would be required to
trade off the individual operator’s desire for certainty and longer term paths with the
system wide efficiency gains from facilitating the possibility of new entry.
The practical problems associated with auctioning and allocating paths have yet to
be resolved. However more powerful computer models currently being developed to
allocate train paths may assist in overcoming some of these difficulties.
(sub. DR103; sub. DR113).184 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Capacity transfer mechanisms
Capacity transfer mechanisms would permit the existing holders of train schedules
to transfer or sell them to other railways (or possibly other organisations). Such
mechanisms may facilitate the transfer, without payment, of schedules (a largely
administrative approach) or encourage the development of markets for the sale of
schedules at commercially negotiated prices. Either mechanism is more flexible, in
terms of freeing up schedules for new entrants, than posted prices or negotiated
pricing arrangements discussed above.
Capacity transfer mechanisms provide opportunities to ‘free up’ the allocation of
train schedules. The NSW Minerals Council argued in favour of a market-based
trading mechanism for schedules:
The Council sees considerable scope for capacity trading and the ultimate development
of secondary markets involving ‘derivatives’, to aid price discovery and transparency
and serve as a competitive discipline on the monopoly seller of rail access.
(sub. DR104, p. 6)
As well as path holders voluntarily trading excess requirements, capacity trading
arrangements could contain ‘use it or lose it’ provisions. An operator could be
required to surrender unused paths to the access provider or offer them for sale to
other train operators. This would limit the ability of incumbents to restrict entry and
competition by hoarding train paths.
A draft capacity transfer policy for inclusion in the NSW rail access regime was
issued by the NSW Government for comment in June 1999 (box 8.6). It includes
provisions for the transfer of access rights and the relinquishment of unused
schedules to RAC.
The draft RAC policy appears to be based largely on administrative processes.
Unused schedules are not sold by operators but are reallocated by RAC to operators
in accordance with its established conditions for offering access. It is unclear
whether the transfer of access rights between operators would involve payment.
The NSW Minerals Council expressed concern that elements of the draft RAC
policy would inhibit the development of an effective market-based approach. In
particular it noted limitations on who could trade capacity, the nature of access
rights offered and the central role of RAC (as both broker and owner)
(NSW Minerals Council, pers. comm., 26 July 1999).ACCESS 185
Box 8.6 Draft NSW capacity transfer policy
The RAC has issued a draft capacity transfer policy to apply to the NSW rail network.
The objective of the policy:
… is to facilitate the optimum efficient utilisation of the NSW Rail Network by rail operators
through the establishment of effective mechanisms for the transfer of access rights between
operators. (RAC 1999, p. 2)
The three principles guiding the development of the policy state:
a) that RAC have the power, where appropriate, to ensure that a rail operator does not retain
the right to use timepaths that are not being utilised in circumstances when they can be
allocated to another rail operator;
b) where a rail operator is not utilising capacity and surrenders the unutilised capacity, and
the access fees payable to RAC are not based on usage of the NSW Rail Network, it may be
necessary to adjust the access fees; and
c) where a rail operator seeks access to capacity that is already utilised by another rail
operator, RAC will approach the other rail operator to seek to negotiate an amendment to its
agreement  so as to facilitate the rail operations of the prospective operator. (RAC 1999, p.
2)
RAC’s role is to negotiate access rights and pro-actively facilitate the transfer of
access rights between operators where there is agreement between the operators to
do so.
Rail operators are free to voluntarily reduce their access rights at any time. To facilitate
the relinquishment of unutilised access rights, RAC may include provisions in access
agreements requiring the payment of path reservation fees or the relinquishment of
access rights if they are not used for a reasonable time (‘use it or lose it’).
Operators are also free to transfer part or all of their access rights to another operator,
provided the new operator accepts the characteristics associated with those rights. If
the new operator wishes to change the characteristics of the access right (for example,
seek a higher axleload) RAC is required to enter negotiations with the new operator to
agree, if practical, to the changed characteristics.
In the case of disputes between RAC and existing or prospective operators these will
be subject to the dispute resolution mechanisms contained in the relevant access
agreement. These may include referral of disputes to IPART for arbitration.
Source: RAC (1999).
Market-based trading is preferred to administrative transfer arrangements to ensure
schedules are obtained by operators who most value the use of the track.
It is not apparent that existing access regimes include market-based mechanisms
for allocating and transferring schedules. The introduction of such mechanisms
would be particularly relevant to the interstate network and main coal lines.186 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The pricing and allocation of train schedules should reflect the value that users
place on the track. To encourage this, the Commonwealth Government should
establish a process to investigate the feasibility of developing a market approach
for allocating schedules or transferring capacity on the interstate network.
8.5 Costing methodology
There are a number of costing issues relating to the establishment of access prices.
An otherwise well designed access regime may result in inefficient access prices if
costing issues are addressed inappropriately. Some participants commented on the
methods currently used to measure costs and the lack of transparency in determining
and publishing costs. Similar concerns have been expressed by participants in the
Commission’s report The Australian Black Coal Industry (PC 1998a).
The methods of measuring the costs of capital in rail infrastructure vary widely
with:
·  the choices of the method of asset valuation (historical, deprival or other
valuation methods); and
·  the rate of return (nominal or real rates).
Valuation of assets
Rail transport entails large capital expenditure on assets, particularly track and
rollingstock. Different approaches to asset valuation may significantly affect the
value of assets and the estimation of costs.
Currently, the method of valuing assets differs across jurisdictions and ranges from
deprival methods, to replacement costs and historical costs.
The choice of asset valuation method is a case by case decision and largely depends
on the objectives for which the asset valuations are sought (CCNCO 1998). It also
depends upon the assets to be valued. Easton argued that the:
… method of valuation should be determined by the nature and characteristics of the
asset, and certain other considerations … particularly in regard to the difficulty of
assessing replacement value … (trans., p. 830)
RECOMMENDATION 8.1ACCESS 187
In this section, asset valuation is considered from the perspective of setting prices
for access to track infrastructure — where issues such as the valuation of ‘once-off’
assets including the provision of track corridors arise.
In the context of setting access prices, several participants argued that historical cost
was the most appropriate form of asset valuation for government-owned railways.
This is because historical values are more transparent and may be simpler to
administer than other approaches, especially for long lived assets. Easton argued
that with historical cost valuation:
… there is no subjectivity involved, valuations are reliable in the sense that they
represent actual expenditures and, as such, they are verifiable. For long life assets,
including sunk capital, these are considered significant advantages [over other asset
valuation methods] … Furthermore there is no need for time consuming and possibly
costly procedures to arrive at alternative costs, which in most instances (for rail specific
assets at least) involve subjective assumptions and even speculation.
(Easton 1996, p. 93)
The characteristics of the assets are an important consideration. Easton has argued:
I think there are some cases in which the nature of characteristics of the asset lends
itself to a treatment of other than historical cost, but please not deprival value.
(trans., p. 844)
King (1996) has also suggested that historical cost is, on balance, the more
appropriate valuation method, arguing that it is easy to administer, transparent, less
subjective than replacement cost, and provides adequate incentives for operation
and investment.
However, the use of historical cost may pose additional problems, particularly in
periods of inflation, technological change or changes in supply and demand
conditions. The Steering Committee on National Performance Monitoring of
Government Trading Enterprises (SCNPMGTE) suggested that in times of
increasing prices, the use of historical cost is likely to result in:
·  the understatement of the value of the assets;
·  the understatement of expenses; and
·  for commercial entities, the overstatement of profits and returns on assets
(SCNPMGTE 1994).
In addition, in its draft guide to access undertakings the ACCC suggested that:
Before accepting the historical cost approach to asset valuation as part of pricing
principles included in an undertaking, the Commission will need to be satisfied that
gold plating and over investment is not likely to occur. (ACCC 1997b, p. 41)188 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Other valuation methods may better capture the value of the economic services in
the asset and so be more appropriate. IPART has suggested an alternative asset
valuation methodology. IPART has recommended that a depreciated optimised
replacement cost (DORC) methodology be used for valuing RAC assets when
setting ceiling prices under the NSW access regime.10 IPART stated that:
DORC is the replacement cost of an ‘optimised’ system, less accumulated depreciation.
An optimised system is a re-configured system using modern technology designed to
serve the current load with current technology, with some allowances for growth. This
method excludes any unused or under utilised assets and allows for potential cost
savings that may have resulted from technological improvement. (IPART 1999a, p. 28).
However, there is not universal support for the DORC valuation methodology. The
NSW Minerals Council noted that:
The theoretical appeal of the DORC approach is undeniable. However its practical
application can present problems on some occasions. (sub. DR104, p. 8)
It also argued that the DORC approach requires an:
… exhaustive and computationally unwieldy ‘optimisation’ process to establish the
appropriate railway configuration for each user or group of users. (sub. DR104, p. 8)
Similarly, the difficulty of specifying the optimal configuration was highlighted by
Westrail:
… DORC can lead to protracted negotiations as to what is the optimum configuration.
The benefit of DORC, which is principally alleged to be avoiding ‘gold plating’ or over
investment in the infrastructure can be achieved in an access regime requiring
demonstration from the owner that the infrastructure is required for the task.
(sub. DR107,  p. 7)
Easton argued that the nature of the assets (especially asset life) is important in
assessing the validity of applying the DORC methodology:
The DORC approach would make more sense, and I use that word deliberately, if
renewals of like by like are a capital charge … [but] What’s the justification for valuing
at replacement value if the assets or substantial slabs of it never have to be replaced?
(trans., p. 832)
There is no single asset valuation methodology which is clearly preferred in all
situations. The use for which the valuation is sought and the characteristics of the
assets, especially their frequency of replacement, influence the selection of an
appropriate valuation methodology.
                                             
10 By virtue of Schedule 3 (iv) of the NSW rail access regime, this recommendation and that
relating to the maximum rate of return took effect without further action on the sixtieth day after
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The appropriate asset valuation methodology should be determined on a case by
case basis, depending upon the purpose for which the valuation is required and
the characteristics of the assets.
Rate of return
Several participants argued that existing access regimes applied non-commercial
rates of return to assets which inflated asset prices. The NSW access regime used
nominal rates of return in setting a ceiling for access charges to rail infrastructure.
The ceiling rate of return was 14 per cent nominal post-tax on the replacement value
of assets. Many participants commented that this was too high, given the sorts of
risks associated with the business.
IPART (1999c) recommended that the maximum rate of return for the NSW regime
be set at a pre-tax real return of 8  per  cent. This change was automatically
incorporated into the NSW rail regime. IPART also recommended that the
NSW Government consider creating a process for revising the maximum rate of
return at periodic intervals, indicating that three yearly revisions were appropriate
(IPART 1999c).
Participants noted that the rate of return recommended by IPART was not
necessarily applicable to all rail networks, and may not be sufficient to attract
private sector investment. ARTC noted that IPART’s recommendation was:
… relative to a set of circumstances presented to a particular market, so I wouldn’t want
that sort of thing to become a kind of general rule framework … but in New South
Wales the Commission was looking at an area that had a sunken investment, had a
high-yield return base on it, and was a very secure risk market … I think you would get
a different decision in different locations, so I don’t think, if that is a general rule, it
would necessarily flow on. (trans., p. 819)
The rate of return which infrastructure owners are permitted to earn on assets can
affect the access charges faced by train operators. Higher permitted rates of return
are likely to lead to higher access charges. However, if returns are set too low
investment may be inhibited. Regulators will need to continually review rate of
return policy.
8.6 Complexity of operating on the interstate network
Participants noted the complexity of operating on the interstate network. Difficulties
arise because this network is owned or managed by several authorities, each
operating under different access regimes which reflect the nature of the markets that190 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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operate within state boundaries. This creates uncertainty and adds to the cost of rail
operators who may wish to buy slots from origin to destination, not just from border
to border.
In order to reduce the complexity ARTC commenced operations on 1 July 1998 to
provide a ‘one stop shop’ for access to the interstate network (box 8.7).
Box 8.7 The Australian Rail Track Corporation
The ARTC was incorporated in February 1998 and commenced operations on
1 July 1998. It is fully owned by the Commonwealth Government through shareholder
representatives of the Departments of Transport and Regional Services, and Finance
and Administration.
It was established to provide a ‘one stop shop’ for national rail operators, and the
States have entered negotiations with ARTC over access arrangements.
The main purpose of ARTC is to ‘facilitate a commercially viable Australian rail industry
through the introduction of new infrastructure and access arrangements, contributing
to an efficient national transport system’ (ARTC 1998, p. 1). In order to do this, ARTC
has responsibility for management of access and track maintenance in South Australia
(and parts of New South Wales, Western Australia and the Northern Territory) as track
owner and in Victoria as track manager via a lease agreement. ARTC is available to
act as a retail broker for access in Queensland, New South Wales and Western
Australia.
Sources: ARTC 1998; sub. 74; sub. 76.
Currently ARTC’s terms and conditions only apply to the track that it owns or
manages. Both New South Wales and Western Australia have indicated that they
will not allow ARTC to own sections of the interstate track within their respective
jurisdictions (HORSCCTMR 1998b). Instead, ARTC must negotiate access and
exclusive agency rights with these jurisdictions and with Queensland
(trans.,  p.  570). ARTC is currently negotiating draft wholesale agreements with
these jurisdictions and has indicated that the negotiations are proceeding to an
advanced stage (sub. DR97 and appendix F).
NRC (sub. DR117) argued that the ‘one stop shop’ approach would create an
additional layer through which operators had to seek access rather than dealing
directly with the access provider. NRC envisaged problems with this approach
including:
·  pricing being shrouded in two layers of secrecy and confidentiality;
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·  provisions for indemnities and warranties would be more complex — with the
ability of ARTC to enforce performance warranties on behalf of the access user
being questionable; and
·  increased complexity in the day to day management of train paths by interposing
ARTC.
In relation to the last problem, Affleck (NRC) argued:
Day to day management of train paths … would be complicated by interposing a
middleman. It would be too easy for the ultimate access provider to ‘pass the buck’ to
the middleman, which in spite of its best intentions would be unable to address the
detailed operational issues which arise every day. (Affleck 1999, p. 11)
These problems led NRC to conclude:
For all of the above difficulties and others, National Rail and other rail operators have a
strong preference to continue to deal directly with the real access providers, both when
negotiating contracts for access and when managing the on-going use of access. The
problems in dealing with several entities to obtain access are minor compared with
those listed above. (sub. DR117, p. 17)
However, while a large incumbent operator such as NRC may be able to deal
directly with  multiple access providers, this is likely to be more difficult and costly
for new entrants or smaller operators. The complexity of existing arrangements can
hinder their ability to respond quickly to commercial opportunities — further
entrenching the position of incumbents.
The creation of a market manager on the interstate network (chapters 6 and 10)
would overcome any problems relating to the day to day operation of the system by
vesting this responsibility within one organisation.
In the meantime, ARTC has encouraged discussions and cooperation between
jurisdictions. As part of these discussions ARTC is developing an industry code to
provide a common framework and set of rules for access to the interstate network




9 Safety regulation and operating
procedures and standards
Inconsistent safety regulations and operating procedures and standards
are an impediment to efficient rail operations, particularly between States.
They can reduce rail safety, add to costs, create uncertainty and inhibit
innovation. Ultimately, existing and potential operators are impeded from
taking advantage of market opportunities, investment is discouraged and
rail’s competitiveness relative to other modes of transport declines.
Although progress has been made by Commonwealth, State and Territory
Governments and industry to reduce inconsistent regulation in railways,
progress could have been faster and the outcomes are still uncertain.
Regulations discussed in this chapter relate to safety and operating procedures and
standards. Chapter 8 discusses regulation relating to access regimes. Rail regulation
in this chapter takes various forms including legislation, standards and codes.1
In the past, each State managed and regulated its own rail system.2 Prior to the
1990s, differences in regulations between States were not of concern to operators
because there was little scope for more than one operator in each system. However,
during the 1990s the completion of the national standard gauge track linking the five
mainland capital cities through Melbourne, the introduction of open access on the
track, the creation of the National Rail Corporation (NRC) and the entry of new
private operators have focused attention on inconsistent rail regulations as a major
                                             
1 The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) defines regulation to be the ‘broad range of
legally enforceable instruments which impose mandatory requirements upon business and the
community as well as to those voluntary codes and advisory instruments … for which there is a
reasonable expectation of widespread compliance’(COAG 1997, p. 2).
2 The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) has four kilometres of track under NSW regulation.
Railways in the Northern Territory were administered by Australian National until July 1998.
The Rail Safety Act 1998 (NT) has been gazetted but no decision has yet been made regarding
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REFORM
impediment to efficient interstate rail operations.3 These differences can increase
costs and reduce the ability of rail to compete with other modes of transport.
Prior to the 1990s, vertically integrated State government-owned railways operated
primarily within their own State so that any rail safety and operational issues related
mainly to individual jurisdictions. Today, train operators are dealing with multiple
jurisdictions. However, State-based accreditation authorities retain responsibility for
regulating safety and ensuring compliance, and track owners adopt their own
operating procedures and standards, while complying with each State’s safety
regulation. Many participants commented on issues relating to safety regulation and
operating procedures and standards, in particular inconsistencies between
jurisdictions and their impact on efficiency. The Australasian Railway
Association (ARA) noted with respect to safety that:
State-based regulatory regimes remain a barrier to entry into rail operations. Despite
their excellent safety record, rail operators are subject to a vastly more complex and
costly regulatory regime than road operators. (sub. 51, p. 11)
And with regard to operating procedures and standards that:
These different standards have adversely affected interstate rail operations.
(sub. 51, p. 10) 
Great Northern Rail Services (GNRS), referring to both safety regulation and
operating procedures and standards in general commented that:
The industry, particularly those operators who work across State borders, are presently
burdened with onerous regulatory requirements. The plethora of regulations … are
expensive imposts on all operators. (sub. 46, p. 8)
And NRC held a similar view in referring to both:
The complexity of regulation of interstate rail equipment, operational procedures and
employee competencies is a significant barrier to entry and a significant impost on
innovation for existing operators. (sub. 53, p. 18)
The WA Government, however, held a different view in relation to safety
accreditation. It noted that:
Perceptions held by a small element of the industry that there is a lack of coordination,
and inconsistency between States are generally unfounded ... (sub. 60, attach. B, p. 2)
The focus of participants’ comments was on the interstate network. However,
inconsistent safety regulations and operating procedures and standards can also
                                             
3 In this chapter interstate rail operations include the activities of operators running trains on any
track in any State other than the State in which their principal activities take place, as well as




affect operators wishing to run trains on the intrastate network in States other than
the State in which their principal activities take place. Although participants focused
on freight operations, passenger operations are also affected.
Safety regulation and operating procedures and standards for railways are
substantially more complex and confusing than for many other industries. The
complex safety accreditation system, layers of regulation, confusion between safety
and operating procedures and standards, different interpretations and terminology
within the industry, and complicated mechanisms for progressing reform have all
been highlighted in this inquiry. These are overlaid by change over the past few
years and during the course of this inquiry.
The Commission’s approach is to treat safety and operating procedures and
standards as separate although operating procedures and standards incorporate
elements of safety. This chapter focuses on how to achieve efficient implementation
of safety regulation by removing inconsistencies in safety accreditation and mutual
recognition between jurisdictions (section 9.1). According to the Industry Reference
Group (IRG), a joint government and industry initiative comprising industry
representatives, rail safety regulation is about ensuring that activities are undertaken
in a safe manner, that is, ‘what you need to do’ (sub. DR109).
Operational issues relate mainly to the choice of operating procedures and standards
adopted by track owners to increase their efficiency while complying with safety
regulations. Of particular interest is the extent to which operating procedures and
standards should be harmonised or made uniform across track owners’ rail networks
(section 9.2) and the development of codes of practice (section 9.3). The IRG
described the process for establishing uniform operating procedures and standards
as being about allowing rail organisations to conduct their operations in a safe and
efficient manner, that is, ‘how to do it’, taking into account the need to remove
jurisdictional differences and improve efficiency (sub. DR109).
The relationship between safety accreditation and mutual recognition, operating
procedures and standards, and codes of practice is represented in figure 9.1.
Alternative ways of maintaining the momentum of reform are considered in
section 9.4. A stocktake of reforms and key developments in removing inconsistent
rail safety regulation and operating procedures and standards during the 1990s are
summarised in chapter 3, with greater detail provided in appendices D and G.196 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The industry recognises that there is a need to focus on managing safety risk, given
the potential for rail accidents, the complexity of rail transport operations, and the
recent entry of operators with little or no experience in rail (ARA  1997). The
Australian Standard on Rail Safety Management (AS 4292) notes that the safety
objective in the railway industry is ‘to minimise the risk of harm to people and
damage to property’ (Part 1, p. 5). AS 4292 is described in box 9.1.
In 1995-96 the incidence of nonfatal accidents in rail transport reported in new
workers’ compensation cases was substantially higher than for the ‘all industries’
total (table 9.1). Although there is no information on fatalities for that year, other
data indicate that the number of fatalities4 associated with railways is substantial —
in 1993 there were over 100  fatalities, and approximately 40  in  1997 (ABS
1993b, ABS 1997).
Table 9.1 Incidence of new workers’ compensation cases reporteda,
1995-96
Industry Fatal Nonfatal Total
Rail transport np 42.59 np
Transport and storage 0.18 41.84 42.01
All industries 0.05 25.47 25.51
a  Excludes Victoria and the ACT. Incidence relates to occurrences per thousand wage and salary earners.
np not provided.
                                             






Box 9.1 Australian Standard on Rail Safety Management
The Australian Standard on Railway Safety Management (AS 4292) is referred to in
the accreditation sections of most State rail safety/transport acts and forms an
underlying component of the national guidelines for safety accreditation. The national
guidelines state that ‘applicants are required to develop their railway safety
management system for their railway activities in a manner consistent with the
Australian Standard for Rail Safety Management (AS 4292)’ (sub. DR106, attachment
on national guidelines).
The objective of AS 4292 is to provide a uniform set of railway safety requirements
which can be incorporated into management systems to adequately control risk. It is
not prescriptive in its approach.
AS 4292 consists of seven parts:
·  Part 1: General and interstate requirements;
·  Part 2: Track, civil and electrical infrastructure;
·  Part 3: Rollingstock;
·  Part 4: Signalling and telecommunications systems and equipment;
·  Part 5: Operational requirements;
·  Part 6: Railway interface with other infrastructure; and
·  Part 7: Railway incident investigation (draft).
AS 4292 was prepared by Committee ME/79, Railway Safety, and approved on behalf
of the Council of Australian Standards. Part 1, published in 1995, establishes the
general principles. Parts 2-6, published in 1997, provide guidance on what is needed
to comply with Part 1. Part 7 has yet to be finalised.
Sources: ARSAA sub. 106; Standards Australia 1997.
Although it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to assess safety risk management in
the rail industry, it is within its scope to examine some of the tools used, such as the
safety accreditation process, in so far as they may impede efficient interstate rail
operations.
The processes of rail safety regulation in Australia and organisational arrangements
associated with progressing regulatory change are presented in figure 9.2.198 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Figure 9.2 Safety regulation
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a    Other organisations involved include the Australian Rail Safety Accreditation Authorities (ARSAA) and
ME/79 (Australian Standards Committee).
Safety legislation
Safety is regulated by State and Territory Governments according to each
jurisdiction’s rail safety legislation. New South Wales was the first State to amend
its railway legislation (in 1993) to include safety accreditation. It placed the onus on
the industry to perform to agreed standards and introduced accountability and
transparency (ATC  1993). This legislation was then used as a model for the
development of legislation in other States.
In 1996 all jurisdictions5 agreed (through an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA))
that legislation be passed making AS 4292 the principal standard forming the basis
for safety accreditation. They also agreed that parties make provision under existing
                                             




or future legislation for accreditation by an accreditation authority and for mutual
recognition (IGA 1996).6
Legislation, consistent with the IGA, followed in the other States and Territories. As
a consequence, legislation covers many similar areas in each State, including
accreditation of owners and operators, safety audits and inspections, rights of
review, enforcement and fees. Legislative reviews in States other than New South
Wales resulted in most also incorporating reference to mutual recognition and
AS 4292.
Although the areas covered under the acts are similar, the detail varies between
jurisdictions. For example, the clauses relating to suspension of accreditation in the
Queensland Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 (chapter 6, part 4) are different to the
wording under this area in the South Australian Rail Safety Act 1996 (part 2,
division 2).
In New South Wales a review of the Rail Safety Act 1993 (NSW) commenced in
mid-1998. Industry consultation is being finalised and submission of legislation to
Parliament is anticipated in September 1999. Rewriting of the Act is expected to be
comprehensive, addressing issues such as mutual recognition.
Other legislation which is not specific to rail but affects the industry includes
occupation, health and safety and dangerous goods legislation. Such legislation is
not discussed in this chapter, but adds to regulatory oversight of railways
(IC 1995c).
Safety accreditation
According to State legislation, an organisation or person wishing to operate a train
must be accredited in the jurisdiction in which the principal activities are
undertaken.
The accreditation process is based on the principle of coregulation, with rail safety
being managed jointly by industry and government. The operator or track owner, not
the regulator, is responsible for the safety of its activities. The accreditation
authority, usually within a State transport department, must be satisfied that the
operator or track owner has in place, and can demonstrate, an appropriate safety
                                             
6 Mutual recognition is based on the premise that safety accreditation of a rail operator or owner in
one State or Territory should be acceptable in other jurisdictions. For a discussion see
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management system.7 This system must be consistent with AS 4292. The
accreditation authority has no responsibility for the development or modification of
the detailed operating procedures and standards of the applicants.8
The safety accreditation process currently being implemented by all accreditation
authorities is set out in figure 9.3.
Figure 9.3 Rail safety accreditation processa
1. Contact Accreditation 
Authority in State where principal 
activity will occur
3. Lodge application with 
supporting documentation and 
application fee if applicable
7. Pay annual fee(s)
9. Commence operations
2. Provides guidelines, 
application form etc. and 
ongoing liaison
4. Assess application and confer 
with other Accreditation 
Authority(s) if interstate 
operations involved
5. Carry out initial audits of 
organisation
6. Advise applicant of the audit 
outcome and annual fee 
amount(s)
8. Issue accreditation and 
conditions
APPLICANT ACCREDITATION AUTHORITY
a   Application and assessment in steps 3-4 may be iterative.
Data source: ARSAA sub. DR 106, attachment on Accreditation Authorities Administrative Processes.
                                             
7 Sugar cane railways in Queensland are exempt from obtaining safety accreditation through this
process, and the intent is for Pilbara railways in Western Australia to be also exempt by the end
of 1999.
8 In addition to accreditation, potential operators must also gain access to the track (chapter 8) and




An operator accredited in one State may apply for accreditation to operate in other
States through mutual recognition. Mutual recognition was adopted in principle
under the IGA and is legislated in all States, except New South Wales — mutual
recognition is, nonetheless, available in that State.
The mutual recognition process agreed to by the accreditation authorities is outlined
in figure 9.4.
Figure 9.4 Mutual recognition of accreditation
1. Lodge application for 
mutual recognition
8. Commence operations
2. Review application for 
completeness
3. Forward complete 
application to OAA
5. Liaise with applicant 
with respect to local 
requirements. Forward 
information to OAA
4. Review application. 
Advise FAA of any 
further information 
required
6. Evaluate submission 
to ensure local 
requirements are met. 
Liaise with FAA as 
required








Data source: ARSAA sub. DR 106, attachment on Accreditation Authorities Administrative Processes.202 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Several operators have gained, or are in the process of gaining, accreditation or
mutual recognition of accreditation in other States. Queensland, for instance, has
accredited seven interstate operators through mutual recognition as of July 1999.
Process issues
Until early 1999, each safety regulator had its own accreditation process which was
broadly consistent with other jurisdictions but varied in detail (see, for example,
PTSD 1999). New South Wales offered interim accreditation, Victoria did not.9
Fees, additional requirements and auditing requirements also varied.
Inconsistencies in the approach adopted by jurisdictions imposed substantial
financial and time costs on operators seeking accreditation and mutual recognition.
They also created uncertainty and barriers to entry to interstate operations.
Participants raised a number of concerns relating to safety accreditation and mutual
recognition processes. These included:
·  processes which were complex, costly and time consuming;
·  additional requirements imposed by regulators; and
·  fees which were too high, duplicated across jurisdictions and which failed to
reflect the service provided.
Many of these concerns are now being addressed.10 Some of them are illustrated in
box 9.2.
Complexity
A number of participants raised concerns about the lack of consistency, complexity
and cost of the accreditation and mutual recognition processes. In particular,
participants commented that accreditation processes were complicated for new
entrants to the rail industry and were an issue not just for operators wishing to gain
accreditation for the interstate network but also for those wishing to operate on
intrastate tracks in other States.
                                             
9 Interim accreditation refers to approval given to an applicant to operate, subject to certain
conditions, prior to final accreditation approval.
10 Other issues related to varying auditing requirements and a lack of clarity about the role and




Box 9.2 Participants’ comments on accreditation and mutual
recognition processes
The present lack of consistency creates an unnecessary and costly burden on interstate
operators and a barrier to entry and competition. (Toll Rail sub. 2, p. 2)
… significant barriers still exist for entry of new rail operators in the Hunter Valley region for
the carriage of coal, due partly to the excessive time costs of attaining accreditation as a Rail
Operator under the RSA [Rail Safety Act]. (NSW Minerals Council 1998, p. 5)
… we had to submit to Queensland a document of some 60 or 70 pages - 60 pages, dealing
with the differences between Queensland and New South Wales … some of those were
quite legitimate differences … but I suppose our view would be that in essence mutual
recognition of accreditation should be just that. At the moment … the exceptions far outweigh
the non-exceptions and it makes it very cumbersome … We have the resources to address
these issues. Some smaller operations do not have the resources … (NRC trans., p. 309)
Although a national agreement covering mutual recognition … has been in place for some
years, its effectiveness has been eroded by additional State requirements outside the
agreement. (National Competition Council sub. 79, p. 12)
The auditing requirements are quite different [between States] … there needs to be an
understanding of what this is costing the operators and the inefficiencies that this results in
… We would like to see the overall process simplified with some standards set on a national
level or at least by agreement among all the States and have one very minor fee that we
would pay. (Australia Southern Railroad trans., p. 37)
Patrick stressed the difficulties facing a new entrant to the rail industry:
In seeking accreditation in several States, there is different legislation in each State and
different fee scales. The process of documentation, audit reviews and incident reporting
requires an ongoing input from the rail operator and ongoing cost. (sub. 87, p.2)
Patrick responded to the Australian Rail Safety Accreditation Authorities (ARSAA)
submission (DR106), commenting:
[The ARSAA] seem to believe that ALL organisations seeking accreditation are age old
operators in the rail industry, no doubt steeped in tradition and documentation regarding
the nuts and bolts of railway operation and safety … [The ARSAA] has little
understanding of the difficulties and time required for a NEW entrant to embark on a
rail venture commencing three years ago.
To seek accreditation under the regimes of the last two years, Patrick Rail, [if it were
an] established railway [government or ex government], would be able to trot out
reams of rail safety procedures, using its excess clerical staff to dig out every bit of
information to meet the requirements of the accreditation authorities. However, reality
is that at the sharp end of the commercial world, to start up and operate a profitable
railway, these procedures have to be established with minimal resources and to high
quality and safety standards … (sub. DR116, pp. 1, 2)204 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Patrick provided the Commission with a detailed timetable of its
accreditation/mutual recognition processes which commenced in 1996 (sub. 87).
The key milestones appear in box 9.3.
Similarly, GNRS pointed out the impact of the mutual recognition process on small
operators:
It may be that instead of putting in the whole documentation you only have to put in a
part of that documentation but it still takes time and it costs money and to a smaller
operator such as ourselves it becomes a significant decision whether you go for that
particular job or that particular task or whether you let it go and go in a different
business direction. (trans., p. 980)
Additional requirements
Several participants, including the National Competition Council, commented on
‘additional requirements’ imposed by various jurisdictions for accreditation. The
Maunsell report (1998) noted additional accreditation requirements as one of the key
differences between jurisdictions. In 1997 national guidelines for rail safety
accreditation applications listed different additional requirements for each
jurisdiction. Those for New South Wales were two pages in length covering areas
such as the right to operate a railway, railway performance details and a description
of rollingstock (RSIAWG 1997).
Yet the ARSAA stated in respect of additional requirements that ‘There are none
and never have been and this is one of the great myths that some railway operators
continue to push …’ (sub. DR106, p. 7).
The revised national guidelines (April 1999) do not refer to any additional
requirements.
Accreditation fees
Each jurisdiction charges fees for safety accreditation and for mutual recognition.
Operators generally pay only one application fee,11 but pay an annual accreditation
fee in the jurisdiction of their principal activities and another full annual fee in the
jurisdiction in which mutual recognition is granted.
                                             




Box 9.3 Patrick: accreditation and mutual recognition processes
Dates Key Milestones
1996
March-June Initial discussions on requirements for accreditation.
June Written application to Victorian authority.
July-Nov Prepare insurances and documentation for initial interview.
December Interview by Victorian and SA authorities to gather initial
accreditation material from Patrick.
1996 costs Estimated  costs  in  preparing submissions, attending
meetings and interviews approximately $10 000.
1997
Jan-April Further written submissions providing additional
information, arrange insurances, update training
procedures to incorporate rail operations under
accreditation.
April Interim accreditation in Victoria. Patrick operates first train
Adelaide to Melbourne.
May-Oct Further documentation and meetings re final accreditation.
November Audit of procedures at Patrick Melbourne terminal.
1997 costs Estimated  costs  in  preparing submissions, attending
meetings and audits approximately $18 000.
1998
Jan-May Provide additional documentation, review rail procedures
and submit regular safety reports.
June Final audit of Patrick rail terminal. Apply for mutual
recognition to operate in South Australia.
September Letter received advising that accreditation granted. Scale of
fees also received.
1998 costs Estimated  costs  in  preparing submissions, attending
meetings and audits approximately $11 000.
1999
January Certificate of accreditation received for Victoria. Scale of
fees indicates $5000 application fee, $5000 annual fee.
February Meeting with Victorian authority to provide additional
information for mutual recognition.
May-June Full audit.
June Final approval given for mutual recognition to operate in
South Australia.
1999 costs To date: fees $10 000 (annual fees for South Australia
not yet known), salaries $3500.
Sources: Patrick sub. 87; Patrick, pers. comm., 15 July 1999.206 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
Participants expressed a number of related concerns about these fees. First, many
complained that the cost of the fees to the operator was too high. The ARA noted:
… interstate operators face substantial costs in complying with different State
requirements including accreditation fees that must be paid to each State jurisdiction
irrespective of mutual recognition. (sub. 51, p. 11)
Second, some argued that the annual fees are excessive because they do not reflect
the cost of provision of that service. The ARA commented:
If they [accreditation agencies] charge it for the work they did that would be fine but
they don’t do it that way. They charge it on size … It’s like a de facto access fee
because it has a very similar base for determining what those fees ought to be. (trans., p.
463)
And GNRS argued:
Perhaps [accreditation] fees should be based on services provided, not an arbitrary fee
calculated to cover costs of an ever expanding bureaucracy with no accountability to the
industry it is supposed to serve. (sub. 46, p. 9)
Third, some argued that the fees vary substantially between States as do the fee
formulae, which are complex. The formulae are based on a variety of measures,
such as quantities of freight or passengers carried, length of track used and/or size of
locomotives.
The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) report on rail safety
accreditation costs (1999b), while relating specifically to New South Wales, also
detailed the different accreditation fee structures and formulae in other States and
assessed the basis for charging fees. It noted that full cost recovery for safety
accreditation was justified but that there were various options in respect of cost
recovery mechanisms. Fees could be calculated on the basis of:
·  costs incurred by the accreditation authority;
·  an assessment of the benefits received by the participant;
·  access fees; and
·  risk exposure of the participant based on either observable risk indicators,
insurance premiums, forward looking risk assessment or incident based reporting
(see IPART (1999b) pp. 21-28 for a detailed discussion).
IPART concluded that:
… the cost recovery mechanisms already in place in NSW and other Australian States
are not clearly based on one or a number of these rationales, and are, to a greater or




It recommended that initial application fees should be charged on a fee for service
basis but that annual fees be charged according to a risk based charging
methodology. However, in supporting a national approach to safety accreditation,
IPART recommended that New South Wales adopt a new charging mechanism only
if it is adopted nationally.
Finally, annual fees are duplicated across States, being payable in the jurisdiction of
principal activities as well as in other jurisdictions in which mutual recognition has
been granted. Specialized Container Transport, for example, has received advice
that in addition to a possible annual accreditation fee of approximately $5000 in
Victoria, it will also have to pay an annual accreditation fee for mutual recognition
in each other State — possibly $20 000 in South Australia and $7000 in New South
Wales (Specialized Container Transport, pers. comm., 2 February 1999).
However, the NSW Government argued that levying another full accreditation fee
for mutual recognition in a jurisdiction was justified on the grounds that there was
no evidence that barriers to entry were imposed, the majority of benefits were
captured by the applicants, and unique geographic and historical conditions resulted
in more ‘onerous’ regulation in New South Wales and hence higher costs
(sub. DR128).
Although fees for mutual recognition may not have resulted in barriers to entry for
larger operators, they can be costly for small operators and accentuate other barriers
to entry identified by participants.
Neither the level of fees or their duplication across jurisdictions should be justified
by the level of benefits derived by applicants. If New South Wales is indeed
imposing rigorous regulation based on unique conditions, it would appear the
revised national guidelines are not being adopted fully. If New South Wales is
incurring additional costs they should not be passed on to the industry.
There is no such duplication of fees in the road transport industry where, in general,
one annual fee is paid to enable operations across all jurisdictions (chapter 10). CRT
Group, when discussing mutual recognition, noted:
In the second jurisdiction in which minimal costs are involved full rate schedules are
charged. Operators therefore pay in all jurisdictions as distinct for road where the
registration fee virtually covers access anywhere in Australia, is payable once in any
State or Territory. (sub. 20, p. 8)208 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Progress to date
The issue of consistent rail safety regulation was raised as long ago as the early
1990s (appendix G) and more recently by Maunsell12, yet has still not been fully
resolved. The Rail Projects Taskforce noted:
Governments have been working together over many years endeavouring to achieve
mutual recognition of safety regulation. However this work has been slow, tedious and
not delivered the results that industry could reasonably expect. (RPT 1999, p. 42)
Concerns about accreditation and mutual recognition processes have been widely
accepted over the past couple of years by the industry and Commonwealth and State
authorities as having validity. Consequently, there has been progress, particularly
during 1999, towards making these processes more efficient and effective. For
example, as noted earlier, the most recent national guidelines do not include
additional requirements. Such progress should particularly advantage new entrants
and small operators.
The Rail Safety Committee of Australia (RSCA), chaired by the Commonwealth,
and comprising State and Territory accreditation authorities and industry
representatives, is addressing these concerns. It is developing processes to
streamline the accreditation process, including simplification of the application
process, eliminating duplication, and reducing the time taken to gain accreditation
(RSCA 1998). Its work in this area is intended to be finalised in August 1999.
The ARSAA commented that there will no longer be any problems because a
common set of national guidelines for accreditation is being implemented by all
jurisdictions, together with consistent processes (trans., p. 986):
… the accreditation authorities, in conjunction with the Rail Safety Committee of
Australia, said not only do we need to produce national guidelines to help industry
know what the accreditation process is, but to make sure that we do things consistently
in various jurisdictions — that we actually have to have some processes for ourselves
that we each follow so that there aren’t differences … (trans., p. 986)
The ARSAA also noted:
Whilst there may have been some problems initially with accreditation and mutual
recognition these issues have now been resolved with the introduction of the national
guidelines and uniform processes being developed by the accreditation authorities in
consultation with industry. (sub. DR106, p. 10)
                                             
12 Maunsell (1998) noted the substantial differences between States in safety accreditation
processes and recommended that the process should be streamlined and overlaps between safety




In New South Wales, the Rail Safety Act 1993 (NSW) is under review, and the Rail
Access Corporation, NSW Transport Safety Bureau and operators have agreed, in
principle, to streamlining the auditing process. The IPART  recommendations on the
full recovery of accreditation costs will be taken into account in the review of the
Act.
Participants commented on the progress in 1999. BHP stated:
As far as I know it’s [mutual recognition] certainly improving … there’s a greater
responsiveness amongst the regulatory authorities … (trans., pp. 1078, 1079)
GNRS commented in respect of mutual recognition:
… as we said in our original submission, our experience with the PTSD [Victorian
Public Transport Safety Directorate] has not always been positive, however it’s changed
for the better over recent times. (trans., p. 975)
Some participants, such as GNRS and NRC, noted that progress which has occurred,
particularly in auditing processes, can be attributed to operators pushing for change.
It is important that any progress is not jeopardised by jurisdictions legislating to
introduce more prescriptive clauses into the accreditation parts of their rail
safety/transport acts when they are subject to review, possibly re-creating other
inconsistencies.
It is too early to ascertain whether all of the concerns raised above have now been
resolved, as the ARSAA indicates. Until outcomes are visible, that is, operators
have gained accreditation and mutual recognition under the new national guidelines,
it is not possible to ascertain the extent of progress.
The introduction of national guidelines does not guarantee the resolution of
operators’ concerns as much will depend on how jurisdictions implement them.
Different interpretations of the guidelines could result in a continuation of
inconsistencies. Specialized Container Transport noted in reference to different
State accreditation authorities that:
… it’s a non-prescriptive area, the accreditation, so therefore every different person in
every different State puts a different interpretation on it … so therefore the more bodies
you’re dealing with the more variations there are. (trans., p. 1090)
Even if their interpretations were consistent, there is no guarantee that mutual
recognition will occur to the satisfaction of operators, that the revised auditing
system will work, or that time delays will be reduced.
As long as so many accreditation authorities exist there is a possibility that
inconsistent processes will remain.210 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
There has been progress in reducing inconsistent safety regulation between
jurisdictions but it could have been faster and outcomes are still uncertain.
One area of concern which has yet to be resolved relates to accreditation fees. This
has been acknowledged by the accreditation authorities (trans., p. 988) and the
RSCA which is examining a nationally consistent approach to setting accreditation
fees (RSCA 1998). Its work is still in progress and will take into account the NSW
IPART views on accreditation fees (1999b).
Whatever national charging mechanism is ultimately selected, it should be
transparent, equitable between rail accreditation applicants, predictable and as
simple as possible.
The fees charged for accreditation and mutual recognition are inconsistent
between jurisdictions. Annual fees are currently duplicated across jurisdictions.
A national approach should be developed for charging rail safety accreditation
fees, with a single annual fee for accreditation and mutual recognition.
As long as separate jurisdictions remain, this fee should be paid in the jurisdiction of
principal activities.
Rail safety review
Ministers at the April 1999 Australian Transport Council (ATC) meeting agreed to
the establishment of an independent review of rail safety arrangements by the
Standing Committee on Transport, to be completed for the ATC meeting in
November 1999. A steering committee has been established to oversee a review by a
consultant. The establishment of such a review provides an indirect indication that
there may be some unresolved issues in the area of safety regulation (other than
fees).
While the RSCA has been considering ways to improve existing rail safety
regulation, the independent rail safety review is taking a wider strategic approach.
The review will advise on the appropriate focus, structure, accountability,





9.2 Operating procedures and standards
Operators wishing to run trains on the interstate network or parts of the intrastate
networks in other States must not only gain accreditation but must also comply with
the operating procedures and standards of the track owner.
Operating procedures and standards can relate to safeworking systems,
communications, management information systems, rollingstock design, axle loads
and train length (Maunsell 1998).
Standards set out the detail of train operations, such as the phonetic alphabet for
radio communication, whereas the procedures set out the process for implementing
that detail, for example, how and when the phonetic alphabet should be used.
Different operating procedures and standards have developed over time as State
government-owned railways installed rail infrastructure, such as signalling systems,
independently of that installed in other States. This was not an issue prior to national
standardisation of the gauge which allowed trains to cross State borders. However,
gauge standardisation and the opening up of rail to competition have highlighted
differences in operating procedures and standards between States as an issue.
According to Safeworking Services, State government-owned railways had
considerable power:
The fact is that railways were the biggest and best technology in town, they had the
biggest and best workforces and so forth, and so they became authorities. They became
law. Railways could do anything … There [have] been a number of reform movements
to try and standardise things but at the end of the day, the fact that railways have been
authorities in the past and have virtually absolute power in this area has impeded rail
reform greatly. (trans., pp. 1057-1058)
In the mid-1990s most State government-owned railways were either
commercialised, corporatised or privatised. The weight of responsibility for
operations and maintenance shifted away from State governments to their track
owners, such as Rail Access Corporation, Queensland Rail and Westrail, and the
commercial focus was increased. Thus operating procedures and standards remain
largely State-based, resulting in inconsistencies between States.
Track owners must ensure that their operations comply with safety regulations, but
their commercial focus may result in the development of different operating
procedures and standards for different parts of the network to ensure efficiency.
This, in turn, may differ across States.212 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Costs of inconsistencies
Rail operators have commented that inconsistencies in track owners’ operating
procedures and standards are affecting their efficiency by creating barriers to entry
to interstate operations and increasing costs. Some of these inconsistencies have
been highlighted by participants (boxes 9.4–9.6).
Box 9.4 Example 1: Radio communications
Radio communication is used in most communication based safeworking systems. It is
also important for communication with company train management, maintenance
gangs, terminal operators and other trains. Two radio facilities are required on the
interstate network — a ‘control’ facility and a ‘local’ facility. The ‘control’ facility is of
prime importance for radio-based safeworking systems.
Variations between track owners and within their jurisdictions include different radio
frequencies for both control and local communications, different radio equipment and
different operating procedures (for technical examples see Deveney in NRC sub. 53).
Source: NRC sub. 53.
Box 9.5 Example 2: Axle loads and speed restrictions
Axle load and speed restrictions are set by track owners. They are determined by the
condition and type of track and by other factors, such as gradient, curvature and
condition of bridges.
For a given speed restriction and rail weight there are substantial variations in axle
load requirements over the interstate network. For example, given a rail weight of
47 kg/m and a speed limit of 80 km/hr, 23, 21 and 20 tonne axle loads are permitted
by three different owners. (Maunsell 1998)
Maunsell (1998) noted that some of the differences in the relationship between axle
loads and speed restrictions do not appear to be justified on the grounds of variations
in track conditions etc.




Box 9.6 Example 3: Safeworking systems
Safeworking systems may be defined as follows:
... the safeworking system provides the means by which trains are detected and signal
indications activated, and the detailed rules for train operation. (NRC, sub. 53, p. 24)
Safeworking systems are designed to avoid conflict between trains and between trains
and track maintenance. Although there is a safety principle underlying these systems,
operating procedures and standards relate to how to undertake operations most
efficiently, such as how to communicate, display signals and undertake maintenance
work in the most efficient manner.
There are three main types of safeworking systems:
·  track circuit systems based on visual signals beside the track activated by an
electric current in the track;
·  communication based systems delivered by voice or data to an in-cab console; and
·  token systems which rely on the physical sighting or moving of a ‘token’ (metal rod).
This was the most commonly used system in the past and is still in use today, even
on some main lines.
Each of these systems has its advantages and disadvantages (Maunsell 1998).
Within these three systems there are variations in the technology, and the procedures
which apply. Consequently, many participants argued that there are in effect over
twenty systems in operation.
NRC noted that there are 24 safeworking codes and their respective systems in total
across the interstate network on which it operates (sub. 53). Crew based at the Junee
depot have to use ten safeworking systems over the route sectors in which they
operate. Crew based in Melbourne, Dimboola and Sydney have to work across eight or
nine systems. To further illustrate the problem, NRC commented:
… on route sector RN19 (Chullora-Junee) there are three safeworking systems in operation:
SWN1 (shunting), SWN2 (electric staff) and SWN7 (track block and automatic). Within the
area of SWN3, there are four changes of signalling systems. First, drivers must respond to
double colour light signals for several kilometres, then single colour light signals, then back to
double, then to upper quadrant semaphore signals (wig-wags), and then lower quadrant
semaphore signals, and finally for the remainder of the sector, single aspect colour signals.
Each of these has a different system for indicating stop, go and caution. (sub. 53, p. 24)
To complicate the situation further, in New South Wales a green over green signal
indicates ‘full clear’, but in Victoria ‘full clear’ is indicated by a green over red signal —
which means ‘caution’ in New South Wales.
Sources: NRC sub. 53; Maunsell 1998.
Inconsistencies are a particular problem where there are interconnecting systems, as
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the urban and interstate networks. Train crews operating on interstate tracks must
have a detailed understanding of each system.
The impact on the rail industry of inconsistencies in operating procedures and
standards, such as those illustrated above, are varied. First, the effectiveness of
standards and procedures is reduced and the probability of accidents increased.
Second, costs are incurred which reduce the ability of rail to compete with other
modes of transport. For example, lower than necessary axle load limits reduce the
quantity (by weight) of goods which can be carried by rail through various interstate
corridors. The need for operators to install more than one radio system in the cab
because they are not compatible adds to the cost. GNRS noted:
Cost, availability and logistics of fitting equipment are onerous to all operators, but in
particular to smaller regional and short haul operators whose viability is threatened by
the impost of such ‘hidden’ costs. (sub. 46, p. 12)
Barriers to entry to interstate operations can occur if costs are substantial or the
availability of required equipment is restricted. GNRS commented that of two
communication devices authorised for a particular section of the Victorian interstate
network, one is domestically developed by a railway operator in conjunction with a
manufacturer, and is not available on the open market. The alternative is an
American system which would cost $25  000 per unit for GNRS to purchase.
Although GNRS ultimately managed to purchase less expensive second hand units
and refurbish them, it noted that ‘these situations underpin the extra “hidden costs”
for operators entering the market and can create a monopolistic situation and
restrict, in real terms, an operator entering particular segments of the network’
(sub. 46, p. 12). The Australian Rail Track Corporation made a similar comment:
Communications equipment also presents a barrier. In Victoria in particular, the fact
that the base communications system is a proprietary system is affecting new entrants’
ability to compete in that market. New system components necessary for new operators
to comply with safeworking are generally unavailable … (sub. 74, p. 9)
Progress to date
In 1991 the Industry Commission discussed the issue of inconsistencies, arguing that
‘there is an urgent need to encourage greater harmonisation where operational
efficiency will be enhanced’ (IC 1991b).
European countries and Canada are experiencing similar difficulties and do not
appear to be any further advanced (appendix G). In Canada, reviews have stressed
the need for regulatory change but implementation is still in progress. In Europe,




Maunsell (1998) recommended a variety of priority actions to address inconsistent
operating procedures and standards in Australia, such as introducing performance-
based standards for braking distances and train size, and agreeing on and
implementing compatibility standards for radio voice and data systems.
The IRG is addressing inconsistent operating procedures and standards. The
Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services (DTRS) noted that:
‘It is the first time that governments and industry have worked together and jointly
allocated financial and human resources to address operational uniformity issues’
(sub. DR125, p.2). The IRG has developed action plans and timelines to address the
tasks identified in the Maunsell report relating to the development of harmonised or
uniform operating procedures and standards. The major mechanism for progressing
these tasks is through the development of codes of practice.
There has been less progress in reducing inconsistent operating procedures and
standards than for safety regulation. Progress could have been faster and
outcomes are still uncertain.
9.3 Codes of practice
Codes of practice are a common set of rules which organisations may apply to their
operating procedures and standards. They are a form of self-regulation, being
developed by industry with facilitation from government.13 According to the IRG
the main reason for developing the codes of practice is ‘the need to facilitate more
efficient interstate train operations’. The IRG explained:
Safety is a key element of train operations and safety concerns should not be
compromised for the sake of improved efficiency. However, in many cases jurisdiction
difference in safe operating practices can impact on efficiency and the uniformity work
is designed to address this issue. (sub. DR109, p. 4)
The codes of practice may also assist industry to comply with the relevant parts of
AS 4292.
The IRG is currently working on four national codes of practice relating to:
·  rollingstock;
·  rail infrastructure and track;
                                             
13 If the mandatory elements of the codes are eventually enforced by government providing
legislative backing, then a coregulation approach would apply, as it does currently in the safety
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·  train operations; and
·  transmission based signalling systems. (sub. DR109, p. 8)14
These codes are currently in draft form and are close to finalisation. It is intended
that they will then be subject to legal review and industry consultation, endorsed by
industry, and implemented in 2000.
In the development of the codes it is intended that only a small component of the
codes will be prescriptive or mandatory, to be confined to ‘those aspects of railway
activity where prescriptive/mandatory requirements are essential to ensure
interoperability and provide for an adequate level of [operational] safety’
(IRG 1999).
Mandatory elements of the codes are intended for operations on the interstate
network. Codes of practice will be recommended, but not mandatory, for areas of
interface between the interstate network and other networks. The codes are intended
as a guide for stand-alone rail systems. They are not intended to replace an
organisation’s operating procedures and standards. Where they are not mandatory
the decision on whether to use the codes will be left to individual organisations
(IRG 1999).
Issues relating to levels of prescriptiveness and mandatory requirements are likely to
be subject to considerable debate when the IRG releases the codes for wider
industry consultation. There are several issues which the Commission considers will
require resolution prior to final implementation (box 9.7).
Ministers at the April 1999 ATC meeting agreed to the development of a framework
for an IGA which would include the establishment of an interim non-statutory unit,
attached to the DTRS, to facilitate and coordinate implementation of the codes of
practice developed by the IRG. This body, to operate with industry representation,
will develop a strategic approach for implementation and facilitate a consistent
approach on the interstate network (ATC 1999).
                                             




Box 9.7 Codes of practice: issues for resolution
There are a number of issues to be considered in assessing the extent to which
inconsistent operating procedures and standards should be harmonised or made
uniform through codes of practice.
·  Greater harmonisation or uniformity should not be imposed just for the sake of it
because the impact of such change will vary across the industry.
–  Operators may gain but net efficiency gains for the track owners will depend on
whether benefits outweigh the costs incurred in the changeover, for example, if
signalling infrastructure has to be replaced.
·  There is a trade-off between flexibility and greater harmonisation or uniformity.
Greater flexibility resulting from less prescriptive or non-mandatory regulation is
likely to result in more inconsistency between track owners’ operating procedures
and standards and vice versa.
·  Similarly, there is a trade-off between the extent of prescriptiveness of regulation
and the degree of harmonisation or uniformity. As long as regulation is not
prescriptive, track owners could implement different operating procedures and
standards.
·  The benefits and costs to the industry will vary between networks.
– For isolated railways, such as BHP Mt Newman in the Pilbara, and many
regional networks, the cost to the track owner of changing its rail infrastructure to
a nationally uniform standard is likely to outweigh substantially any potential
gains to the industry.
–  On the interstate network where operators currently run trains across track with
several different operating procedures and standards, the benefits of
harmonisation or uniformity are likely to outweigh the costs.
–  This may also be the case for some parts of intrastate networks, particularly at
the interface with the interstate network.
·  Local conditions may necessitate track owners maintaining different operating
procedures and standards within their jurisdictions with which operators must
comply. As Maunsell (1998) and the ARSAA (trans., p. 928) noted, there are
particular local conditions relating to, for example, geographic features, which
require particular operating procedures and standards. This is reasonable as long
as they reflect these conditions and are not imposed on operators as a barrier to
competition. Maunsell was of the opinion that some differences in operating
procedures and standards were not justified by particular conditions (box 9.5).218 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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In the process of developing the codes of practice to date, the IRG has incorporated
some elements of best practice regulation. Best practice regulation was endorsed by
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) in 1995.15 Its main features
include specification of regulatory objectives, consultation, an assessment of the
benefits and costs of options, and an implementation and review strategy. These are
usually incorporated into a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) (appendix G).16
The IRG has a clearly specified objective, to minimise prescriptive and mandatory
codes, and intends to consult widely with industry prior to recommending the codes
for implementation (IRG 1999). However, the draft codes have been developed
without any systematic assessment of the benefits and costs to the industry.
The DTRS supported the concept of best practice regulation, commenting that:
The Department endorses the adoption of best practice regulation for activities which
may have a significant impact on business. (sub. DR125, p.2)
BHP also supported the application of best practice regulation through a rigorous
RIS process:
We think it is desirable and necessary to have a regulatory impact statement process.
It’s important that those who are pushing reforms are able to clearly say why they’re
necessary. (trans., p. 1068)
BHP also noted:
… the advisory structures which support regulatory initiatives in the rail industry are
complex and multi-layered … The processes by which the input of industry
representatives and other affected parties into proposed regulatory initiatives is made
can be somewhat ad hoc, and vary from issue to issue. Risks exist that new regulatory
initiatives may impose substantial financial and time costs on operators. A well-
constructed process requiring Regulatory Impact Statements to be completed prior to
the implementation of major safety regulation initiatives would greatly assist in the
management of these risks. (sub. DR110, p. 2)
BHP provided an example of where, in its opinion, failure to apply best practice
regulation resulted in proposed regulations that were not ‘seen by those affected
until they are well on the way to completion or implementation, then some sort of
effort is required to resolve the matters’ (trans., p. 1067) (box 9.8).
                                             
15 In 1995 COAG endorsed guidelines which set out the best process to follow in determining
whether standards, laws and regulations are appropriate. The guidelines were amended in
November 1997 (COAG 1997).
16 A guide to assist organisations to undertake best practice regulation has been developed by the




Box 9.8 BHP example of a lack of best practice regulation
In 1998 BHP became aware of the draft code of practice on rollingstock, and that the
majority of its operations would not comply. In particular, BHP’s Pilbara railways would
need to be restructured (even though they complied with North American standards).
BHP raised its difficulties at an early stage and was able to resolve the situation.
However, BHP is not sure that processes are currently in place to enable similar issues
to be satisfactorily resolved in the future. BHP stated:
… the current processes do not contain systematic safeguards, such as might be built into a
Regulatory Impact Statement procedure, to ensure similar problems arising in the future can
be adequately dealt with. (sub. DR110, p. 2)
Sources: BHP sub. DR110; BHP trans.
The IRG, on the other hand, commented that a RIS should not be undertaken on two
main grounds. First, a RIS is not required by the ATC:
The Commonwealth’s current role is solely one of facilitation and the Commission’s
statement that a RIS is mandatory for Commonwealth regulation is not relevant to the
IRG uniformity work … The IRG questions whether a RIS needs to be undertaken on
work developed by the industry for the industry … Given that the uniformity work is
not to be endorsed by the ATC … the IRG questions the Commission’s [Draft Report]
recommendation for a RIS. (sub. DR109, pp. 2, 3)
Second, there has already been ‘extensive industry participation’, and it is intended
that further industry consultation will take place (through the IRG) and an
implementation strategy developed (by the proposed unit) (sub. DR109, p. 2).
Industry consultation and the development of an implementation strategy are
important components of best practice regulation but they are not sufficient. It is
also important that the benefits and costs of implementing the codes of practice are
adequately assessed, taking into account the issues raised in box 9.7.
Implementation of the codes will be difficult without industry support, which is less
likely to be forthcoming if the processes are not, and/or are not seen to be, rigorous,
transparent and fair.
Moreover, a RIS may be required under COAG guidelines if legislation was
required to bring any mandatory elements of the codes into effect (COAG 1997).
Even if a RIS is not compulsory, it would still be desirable to apply best practice
regulation to the remainder of the process to final implementation. This approach
would maximise acceptance of changes within the industry and ensure that best
outcomes are achieved.220 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The principles of best practice regulation, as endorsed by the Council of
Australian Governments, should be applied to the development and
implementation of railway codes of practice.
9.4 Advancing regulatory reform
The preceding discussion, and evidence in appendices D and G, indicate that
regulatory reform has occurred but progress could have been faster and outcomes
are still uncertain. Unless the pace of reform is increased, continuing uncertainty
about the regulatory environment may impede investment in the industry and affect
its commercial viability. In the area of safety regulation, it is too early to ascertain
whether outcomes of changes to the accreditation and mutual recognition processes
will be successful. The review of rail safety regulation, although a positive step,
creates further uncertainty. In regard to operating procedures and standards,
outcomes are also uncertain because the major mechanism for change, the codes of
practice, have not yet been implemented.
Safety regulation
The rail safety review is examining current regulatory arrangements but it may not
be in a position to assess adequately the outcomes of the implementation of the
revised national guidelines before its report to the ATC in November 1999. It is
unlikely that a sufficient number of operators will have applied for mutual
recognition under these guidelines to draw any definitive conclusions.
If this is the case it may be desirable to set up a process within 12 months to review
progress in the application of mutual recognition under the guidelines.
If it was found that mutual recognition is not working, or is unlikely to work in the
future, then consideration could be given to alternative regulatory approaches. These
include:
·  the establishment of a single national safety regulator covering all rail systems in
Australia, with responsibility for the development and enforcement of national
regulation (the Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia (CASA) model);
·  the establishment of a single national safety regulator covering all rail systems in
Australia, with the States maintaining responsibility for legislation and





·  a national safety regulator covering the interstate network only.
A number of participants commented that safety regulation could be progressed by a
single national rail safety regulator:
Patrick, in highlighting the cost of safety accreditation, stated:
Patrick still maintains that establishment of a single Rail Safety organisation would
provide uniform requirements and fee scales and would provide more sensible direction
to interstate rail operators. (sub. 87, p. 2)
And the Australian Rail Track Corporation commented:
Standard safety levels should apply on a national basis with an operator required to
demonstrate adequacy to a single body much like the Civil Aviation Authority (CASA)
in the aviation industry. (sub. 74, pp. 6, 7)
The Rail Projects Taskforce in its recent report stated:
The Taskforce supports the call for a single rail safety regulatory body. This could be
modelled on the Civil Aviation Safety Authority that regulates international and
interstate aviation safety … (RPT 1999, p. 42)
IPART (1999b) noted that a national accreditation regime would reduce the overall
costs of safety accreditation.
In the aviation industry, safety regulation is developed, implemented and enforced
by a single national agency — CASA. This approach ensures that inconsistent
regulations between jurisdictions are not an issue (box 9.9).
Box 9.9 The Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia
In 1995 the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cwlth) was amended to establish CASA, an
independent statutory authority. It is controlled by a board which reports to the
Commonwealth Minister for Transport and Regional Services. CASA’s main
responsibility is to ‘maintain, enhance and promote the safety of civil aviation …
through effective safety regulation and by encouraging greater acceptance by industry
of its obligations to maintain high safety standards’ (CASA 1998, p. 2).
Prior to 1965 the States and Territories regulated aviation safety. However, they ceded
power to the Commonwealth following decisions in the High Court which determined
that intrastate aviation could affect interstate and international aviation.
CASA develops aviation standards and procedures and also maintains a compliance
and enforcement role. Aircraft incident and accident investigation is handled by a
separate authority — the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation.
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The NRTC adopted a different approach. The NRTC is responsible for safety as
well as developing uniform national standards, but leaves implementation and
enforcement to the States. It was viewed by participants as generally successful in
progressing regulatory reform in road transport. Although the pace of change has
perhaps been slower than anticipated, more appears to have been achieved in road
transport regulatory reform than has occurred in rail (box 9.10 and chapter 10).
It could be argued that regulatory reform in the road transport industry has been
more successful than for rail because it was given priority by COAG and the
decision-making process is deliberative rather than consensual. The Ministerial
Council on Road Transport votes on issues, and although this process may involve
compromise, it is more conducive to progressing reform than the requirement to
obtain the agreement of all parties in the ATC. Moreover, the NRTC has adopted
processes which facilitate best practice regulation and effective implementation of
regulations.
A substantial drawback of both the NRTC and existing rail approaches is that as
long as there are several jurisdictions involved in implementing and enforcing
regulation, no matter how substantive the goodwill, there is a likelihood that a
particular jurisdiction will interpret the regulation differently, thus diluting national
consistency. In the CASA approach, enforcement is undertaken by the national
regulator, thereby ensuring consistency.
An alternative approach, supported by Safeworking Services (sub. DR101), would
be for the national regulator to be responsible for the interstate track only. The
House of Representatives report, Tracking Australia, an Inquiry into the Role of
Rail in the National Transport Network, recommended that a rail safety authority be
established for the interstate network (HORSCCTMR 1998b).17
Advantages of this approach would include:
·  a one stop shop for safety accreditation would be provided for operators on the
interstate network;
·  there would be the potential for reforms to flow on to state accreditation
authorities; and
·  this may be potentially easier (and faster) to achieve than a single national
regulator because State accreditation authorities would not have to cede all of
their safety accreditation responsibilities.
                                             
17 It should be noted that this report did not discuss the issue of whether a national safety
regulator should cover only the interstate network because the report focused on the interstate




Box 9.10 The National Road Transport Commission
In the early 1990s the road transport industry faced a similar situation to rail —
regulations relating to driver and vehicle operations and standards, weights and
dimensions differed between jurisdictions, creating unnecessary costs for interstate
road transport users and regulatory authorities.
To address this issue, in 1991 Heads of Government agreed to the establishment of
the NRTC as a joint Commonwealth/State/Territory body with a high degree of
independence reporting to the Ministerial Council on Road Transport.18 A key
objective was to introduce nationally uniform or consistent transport policies, laws and
standards. Reforms which have been implemented to date include:
·  national uniform charges for heavy vehicles (see chapter 10 for details);
·  national heavy vehicle registration scheme and standards; and
·  national heavy vehicle pre-registration standards and roadworthiness standards.
Features of the NRTC reform process which are particularly pertinent to rail are:
·  in effect, the NRTC develops national standards but implementation and
enforcement is undertaken by individual governments;
·  development of a strategic plan to systematically progress additional reforms on a
module basis (rather than all at once) through to the year 2000-2001;
·  RISs are routinely prepared as a requirement of the legislation/regulation making
process and submitted to the Ministerial Council for Road Transport. They are
prepared in consultation with interested parties and include a benefit–cost
evaluation;
·  a mutual recognition type process, in effect, has been used as a vehicle for
implementation. For example, once a heavy vehicle is licensed in one jurisdiction
and pays the one registration fee, that vehicle can then be operated across all
jurisdictions — a very different situation to rail; and
·  implementation of legislative proposals through a template legislation process
whereby the Commonwealth Parliament passes legislation on behalf of the ACT.19
Other jurisdictions then pass this legislation by adopting that of the ACT.
Implementation has proven to be a time-consuming process.
Sources: NRTC 1996; NRTC 1998a.
                                             
18 Comprising Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers with road and/or transport
responsibilities.
19 See IC (1995c) for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of template legislation.
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Although a national approach is important for an interconnecting system, such as the
interstate network (Forsyth and Trace, sub. 88), it is also important that national
regulation applies to intrastate tracks that may be used by operators, particularly at
the interface with the interstate network. One set of regulations for the interstate
network and different State-based regulations for other tracks add another layer of
complexity for operators. Rather than six accreditation authorities, there would be
seven. As the Rail Projects Taskforce noted:
Without a national body covering both national and state track, rail operators would
still require accreditation in each State it operated in resulting in the need to support
multiple bureaucracies. (RPT 1999, p. 42)
The establishment of a single national safety regulator would be preferable to a
seventh regulator. Consistency would be improved further if State accreditation
authorities ceded all their safety accreditation responsibilities to this regulator (the
CASA approach). Such a regulator could maintain a coregulation approach, rather
than a ‘command and control’ approach, and would preferably be an independent
statutory agency. This approach would ensure a less costly and time consuming
accreditation process, removing the need for mutual recognition processes and
duplication of accreditation fee across jurisdictions.
However, alternative regulatory arrangements should only be progressed if it is clear
that mutual recognition is not working.
Operating procedures and standards
As in other countries, issues relating to inconsistent operating procedures and
standards in Australia will not be resolved in the short term. Approaches to
progressing the harmonisation or uniformity of operating procedures and standards
include:
·  extending the functions of a single national safety regulator; or
·  establishing a separate body.
The NRTC addresses both the issues of safety and inconsistent operating procedures
and standards. Such an approach would be feasible for the rail industry. However, as
these issues are essentially separate and have been treated as such by the rail
industry, a body to address only inconsistent operating procedures and standards
could also be effective.
The latter approach has been adopted by the industry. As noted above, an interim
unit is to be established to facilitate and coordinate implementation of more




permanent national body, with industry representation, to progress work in this area
in the longer term. The DTRS noted that a permanent mechanism, such as
legislation, may take up to 18 months to finalise, but was important to ensure that
work in this area continues (sub. DR125).
The Commonwealth Government should establish a permanent mechanism to






A lack of competitive neutrality can have adverse effects on the efficiency
of the whole transport system, the performance of the rail industry, and
private sector participation in the rail transport market. Corporatisation
does not appear to have fully neutralised the competitive advantages and
disadvantages between government and private railways. Achieving an
efficient land transport system requires more than increasing the
commercial focus of railways. It requires reform to road provision and
pricing to address competitive neutrality between rail and road.
The inquiry’s terms of reference require the Commission to examine the
implications for rail transport services and the economy generally of regulations,
charges and arrangements affecting competing and complementary modes of
transport.
In this chapter, competitive neutrality between government and private enterprises
in the rail transport market is discussed (section 10.1). The key issues regarding
competitive neutrality between rail and road transport are examined (section 10.2)
and different approaches to planning and investment in land transport infrastructure
are discussed (section 10.3).
10.1 Competitive neutrality between rail operators
Fostering competitive neutrality is a core element of the Competition Principles
Agreement (CPA). It requires that government enterprises do not have any net
competitive advantages over private sector rivals simply as a result of public
ownership. As the National Competition Council (NCC) stated:
In essence, competitive neutrality involves the application to public enterprises of the
taxes, incentives and regulations that private businesses face. This allows the two
sectors to compete for resources on an equal footing and encourages efficient operation
of public enterprises. The underlying aim is to ensure that the community’s resources
are used as efficiently as possible. (sub. 79, p. 12)
Governments agreed, under the CPA, to introduce competitive neutrality principles
to their significant business activities which include railways. The CPA (clause 3)228 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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identified four areas of potential net competitive advantages possessed by
government enterprises.1
Competitive neutrality has been pursued through corporatisation for most
government-owned rail authorities. As discussed in chapter 7, this involves:
·  levying the full range of taxes on a public enterprise;
·  imposing a rate of return requirement and debt guarantee fees; and
·  introducing pricing which better reflects costs of provision.
A number of participants considered that, despite corporatisation, government-
owned railways do not compete for business on a competitively neutral basis with
private operators. Participants’ concerns focused on the alleged ability of
government-owned railways to charge low, and possibly uncommercial, freight rates
and to hoard physical assets such as rollingstock and terminals.
Government-owned railways have the potential to offer lower freight rates than their
private sector counterparts where the requirement to make a commercial return is
not binding. In contrast, private enterprises cannot continue to earn returns lower
than that required by private owners and must price their services on a commercial
basis — that is, full cost recovery including an appropriate return on capital.
The National Rail Corporation (NRC) and Rail Access Corporation (RAC)
identified competitive neutrality risks in operations supported by community service
obligations (CSOs). The RAC noted that, in the absence of a contestable process for
CSO supported operations, the information gap between the rail operator and budget
sector agencies could result in excess levels of CSO payments (sub. DR102). This
may allow the CSO supported operator to win business from commercial operators
by using the excess to cross-subsidise its other activities.
Although the following claims are untested, they indicate that the private sector
perceives a lack of competitive neutrality.
Several participants have alleged that government-owned enterprises engage in
uncommercial pricing of rail services. Capricorn Capital Limited and the Austrac
Group (Austrac) contended that major government-owned rail enterprises are
apparently operating without commercial discipline and possess an ability to price
below economic cost (sub. 56).
                                             
1 These include exemption from taxation liability, access to capital at concessional rates,
exemption from aspects of business regulation, and pricing policy which does not take into
account all of the costs of production (Willett 1996).COMPETITIVE
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Similarly, Australia Southern Railroad (ASR) alleged that NRC:
… was  allowed  to  bid  for  the  contract  to  provide  locomotives  and  drivers  for  the
concurrently privatized Great Southern Railway. National Rail has never shown a
profit, and at the rates bid for the Great Southern Railway business we doubt if there is
a profit motive in the organization. (sub. 45, p. 1)2
Austrac contended that ‘sub-economic returns resulting from freight rates set by
NRC undermine the capability of start-ups like Austrac to raise equity’
(sub. 56, p. 4).
Moreover, ASR has claimed that FreightCorp — an enterprise owned by the NSW
Government  —  offered uncommercial freight rates to win a major coal haulage
contract in South Australia. ASR previously held the contract with Flinders Power
to freight coal from the Leigh Creek coal fields to its Port Augusta power station. In
its bid for the new contract, ASR had apparently offered Flinders Power a freight
rate less than half the rate charged by the former Australian National (Australian
Financial Review, 11 December 1998, p. 20).
Another private operator, Great Northern Rail Services (GNRS), has alleged anti-
competitive behaviour by a publicly-owned rival. GNRS stated that
‘anti-competitive actions by the present corporatised but government owned V/Line
Freight have significantly impacted on GNR’s operations and opportunities’
(sub. 46, p. 5).3
Some participants expressed concerns about the retention of surplus assets by public
rail operators. Austrac stated that government-owned railways have ‘control over
unnecessary quantities of locomotives and rollingstock and essential supporting
assets including terminals’ (sub. 56, p. 4).
In a recent survey of private rail operators, a significant proportion of the
respondents considered that competing with government-owned operators was a
major barrier to private investment (DTRS  1999). Respondents commented on a
range of practices allegedly employed by government-owned competitors including
predatory pricing, causing delays in obtaining access, and overinvestment in and
hoarding of rollingstock.
As noted above, these claims about a lack of competitive neutrality are untested.
However, it is worth considering the possible effects on private operators of
                                             
2 This claim has been disputed. NRC indicated that, according to Great Southern Railway, it had
won the ‘hook and pull’ contract in November 1997 with a quoted price higher than that offered
by one or more other tenderers on the basis of superior service quality (sub. DR117).
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competition with government-owned railways which may possess advantages due to
ownership. Where public enterprises operate in a competitive market but adopt
uncommercial practices, this could have several important consequences. Such
practices may:
·  reduce the market share and viability of existing private operators;
·  dampen confidence, create uncertainty and increase risks, combining to lower
private sector investment; and
·  deter the entry of new private operators.
A lack of competitive neutrality (or even the perception of unfair competition)
would generally inhibit private sector participation in the rail industry. There is also
a cost to the community where such uncommercial practices are supported by
government subsidies or lower dividends. In these cases, achieving competitive
neutrality would release or contribute to budgetary resources for application to more
socially beneficial purposes.
Under the CPA, governments are required to establish mechanisms whereby
businesses can lodge complaints that competitive neutrality is not being
implemented appropriately by government-owned enterprises. Mechanisms for
handling complaints now operate in all jurisdictions (NCC 1998a). A recent case is
outlined in box 10.1. Use of these mechanisms by private operators with genuine
complaints can maintain pressure on governments to pursue reforms in this area.
That said, the achievement of competitive neutrality hinges on the issues of
governance, incentives and disciplines under public ownership. Most jurisdictions
have corporatised their rail enterprises. However, the Commission questions the
effectiveness of some of these arrangements (chapter 7). While not a requirement of
the CPA, seeking private sector operation of government-owned assets — through
competitive contracting out or franchising — or private ownership and operation are
alternative solutions to competitive neutrality issues. Full privatisation would align
objectives, incentives and disciplines between firms competing in the rail transport
market.
Reforms under corporatisation have the potential to place government-owned
railways on a commercial footing, but in practice they appear insufficient to
achieve competitive neutrality in the rail transport market.
Although not required by the Competition Principles Agreement, private sector
provision of rail services — whether through competitive contracting out,
franchising or privatisation — is a more effective means of aligning commercial
practices between competing rail operators.COMPETITIVE
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Box 10.1 Competitive neutrality complaints — the Coachtrans case
Coachtrans Australia (Coachtrans) lodged a complaint with the Queensland
Competition Authority (QCA) against Queensland Rail (QR) alleging a breach of
competitive neutrality, misuse of monopoly powers and severe market distortion.
In February 1996, QR introduced a rail passenger transport service from Brisbane to
Helensvale. QR charged $7.20 per single adult fare for this service. At the time QR
introduced the service, Coachtrans provided a bus service from Brisbane to
Helensvale charging $11.00 per single adult fare.
Coachtrans alleged that the principle of competitive neutrality had been breached by
the prices QR was charging for the Brisbane to Gold Coast passenger rail service and
the procedural and regulatory advantages enjoyed by QR. Coachtrans advised the
QCA that, as a result of these alleged advantages, its viability was diminished and that
its parent company was underwriting losses pending resolution of the complaint.
The QCA found that QR has a competitive advantage over Coachtrans in respect of
prices in the Brisbane to Gold Coast transport passenger market. It noted that QR is in
receipt of substantial subsidies from the Queensland Government and is able to set
prices which are below its operating costs and which make no return on its capital
costs. It noted that Coachtrans does not receive subsidies or other assistance from the
Queensland Government and is required to meet all its costs to remain viable over the
longer term. The QCA also found that QR does not enjoy any procedural or regulatory
advantage in respect of Brisbane to Gold Coast services.
While accepting the QCA’s decision on procedural and regulatory matters, the
Queensland Government rejected its decision that there has been a breach of the
principle of competitive neutrality in relation to the fares charged by QR for its Brisbane
to Gold Coast services. The Government considered that the information available to it
was not sufficiently conclusive to support the QCA decision. This case is now the
subject of legal action.
Sources: QCA 1998; Queensland Government Gazette, August 1998, p. 1834.
10.2 Competitive neutrality across rail and road
transport
Railways compete with road, sea and air transport for freight and passengers. Modal
shares vary between market segments and over time (chapter 2). The potential for
modal substitution depends largely on the responsiveness of transport customers to:
·  prices (freight rates or passenger fares); and
·  service characteristics (such as punctuality, reliability, frequency, transit time and
the capacity to carry specific commodities).232 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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In turn, prices and service characteristics are influenced by a number of factors
including managerial decisions, technological developments, competitive pressures
as well as government policies. There may also be interaction between these factors.
The concept of competitive neutrality can be applied more broadly to the market for
transport services (encompassing rail, road, sea and air transport services).
Competitive neutrality issues arise regarding government policies applying to
different modes where they favour one mode over others. In this broader sense, a
lack of competitive neutrality need not necessarily stem solely from government
ownership of transport enterprises, but rather the policy framework and processes.
Participants accorded particular significance to the issue of competitive neutrality in
the land transport market — that is, rail and road transport. Laird indicated that
competitive neutrality with road is an issue demanding attention (sub.  4). Other
participants concurred with this view. The NSW Government noted that:
…  road/rail competitive neutrality is a fundamental land transport issue that needs to
be addressed nationally especially as a critical area of cross modal competition is in
interstate line haul. (sub. DR128, p. 39)
Key government policies and arrangements which could affect competitive
neutrality in the land transport market include investment, taxes and charges, as well
as access regimes, safety regulation and operating procedures and standards
(table 10.1).
Table 10.1 Government policies potentially affecting competitive neutrality
between rail and road transport
Policy area Specific policy or process
Infrastructure investment · Planning framework
· Investment appraisal
· Budgetary processes
Taxes and government charges · Diesel fuel excise
· Road user charges
Access, regulations and procedures · Access regimes
· Safety regulation
· Operating procedures and
standards
Participants pointed to differences and inconsistencies in access regimes, safety
regulation and operating procedures facing railways operating across State borders.
In contrast, there have been significant reforms creating consistency in charges and
regulations applying to heavy vehicles in the road transport sector. (Access regimesCOMPETITIVE
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are discussed in chapter  8 and issues regarding safety regulation and operating
procedures and standards within the rail industry are examined in chapter 9.)
Railways and road transport operators could face greater competitive pressures
from sea transport (especially in the long-haul freight market) if reforms to coastal
shipping and the waterfront were further progressed. The Victorian Government
commented on the ‘rent-collecting tradition’ in the maritime industry, pointing to
the large number of small ports in Australia given its population and share in world
trade as one area for future reform (trans., p. 944).
Investment in road and rail systems
Governments have been primarily responsible for capital expenditure on rail and
road infrastructure.4 However, many participants (Australasian Railway Association
(ARA), ASR, Campbelltown and Districts Commuter Association, FreightCorp,
Laird and Healthy Cities Illawarra) expressed concerns over the comparative levels
of government expenditure on the rail network and the road system. ASR claimed
that:
…    governments in Australia created and built the railroads as a publicly owned
enterprise to produce an efficient transportation system. Since that start, however, the
governments have invested heavily in the public highway system and almost ignored
the railways. Now they cannot understand why the railways have trouble
competing. (sub. 45, p. 2)
The Local Government and Shires Associations of New South Wales (NSWLGSA)
stated that ‘the ability of the rail transport sector to be competitive has been
constrained in recent times by lack of investment’ (sub. 71, p. 4).
The Campbelltown and Districts Commuter Association pointed to the Adelaide
Hills as an example of relative investment in road and rail infrastructure:
The hundred or so million dollars being spent on a few kilometres of road to remove
bends, make tunnels and fill in gorges to enable a reduction in road length by a
kilometre and save a few minutes is by contrast a ‘gold plated project’ compared with
the nearby rail line. I understand that freight trains take 3  hours to travel about
100 kilometres. A figure of $80 million was suggested to realign the track to fast freight
standard and remove 2 hours of transit time. (sub. 11, p. 10)
Although this subsection focuses on investment, overall public sector expenditure
on these modes also includes spending on operations and maintenance. Further, for
a range of reasons, these expenditures (or costs) may not be fully recovered from
                                             
4 As owners of public rail enterprises, governments have also had responsibility for investing in
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users. In this regard, several participants (the Commonwealth Department of
Transport and Regional Services (DTRS), the Victorian Government and the Road
Transport Forum) noted the large subsidies provided to government-owned
railways.
Capital expenditure and asset condition
There has been a significant disparity in investment funds allocated by the public
sector to rail and road systems in recent decades. The differential between the
modes declined substantially in the late 1960s and 1970s (figure 10.1). It averaged
about half a percentage point of gross domestic product (GDP) each year in the
1980s. The differential has further narrowed in the mid 1990s.
Figure 10.1 Public sector investment in land transport infrastructure,
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a    Gross fixed capital expenditure as defined by the ABS.  b    The public sector comprises the general
government sector and the public trading enterprise sector including government-owned railways.  c  The
data include Commonwealth and State/local sector investment.
Data source: ABS (unpublished constant price estimates; National Income, Expenditure and Product,
Cat. no. 5206.0).
According to the Commonwealth Department of Finance and Administration,
Commonwealth funding of roads over the last 20 years has been about eight times
the level of Commonwealth funding of railways. From 1977-78 to 1996-97, the
Commonwealth spent $3.9  billion (in 1996-97 prices) on Commonwealth railCOMPETITIVE
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entities and infrastructure. Over the same period, Commonwealth funding of roads
was $31.5 billion (sub. 65).
The large disparity in road and rail investment has coincided with road transport
capturing an increasing share of the domestic freight and passenger markets
(chapter 2). However, causation may run in two directions. Increased investment in
roads may have encouraged modal substitution.5 Alternatively, growing road use
(due to factors such as inter-suburban travel and ‘just in time’ logistics
requirements) may have led governments to invest more in their road systems.
The capacity and quality of the infrastructure network — be it road or rail — is a
function of investment and maintenance spending. But, analysis of comparative
levels of expenditure on rail and road systems is not sufficient to establish whether
under or overinvestment has occurred in these transport modes. Investment may be
driven by factors which differ in importance across modes and time, so investment
levels need not be similar. DTRS noted that relative investment levels reflect factors
such as the size and maturity of the respective networks:
The rail network was largely developed before the advent of heavy vehicles on roads.
Consequently the rail network represents a mature network with the focus of works on
maintenance and realignments, while the road network has until recently been under
development to meet current demands … (sub. DR125, p. 5)
Moreover, the Commonwealth Government’s funding of roads and railways reflects
its responsibilities. Unlike the National Highway System where the Commonwealth
Government is responsible for construction and maintenance, about half of the
interstate rail track is currently owned by State Governments.
That said, the Commonwealth Government has directed significant funds towards
the upgrading of the National Highway System since 1974-75.6 Upgrading and
augmentation of the system has included additional lanes, wider lanes, town
bypasses, bridge strengthening and new roads. In an evaluation of the Sydney–
Melbourne transport corridor, the Bureau of Transport and Communications
Economics (BTCE) concluded that:
The ‘level of service’ provided by the Hume Highway, which describes such
operational characteristics as travel time, comfort and convenience, safety, vehicle
operation and community effects, is assessed to be relatively high for most of the
highway. (BTCE 1993, p. 56)
                                             
5 The Allen Consulting Group (1993) found that investment in roads leads to a substitution away
from other forms of transport — particularly rail — in favour of road transport (sub. 17).
6 Laird (1996) estimated that grants for upgrading and maintaining the National Highway System
amounted to about $12.6  billion (1994 dollars) between 1974-75 and 1993-94 or around
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Improvements in the capacity and quality of the interstate road system in turn has
raised the productivity of road transport operators. For example, with the completion
of major town bypasses (Mittagong, Goulburn and Yass), gains in efficiency can be
expected through the reductions in vehicle operating costs from shorter travel
distance and less steep grades (BTCE 1993).
In the case of railways, many participants commented on the poor state of the
infrastructure (box 10.2). Of particular concern was the condition and capacity of
the interstate track. Another major problem was route congestion in the Sydney
metropolitan area (box 10.3).
Recent parliamentary and commissioned reports have presented considerable
evidence on the inadequacy of rail infrastructure.
·  The House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications,
Transport and Microeconomic Reform (HORSCCTMR) noted that it had
received evidence from rail operators, industry groups and private sector
interests on the serious inadequacy of existing infrastructure in many areas of the
interstate and intrastate rail networks (HORSCCTMR 1998b).
·  In a report commissioned by the Australian Transport Council, Maunsell (1998)
identified priority areas which require major capital expenditure including
crossing loop and gradient improvements, areas with axle load and speed
restrictions, extending double stack clearances throughout the interstate network,
and improving capacity for high demand routes.
·  In a report for the Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional
Development and the Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC), Booz-Allen &
Hamilton (1998) identified a number of high priority projects on the interstate
network. High benefit–cost ratios were estimated for projects which would
reduce route congestion in the Sydney area and for passing loops throughout the
network.
Importantly, low quality track has adverse consequences for rail costs and
productivity. This is manifested in terms of slower train speeds, lighter axle loads,
longer transit times, higher crew costs and higher fuel costs. Inadequate track
capacity also impinges on rail performance. The lack of passing loops constrains
traffic along a given line and short passing loops limit train length. Such
deficiencies are likely to undermine the ability of railways to compete with road
transport operators and contribute to modal substitution.COMPETITIVE
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Box 10.2 Participants’ comments on deficiencies in rail infrastructure
A significant number of submissions pointed to problems with the existing rail
infrastructure. The Australian Shipping Federation stated that:
Many of the vital transport networks … [including the standard gauge network], both
interstate and intercity, are in dire need of considerable upgrading … (sub. 18, p. 2)
The Australian Wheat Board contended that:
At an infrastructure level, the lack of investment on track and signals constitute one of the
main factors which has resulted in slow track speeds and low axle load capacities. 
(sub. 32, p. 14)
According to the Campbelltown and Districts Commuter Association:
There are 63 places that have extreme grade and curvature occurring together between
Brisbane and Melbourne  …  This wastes fuel, increases wheel wear, rail wear, distance and
time. (sub. 11, p. 7)
The CRT Group stated that:
The infrastructure is sub-standard and is still after several years subject to severe speed
restrictions and passing loop and signalling inconsistencies. (sub. 20, p. 4)
Laird claimed that:
The Adelaide–Melbourne–Sydney–Brisbane corridors are currently poor. This is due to
various factors including steep ruling grades and poor track alignment with many tight radius
curves … and leads to higher unit operating and maintenance costs. (sub. 4, p. 12)
The NRC commented that:
The poor quality of interstate rail infrastructure is a legacy of many decades of neglect by
State governments, and has many aspects    …  [including obsolete alignments, obsolete
signalling and communications equipment, short crossing loops, inadequate height
clearances, inadequate track strength and poor quality track structure]. (sub. 53, pp. 12-13)
Specialized Container Transport noted that:
Most operators have expressed their concerns regarding … the poor track condition, the lack
of long passing loops, inconsistent and prohibitive speed limits, the inability to double stack
containers from Melbourne and the far from world’s best practice maximum axle weights.
(sub. 37, p. 1)
According to the Railway Technical Society of Australasia:
… the network has numerous speed-weight restrictions due to: wooden sleepers in Victoria;
light weight rail on the Melbourne to Albury standard gauge track; a curve for every kilometre
plus steep ruling grades from Albury to Sydney; poor alignment from Sydney to Brisbane  …
(sub. DR93, p. 2)
The quality of the track between Melbourne and Adelaide raised concerns among
participants including the ARA, Patrick, People for Public Transport and Wimmera-
Mallee Rail Services. Patrick stated that:
… although now standard gauge, the track condition varies from poor to good through the
corridor with some sections still under speed restrictions. This extends the transit time and
adds cost to each journey. (sub. 63, attach. 1, p. 9)238 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box 10.3 Participants’ comments on route congestion in Sydney
Many participants expressed their concern about route congestion in Sydney and its
detrimental impacts. The Victorian Government noted that ‘moving freight in and out of
Sydney by sea and rail is a big problem’ (trans., p. 949) and more generally:
It [Sydney] is the crucible of Australia’s transport disaster. There are many bad things
happening outside Sydney, but they’re all happening in spades in Sydney. (trans., p. 949)
It also argued that:
…  if they [freight and passengers] can’t get in and out of Sydney the whole nation pays for
that. It’s a national problem needing national leadership, and we’re seeing precious little of it
at the present time. (trans., p. 950)
The Association of Mine Related Councils stated that:
In the Sydney metropolitan area – a by-pass to the Chullora freight route is critical. The
inadequacies of the present system were demonstrated during the period of the Royal Easter
Show in 1998 at the Homebush facilities. (sub. 13, p. 2)
According to the ARTC:
The difficulty of rail congestion throughout the Sydney metropolitan area continues to be a
major impediment to the efficient movement of freight on the North-South corridor (Brisbane-
Sydney-Melbourne) … (sub. 74, p. 6)
Similarly, John Hearsch Consulting noted that:
…  freight service quality is also adversely affected by conflicting demands for scarce track
capacity between passenger and freight trains. The problem is particularly severe in Sydney
where there is a four hour curfew on freight trains in the suburban area morning and
afternoon in order to ensure that peak commuter travel is not delayed.
(sub. DR120, attach. 1. p. 20)
The NSW Department of Transport stated that:
The Sydney problem, as we see it, is basically a hole in the national network. As the Sydney
area expands and as urban traffic grows … the availability of the constrained infrastructure is
going to get less and less. (trans., p. 248)
Westrail noted the wider effects of bottlenecks in Sydney:
…  we get 16 interstate trains in a period of seven hours and otherwise don’t use the track for
the rest of the day, and that’s causing major problems … unless you resolve the urban issue,
particularly in Sydney, you are not going to get anywhere and that’s particularly important for
the north-south corridor, which is the worst performing corridor …
Until you get the horizontal separation you are going to have this continual … problem with
freight trying to go in and out of there and then at the end of the day the only solution in
Sydney is to separate the two networks. (trans., pp. 757-758)COMPETITIVE
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The Rail Projects Taskforce  (1999) recommended that the national track be
upgraded to a standard where it could be a competitive and sustainable alternative to
road transport. According to the Taskforce, the projects to be funded would remove
temporary speed restrictions, provide additional and longer passing loops, alleviate
congestion and strengthen the track.
There has been inadequate investment in some parts of the rail network. The
resulting problems for the rail industry are particularly acute in the Sydney area.
Investment decision-making processes
The relative levels of investment spending on road and rail networks together with
specific evidence of deficiencies in rail infrastructure, raise questions about the
processes which governments have used to allocate funds within and between
different transport modes. Capital expenditure on rail and road systems in Australia
is the result of several economic processes. These involve transport planning,
applying techniques of investment appraisal, ranking projects in order of priority
and the allocation of budgetary funds.
Transport planning
The lack of an integrated planning framework is a possible factor behind modal
investment outcomes in recent decades. Numerous participants (Bicycle Federation
of Australia, Hames, NSWLGSA, People for Ecologically Sustainable Transport,
QR and Rail 2000) claimed there was a need for an integrated approach to transport
planning. The South Australian Local Government Association (SALGA) noted:
…   the need for governments to develop a coordinated, comprehensive and holistic
transport strategy which incorporates rail as a viable option in the transport network.
(sub. 57, attach. 1, p. 3)
The National Transport Planning Taskforce found that transport investment
decision-making in Australia was highly segmented by mode and level of
administration (NTPT  1994). Because many different government authorities are
involved in the provision of transport infrastructure, this may lead to coordination
failures, inconsistencies in approaches, and has the potential to overlook network
effects and interactions between modes. The NTPT recommended that a framework
for national strategic transport planning be established. Under such a framework,
national transport needs would be considered on a multi-modal corridor basis.
More recently, the HORSCCTMR has urged the Commonwealth Government to
develop an integrated national transport plan (HORSCCTMR 1997 and 1998b). The
Rail Projects Taskforce  (1999) also supported a national transport plan,240 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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recommending that the Commonwealth Government take the lead in its
development to ‘secure a seamless domestic transport system’.
Several approaches to planning (and investment) in land transport are discussed in
section 10.3.
Investment appraisal
Differential treatment of rail and road projects in investment evaluations has been
suggested as a factor which could bias investment spending towards a particular
mode. A number of participants contended that current investment appraisal
procedures lack consistency. The ARA stated that ‘analysis of road projects has
included wider social cost–benefit criteria, whereas rail projects have been assessed
on a narrow, commercial basis’ (sub.  3,  p.  13). The NSWLGSA contended that
‘there is not a consistent approach across the country to investment evaluation’
(sub. 71, p. 4).
An extensive survey of investment evaluation methods used by transport authorities
was undertaken for the NTPT (Applied Economics 1994). The results indicated that
cost–benefit analysis was applied quite widely for road infrastructure but was only
occasionally used for investments in railways, seaports and airports.
According to the survey, financial evaluation was the most common form of
investment appraisal used by railways. The technique was used mainly for internally
funded projects and for small projects requiring outside funding. However, cost–
benefit analysis was used for some large projects that required external funds. In the
case of road infrastructure, cost–benefit analysis was both required and used to
evaluate road investments in all States.
There are several practices in the cost–benefit analysis of road projects which can
raise estimated social returns and potentially distort investment allocation between
modes. Benefits to users such as travel time savings are included as benefits in road
analyses but these are omitted from evaluations of rail investments. Environmental
effects are often excluded from the calculation of benefit–cost ratios for road




Even if time savings benefits are included in both road and rail project evaluations,
DTRS argued that these benefits do not occur to the same extent in rail projects.
According to the department, this stems from the road transport industry sharing the
asset with private motorists and railways competing in the less time sensitive
segment of the transport market. It stated that:
Unless the assessment of rail projects is able to demonstrate similar social and time
value benefits accruing from the investment, under consistent assessment criteria road
improvement projects will almost always be favoured as a result of the superior BCRs
[benefit–cost ratios] that are generated. (sub. DR125, p. 6)
Although most investment in rail and road infrastructure has been by government,
the private sector has played an increasing role in recent years, for example, in road
and rail build-own-operate-transfer projects. Under current infrastructure investment
arrangements, proposals prepared by the private sector are submitted to the relevant
government agency or committee for initial assessment. At this stage of the process,
governments are able to identify whether cost–benefit analysis is required and, if so,
the relevant considerations in measuring costs and benefits.
Cost–benefit analysis is especially relevant for large transport projects relating to
both rail and road infrastructure which have significant network and/or external
effects (whether positive or negative) and for projects requiring funding to meet
social objectives. However, financial evaluation may be more appropriate for
smaller projects where externalities or network effects do not figure prominently.
Cost–benefit analysis is warranted where proposed major projects (whether
predominantly publicly or privately financed) are expected to generate significant
external effects.
Budgetary and political factors
Aside from the iron ore railways and some coal railways, investment in rail
infrastructure has been funded mainly by government grants and borrowing.
Budgetary allocations have also funded capital expenditure on the road system. The
amount of funding governments allocate to rail investment may be affected by:
·  budgetary or borrowing constraints;
·  the financial losses of government-owned railways; and
·  competing political priorities.
For rail and road transport, budgetary pressures can halt or delay projects even
though the projects are expected to generate high social returns. Funds for
investment are generally scarcer within a contractionary fiscal environment. Since
1991, many State Governments have implemented measures to improve their fiscal242 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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positions, often to address high levels of public debt. More recently, the
Commonwealth Government has progressively reduced its outlays relative to
revenue and GDP.
This trend of fiscal consolidation may have constrained the amount of funds
available for investment in infrastructure generally. The EPAC Private
Infrastructure Task Force concluded that borrowing constraints have in the past
impeded public investment (EPAC    1995a). There may also be a tendency for
governments, when faced with budgetary constraints, to give priority to recurrent
spending over capital expenditure.
In principle, corporatised railways should be able to obtain equity from their
government owners or borrow funds to finance investment in commercially viable
operations, that is, where financial returns are expected to at least meet the cost of
capital. As Rio Tinto pointed out:
…   there are parts of the system where investment could be justified, namely those
where good returns are currently being earned and there is scope for increased traffic. It
is important that those investments be undertaken. (sub. 58, p. 21)
However, the poor financial performance of government-owned railways in recent
decades may have contributed to their greater difficulty in obtaining capital
(compared with road agencies) through budgetary or borrowing processes. As
governments already contribute significantly to cover the losses of railways, they
may be reluctant to allocate additional funds (chapter  7). While conventional
wisdom would advise against further investment in loss-making businesses, this
fails to consider that much of the rail deficit is the result of governments’ non-
commercial objectives.7 Currently, there is no equivalent way of assessing the
financial performance of past investments in the road system.
The relative spending on rail and road infrastructure could also reflect the political
priorities of governments. The Australian Wheat Board pointed to limited
government funding and the ‘relative political “unattractiveness” of rail freight
compared to passenger and other funding portfolios’ as possible reasons for the rail
industry’s slow take-up of new technology (sub. 32, p. 9). Similarly, Forsyth and
Trace noted that rail authorities, subject to government pressures, may invest in high
profile projects but such investments may be less rewarding in efficiency terms than
more mundane investments in track improvements (sub. 88).
Due to budgetary constraints and political priorities, some rail projects may not
proceed even though they are anticipated to generate commercial returns. This
                                             




would occur, for example, where the measured social returns of road projects are
higher than rail projects and the budget constraint is reached before any rail projects
are selected. Such investment opportunities would normally have been undertaken if
rail enterprises were fully commercial or under private ownership.
The budgetary and political environment under which government-owned
railways operate may have hindered their ability to raise adequate funds for
investment purposes.
Taxes and charges
A number of taxes and charges are levied on providers of transport services in
Australia (table 10.2). To the extent that these distort relative freight rates between
modes, they can influence the competitiveness of railways compared to road
transport, and affect modal usage and investment patterns.
Table 10.2 Main taxes and charges applying to rail and road transport a
Indirect taxes Charges Income taxes
· diesel fuel excise · access/registration · company tax
· payroll tax · safety
· import duty
a  Railways are currently exempt from wholesale sales tax on certain items.
Source: Based on BTCE 1997b.
According to some participants, railways are disadvantaged relative to road
transport operators by high levels of taxes and charges. The ARA stated that:
In 1995, the NTPT estimated taxes and charges as comprising 16.6 per cent of road
freight operating costs. At the time, no charges applied to rail operators, but taxes were
estimated to comprise 16.5 per cent of rail operating costs of which 12 per cent was
diesel fuel excise. Track access charges applying to rail operators have now increased
rail’s taxes and charges by 25 per cent – 30 per cent to over 40 per cent of operating
costs, two and one half to three times that of road. (sub. 51, p. 15)
The central question is whether taxes and charges are being applied consistently
across modes. Participants’ concerns relate chiefly to the diesel fuel excise, the
potential impact of taxation reform, and infrastructure charges.
Diesel fuel excise
The diesel fuel excise was introduced in 1957 as a means of raising funds for road
construction and maintenance. The excise was directed at road users so an244 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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exemption scheme was introduced for off-road users of diesel fuel including
railways. However, in 1982, the Diesel Fuel Taxes Legislation Amendment Act 1982
(Cwlth) replaced the exemption scheme with a rebate scheme and changed the
definition of off-road users to exclude railways, coastal shipping and manufacturing.
This meant that railways could not claim the rebate unless beneficiation was
involved.8 These amendments diminished the competitive position of railways
relative to road transport, holding other factors constant.
In 1998, the Commonwealth Government released its plan for a new tax system
(Costello 1998). As part of its proposed tax reforms, the Government intended to
reduce the effective diesel fuel excise from 35 cents a litre to 18 cents a litre for rail
transport operators, and from 43  cents a litre to 18  cents a litre for heavy road
vehicles.9 Studies estimated that the reforms would have delivered greater benefits
to road transport than to railways (Costello 1998; MM Starrs Pty Ltd and Ian Wright
& Associates 1999).
These tax reform proposals raised the issue of whether the same rate of excise
should apply to both modes. The main rationales for imposing indirect taxes, such as
the diesel fuel excise, are to raise revenue for either specific or general purposes and
to address externalities (BTCE 1997b; Freebairn 1997a).
Numerous participants (ASR, Institution of Engineers, NSW Minerals Council and
QR) viewed the diesel fuel excise as a measure which raises funds for the road
system.10 The Australian Peak Shippers Association stated that ‘a majority of diesel
fuel taxes collected by the Federal Government from rail go to fund road
infrastructure over which rail’s competitors operate’ (sub. 10, p. 2).
In determining annual registration fees for heavy road vehicles (over 4.5  tonnes
gross vehicle mass), the National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) includes a
portion of the diesel fuel excise as a road use charge. The charge has a legislative
basis, being defined in the Heavy Vehicles Agreement 1991 as:
                                             
8 A rebate is allowed for diesel fuel used in transporting minerals or ores from a mine to other
locations for beneficiation. Beneficiation involves upgrading the concentration of ores or the
removal of impurities but not final smelting or processing (BTCE 1997b).
9 The difference between 43 cents a litre and 35 cents a litre reflects the excise collected by the
Commonwealth on behalf of the States and Territories as compensation for the loss of business
franchise fees following a 1997 High Court decision.
10 On the other hand, the Commonwealth does not consider the diesel fuel excise to be a road user
charge. It stated that fuel taxes and the revenue they generate have no correlation to the amount
of funds provided by the Commonwealth for roads and that the fuel excise is a source of general
revenue (Commonwealth Minister for Transport and Regional Services 1999). Further, the
Commonwealth Department of Finance and Administration noted that ‘the fuel excise is
principally a revenue raising measure and the tax receipts are paid into the Consolidated
Revenue Fund’ (sub. 65, p. 12).COMPETITIVE
NEUTRALITY
245
…  a charge equal to the part of the diesel fuel tax levied by the Commonwealth for the
use of a Vehicle on a road being the part fixed by the National Commission from time
to time, in accordance with this Agreement. (Schedule  1 of the National Road
Transport Commission Act 1991 (Cwlth))
The charge nominated by the NRTC is subject to approval by the Ministerial
Council for Road Transport. Under the First Charges Determination, the notional
charge was set at 18 cents a litre (NRTC 1992).11
In its inquiries into rail transport and petroleum products, the Industry
Commission (IC) recommended that the rebate scheme be extended to include diesel
fuel used in rail freight services (IC 1991b; IC 1994a). In the latter report, the IC
argued that extending the rebate to railways, which often transport export
commodities, was in keeping with the objectives of the rebate scheme.12 The Rail
Projects Taskforce (1999) recommended that rail operators be treated like other off-
road diesel users for the purposes of fuel taxation.
Following recent negotiations, some elements of the Commonwealth Government’s
proposed tax reforms (Costello  1998) have been modified. There are two key
changes to diesel fuel excise arrangements affecting road and rail transport:
·  the effective excise will be reduced to 20 cents a litre by granting credits to
qualifying road vehicles; and
·  railways will be entitled to receive full credit for excise paid.
The Customs and Excise Amendment (Diesel Fuel Rebate Scheme) Act 1999 (Cwlth)
allows rail transport to claim the rebate. This change is likely to ameliorate some
concerns about competitive neutrality. Whether competitive neutrality is actually
improved — in an overall sense — depends on the magnitude of any remaining
distortions in the road and rail transport sectors arising from government policies.
Recent legislation will partly address competitive neutrality concerns between
railways and road transport relating to taxes and charges.
Infrastructure charges
There are several different methods for pricing access to rail networks in Australia
(chapter  8). In the case of heavy road vehicles (over 4.5 tonnes), the NRTC has
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12 The scheme is a way of improving the competitiveness of Australian commodity exports by
rebating most of the excise paid on the off-road use of diesel fuel by agricultural and mineral
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developed a system of road use charges. There are two components to national
heavy vehicle charges:
·  part of the diesel fuel excise (which is nominated by the NRTC as a road use
charge); and
·  annual registration charges which vary between vehicle classes, vehicle use and
the number of axles.
In rail transport, track access charges account for a substantial component of
operating costs. However, road access costs are generally only a small proportion of
heavy vehicle operating costs — generally less than 10 per cent and typically less
than 5 per cent (Stanley 1993). This means that even large percentage changes in
registration charges for heavy vehicles may not significantly change the price of
road transport. Aside from changes in relative prices, the extent of any modal
substitution would also depend on the size of cross-price elasticities and the
importance of non-price factors such as service quality.
A number of participants (ARA, ASR, CRT Group, Laird, NRC and NSW Minerals
Council) argued that differentials in access charges confer a significant competitive
advantage to the road transport industry. Some participants also noted that,
controlling for mass and distance, rail access charges greatly exceed heavy vehicle
registration charges. The CRT Group estimated that the access charge on a normal-
sized train from Sydney to Melbourne of 1000  net tonnes is $5.50 a tonne.
Registration charges would equate to about 55 cents a tonne for a similar journey by
a B-double truck assuming a 40 tonne net payload (sub. 20). NRC has calculated
similar disparities between access and registration charges (sub. 53).
Where government policies on charging (as well as taxation and investment) have
the effect of materially assisting one mode over its competitors, such biases could
act to deter private sector investment in the disadvantaged modes. The NSW
Government stated that:
Less than optimal development of transport systems due to poor infrastructure charging
signals has implications for the likelihood of private sector investment in transport and
calls on Government funding, and would also have adverse community and
environmental consequences. (sub. DR128, p. 38)
Although charges need not be equal across modes, these differences warrant a closer
look at the current methods of charging for access in both rail and road networks. As
the Commonwealth Department of Finance and Administration noted,
‘inconsistencies between access pricing for various modes of transport can result in
sub-optimal allocation of transport tasks between modes’ (sub. 65, p. 12). Given that
the Commission’s approach is to move towards efficient pricing in each mode, the
issue is whether heavy vehicles are being charged appropriately for road usage.COMPETITIVE
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Heavy road vehicle charges
Important reforms have occurred in the charging of heavy vehicles in recent years
(chapter    3). Despite these initiatives, concerns remain about the schedule of
charges. The Burnside City Council claimed that:
The damage to the national road network is absolutely out of proportion to the
contribution which heavy vehicle operators make towards their upkeep. (sub. 5, p. 6)
QR also found strong reason to believe that there is significant underrecovery of
direct costs for heavy articulated road vehicles that compete with railways (sub. 59).
The NRTC charging system, outlined in box 10.4, attempts to recover the share of
road expenditure that can be reasonably allocated to heavy vehicles (NRTC 1998b).
Registration charges for a particular vehicle class are based on the average distance
travelled by that class and the average gross mass of that vehicle class, for example,
all six axle trucks are levied the same charge.
However, the averaging process used to calculate registration charges by vehicle
class is a weakness of the present charging system. This has been acknowledged by
NRTC:
All the road use data in the charging process are averages for a vehicle class. These
averages conceal differences in the use made of the road system by individual vehicles.
(NRTC 1995, p. 20)
The averaging process assumes that all vehicles within a class are attributed the
same road costs. This results in overrecovery of road costs from vehicles carrying
lighter loads and travelling shorter distances, and cost underrecovery from vehicles
carrying heavier loads and travelling longer distances.
According to NRTC  (1998b), the charging structure tends to overcharge lighter
vehicles and undercharge heavier vehicles. In the First Charges Determination, a
minimum charge was introduced to ensure continuity between registration charges
for the ‘heaviest’ light vehicles and the ‘lightest’ heavy vehicles. This resulted in
overrecovery of road costs from the lightest heavy vehicles which was then
redistributed across other vehicle classes. As a consequence, there was
underrecovery of road costs from classes of heavier vehicles.248 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box 10.4 NRTC road charging approach
The cost allocation model uses road expenditure and road usage data as inputs, and
attributes expenditure by vehicle class as an output. The process involves:
·  assuming that the costs of road use are equal to the average level of road
expenditure over a three year period;
·  attributing those costs that can be associated with use of different vehicle types to
those classes of vehicles; and
·  allocating remaining costs on some broad measure of road use (vehicle
kilometres of travel is used).
The charging model aims to recover the expenditures allocated to each vehicle class
through a combination of a notional diesel fuel charge and annual registration charges.
·  A diesel fuel charge and an ‘access charge’ are selected.
·  Revenues from both these sources are deducted from the expenditure allocated
to each vehicle class and ‘mass distance charges’ are derived from the remaining
expenditures.
·  The ‘access charge’ and ‘mass distance charge’ are then combined to form
annual registration charges.
In the analysis for the First Charges Determination, this approach attributed around
$1020 million of road costs to heavy vehicles. It recovered about $660 million from a
road use charge set at 18  cents a litre of diesel and $370  million from annual
registration charges which varied by vehicle class.
Sources: NRTC 1998c; NRTC, Melbourne, pers. comm., 4 August 1999.
Since the First Charges Determination, there have been changes in the costs of road
construction and maintenance, the level of road expenditure, patterns of vehicle use
and revenue obtained from charges. As a result, road expenditures related to heavy
vehicles have increased by about 25 per cent. To maintain recovery of direct costs,
the NRTC has proposed increasing the notional diesel fuel charge from 18 cents a
litre to 20 cents a litre and increasing registration charges for some vehicles. It has
proposed that increases in registration charges should be limited to the heaviest
vehicles where there is underrecovery of their share of the costs (NRTC 1998b).
While it is unclear whether the changes to heavy vehicle charges proposed by the
NRTC will be sufficient to correct for previous undercharging, they will reduce the
existing differential.
A road user charging system for heavy vehicles, based on variable weight and
distance, would overcome the deficiencies of the averaging process. Consequently,
weight-distance charges are aligned with each vehicle’s road usage and associated
pavement wear. Weight-distance charging has applied to heavy vehicles inCOMPETITIVE
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New Zealand since 1978 (Bollard and Pickford 1998). In the United States, some
states have adopted taxes based on an assessment of trucks according to their total
weight and distance travelled (Winston  1991). Weight-distance taxes can
approximate the damage charge quite closely, provided they are made specific to the
type of vehicle (Newbery 1990).
Moving to a weight-distance system would involve the use of measurement devices.
This may require evaluating different technologies such as electronic tolling (which
will apply on CityLink in Melbourne) and Global Positioning Satellite (GPS)
systems.13 Further advances in technology are likely to increase the feasibility of
introducing weight-distance road user charging. The additional benefits that may
result from adopting a weight-distance system would need to be considered against
the related administrative, compliance and enforcement costs.
The existing road user charging system for heavy vehicles underrecovers road
costs attributable to classes of vehicles which compete directly with railways. This
confers a competitive advantage on long distance road transport operators.
The National Road Transport Commission should prepare — and recommend to
the Ministerial Council for Road Transport for adoption — a revised schedule of
heavy vehicle charges which ensures that each class of vehicle pays the full cost
of its road use.
Indirect costs of road use
The current system of heavy vehicle charges does not take into account the indirect
external costs associated with road use.14 Stanley (1993) noted that the NRTC brief
on charging was solely to develop a uniform system of charging heavy vehicles for
road expenditure attributable to their road use and excluded the indirect external
costs of road use and light vehicle charging.
Many submissions (Bicycle Federation of Australia, Fleay, Healthy Cities Illawarra,
People for Public Transport and SALGA) commented on the indirect external costs
of road usage. Healthy Cities Illawarra was concerned that:
                                             
13 GPS systems have the potential to incorporate information on road damage, engine emission
externalities and congestion. In 1998-99, the Tasmanian Department of Infrastructure, Energy
and Resources commenced an Intelligent Vehicle Trial to examine the feasibility of using the
GPS system as an aid to better management of road networks.
14 Direct external costs include damage and wear caused to roads and bridges by motor vehicles
whereas indirect external costs encompass pollution, congestion and accident costs. Insurance
may cover the property costs and some medical costs of road accidents.
RECOMMENDATION 10.1250 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
Road vehicle use, particularly heavy trucks, is continuing to increase, despite the costs
in air pollution, greenhouse gases, noise pollution, health impacts, and road congestion.
(sub. 6, attach. 1, p. 1).
SALGA pointed to the ‘environmental impact of increased road usage, particularly
through built up urban areas in terms of noise pollution and gas emissions’
(sub. 57, p. 2). Several participants also noted that rail transport was more energy-
efficient than road transport and generates fewer emissions for an equivalent
transport task.
A number of participants (ARA, Maddock, RAC and State Rail Authority of New
South Wales (SRA)) agreed that road charges should include external effects. As
Maddock stated:
The best outcome would be achieved if the price of road services were set in such a way
that it takes full and appropriate account of road costs and any external benefits and
costs. (sub. 40, p. 3)
And, the SRA noted that:
If correct pricing principles were applied to both rail and road, the price of externality
effects would be part of the user charge applied to each mode of transport.
(sub. 67, p. 5)
In New Zealand, road pricing reforms are being contemplated as part of broader
reforms to the provision of roads. The Land Transport Pricing Study examined the
cost of road infrastructure as well as environmental and safety externalities
(New  Zealand Ministry of Transport  1997a). The study presented a number of
options for the funding, pricing and management of New Zealand’s roads. More
recently, the Better Transport Better Roads proposal canvassed congestion pricing
and road charges that reflect the environmental impact of road use (New Zealand
Ministry of Transport 1998a).
In the Commission’s view, systems of road pricing that incorporate the full
economic costs should be considered for future application in Australia.
Current systems for charging road users do not take sufficient account of indirect
external costs such as pollution costs, accident costs (that are not covered by
insurance) and congestion costs.
10.3 Planning and investment in land transport
As noted earlier, some parts of the rail network (such as the interstate track) are in
need of further investment. Participants also expressed concerns about a lack of
transport planning. Given that these infrastructure deficiencies have arisen underCOMPETITIVE
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current institutional arrangements, it is worth examining alternative approaches to
planning and investment in land transport networks, including:
·  the integrated approach;
·  the Swedish approach; and
·  the commercial approach.
The integrated approach
This approach involves establishing a central public organisation (in the form of a
committee, authority or commission) which would be responsible for preparing a
plan for national road and rail networks — and possibly other modes (sea and air
transport). This body could perform a range of planning and other functions
including setting transport objectives, compiling an inventory of transport assets and
gathering information on current and future transport demand.
The organisation’s main function would be to identify transport projects for
inclusion in the national plan. This would involve evaluating projects and ranking
them in order of priority. A national planning body could rank rail and road projects
on the basis of benefit–cost ratios. Such a body could also make recommendations
to governments on which projects should receive funding.
The key potential benefit of the integrated approach is that, having one body
performing the planning task, there would be greater consistency and coordination
in developing road and rail networks. As proposed investments would be assessed
and ranked on the same basis (using cost–benefit analysis), project selection is more
likely to be neutral with respect to mode.
Investment in transport infrastructure has often been guided by political
considerations. A further advantage of an organisation which compiles and
publishes a list of projects ranked according to economic criteria is that it would
limit, or at least highlight, ministerial discretion in selecting projects.
Integrated planning for national networks has conceptual appeal, but there are
potential difficulties with such an approach.
A national planning body may rely primarily on further investment to resolve
perceived infrastructure shortages. For example, to alleviate road congestion, it
might recommend greater investment in roads or railways. However, measures
aimed at managing the demand for road space (such as road pricing) may also be
effective and may use less capital resources than a supply-based approach.252 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Proponents of a national transport plan argue that the plan must be linked to funding
to enable implementation. The HORSCCTMR  (1997) recommended that the
Commonwealth Government develop an integrated strategic plan for the national
transport network and that it also provide an appropriate, guaranteed level of road
funding to support the national outcomes as set out in the plan.
However, linking a national plan to funding can create undesirable incentives. If
projects included in the plan automatically attract Commonwealth funding, it is
likely that States and Territories will push to have projects in their jurisdictions
added to the plan. Similarly, the private sector may promote large scale transport
projects as being of national significance in order to gain government assistance.
The plan could evolve into a wishlist containing ‘vision’ projects of doubtful value,
while commercially viable projects do not proceed.
A related issue is the definition of the national transport network. While definition is
easier for infrastructure which links jurisdictions, in other cases it may prove more
difficult. For example, are transport projects required for major sporting or cultural
events part of the national network? To avoid disputes with jurisdictions, the
planning body may need to devise a set of criteria to determine which existing
infrastructure and new projects form part of the national network.
Under an integrated approach governments, through the central body, would have
primary responsibility for planning, project selection and funding, and possibly even
provision. However, benefits are expected from further private sector involvement
in railways (chapter    7). The private sector is normally better capable (than the
public sector) of identifying and evaluating commercial opportunities. Private
entities have a strong incentive to seek out all relevant information and assess the
risks regarding potential investments.
Another drawback is that a central body might be too removed from the businesses
and enterprises that actually invest in and operate transport systems. In evaluating
and ranking projects, the body would be heavily dependent on the quality and detail
of the information supplied by these agencies.
There are administration costs associated with establishing and running a central
body. Implementing its recommendations on which projects should proceed will
also have budgetary implications. Even if a national body were formed, States and
Territories are likely to retain planning responsibilities for their own transport
systems. Further, it may not be possible to divorce priority setting completely from




Although a centralised planning approach would improve some aspects of existing
arrangements, it would continue the past practices of relying on governments to
provide funds for transport infrastructure — and the past, as evidenced above, does
not have a good record.
The Swedish approach
Unlike the integrated approach, in Sweden separate government agencies are
responsible for planning and investment in road and rail networks. The Swedish
approach relies on subsidies to promote competitive neutrality between rail and road
transport.
In the case of road investment, the road administration is required to:
·  evaluate projects on economic (rather than commercial) criteria;
·  prepare investment programs which prioritise projects according to the results of
cost–benefit analyses; and
·  submit investment programs to parliament for approval and decisions on funding
allocations.
This is known in Sweden as the ‘road model’ (OECD  1999). Since the vertical
separation of Swedish railways in 1988 (appendix  E), the road model has been
applied to assessing investment in rail infrastructure. Unlike Australian practice,
cost–benefit analysis of track investment attempts to measure the benefits to users,
such as the value of shorter travel times (Kopicki and Thompson  1995). The
national track authority must also prepare and submit its investment program to
parliament.
Many participants have suggested that investing in railways is a way of ameliorating
the costs of road transport (including the indirect external costs of accidents,
pollution and congestion) and attaining an optimal modal split between road and rail
transport. This means that, where road infrastructure is subsidised by say imposing
low road user charges or fuel taxes, railways would also require subsidies to lower
the price of rail services and generate a substitution towards rail transport.
Such an approach has been adopted in Sweden. A Transport Bill presented to the
Swedish parliament proposed reducing rail track charges to correct for distortions of
intermodal competition caused by changes in road vehicle taxation since  1988
(Jones et al.  1998). The Swedish Government, which owns the national track
authority, indicated that from 1 January 1999 many of the track access charges were
to be removed (Railway Gazette International, August 1998). As a result, subsidies
for track provision have increased.254 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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If the Swedish approach to the subsidisation of rail transport were to be
implemented comprehensively, the data and analytical burden would be onerous.
Governments would need to collect and analyse information to estimate, for
instance, price deviations from social marginal costs in one mode (such as road
transport) and then adjust prices appropriately in competing modes (such as rail
transport).15
Moreover, the Swedish approach may not fully resolve the issue of investment
priorities within rail transport. According to Thompson (1997), in Sweden, there
have been coordination problems between the national track authority and the
national operator. The operator wants to set investment priorities for track work
whereas the authority follows politically-determined funding priorities. Following
vertical separation, infrastructure spending increased significantly. However, ‘since
that money was provided by the taxpayers, the politicians wanted full control over
the spending’ (OECD  1999, p.  180). Indeed, as noted above, both rail and road
investment programs must be approved by parliament.
The Swedish approach would involve costs in budgetary terms and could result in
resource misallocation. Where prices are set below marginal costs, subsidies would
be required to cover operating losses. There are also costs of administering such
policies. Aside from the budgetary impacts, this approach could skew economic
activity towards the transport sector and away from other sectors. Government must
also be committed to making the funds available.
The commercial approach
Planning and investment in land transport infrastructure can also be determined on a
more commercial basis by enterprises and agencies within each mode. The
commercial approach involves the following elements:
·  a broad policy framework for the national transport system;
·  the provision of rail and road infrastructure;
·  use of the purchaser-provider model for non-commercial objectives; and
·  a network manager for the interstate track.
To advance key transport goals, the Commonwealth Government could develop and
introduce an overarching policy framework for the national transport system. The
framework would set out the Government’s main objectives and directions for the
                                             
15 Such analysis would require estimates of substitution elasticities which vary across transport
corridors and between studies. There is likely to be considerable debate over the magnitude of
the estimated elasticities and differing estimates may leave scope for political lobbying.COMPETITIVE
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system regarding efficiency, safety, equity and the environment. The
Commonwealth Government could prepare a draft framework for public comment
before preparing a final version. Such a framework has been developed in
New  Zealand — initially in the form of a National Land Transport Strategy Draft
and subsequently a National Transport Statement (New  Zealand Ministry of
Transport 1997b and 1998b).
Improving coordination and consistency within and between modes could be
included as an efficiency goal in the framework. Transport agencies would be
required to ensure that their objectives, policies and decisions are broadly consistent
with the national framework. This requirement could be included in performance
agreements between agencies and their parent departments.
Through this mechanism, the Commonwealth Government could influence the long
term development of the transport system without needing to supplant or centralise
the planning and investment functions of separate transport entities.
In the case of railways, this approach would then require that rail enterprises operate
and invest only where services are viable. Existing operations would continue or
new investment proceed if the rate of return at least meets the cost of capital. Private
sector involvement would further strengthen the commercial orientation of rail
enterprises. Investments proposed by the private sector would still be subject to the
normal project approval processes required by governments.
A commercial emphasis does not preclude the provision of some non-commercial
rail services. Governments may be willing to fund services for social or other
reasons. Where governments wish to pursue non-commercial objectives (such as
income redistribution or regional development goals), the purchaser-provider model
should be applied (chapter  11). In these cases, governments would underpin
planning and investment through their commitment to purchase services.
Moreover, the commercial approach does not prevent governments from addressing
external or network effects arising from land transport activities. As discussed
above, for major projects which are expected to have large external effects (positive
or negative), cost–benefit analysis is required. Where projects will generate
significant positive externalities and benefit the community but are not viable,
governments may decide to provide ‘top-up’ funding to projects involving private
financing or fund them completely.
Commercialising railways is likely to generate benefits in its own right. However,
given that rail and road transport compete for business in many freight and
passenger markets and are complementary in others, outcomes in commercialised256 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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railways will be conditional on developments in government policy regarding the
road system and the road transport industry.
Aside from the issue of road pricing, there are broader issues concerning the
institutional arrangements for delivering roads in Australia. Submissions to recent
parliamentary committees of inquiry have argued that governments have not set
clear objectives for road provision, investment patterns have not maximised the
potential benefits to road users and political imperatives and funding uncertainty
have impeded long term planning (HORSCCTMR 1997; HORSCTCI 1993).
These issues suggest scope for improving road provision. Abrams et al.  (1998)
examined a number of different institutional arrangements for road provision,
including commercial approaches based on the effective road fund and public utility
models.16 A road fund currently operates in New Zealand where further road
reforms are also being considered (box 10.5).
Achieving competitive neutrality between rail and road in Australia, within a more
commercial framework, will require reforms to the provision of roads. A range of
issues covering planning, investment, funding and institutional arrangements should
be examined within the context of a broad public inquiry into road provision.
A commercial approach to the provision of rail and road infrastructure would be
a better way of promoting competitive neutrality between modes than introducing
a government-driven integrated planning process or linking rail subsidies to those
of the road sector.
                                             
16 The effective road fund approach involves a devolution of responsibility for key road provision
tasks to a representative board of management. The board decides both the aggregate level of
expenditure on roads and where these funds will be invested. Funds are derived from earmarked
taxes and charges. The public utility model involves a fully commercial treatment of road
provision. The utility charges directly for road use and provides road services on the basis of
achieving a reasonable rate of return on its investments.COMPETITIVE
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Box 10.5 Road provision in New Zealand
Transfund’s main objective is to allocate resources to achieve a safe and efficient road
system. It purchases components (road outputs) which comprise the National Roading
Program from various road agencies, including Transit New Zealand and local
authorities.
The board of Transfund has a high level of autonomy in deciding what road works will
be undertaken to achieve assigned objectives. Its purchase of road outputs is financed
through the National Road Fund (NRF). The NRF is largely funded by an identified
portion of the fuel excise, road user charges and motor vehicle registration fees.
Transfund also recommends to government the level of these charges.
Recently, the New Zealand Government proposed significant changes to the
institutional arrangements for road provision — outlined in Better Transport Better
Roads (New   Zealand Ministry of Transport 1998a). Under these proposals, a small
number of regionally-based local road companies would manage local roads. A Crown-
owned company, Transit New Zealand Limited, would operate state highways and
motorways. Another Crown-owned company, Transfund New Zealand Limited, would
provide road funding.
Source: Abrams et al 1998; New Zealand Ministry of Transport 1998a.
Role of a network manager under the commercial approach
To facilitate investment in the interstate rail system under a commercial approach,
the Commonwealth Government could establish a network manager to coordinate
planning, amongst other functions (chapter 6). These functions could be defined in a
formal code of conduct. In regards to planning, the code would:
·  require the network manager to collect and disseminate planning information to
network participants and interested parties;
·  request track providers and users to participate in the planning process; and
·  set out consultation mechanisms through which interested parties could examine,
and comment upon, investment plans.
This coordinating function is similar to that undertaken by the National Electricity
Market Management Company (NEMMCO) — the network manager of the national
electricity market (box 10.6). Its other functions are outlined in chapter 6 (box 6.3).
The proposed manager would administer the planning process to facilitate
investment, but it would not actually undertake the investment — this would be
done by participants in the rail industry (appendix  H). To avoid conflicts of interest,
the manager would not own any track or rollingstock. Importantly, establishing a258 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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network manager obviates the need to have a single network owner, that is, different
parts of the network can have different owners — government or private.17
Being responsible for the day-to-day management of the network, the manager
would be in a good position to collect information on the condition of the track,
capacity constraints, track charges and current and future traffic flows. The manager
would also be closer to the network and its users than a government committee or
commission.
Box 10.6 Planning of the national electricity network
The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) coordinates the
planning of the national power system. The National Electricity Code sets out the
procedures for network planning and development.
For planning within a region, the code requires service providers to conduct annual
planning reviews. Where a need for network augmentation is identified, joint planning
is undertaken by the relevant service providers. They must consult with affected code
participants and interested parties on possible options to address the projected system
limitations. The service providers then prepare a report which includes an assessment
of identified options, the preferred proposal, a summary of submissions from
consultations, and the recommended action. The report is made available to affected
code participants and interested parties. Where any code participant disputes a
recommendation, the service provider and the affected code participant must negotiate
in good faith to reach agreement on the action to be taken.
For planning across regions, the code requires NEMMCO to establish an Interregional
Planning Committee. The committee helps NEMMCO prepare the statement of
opportunities, undertake an annual planning review of the power system and assess
applications to establish new interconnectors between regions. The statement of
opportunities contains information on the performance of the existing system and
power transfer capabilities, as well as the adequacy of the system to meet forecast
power transfers. As part of the annual planning review, the committee identifies and
assesses options to address system constraints and must call for and receive
submissions from service providers, code participants and interested parties.
In the case of new interconnectors across regions, the committee assesses
applications and NEMMCO determines whether the proposed interconnector is
justified. For example, TransGrid requested the committee and NEMMCO to review
the economic and technical aspects of proposed interconnection between South
Australia and New South Wales.
Source: National Grid Management Council 1996; Interconnections Options Working Group 1999.
                                             
17 Under the approach recommended by the Rail Projects Taskforce (1999), the Commonwealth




As part of its planning function, the manager would identify deficiencies within the
interstate network and coordinate a response to these problems. In some cases,
infrastructure deficiencies can have adverse effects throughout the network. As
noted earlier, route congestion in the Sydney metropolitan area has been identified
as a major national problem (box 10.3). The NSW Rail Access Regime establishes
‘passenger priority’ provisions for use of the State network (sub. DR128). Urban
passenger trains in Sydney are given priority to use the track in the morning and
afternoon peak periods, causing significant delays for other trains entering or exiting
the Sydney area. It has led freight operators to divert trains onto other routes and
reschedule services to avoid the morning and afternoon curfews. Furthermore, it
results in many trains travelling within a narrow band of time, creating difficulties in
other parts of the network. The NSW Government noted that:
In recognition of the importance of improving capacity through Sydney to rail freight
movements throughout Australia, parties to the 1997 National Rail Summit agreed to
develop a plan for the provision of dedicated freight track(s) through metropolitan
Sydney. (sub. DR128, p. 36)
Although the infrastructure problem in Sydney could be resolved eventually under
the commercial approach, there would be a time lag before its key elements are
implemented. Given that private sector funding is unlikely to be forthcoming in the
short term, there is a compelling case for Commonwealth Government funding to
create additional freight paths through Sydney on externality grounds. While a
portion of the Commonwealth’s $250  million Interstate Rail Infrastructure
Investment Fund has been allocated to projects in Sydney18, this allocation falls
short of the amount required to resolve the congestion problem fully. The Rail
Projects Taskforce (1999) noted that a dedicated rail freight route through Sydney
may cost in the range of $300 million to $500 million.19 Detailed project evaluation
should be undertaken to ascertain the level of funding required.
This investment would facilitate the efficient use of the interstate network and so
enhance the ability of railways to compete with other modes, especially road
transport. However, the full benefits for the network from such investment would
only be realised through the establishment of a network manager to handle
competitive access and facilitate planning. Thus, Commonwealth funding for rail
infrastructure in Sydney should be made contingent on the adoption of a network
manager for the interstate track.
                                             
18 Construction of the first project, at Flemington junction in Sydney, commenced in late 1998
(sub. DR128).
19 The NSW Government prepared preliminary indicative costings for southern and northern
access route projects between Macarthur and Cowan (NSW Minister for Transport 1997). In
total, these projects were estimated to cost in the vicinity of $450 million (1997 dollars).260 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Governments should adopt a more commercial approach to railways and road
provision. This will involve:
·  the Commonwealth Government introducing an overarching policy framework
for national transport;
·  applying competitive contracting out, franchising or full privatisation to
railways;
·  establishing a network manager for the interstate track to manage competitive
access and facilitate planning;
·  applying the purchaser-provider model rigorously where non-commercial
objectives are being pursued; and
·  evaluating major road and rail projects using cost–benefit analysis where the
projects are expected to have significant external effects.
The Commonwealth Government should — as a matter of national priority —
allocate additional funds to projects which would alleviate route congestion in the
Sydney metropolitan area, subject to the adoption of a network manager for the
interstate track.
The Commonwealth Government should establish a public inquiry into road
provision in Australia. This inquiry should examine:
·  road transport planning processes;
·  methods of investment appraisal (including the evaluation and allocation of
costs and benefits);
·  funding arrangements (including taxation, charges and grants);
·  the scope to improve road pricing; and
·  current institutional arrangements and alternatives.
RECOMMENDATION 10.2
RECOMMENDATION 10.3
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11 Social dimensions
Governments have used the provision of rail services to promote a
number of non-commercial objectives relating to passenger and freight
transport. These include safety, congestion, the environment, employment
and regional development. The reform of Australia’s railways does not
preclude governments from pursuing clearly specified and funded non-
commercial objectives. However, consideration needs to be given to the
most effective and efficient way of achieving desired outcomes. If
governments do choose to subsidise railways, procedures and funding
need to be managed in a commercial manner and costs made transparent.
The reduced demand for labour by railways is largely due to technological
change and competition from road transport. As a consequence, direct
intervention by government is likely to be a costly and ineffective way of
influencing the level of employment in railways or achieving general
employment objectives. Instead, governments have a key role to play in
facilitating adjustment within the industry to reduce unnecessary
transitional costs and to help people and regions adjust to change.
As part of this inquiry, the terms of reference require the Commission to ‘have
regard to the established economic, social, regional development and environmental
objectives of government’. In addition, the Productivity Commission Act 1998,
requires the Commission ‘to recognise the interests of industries, employees,
consumers and the community, likely to be affected by measures proposed by the
Commission’.
Participants have raised concerns regarding the effects of rail reform on the
provision of non-commercial services (particularly in urban areas), employment
levels and regional development outcomes. This chapter describes the current role
of governments in providing non-commercial rail services (section  11.1).
Section  11.2 considers the rationale for subsidising railways and the scope for
minimising the cost of such subsidies. Section 11.3 addresses some of the specific
concerns raised by participants regarding the provision of non-commercial rail
services. Section 11.4 then discusses the impacts of reform on railway employment
and regional areas in Australia.262 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The Commission’s concurrent inquiry, The Impact of Competition Policy Reforms
on Rural and Regional Australia, considers structural adjustment issues in regional
Australia in greater detail (PC 1999).
11.1 Government payments to railways
State governments make considerable payments to railways from their annual
budgets to fund the provision of non-commercial rail services.1 These services are
widely known as community service obligations (CSOs). As well as recurrent
payments to cover operating expenses, governments in some instances provide
capital grants for the purchase of infrastructure such as rollingstock and track.
There are difficulties in accurately determining the cost of providing subsidised rail
services in most jurisdictions from publicly available information. In some instances
subsidy payments are presented as a consolidated payment for all transport modes.
In many cases it is unclear how the cost of the service was calculated, especially the
treatment of capital assets.
Government payments for urban and non-urban passenger services are usually a
combination of general subsidies for all passengers, as well as additional
concessions for targeted users. Payments for freight services include subsidies to
train operators as well as payments for the retention of non-commercial branch
lines.
For example, the NSW Government paid over $1 billion to purchase rail services
and infrastructure in 1997-98 (table  11.1). Payments made to railways included
explicit CSO payments, deficit funding and capital grants. Explicit payments were
made to the State Rail Authority of New South Wales (SRA) (for urban and non-
urban passengers), FreightCorp (for the haulage of some grain, minerals and general
freight in regional New South Wales) and Rail Access Corporation (RAC) (for track
infrastructure on a number of regional branch lines). In addition, SRA received a
capital grant of $356 million and recorded an operating deficit of nearly $33 million
in 1997-98.
                                             
1 Transport subsidies are not restricted to railways. Governments subsidise a range of transport
modes including buses, ferries, trams and regional aviation. The Commonwealth Government no
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Table 11.1 State Government payments for community service
obligationsa, 1997-98
Rail service NSW Vic Qld WA SA
$m $m $m $m $m
Urban passengers
Explicit payments and deficit funding 462.5 b 201.2 d   327.5 e 87.2 174.5 g  
Capital grants 356.2 c 172.7 d 0 f 0 f 0 f
Non-urban passengers
Explicit payments and deficit funding 71.2 –– 59.8 13.7 0 h
Freight
Explicit payments 90.0 6.5 158.8 0 h 0 h
Track
Explicit payments 177.0 …… … …
Total payments 1 156.9 380.4 546.1 100.9 174.5
a No rail CSO payments were made by the Tasmanian Government in 1997-98. b  The entire operating deficit
for SRA in 1997-98 ($38.2 million) has been allocated to urban passenger services.  c  All capital grants to
SRA have been allocated to urban passenger services. d  This figure represents the total cash payment to
the PTC for all passenger services (trains, trams, buses and non-urban passengers) in 1997-98. Around half
the passenger services provided in 1997-98 were by rail. e  QR received $7.8 million in concession payments
for urban passenger services. These funds were recorded as sales revenue by QR. f No capital grants were
made by the State Government for urban passenger services in 1997-98. Costs associated with the
maintenance of capital are included as part of the explicit payments. g  Includes payments to TransAdelaide
(economic entity) for urban trains, buses and trams. Around 22  per  cent of the journeys provided by
TransAdelaide in 1997-98 were by rail. h  No payments were made by the State Government for this service
in 1997-98.
…  included as part of payments for the provision of subsidised passenger and freight services.
––  included as part of the consolidated payment for urban passenger services.
Sources: SRA 1998; FreightCorp 1998; RAC 1998; PTC 1998; V/Line Freight 1998; QR 1998; Westrail 1998;
TransAdelaide 1998.
The NSW Minerals Council suggested that the NSW Government was partly
funding certain rail freight CSOs through cross-subsidisation from coal operations:
Additional CSO funding is provided by monopoly rent from coal access charges. This
is described as an ‘adjustment component’ of access charges under clause v(e) of
Schedule 3 of the [access] Regime.
... An analysis of the accounts suggests that the adjustment component is being used to
cross-subsidise RAC’s operations. (sub. 39, p. 17)
However, RAC disputed this suggestion:
… the export coal adjustment component is not and has never been used by RAC to
cross-subsidise loss making operations as suggested by the NSW Minerals Council.
(sub. DR102, p. 34)264 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The Commission has not sought to verify the claims made by the NSW Minerals
Council. However, the situation does demonstrate how a lack of transparency in the
manner by which governments specify and fund non-commercial services can create
perceptions of unfair treatment on the part of commercial (unsubsidised) customers.
The Victorian Government paid over $380 million to purchase rail services and fund
infrastructure in 1997-98. Payments made to the Public Transport Corporation also
included explicit payments, deficit funding and capital grants. V/Line Freight
received $6.5 million in payments for subsidised freight operations.
In Queensland and Western Australia, non-commercial services are funded through
explicit payments to Queensland Rail (QR) and Westrail, respectively.
In South Australia, urban rail passenger services in Adelaide are provided by
TransAdelaide. In addition, TransAdelaide also provides urban bus and tram
services. Total contract payments to TransAdelaide for all services were
$174.5 million in 1997-98.2
Long distance passenger services (the Indian Pacific, Ghan and Overland trains) are
provided by Great Southern Railway (GSR). With regard to passenger subsidies,
GSR stated:
Great Southern Railway now operates without any Government subsidy. The
Commonwealth and certain States continue to pay reimbursement for pensioner
discounts and other concessions, however this has now declined to about 10 per cent of
income. (sub. DR95, p. 2)
In Tasmania no rail CSO payments were made by the Government in 1997-98.
11.2 Subsidising railways
Government subsidies to railways represent a significant use of the community’s
resources, exceeding $2.3  billion in 1997-98 across jurisdictions (table  11.1). In
New South Wales and Queensland, payments to railways represented around
5  per  cent and 4  per  cent of total government outlays respectively (NSW
Government 1998b; Queensland Government 1998b).
                                             
2 Published payments to TransAdelaide are consolidated across all transport modes with no
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In some instances users make virtually no contribution to the cost of their rail
services. For example, with respect to some branch lines used for transporting grain
in New South Wales, RAC commented:
Certainly without below rail CSOs that very extensive network of grain branch lines in
New South Wales wouldn’t exist. We get about 95 per cent of our revenue off a typical
branch line from the CSO and only about 5  per  cent through access fees.
(trans., p. 1106)
Similarly, in the case of urban and non-urban passenger services, government
subsidies often cover most of the cost of providing the service. Fare structures are
determined by government and prices paid by passengers cover only a small
proportion of the cost of service provided. The difference between the cost of
service and passenger fare is broadly consistent across jurisdictions. For example, in
Queensland, the average government payment (subsidy) per urban rail passenger
journey is over five times the average fare paid by passengers (box  11.1). In
Western Australia, the average government payment per urban rail passenger
journey is over four times the average fare paid by passengers (Westrail 1998).
Box 11.1 Government subsidies for urban rail passenger services in
Brisbane
In Brisbane, urban rail passenger services are provided by the State-owned statutory
corporation, Queensland Rail (QR). In 1997-98, QR provided around 41.5  million
passenger journeys and collected approximately $60.6  million in farebox revenue,
$7.8  million in concession payments and $319.7  million in community service
obligation payments from government. From this information it can be estimated that:
·  the average fare paid by passengers per journey was approximately $1.45.
·  the average subsidy (including targeted concessions) per passenger journey was
approximately $7.90.
Source: QR 1998.
Governments may justify some subsidies on the basis that rail is disadvantaged
relative to road transport. Under existing arrangements, some of the costs of road
transport (such as air pollution and damage to roads) are not fully reflected in road
user charges. Subsidies to railways may also be justified as promoting social
objectives, including income redistribution, access for disadvantaged groups and
regional development.
This section focuses on the merits of subsidising railways to promote non-
commercial objectives as well as some issues arising from such a policy.
Consideration is also given to the most effective and efficient way of minimising the
cost of subsidies while achieving the desired outcomes.266 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Participants’ views
Participants generally supported governments subsidising railways for a variety of
reasons, including a lack of competitive neutrality with road, accessibility for
disadvantaged groups and regional development. In addition, People for Public
Transport and the Bicycle Federation of Australia raised the issue of the relationship
between energy use and transport as worthy of consideration by governments
(subs. 14 and 31).
In regard to urban passenger services, the Australasian Railway Association (ARA)
commented:
Australia’s urban and commuter railways generate significant social benefits by
providing an efficient mass transport alternative to cars, helping to reduce road
congestion and accidents, fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions,
particularly in urban areas. (sub. 51, p. 8)
And the South Australian Local Government Association (SALGA) noted:
Well patronised urban passenger rail services will lead to reduced greenhouse gas
emissions, reduced fossil fuel use and improved air quality for all. (sub. 57, p. 2)
The importance of maintaining transport services, including rail, to regional
Australia was raised by the Local Government and Shires Associations of New
South Wales:
Intrastate and interstate passenger services are also vital. These services provide
important passenger transport links for rural and regional centres, particularly for the
aged, disabled, youth and those with limited means. These links are becoming more
critical with the ongoing rationalisation and centralisation of services forcing people to
travel greater distances. The closure of a number of branch lines and service cuts are a
major concern to many councils in regional Australia.
Intrastate and interstate [are] also critical freight links that are important in maintaining
and developing our regions. Regional development is a matter of utmost concern to
rural councils. (sub. 71, p. 2)
And the SALGA:
Government policy should also focus on balancing regionalism with national benefits.
Healthy regional economies benefit the whole of the Australian economy. Thus,
improved rail services in the regions should be encouraged to support the local
economies and, moreover, would alleviate the negative impacts of excessive road
transport. (sub. 57, attach. 1, p. 2)
In addition to maintaining transport services in regional areas, RAC acknowledged
that subsidies for railways in New South Wales were essentially an indirect
assistance measure for the rural sector (trans., p. 1107).SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 267
External costs of road transport
As noted in chapter  5, the overall objective of reform is to have an efficient
transport system. Achieving this objective requires that the fares and charges for
transport reflect all the economic costs imposed by individual use. This includes
recognising and dealing with any external costs generated by transport, regardless of
mode.
In some instances it would appear that the level of subsidies to railways greatly
exceeds that necessary to correct for distortions in the road sector. The question
arises as to whether such subsidies are required at all to meet economic objectives.
Chapter 10 considered the merits of subsidising railways on the basis of a lack of
competitive neutrality between road and rail transport. It was found that a more
commercial approach to the provision and pricing of roads (that encompasses
external costs such as pollution, noise and congestion) was more efficient than
linking rail subsidies to those of the road sector.
If this approach was fully implemented, there would be no economic reason for
subsidising railways to compensate for a lack of full cost recovery in road transport.
Social objectives
In some instances governments may choose to subsidise transport to promote purely
social objectives, generally relating to equity. Social objectives, by their nature, are
broad and governments can use a variety of instruments to promote them including:
·  the tax and welfare system;
·  the provision of social services, such as education, health and law and order;
·  financial grants from the Commonwealth Government to State, Territory and
Local Governments;
·  direct assistance to rural and regional industries; and
·  subsidising transport, including railways.268 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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FreightCorp stated that subsidies for rail freight were justified for two reasons:
They contribute to the survival of small, often isolated rural communities and meet
community needs by reducing the reliance on road transport. (FreightCorp 1997, p. 29)
However, it is often difficult to determine the precise reason(s) (and hence difficult
to justify a specific subsidy level) why most governments are subsidising railways.
The Commission is unaware of any Australian published material that link subsidies
to railways to specific social objectives (section 11.3).
Most governments do not appear to have clearly specified social objectives
relating to subsidies provided to railways.
Determining the most appropriate way of achieving social objectives from the range
of options available, requires clearly specified goals and knowledge of the cost
effectiveness of each option in achieving these goals. In addition, it is important that
the option(s) chosen are provided in the most efficient manner.
This approach ensures that the community receives value for money and maximises
the ability of governments to promote social objectives within resource constraints.
Subsidising transport
It may be the case that after careful assessment of the alternatives, governments
decide that subsidising transport is their preferred way of promoting social
objectives.
Within transport, there are a number of alternative modes that governments could
choose to subsidise. As such, a rigorous and consistent approach to assessing the
merits of subsidising alternative transport modes is needed to determine the most
effective and efficient means of promoting social objectives. As noted by the
Victorian Government, while railways have a role in Australia’s transport system,
they are better suited to providing some types of transport services than others
(trans., p. 939). It is unlikely that railways will be the most effective and efficient
transport mode to promote social objectives in all cases. For example, Jones et al.
questioned the effectiveness of subsidising railways to promote income
redistribution objectives:
Rail’s low market share, and the fact that other forms of public transport (such as buses
and coaches) might offer cheaper and more flexible alternatives, limits the effectiveness
of subsidising rail services as a means of income redistribution. (Jones et al.
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The most effective and efficient transport mode for passengers or freight may also
change over time due to factors such as improvements in technology and supplier
responsiveness to the preferences of users. As noted by the Independent Pricing and
Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) with respect to the provision of trains and buses for
long distance travel:
It appears that the level of service superiority previously held by trains over coaches has
narrowed and is negligible when assessed in conjunction with operational flexibility,
lower capital costs and the commercial viability of coaches. (IPART 1997, p. 20)
Evaluating the cost effectiveness of alternative transport modes is important in
deciding how best to provide subsidised transport services.
Subsidising railways
If governments choose to subsidise railways rather than another mode, they then
need to determine the most appropriate way of providing the assistance. As
discussed in chapter 6, there is scope for minimising the cost of rail subsidies to
taxpayers through tendering and greater private sector participation. Any such
subsidies to railways need to be specified in contracts that articulate clearly the
services required and the level of the subsidy.
Passengers
Subsidies for rail passengers are commonly provided as general subsidies for all
users, with additional concessions for targeted user groups. Targeted concessions
are usually provided on the basis of social objectives, such as income redistribution
and improved access for disadvantaged people. The use of concessions for urban
rail passengers to promote social objectives was considered in detail by the Industry
Commission’s (IC) (1994b) report, Urban Transport. A finding of this report was
that the effectiveness of such concessions can be increased by making them
available to people who satisfy eligibility criteria, rather than be restricted to those
who have access to particular transport providers.
The franchising of urban passenger services in Melbourne provides a recent
example of where steps have been taken to minimise the costs to taxpayers of a
general subsidy (chapters 3 and 7).
Freight
Adoption of the Commission’s reform package for regional railways is consistent
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necessary. Evidence from recently privatised railways, including Tasrail and
Australia Southern Railroad, indicates that under private ownership, railways can
successfully compete in Australia’s transport markets with little, if any, subsidy
from government (chapter 7).
By adopting the Commission’s reform package, the need for subsidies to regional
railways is likely to be significantly reduced.
Even so, some existing branch lines in regional networks may still prove to be non-
commercial and require government support if the government decides they are to
remain open.
The characteristics of non-commercial branch lines (few commodities and low
traffic volumes) indicate that if governments choose to support their retention, the
cost of the subsidy can be minimised through a franchise agreement or negotiations
with potential purchasers if the network were to be privatised. Given the limited
volumes of freight transported over these lines, access and interface issues with
other networks or operators is likely to be minimal.
For vertically separated railways, as in New South Wales, governments have the
option of subsidising the track infrastructure, train operations or some combination
of the two. With regard to the appropriateness of below track subsidies, RAC
commented:
The present CSO line approach is the model preferred by all parties in NSW because it
recognises that rural freight usage is insufficient in most sectors to meet the fixed
common costs of providing access. It allows RAC to charge train operators, particularly
freight operators, affordable access fees which make a contribution to fixed costs. Other
previous funding approaches did not address this issue and attempted to transfer the
infrastructure shortfall to freight rates or to passenger fares with all the attendant
distortions. (sub. DR102, p. 36)
QR (sub.  59, attach.  2) also supported the concept of below track subsidies,
especially on very low volume lines. It considered the provision of subsidies to train
operators to be inefficient on the grounds that:
·  it places the risk of third party volatility on the last remaining operator, who has
no ability to manage the risk; and
·  any potential for increasing traffic on the line is diminished greatly by the barrier
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However, the economic characteristics of non-commercial branch lines indicate that
few efficiency gains are likely to be achieved by promoting competition between
train operators on subsidised track (chapter 6). As such, subsidies can be provided to
one train operator and their costs minimised through a franchise agreement. As
argued by Jones et al.:
Subsidies paid to train operators (rather than infrastructure managers) enable
governments to have a role in deciding precisely which services are provided, and can
be combined with a franchising or competitive tendering process to ensure that state-
supported services are provided efficiently. (Jones et al. 1998, p. 55)
This approach does not exclude the franchisee from allowing other train operators
access to the track.
In addition to minimising the cost of the subsidy, its transparency could also be
enhanced by directly subsidising the operators rather than indirectly by lowering
track access costs.
This approach for subsidising rail freight has parallels with current funding
arrangements in New South Wales for urban rail passengers. The Government
directly subsidises SRA (the predominant train operator) rather than the
infrastructure provider (RAC).
Subsidisation of track infrastructure in regional areas is unlikely to be the most
effective and efficient way of achieving social objectives. If governments choose to
subsidise regional railways, these payments can be minimised through
franchising or negotiated as part of the privatisation of regional railways.
An alternative to directly subsidising rail freight operations is to redirect the
assistance to the users themselves. This can be done through a system of freight
rebates. Such a system currently operates in Queensland for the movement of stock
and fodder during drought periods (box 11.2).272 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box 11.2 Drought assistance in Queensland
In Queensland, the Department of Primary Industries is responsible for administering
freight subsidies as part of the Government’s Drought Relief Assistance Payment
Scheme. The scheme provides subsidy assistance to primary producers for the
transport costs of fodder, stock drinking water, livestock returning from agistment and
restocking.
The scheme operates as a rebate system where users receive a discount from the
Department on eligible transport costs. They have the option of choosing between rail,
hired carrier or private vehicle, with different rebates applying to different transport
modes.
Source: Department of Primary Industries 1999, DPI Assistance Measures,
http://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/ruraldev/welcome.htm (accessed 11 June 1999).
11.3 Improving the provision of non-commercial rail
services
The preceding section examined the merits of subsidising railways to promote non-
commercial objectives. This section outlines the reforms governments have
implemented to improve the effectiveness and efficiency by which railways are used
to promote non-commercial objectives and addresses some of the specific concerns
raised by participants.
Recent reforms
Reform of the procurement of non-commercial rail services has generally been
addressed through a ‘whole of government’ approach to procurement. These
reforms have occurred within the context of what is termed the purchaser-provider
framework. More detail on the purchaser-provider framework are provided in
appendix I.
A key element underpinning the reform process has been a shift towards the
development of contractual arrangements between the government and railways.
These formal agreements set out the non-commercial services required and explicit
government payments, thus avoiding the need for cross-subsidisation and deficit
funding.
Victoria and South Australia have refined further the manner in which railways
provide non-commercial rail services. In Victoria, the Government has increased the
level of private sector participation through franchising rail passenger services
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and quality of services required and the prices that will be charged. The level of
subsidy was determined through a competitive bidding process.
In South Australia, the Government in 1994-95 created the Passenger Transport
Board (PTB) to coordinate the provision of urban passenger services in Adelaide
(chapter 3). TransAdelaide provides urban rail passenger services under contract to
the PTB but there is currently no tendering of the service.
Despite such reforms, the Rail Tram and Bus Union (RTBU) was critical of the
ability to successfully apply the purchaser-provider framework with regards to
railways:
The ‘purchaser-provider’ model proposed by the Industry Commission in 1991 was
generally rejected. This is because it is highly impractical to expect the main purchasers
of public transport — the departments of transport, education and social welfare — to
be able to adequately negotiate with rail operators, let alone run a tendering process for
the provision of rail, bus and ferry concessional services. (sub. DR114, p. 40)
Successful implementation of the purchaser-provider framework is not an easy task.
It requires a range of policy formulation, negotiation and tendering skills. In many
instances more planning and effort is required by purchasers to improve the
provision of non-commercial transport services. However, current deficiencies do
not necessarily mean that the purchaser-provider framework cannot be implemented
successfully. Rather, they highlight those areas requiring further improvement to
ensure that the benefits of the framework are fully realised.
A number of specific concerns were raised relating to the current arrangements for
providing non-commercial rail services. These related to the specification of policy
objectives, the types of rail services required to achieve these objectives and the
transparency of the costings of these services.
Specification of policy objectives
As discussed earlier, participants generally supported subsidising railways for a
variety of economic and social reasons.
However, in response to the Draft Report, some were critical of the level of
attention given to the specification of policy objectives. McKillop argued:
The Draft Report … gives inadequate attention to these issues, particularly the
established economic, social, regional development and environmental objectives of
governments. (sub. DR90, p. 1)274 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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And the Wimmera-Mallee Rail Services Association:
The draft report does not give much attention from the user’s point of view re provision
of social and economic benefits through rail services in regional areas.
(sub. DR115, p. 1)
The terms of reference require the Commission to have regard to the established
economic, social, regional development and environmental objectives of
governments. However, in addressing its terms of reference, the Commission has
not sought to question or redefine such objectives. Instead, it has examined the
manner in which governments promote stated objectives, including whether they
have clearly defined such objectives and developed indicators to monitor
performance.
Available evidence indicates that few jurisdictions have made public, even in
general terms, the overall objectives they seek to meet from their transport systems.
Most jurisdictions have published transport plans or strategies that contain some
reference to expected transport outcomes, such as public transport patronage
numbers or vehicle kilometres by private cars (Victorian Government 1998; NSW
Government 1998a; WA Government 1995). However, these plans appear to place
the greatest emphasis on the services to be subsidised, without clearly articulating
the underlying purpose of providing the service.
A lack of clearly defined transport objectives can mean that purchasers are not in a
position to judge the merits of the range of services which could be purchased.
Importantly, accountability (of the purchaser) is weakened when the purchaser is
responsible for promoting vague or incomplete policy objectives.
Specification of services
Participants raised concerns regarding the quality and appropriateness of rail
services subsidised by governments. As with the specification of objectives, some
participants were critical of the level of detail given to the specification of services
in the Draft Report. The RTBU argued:
The Draft Report failed completely to look at how urban public transport could be
expanded to meet major social needs for better transport, less congestion and less
pollution in our cities. This is because of the extremely narrow commercial focus of the
PC and its acceptance that the car will dominate urban transport, while rail, bus and
ferry services will be residual. (sub. DR114, p. 41)
A number of participants also cited individual projects and requirements (including
Friends of the Belair Line (sub.  DR89) and the Bicycle Federation of Australia
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The Commission has investigated the underlying principles and processes used in
specifying the provision of non-commercial transport services, but has not examined
the merits of individual projects. This role is most appropriately undertaken by
purchasing agencies.
Available evidence suggests that there is a lack of consistent and transparent
evaluation of the types of transport services purchased to promote non-commercial
objectives.
Michael (1994) argued that the services purchased by government are not always the
most appropriate from the government’s perspective:
The Australian emphasis, however, has not been to pursue CSO policy from the
perspective of the policy-maker, but rather from that of the management’s needs of
individual State-owned enterprises. (Michael 1994, p. 4)
IPART recommended a review of support for Countrylink in New South Wales on
the basis that there is currently no definite link between the services provided and
stated policy objectives (box 11.3).
Box 11.3 Regional passenger services in New South Wales
Countrylink was established in July 1989 to operate regional passenger services in
New South Wales. In 1997-98, the Government subsidised Countrylink by some
$71.2 million to:
·  provide concessions for the elderly, students and disadvantaged people to achieve
equity goals;
·  provide services to particular regions to achieve access and mobility goals;
·  offset negative congestion and environmental, health and safety aspects of private
road transport; and
·  offset cost disadvantages associated with government provision of services.
In September 1996 the Premier of New South Wales requested that the Independent
Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) review the pricing policies of Countrylink.
IPART released its report in February 1997.
One of IPART’s recommendations was that the Government review support for long
distance passenger train services compared to alternative travel. Two important
considerations underpinning this recommendation were that:
·  overall, the mobility disadvantage of Countrylink passengers appeared to be
overstated; and
·  there were divergent views on the value of the externality benefits generated by
Countrylink.
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Many bicycle groups indicated that governments did not appear to be undertaking an
adequate assessment of the benefits and costs associated with improved integration
of bicycles and trains. They argued that environmental outcomes (among other
things) could be improved through better integration of the needs of cyclists and
travel on rail transport (box 11.4). According to the Bicycle Federation of Australia:
… our mode of transport, and even when combined with others — often ends up at the
bottom of the heap. (trans., p. 88)
Box 11.4 Railways and bicycles
The Commission received numerous submissions from bicycle groups from all states
in Australia (for example, subs. 22, 28, 31, 33 and DR111). The general theme of the
submissions was that benefits could be derived from better intermodal integration of
railways and bicycles. Benefits cited included improved environmental outcomes (air
quality and noise levels), reduced congestion levels and a more energy efficient
transport system.
Japan and the Netherlands were presented as examples of countries that had
achieved such integration. The current situation for bicycle users in New South Wales,
Victoria, Western Australia and South Australia was also detailed.
The Bicycle Federation of Australia (DR111) argued that to achieve the benefits of
greater integration of bicycles and trains governments needed to:
·  make bicycle parking mandatory in all stations and in a fixed proportion to station
patronage;
·  adopt the newly revised Austroads bicycle security planning guidelines for long term
bicycle parking; and
·  begin planning for bicycle hire facilities at all major stations.
In commenting on the integration of railways and bicycles, the State Rail Authority of
New South Wales indicated that it was encouraging commuters to store their bicycles
at stations:
... what we’re seeking to do is certainly bicycle storage at stations, and in fact encouraging
this; the problem in Sydney is getting enough critical bicycle mass to really get that going.
(trans., p. 283)
In most systems bicycles are allowed on metropolitan trains free of charge during off-
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The Commission also received complaints that the quality and choice of transport
services to regional areas had suffered as a result of reform to Australia’s railways.
The Commonwealth Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (AFFA)
noted:
One consequence of reform at this [State] level has been the withdrawal of rail freight
and passenger operations from many ‘thin’ routes servicing rural and regional areas,
following assessment of the financial performance of those services. Typically this has
left businesses and consumers with fewer transport options. (sub. 84, p. 6)
The Wimmera-Mallee Rail Services Association argued that the replacement of
train with bus services was unacceptable in the case of V/Line country services:
People of all ages found the buses did not meet their needs for comfort, ease of entry,
freedom to move about, access to on-board food and toilets, overall time of journey (eg.
Dimboola-Melbourne half to three quarters of an hour more due to changeover at
Ballarat) and safety. (sub. 26, p. 1)
As discussed in the preceding section, a more rigorous and consistent approach to
assessing the merits of the services provided to promote non-commercial objectives,
using techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, can address the concerns of
participants. Public consultation and disclosure of any such analysis strengthens the
purchaser’s accountability to the government and community.
Transparency
Despite the reforms initiated by governments, in many instances there still appears
to have been little improvement in the transparency of the information provided to
the community on the cost of providing non-commercial rail services. As noted
earlier, payments for non-commercial services are still often consolidated across
transport modes and it is unclear how services are costed. The ARA stated:
However, procurement of these [non-commercial] services must not disguise
inefficiencies. These services must be managed commercially by rail authorities, but
with transparent CSO payments from government. (sub. 51, p. 8)
And AFFA stated:
… where governments choose to retain subsidised passenger rail services in non-
metropolitan Australia, they should provide direct funding for these subsidies rather
than using freight costs to cross-subsidise these services as has been the case in the past.
Such community service obligations should be transparent[ly] funded from the budget
of the relevant government department. (sub. 84, p. 3)278 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Reinforcing the need for transparency, Kennard argued:
… I feel that the public needs to be better informed about the costs of train operations
and also comparative costs covering various forms of transport, road (car and truck) and
rail. Too little is known and understood about the nature and the extent of capital and
real operating costs. (sub. 12, p. 1)
An accurate costing of subsidies for rail services involves an economic costing of
each service, based on the opportunity cost of the resources used in production.
Economic costing covers all variable operating costs, such as labour and fuel, plus a
rental charge based on an appropriate rate of return on the assets used in production.
As an example, the planned total cost for providing Citytrain (urban passenger)
services in Queensland was $454 million in 1997-98. This cost comprised around
$200  million in working expenses (such as labour and fuel) and $254  million
(around 55  per  cent) in capital expenses (depreciation and return on assets)
(Queensland Rail, Brisbane, pers. comm., 29 April 1999).
The difference between the economic cost of the service and the payments made by
users accurately represents the cost to the community of providing non-commercial
transport services.
Accountability of purchasers would be enhanced if information provided to the
community on subsidised transport services were based on economic costs and
disaggregated across transport modes.
Governments need to address the deficiencies in the application of the purchaser-
provider framework to rail and should enter into transparent contractual
arrangements with clearly specified non-commercial objectives.
11.4 Employment
There have been large reductions in employment in railways, with full-time
employment falling from 88  500 to 36  500 between 1986 and 1998 (chapter  2).
Chapter 12 discusses future employment prospects in railways.
Participants have raised concerns regarding the negative effects of rail reform on
workers in relation to privatisation and the contracting of services previously done
‘in-house’ by government railways; the difficulties faced by redundant railway
workers in finding new employment; and the negative effects on regional
communities from job shedding programs undertaken by railways.
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This section considers these concerns regarding job losses and regional adjustment,
and the role of governments in rail reform and meeting employment objectives.
Privatisation and the contracting of activities
One of the features of Australia’s railways is the greater level of private sector
participation in the industry through privatisation and the contracting of activities.
Concerns have been raised by participants, including the RTBU, regarding changes
to the wages, employment conditions and bargaining rights of rail workers under
privatisation (box 11.5).
Box 11.5 Rail Tram and Bus Union concerns about privatisation
One element of the rail reform process in Australia has been the privatisation of
formerly government-owned railways. Examples include the separation and transfer of
Australian National to private ownership in 1997-98 and the recent sale of V/Line
Freight in Victoria.
In Australia, the Workplace Relations Act 1996 is a central piece of legislation
influencing labour market arrangements. In addition, Australia has ratified international
conventions regarding the rights of workers. One such convention highlighted by the
RTBU is the International Labour Organisation Convention No.  98, concerning the
rights of workers to organise and bargain collectively, ratified in 1973.
The transfer from public to private ownership has resulted in changes to both the
number of workers employed by these railways and the manner in which wages and
conditions are determined.3
Labour market outcomes after privatisation have differed across jurisdictions. For
example, in Tasmania, a new set of wages and conditions for workers employed at
Tasrail (formerly part of Australian National) were negotiated within the context of
individual Australian Workplace Agreements. On the other hand, in Victoria, a proviso
on the purchase of V/Line Freight was the certification by the Australian Industrial
Relations Commission of a replacement Enterprise Agreement (sub. DR114).
                                             
3 In July 1999, the Full Bench of the Federal Court upheld a previous decision by the Court that
when an organisation takes over an obligation to deliver services ‘outsourced’ by a State
government department, the organisation was bound by the awards to which the State was bound
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Participants argued that competitive tendering and contracting (CTC) has a negative
effect on labour, particularly through lower wages and conditions of workers, and
eroded job security. The Australian Services Union noted:
These two issues [the outsourcing of activities and competitive tendering and
contracting], seek to undermine job security and standards of living of members of this
Union and cause a reduction in jobs available to Australians — along with reduction of
employment opportunities for regional Australia, which in turn has an affect upon
services to regional and country Australia, which places pressure upon other community
services such as schools, hospitals, banks to name a few. (sub. 78, p. 2)
Inglis commented on the loss of job security associated with CTC:
I deplore wholeheartedly, the system of contracting jobs for a period of time, and
getting people with no railway experience … The railways in each State, promised job
security, which in turn bred loyalty and efficient performance of jobs. (sub. 38, p. 4)
The RTBU cited research by the ACTU which argued:
CT results in casualisation of the workforce, loss of jobs and working conditions, and is
particularly disastrous for the employment conditions of women and other
disadvantaged groups. (sub. DR114, p. 27)
In addition, a report commissioned by the Public Transport Union argued that the
social costs of outsourcing RAC’s maintenance work exceed the financial benefits
(box 11.6 and chapter 3).
However, as noted by the RTBU (sub. DR114), outcomes for workers from these
reforms is broader than just wages and conditions of employment. It includes other
factors such as job security, professional development, worker morale, occupational
health and safety and family life. For example, in commenting on the outcomes for
labour after the privatisation of Tasrail, the Australian Transport Network argued
that:
… we have created a number of family supporting good paying jobs, provided
promotional opportunities, and given our employees a sense of pride in their
accomplishments. (HORSCCTMR 1998a, p. 1195)
The effects of CTC on labour were considered in detail in the IC’s (1996) report,
Competitive Tendering and Contracting by Public Sector Agencies. That inquiry
included an examination of the scope of CTC at all levels of government in
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Box 11.6 Track maintenance in New South Wales
In New South Wales, under the separation program of the former State Rail Authority,
it was intended that track maintenance services required by the Rail Access
Corporation (RAC) would be made fully contestable by June 2000. However, as
contracts were progressively opened to tender, the inability of the incumbent
government provider, Rail Services Australia, to win maintenance contracts with RAC
led to the State Government imposing a moratorium on the contracting out of track
maintenance until July 1999.
In support of the moratorium, the Public Transport Union commissioned a report, Back
on Track, which argued that the social costs of outsourcing RAC’s track maintenance
requirements outweigh the economic benefits gained. The social costs from
outsourcing rail track maintenance included the loss of employment that would occur
within Rail Services Australia and the public risks associated with the outsourcing of
track maintenance.
The Government has since partially lifted the moratorium by allowing competition for
the provision of maintenance services on the Bondi Junction to Waterfall line in
Sydney and the Hunter Valley coal lines (some $65 million in maintenance contracts).
Source: PECG 1998.
An important finding was that protecting the employment of public sector
employees by not engaging in CTC provided no long term guarantees for their job
security. This has particular relevance for Australia’s railways given the strong
(privately provided) competition from alternative transport modes faced by the
industry. As noted in chapter 7, when well designed, the application of CTC in rail
transport can lead to improvements in efficiency. CTC therefore provides one
mechanism for railways to compete better in Australia’s transport markets,
potentially enhancing the job security for workers in the industry.
Labour adjustment
The costs and difficulties associated with railway workers adjusting to losing their
jobs in the industry depend upon the ease with which individuals can relocate to
alternative employment, either within the same region or other regions. The ability
to relocate is influenced by several factors including:
·  the availability of suitable alternative employment;
·  the transferability of skills where individuals seek employment in alternative
occupations and the ability to undertake retraining, where necessary;
·  the costs of moving  —  substantial costs may be involved, particularly for
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·  government impediments to mobility — some government taxes (such as stamp
duty on the purchase of residential property), charges and regulations discourage
labour mobility; and
·  emotional attachment to a particular location  —  people dislike moving away
from friends, family and a familiar environment.
The Bureau of Transport and Communications Economics (BTCE) (1990)
undertook a survey of redeployed and redundant railway workers as part of its
assessment of social impacts resulting from railway restructuring. The main findings
from the report were:
·  of those workers that accepted a redundancy package, and did not retire from the
workforce, 56 per cent found alternative employment;
·  44 per cent remained unemployed after redundancy and two thirds of these for at
least 13 months. Lowly skilled employees accounted for over 56 per cent of the
unemployed; and
·  89 per cent of the unemployed workers had not applied for available government
retraining schemes.
The RTBU argued that given the current restructuring occurring in the industry and
the large number of railway workers who have lost their jobs, the study by the
BTCE be updated (sub. DR114).
Workforce characteristics also provide an indication of the ability of incumbent
employees to adjust to structural change. Data obtained from the ABS Labour Force
Survey indicated that most railway workers are less ‘mobile’ than workers in other
industries (appendix J). This is in part explained by the fact that the majority of
railway workers are older males with less than half having completed the highest
level of secondary school.
Specific assistance for railway workers?
The large reductions in employment combined with past difficulties redundant
railway workers have faced in finding alternative employment may give rise to calls
for specific assistance to railway workers and their families. Assistance packages
aimed at specific industries have included the Labour Adjustment Package (LAP)
for textiles, clothing and footwear and passenger motor vehicles. The RTBU argued
that because many of the reductions in railway employment were attributable to
government policies, the introduction of a LAP for rail workers would be
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In considering specific assistance in these circumstances, it is important to note that
all government policies can generate winners and losers. While participants
generally highlighted those policies which they believed lowered output and
employment in the rail industry, it should also be recognised that governments are
also substantial purchasers and subsidisers of railway services. It is therefore
difficult to determine the net effect of all government policies on railway
employment. This is especially true when considered within the context of forces
external to the industry, independent of government policy. These include increased
competition in the final markets served by railways, such as Australia’s black coal
industry, and continual improvement in the operations of road transport (chapter 3).
The introduction of specific assistance for railway workers can create important
equity considerations. Factors which are driving change in railways are also driving
change in a range of other industries across the Australian economy. These factors
extend beyond changes in government policy to changes in technology and
increased competitive pressures. It would appear inequitable to provide specific
assistance to railway workers compared to workers in other industries also made
redundant for similar reasons. As such, general — rather than industry-specific —
assistance for railway workers is preferable in equity terms.
The Commission also notes that the results from past specific assistance programs
have not been encouraging. The IC found that the LAP program for textile, clothing
and footwear workers produced poor labour market outcomes (compared to general
assistance programs) despite good participation rates in the program by workers
(IC 1997c).
The advantage of relying on general support programs is that they aim to address the
training and income maintenance needs of the unemployed regardless of the
particular combination of circumstances that may have caused their job loss.
Generally available assistance for displaced workers includes:
·  welfare assistance, such as the Commonwealth Newstart Allowance;
·  the provision of information by the Commonwealth Government about job
vacancies, careers and assistance; and
·  education and training policies at the Commonwealth and State levels to improve
the ability of railway workers to transfer employment opportunities elsewhere.
The European Union has adopted a similar approach in establishing a Social Fund
that provides financial assistance for projects aimed at reducing structural
adjustment costs for workers across all industries facing structural adjustment
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Box 11.7 The European Social Fund
The European Social Fund (established under the Treaty of Rome) is one of three
Structural Funds designed to strengthen the economic and social cohesion of the
European Union. The objectives of the Social Fund are:
·  promoting the development and structural adjustment of regions where
development is lagging behind;
·  assisting regions seriously affected by industrial decline;
·  combating long term unemployment;
·  providing support for workers having to adjust to industrial changes; and
·  promoting the development of rural areas.
In promoting these objectives, the Fund provides financial assistance towards the
running costs for vocational training schemes, guidance and counselling projects, job
creation measures and other steps to improve the employability and skills of both
employed and unemployed people.
Source: EU 1997.
Governments therefore have an important role in ensuring the effectiveness of
general support programs for redundant workers. Such programs need to be
adequately funded and reviewed regularly to ensure that unnecessary economic and
social costs from structural change across all industries are minimised.
Regional issues
As noted in chapter  2, evidence indicates that employment in railways outside
Australia’s capital cities has fallen more rapidly than within capital cities.
Participants expressed concern over the negative effects of these job losses on local
communities. The Australian Services Union commented:
We all see what happens when jobs are lost to a town, the town’s growth slows, it
stagnates and then we have pressures upon the town to maintain infrastructure services
such as schools, hospitals and roads, where they may be in demand to go to perimeter
areas of capital cities, for instance, the movement of hospital beds and such.
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With regards to the reform and sale of Australian National (AN), the SALGA noted:
... the economic effect the downsizing and lack of Government support for the rail
industry had on the operation of Australian National and its eventual sale. This is
highlighted in the case of Port Augusta where the quantified effect has been calculated
at $90m over the past three years; and the effect this will have on communities which
have in the past relied heavily on the industry for employment, both directly and
through related industries. (sub. 57, p. 1)
During this process, the Commonwealth Government allocated $20  million in
1996-97 towards the Rail Reform Transition Program.4 This program involved
facilitating business and job creation in those areas affected by the privatisation of
AN (box  11.8). The Tasmanian Government supported the operation of the
program:
The Commonwealth Rail Reform Transition Program considerably offset the negative
impacts of the sale of Tasrail. (sub. 81, p. 3)
The Commission recognises that the reduced demand for labour by railways has
serious implications for some rural communities. However, no definite conclusions
can be drawn without a detailed study covering issues such as the significance of
railway employment, overall industry structure and unemployment rate in the
affected region.
Box 11.8 Rail Reform Transition Program
In 1996 the Commonwealth Government began a series of reforms to Australian
National (AN), culminating in its separation and privatisation in 1997-98. To assist local
economies to adjust to the changes that were created by the eventual privatisation of
AN, the Government allocated a total of $20 million over two years from 1996-97.
The objective of the Rail Reform Transition Program was to support measures which
would encourage job creation through economic development of the regions most
adversely affected by the privatisation of AN. The funds available were not directed
specifically towards railway workers. Instead, funding was available for projects that
offered suitable potential to create, directly or indirectly, sustainable employment
opportunities in the affected regions.
Source: Sharp 1997.
                                             
4 In the same financial year the Commonwealth Government also announced an Assistance to
Depressed Regions Programme to support strategies to improve the skills base of regions
experiencing adjustment pressures, high levels of unemployment or that are disadvantaged by
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In the first instance it is important that the resources invested in general assistance
programs are targeted at those areas — whether they be metropolitan or rural —
with high levels of unemployment and difficulty in adjusting to structural change.
A case for additional assistance in a specific regional area can be made only if it has
substantially greater difficulty than others in adjusting to changes in the structure of
its local economy. However, even if a robust case could be made, it can be very
difficult and potentially quite costly to structure a program to improve the economic
and social fortunes of the affected region. Any such program would need to be
carefully targeted and only short term in nature so as to ensure that it did not
develop into a poorly targeted, long term assistance measure.
Reform of railways and employment objectives
The concerns raised by participants regarding the negative effects of rail reform on
employment may give rise to calls for the slowing or suspending of reform in the
industry. However, maintaining inappropriate employment levels could adversely
affect the competitive position of rail in some of its major markets, such as the
carriage of export coal from mines to ports. Rail freight charges comprise 15 to
30 per cent of the free on board cost of New South Wales coal exports (chapter 2).
Railways therefore can influence the competitiveness, and hence output and
employment of Australian coal mines.
The NSW Minerals Council commented:
Ultimately, mines close or reduce production and manpower because the cost of
production is higher than sales revenue. The unnecessarily high cost of rail transport is
a contributing factor to costs. (NSW Minerals Council submission to the Inquiry into
the Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia,
sub. 62, p. 7)
Reduced output by coal mines would in turn reduce the demand for rail services and
hence erode job security within the rail industry.
In the case of non-bulk freight, rail already faces strong competition from road
transport. Avoiding reforms to improve the efficiency of rail services would erode
the competitive position of rail in the face of continual improvements in efficiency
by road transport operators. Conversely, improving the efficiency of railways can
benefit both the railways and the industries and regions they serve:
Reduced transport costs mean that regional products effectively become cheaper in their
final markets, increasing the competitiveness of producing areas. (The Chamber of
Minerals and Energy of Western Australia submission to the Inquiry into the Impact of
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Improving the productivity of Australia’s railways can also deliver broader benefits
to the community. Rail Services Australia argued that rail reform in New South
Wales has increased the ability of the Government to provide other goods and
services to the community:
These savings are in fact annual savings and we anticipate that over a billion dollars in
savings — that’s present-day dollars — will be delivered to the people of New South
Wales over the course of the first 6 years of rail reform. That’s money that governments
can spend on schools, police, hospitals or, if they choose, on rail. (trans., p. 364)
Secure employment in the rail industry can best be promoted by an efficient industry
capable of competing with alternative forms of transport, especially road transport.
As argued by the European Commission:
Vigorous action to restore competitiveness is the only way to stable employment;
although jobs in the railways will be less numerous in future, they should be more
secure in a healthy industry. Moreover, a certain number of jobs will be created when
new entrants find and exploit new markets. (EC 1996, p. 31)
Ongoing improvement to the productivity of Australia’s railways is the key to
allowing the industry to achieve its output and employment potential.THE WAY AHEAD 289
12 The way ahead
12.1 The case for continued reform
Since 1991, the Commonwealth and States have to varying degrees, undertaken
reforms aimed at improving their rail systems and regulatory regimes (chapter 3).
Some progress has been made in increasing the commercial focus of railways,
restructuring rail systems, increasing private sector involvement and reducing the
complexity of safety legislation and operating procedures.
There is evidence that the reforms to date have improved railway performance.
Newly privatised railways are becoming profitable and new entrants are competing
in niche markets. Freight rates have reduced substantially. Productivity has
increased overall and service quality has improved in some jurisdictions, especially
New South Wales and Queensland.
However, in some markets, freight railways are still making losses or are barely
viable. Productivity in Australia is still significantly lower than in North America, so
freight rates are higher. Rail continues to lose market share to road in the transport
of non-bulk freight.
Among government-owned railways, there is evidence of a lack of investment in
some areas and the quality of infrastructure has declined. Yet many railways, both
passengers and freight, continue to receive significant government financial support.
Some problems are more specific to particular networks, for instance black coal
railways have been used to extract monopoly rents.
Structural reform and the introduction of access regimes have been proceeding
slowly. There are problems associated with multiple access regimes and complex
arrangements within individual regimes.
Inconsistent accreditation fees and operating procedures and standards are an
impediment to efficient rail operations. Although progress has been made to reduce
such inconsistencies, outcomes are uncertain.
Completing these reforms and removing regulatory barriers are expected to yield
further improvements in performance.290 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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12.2 Priorities for reform
The overall objective of reform is to have an efficient transport system — this
involves having the appropriate mix of transport modes which best meet Australia’s
freight and passenger transport needs (chapter 5).
In order to ensure a place in the transport system of the future, railways must
continue to improve their efficiency. To some extent, past reforms have yielded the
‘easy’ gains resulting from improving the efficiency of the existing rail systems.
Future reforms need to be targeted to yield the more difficult efficiency gains
resulting from the choice of technology in rail systems and the participation of rail
in the transport logistics chain.
As noted in chapter 5, governments need to create an environment that will give rail
the opportunity to take its place in an efficient transport system.
In many markets rail competes with other modes of transport. The ability of railways
to compete in these markets can be impeded by a lack of commercial focus to drive
efficient operations. This report has made a number of suggestions as to how to
achieve an environment to enable railways to operate more commercially. These
centre on addressing ownership and structural arrangements, ensuring competitive
neutrality both within the rail sector and between transport modes, and removing
complex and inconsistent regulatory arrangements, and introducing competition in
railway operations.
Increasing commercial focus
To achieve a commercial focus, it is important that railways have:
·  the flexibility to make timely decisions (both investment and operational);
·  the ability to form strategic alliances, mergers or joint ventures;
·  access to capital; and
·  no undue restrictions on input choice.
There are a number of ways in which the commercial orientation, customer focus
and market responsiveness of railways can be improved. One is the stricter
application of the corporatisation model to government-owned railways. However, a
threshold issue is whether the rail industry tests the limits of this model.
Competitive tendering and franchising, particularly in urban passenger networks,
may offer benefits beyond those available from simply corporatising a government
railway, largely because of the private sector’s stronger commercial orientation.THE WAY AHEAD 291
Franchising may generate further gains compared with contracting out because
franchisees usually bear some revenue risk which is likely to strengthen their
incentives to develop the market.
In the case where there is strong competition from other transport modes, such as
road, privatisation will be desirable. There is no reason why most freight operations
should not be privatised. In cases where there is strong competition from road, track
infrastructure could also be privatised, or at least subject to a long term lease
arrangement. There is evidence that the initial privatisation of former government-
owned railways has been successful — Tasrail  has  substantially  improved  its
performance since being privatised.
Non-commercial services
Governments have, and will continue to have, important social and economic
objectives relating to rail. The emphasis on increasing the commercial focus of
railways does not preclude governments from using railways to achieve non-
commercial objectives relating to urban passenger and other services.
The challenge is to implement an approach that allows both commercial and non-
commercial objectives to be met without impeding the ability of railways to compete
commercially, where possible, against other modes.
If governments choose to subsidise railways, they should clearly specify their policy
objectives, the services required to achieve these objectives and the appropriate
level and form of the subsidy to be provided.
Promoting competition
Not all railways face competition from road or other transport modes. But there are
several forms of competition that may be generated within the rail sector to control
any market power. Governments can use competition for the market, which occurs
when operators compete to win a franchise or contract to provide a particular
service for a given period. Train operators may also compete for the same
customers, so called ‘rail-on-rail’ competition. There may also be competition for
train schedules in the network — where train operators compete for the right to
obtain the schedule they value most highly.292 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Promoting competitive neutrality
Arrangements ensuring competitive neutrality both between different modes and
within the rail sector are required if competition is to result in an efficient transport
system.
With regard to intermodal competition, each mode should be able to compete on the
basis of price and service quality without being unfairly advantaged or
disadvantaged as a result of government policy.
Planning and investment is one area where governments can directly affect
competitive neutrality between modes. There are three broad options: an integrated
approach involving a public organisation preparing a plan for both the national road
and rail network; separate road and rail planning organisations along with subsidies
to rail so that it is treated in a similar manner to roads (as in Sweden); or a more
commercial approach to both rail and road transport. The Commission’s preferred
approach is to adopt the latter option, that is to introduce appropriate road
investment, pricing and cost recovery arrangements, and allow both road and rail to
operate on a commercial basis.
The issue of competitive neutrality within the rail sector also arises. It is possible
that on some routes there will be a mix of government and privately owned train
operators. No railway should be advantaged or disadvantaged simply as a result of
its ownership — it should compete on its own merit.
Increasing the commercial focus of railways, and encouraging private sector
operators, will address many of the concerns regarding competitive neutrality within
the rail sector.
Introducing consistent regulatory arrangements
Inconsistent operating procedures and standards and variations in accreditation fees
across jurisdictions are still impediments to efficient rail operations. Although
progress has been made, the outcomes are uncertain. It is too early to ascertain
whether operators’ concerns regarding rail safety regulation more generally have
been resolved, although it would appear that progress has been made in introducing
consistent regulation and mutual recognition across states. Uncertainty also remains
regarding operating procedures and standards because the codes of practice relating
to these procedures have yet to be implemented.
There are processes in place to deal with inconsistencies in rail safety regulation and
operating procedures and standards, but issues remain to be resolved.THE WAY AHEAD 293
12.3 Implementation strategy
Improving the performance and efficiency of Australian railways requires that both
the Commonwealth Government and other Australian jurisdictions undertake
reforms over which they have control and responsibility.
Some reforms require collaborative action by governments, while others can be
undertaken by governments acting independently.
The Commonwealth Government’s role
Given the need for a national approach on some reforms, it is appropriate that the
Commonwealth adopts a significant role in leading the reform process.
The Commonwealth should have direct responsibility for a number of reform
areas  — the development of a national transport policy framework, ensuring
competitive neutrality and facilitating a consistent approach to safety and
operational regulation. Reform in these areas is required irrespective of the changes
individual jurisdictions make to their own railway networks. In addition, the
Commonwealth also has a role, in consultation with affected States, in establishing a
single interstate network manager and in providing funds to alleviate major
problems on this network.
Developing a national transport policy framework
The Commonwealth could play an important part in developing an overarching
national transport policy framework. This framework would set out the
Commonwealth’s main objectives and directions for the national transport system
regarding efficiency, safety, equity and the environment.
A national transport policy framework would differ — with less detail and no
funding commitments — from the integrated strategic plan for the national transport
network recommended by the HORSCCTMR  (1997) and from the NSW cross-
modal transport plan Action for Transport 2010.
Ensuring competitive neutrality
It is the responsibility of the Commonwealth to ensure that there is competitive
neutrality between transport modes. The Commonwealth has already partly
addressed a previous anomaly through recent reforms to the diesel fuel excise.294 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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A key element of a national transport policy framework would be to facilitate
competitive neutrality between road and rail, with both modes operating within a
more commercial environment.
Reforms to the provision of roads are also required, including road transport
planning processes, methods of investment appraisal, road funding, and charging for
different classes of vehicles. The Commonwealth should establish an inquiry into
road investment and provision in Australia.
Facilitating consistent safety regulation and operating procedures and standards
The Commonwealth should continue to facilitate the removal of regulatory
impediments to interstate rail operations, particularly inconsistent safety
accreditation fees and operating procedures and standards. This process should be
undertaken in consultation with industry and the States and Territories.
Monitoring the progress of mutual recognition of rail safety accreditation processes
is also required. If mutual recognition does not appear to be functioning effectively
consideration should be given to alternative approaches, such as a single national
safety regulator.
Facilitating the establishment of an interstate network manager
The Commonwealth should facilitate the establishment of a single manager for the
interstate network. In the first instance the Commonwealth and the affected States
should establish a process to develop the specific roles and responsibilities of the
interstate network manager, and define the extent of the interstate network.
Access arrangements on the interstate network would be embedded in a code of
conduct governing the operations of the interstate manager. The network manager
would be responsible for setting the terms and conditions for access.
It would also be responsible for allocating train schedules and contributing to the
identification of investment needs across the whole interstate network. Setting
prices and allocating train schedules should reflect the opportunity cost of all users
of the interstate network, both interstate and intrastate train operators. An option
which the network manager may consider is the use of market-based mechanisms
for determining train schedules, including capacity transfer arrangements and
auctioning.
The network manager would be in a position to identify areas of possible investment
in the interstate network. However, significant congestion problems in the Sydney
metropolitan area which affect operators throughout the interstate network need toTHE WAY AHEAD 295
be addressed immediately. The Commonwealth should — as a matter of national
priority — provide funding to alleviate congestion on the interstate network in the
Sydney metropolitan area, subject to acceptance of the network manager model.
The jurisdictions’ role
Reform of structural, ownership and access arrangements is the responsibility of
each jurisdiction, including the Commonwealth in regard to the interstate network.
Railways can be separated into three categories to facilitate the application of policy
reforms  —  interstate, regional and urban passenger networks. Regional networks
can in turn be divided into those with market power (the main coal lines) and those
without. This categorisation is not a rigid taxonomy but is intended to highlight the
contrasts that exist in the Australian railway system and is a useful device for policy
development. Railway networks are classified according to the dominant rail
operation (freight or urban passenger); other train operators, such as those providing
non-urban passenger services, would negotiate access to these other networks.
Interstate network
The preferred approach to the interstate network is to vertically separate the track
from train operations, with a single horizontally integrated network manager to
administer access and facilitate investment.
This package is intended to facilitate competition on the interstate network. Three
aspects of competition could be enhanced  —  competition between railways and
other transport modes, competition between train operators for the same customers,
and competition for train schedules.
The Commonwealth and its joint shareholders should conclude the sale of the
National Rail Corporation. This process has been under way for some time and an
expeditious sale will assist in maintaining the momentum of reform.
Regional networks
Policy packages have been developed for regional networks without market power
and those (the main coal lines) which are able to exercise market power.
Regional networks without market power
Regional networks should be horizontally separated from urban and other freight
networks. They should also be vertically integrated. There is strong intermodal296 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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competition, little scope for competition between train operators, and benefits
accrue from combining train operations and track infrastructure.
Stringent application of the corporatisation process may facilitate the adoption of a
more commercial focus. However, increased private sector involvement through
franchising or privatisation is more likely to achieve greater benefits than those
achievable through corporatisation. A number of privatisations have already taken
place among these networks — in Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia.
Only light-handed access regimes are required. Given the low volumes of freight
carried on most of these networks, there is unlikely to be much demand by other
train operators for access. Where there is demand, the commercial approach of the
railways, together with excess capacity, suggest that access would be negotiated
between the parties.
It is expected that horizontal separation and increased private involvement will give
these networks the freedom and commercial focus (including greater autonomy,
flexibility and access to capital) required to compete with a strong road transport
industry.
Regional networks with market power
Horizontal separation of regional networks with market power (the main coal lines
centred around the Hunter Valley in NSW, Goonyella and Blackwater coal railways
in Queensland) will facilitate the regulation of the natural monopoly element of the
network. Horizontal separation also facilitates the franchising of these networks.
The Commission’s preferred approach is for track and train operations to be
vertically integrated. Market power in track infrastructure would be addressed
through the promotion of competition for the market using franchising. Vertical
integration permits the realisation of gains from the application of logistics
management, including the optimisation of the transport process from the mine to
the port.
Incentives to improve efficiency are generated by promoting competition for the
market through contracting out or franchising, using competitive bidding. Other rail
operators, apart from the incumbent, could enter the market from time to time.
Provisions for access would be included in the franchise agreement.
This approach maximises the possibility of capturing the gains available from
retaining an integrated system while also introducing pressures to minimise costs —
at least during the bidding process.THE WAY AHEAD 297
Urban passenger networks
Urban passenger networks should be horizontally separated from freight networks
but remain vertically integrated. Vertical separation of train operations from track
provision is unlikely to generate benefits.
A purchaser-provider framework should be applied to the separated businesses.
Government agencies, such as departments of transport, education and community
services should be responsible for the planning, specification and purchase of
services. They would be responsible for monitoring performance and ensuring that
the provisions of the contract are met by the service provider.
The selection of the provider should be through a competitive process involving
contracting out or franchising, thus introducing competition for the market. Larger
urban networks could be horizontally separated further by geographic area, thereby
facilitating ‘yardstick’ competition, as is expected to occur in Victoria.
There is no particular need for a strong access regime because there is little potential
for competition between train operators for customers and train schedules.
It is expected that these reforms will lead to an improvement in the efficiency of
transport in urban areas, particularly in the areas of planning, provision and pricing
of rail services.
Implications for individual jurisdictions
The priorities for reform have different implications in each jurisdiction because of
differences in the characteristics of their railways. Progress in reform has varied
between jurisdictions, but the potential exists for further change in them all.
The reform packages have the greatest implications for Queensland. Currently a
single, vertically integrated, government-owned railway, it has regional (including
coal) freight networks, an urban passenger network and provides non-urban
passenger services. The Queensland Government should consider whether its rail
system would benefit from reforms to its structure and/or ownership arrangements.
In the first instance, it could separate, and franchise, its two major coal hauling
railways (centred on the Goonyella and Blackwater regions) from the rest of the
network. In the next stage it should consider horizontally separating (and
franchising) its urban network from the remainder of the network and also
privatising Queensland Rail’s remaining freight operations.
New South Wales could also adopt a similar approach for its Hunter Valley coal
freight railways to ensure that progress in improving their performance continues.298 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The privatisation of FreightCorp should also be investigated and the payment of
subsidies for track infrastructure reconsidered. If subsidies are to continue, the
payments could be better focused and minimised through their inclusion in franchise
agreements with operators, or negotiated as part of the privatisation of regional
railways.
Further reform of the interstate network has particular implications for the
Commonwealth, New South Wales, and Western Australian Governments. They are
currently owners of parts of the network, have separate access regimes, and own
railways which operate over parts of the network. The single network manager
approach will be more effective if the interstate network is vertically separated. This
implies that the proposed sale of Westrail exclude the track between Perth and
Kalgoorlie. Promoting competition over the entire interstate network through a
single network manager is likely to generate significant benefits and give rail an
opportunity to strengthen its competitive position on these important transport
corridors. Such an approach will require cooperation between these jurisdictions as
operators and owners of the network.
In most jurisdictions the performance of urban passenger rail systems could be
improved by a more rigorous application of the purchaser-provider framework and
by introducing competition for the right to provide these services. Evidence from
Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia demonstrates that urban networks
can be horizontally separated successfully from the remainder of the rail network.
Victoria’s initiative in franchising its urban railways should be monitored with a
view to applying the model in other jurisdictions.
12.4 The impact of reforms
At the broadest level, these reforms will lead to a more efficient transport system.
More specifically, their implementation would be expected to improve the
environment within which railways operate by:
·  creating more commercially-focused railways, with the flexibility to make
operational and investment decisions in a timely manner; and
·  reducing uncertainty, particularly relating to competitive neutrality, regulatory
arrangements and the role of government more generally.
This in turn could encourage greater private sector interest in entering the Australian
market, through contracting out, franchising, the privatisation of existing
government-owned railways, or the formation of new companies. Private operators
would have strong incentives to minimise costs, thus leading to further
improvements in rail performance.THE WAY AHEAD 299
They would also have greater incentives to undertake new investment wherever it is
viable and adopt more innovative approaches to investment. Tranz Rail in New
Zealand has adopted an approach of reconditioning second-hand locomotives rather
than buying new equipment — thereby greatly reducing the cost of supplementing
its locomotive fleet. Private operators are also better able to raise the required
capital, free of government borrowing constraints.
It is expected also that the reforms would result in further market segmentation,
especially on the interstate network, and the development of specialist operators to
meet specific customer requirements. There are examples of this occurring already
on the interstate network as a result of previous reforms.
The approach to reform suggested by the Commission may also affect railway
employment, especially in government-owned railways, although less so than in the
past in most jurisdictions.
However, new private participants, such as Specialized Container Transport, Toll
Rail and Patrick have already entered the market. Further private participation in the
industry has the potential to stabilise employment or at least slow the rate of decline.
Secure employment in the rail industry can best be promoted by an efficient industry
that is better able to compete with alternative forms of transport, especially road
transport, and whose dependence on government subsidies is minimised.
In addition to industry wide changes in employment, there may also be region-
specific issues associated with employment losses or the reduction or cessation of
services. These issues are being considered in the Commission’s concurrent inquiry
into the impact of competition policy reforms on rural and regional Australia.
If the reform of railways is not pursued the industry may not survive long into the
21st Century, other than as a carrier of coal and other bulk products. Further reform
of the Australian railway industry will yield significant benefits to consumers of rail
services. Rail services are an important input into many industries, especially the
export-oriented mineral sector. Reductions in freight costs and passenger fares, and
improved service quality will result in significant benefits, not only to passengers
and Australian industry, but for the community more widely.CONDUCT OF THE
INQUIRY
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A Conduct of the inquiry
A.1 Introduction
This appendix outlines the inquiry process and the organisations and individuals that
have participated in the inquiry.
On 5 August 1998, the Commission received the terms of reference for the inquiry.
The reference directed the Commission to inquire into progress in rail reform in
Australia, and to report within twelve months. The full terms of reference are on
page XVIII.
Following receipt of the terms of reference, the Commission placed a notice in the
national press inviting public participation in the inquiry and released an issues
paper to assist participants in preparing their submissions. The Commission received
88 submissions prior to the release of the Draft Report and an additional
40  following the Draft Report. A list of those who made submissions is in
section  A.2. The Commission also held informal discussions with organisations,
companies and individuals to gain background information and to assist in setting an
agenda for the inquiry. Organisations visited by the Commission are listed in
section A.3.
In October and November 1998, the Commission held public hearings in Adelaide,
Perth, Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne with 38 individuals and organisations
attending. Following the release of the Draft Report in March 1999, public hearings
were held in Sydney, Perth, Adelaide and Melbourne in May (section  A.4).
Submissions and transcripts of these hearings are publicly available.
Two technical workshops (December 1998, February 1999) and a public workshop
(April 1999) were held during the course of the inquiry to discuss the analysis of
railway performance presented in chapter 4. In addition, the Commission established
an Independent Referee Panel to comment on the productivity analysis of railways.1
Participants to the workshops and panel members are listed in section A.5.
A session on regulatory reform in railways was organised by the Commission as part
of the July 1999 Industry Economics Conference, hosted by Monash University.
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B Rail network maps
This appendix contains maps of Australia’s interstate and regional rail networks,
including:
•   the interstate rail network1 (section B.1);
•   the New South Wales rail network2 (section B.2);
•   the Victorian rail network (section B.3);
•   the Queensland rail network (section B.4);
•   the South Australian/ Northern Territory rail network (section B.5);
•   the Western Australian rail network (section B.6); and
•   the Tasmanian rail network (section B.7).
                                             
1 The interstate rail network has been defined by National Rail Corporation and is discussed in
chapter 2.
2 Also includes the ACT.B2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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C History of railways in Australia
The current role and performance of different transport modes in Australia are
products of past decisions and events. A number of factors including investment
decisions, government regulation, changes in technology and work practices have all
influenced the development of Australia’s transport system, including railways. The
Victorian Government stated:
… what we have today is a product of history and a product of what would fashionably
be called “past dependence”. That is, the sequence in which events happened leads to
the outcome which one sees and one cannot, in past dependent processes, argue that
what one sees is in any way remotely related to an optimal position in its transport
configuration or anything else where you have got a past dependent process going.
(trans., p. 940)
This appendix briefly describes the development of railways in Australia from the
1840s to the 1990s, providing a context for examining the current issues and
challenges facing the industry.
C.1 1840 to 1915
Private enterprise was responsible for the introduction of railways in Australia. In
1846 the Great Southern and Western Railway Company was formed with the
intention to construct railway lines from Sydney to Parramatta and
Richmond/Windsor (Brooke  1988). Initial government involvement in Australian
railways arose because of investors’ demands that governments guarantee the
dividends of private investors and the need to provide additional capital to complete
lines (IC 1991b).
The majority of the initial private railway companies collapsed without ever
building, still less operating, a railway. Governments out of necessity took over
ownership of the early railway companies to protect themselves from financial
exposure. Thus there is no significant early history of private participation in
railways (IC 1991b).
The boom years for railways in Australia first occurred between 1860 and 1890.
Each colony developed a railway network centred on the capital city or other ports,
extending out into the rural towns (Stevenson 1987). The growth of the rail networkC2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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created political pressure for the construction of lines to every settlement. However,
McKillop argued that the spread of railways actually benefited the capital cities
more than rural areas:
The paradox of Australian railways is that while the political pressure to build railway
lines into the interior came from rural communities, the net effect of the railway
systems was to centralise economic and institutional power in the capital cities of the
colonies. Not only did the railway system of NSW radiate out from the port of Sydney
(and to a lesser extent Newcastle), but differential freight rates were used to give city-
based merchants and manufacturers a price advantage over country-based competitors.
(sub. DR90, p. 2)
The Victorian Government also noted the close association between the
development of railways and the maritime industry:
… rail was used by the colonial governments to prop up an increasingly obsolete port
configuration as land transport improves largely due to rail, and there was a very sick
co-evolution with the maritime industry due to the intervention of government in trying
to protect past rent-seeking or rent-earning opportunities when the time had passed.
(trans., p. 940)
The rapid expansion of the rail network soon began to dominate the budgets and
political agendas of the colonial governments:
The six colonial governments which owned railways were excited and worried by the
spread of lines. In Victoria and New South Wales the steam monster threatened to
swallow its masters. (Blainey 1983, p. 253)
One of the most discussed issues concerning railways during these early periods —
an issue that continued well into the 1990s — was the gauge problem. New South
Wales, Victoria and South Australia initially started constructing railways based on
the broad gauge (5 ft 3 in or 1600 mm). However, New South Wales converted to
standard gauge (4  ft  8½  in or 1435  mm) in the 1850s. In Queensland, Western
Australia and Tasmania, railways were constructed to the less expensive narrow
gauge (3 ft 6 in or 1067 mm).1
The break of gauge initially caused little concern among the colonial governments.
Railways were not used to link capital cities but rather to link each capital with its
outer towns and regions. However, the problem of gauges developed as more
railways were built to link the States. During the two World Wars, the gauge barrier
to the quick passage of supplies and troops across States became an acute problem.
Criticism from the business community and general public ‘raised sufficient heat to
melt every railway in the land’ (Blainey 1983, p. 244).
                                             




During the early period, railways were treated like any other government department
and fell under the direct authority of a minister. As argued by Stevenson:
Governments typically set rates and fares, decided when to build new lines, and were
involved in other major and even quite minor decisions. Railway receipts were paid into
consolidated revenue … It made railway authorities financially dependent on
governments even when they operated at a profit, which quite frequently they did.
(Stevenson 1987, p. 7)
However, in the 1880s the colonies of New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and
South Australia handed over the detailed running of their railways to appointed
commissioners. Governments experimented with single commissioners, a board of
commissioners or a single commissioner with assistant commissioners. The
appointment of commissioners effectively transformed the running of railways into
semi-independent agencies.
Despite the doubtful economic or social value of some of the railways built and
operated during the boom years, they generally proved to be marginally viable. This
was possible because government railways were exposed to little competition from
competing transport modes or from other railways. Road and air transport were still
not serious threats to the dominance of the railways, though steamships offered
some competition. Government control over the railways meant that there was no
potential competition from privately-owned and operated railway companies
(Stevenson 1987).
C.2 1915 to the 1990s
The past dominance of the railways in Australia began to end after World War One.
Two reasons cited for this decline were the inability of the railways to cater to
changing demand patterns and the growth of road transport.
In relation to demand McKillop argued that:
The decline of rail as a dominant transport form in NSW since the 1920s, and
particularly since the 1950s, reflects the inappropriateness of its 19th century routes …
The traditional centralist organisation and route structure of the NSW railways meant
that they missed out on most of the post-War growth. Its network was not appropriate
for the changed demand pattern … (sub. DR90, p. 4)C4 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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After World War One road transport also emerged as a viable alternative to rail
transport. However, the Victorian Government argued road transport did not emerge
as a serious competitor to the railways until the 1970s:
Road competition appeared late in Australia compared with North America and Europe
… the Sydney-Brisbane connection by road was only fully sealed by 1958 and the last
river was bridged on the Pacific Highway in 1966 … Until the 70s, at least, there was
not anything – leaving aside the National Highway Program – nothing like a
competitive road freight mode, just because the infrastructure wasn’t there …
(trans., pp. 940, 944)
Despite some difference of opinion regarding when road transport became a serious
competitor to the railways, when it did occur it posed serious problems for State
Governments in terms of both the profitability of the railways and resulting effects
on State finances (Stevenson 1987).
The first response of State Governments to the emergence of road transport was to
regulate the traffic of passengers and goods in the 1930s. Traffic regulations
restricting freight can be categorised as:
·  geographically based restrictions on the distance commodities could be carried
by road transport;
·  restrictions on the commodities that could be carried by road transport; and
·  special taxes in proportion to the volume of traffic and the distance travelled.
The period after the Second World War was a time of mixed fortunes for the
railways. Railways were seriously run down during the War and substantial renewal
was required to rectify the deferral of maintenance that had occurred. Even more
importantly, by the 1950s railways suffered substantial losses of traffic to private
truck operators despite the restrictions placed on freight transport listed above. In
addition, the Privy Council’s ruling on the Hughes and Vale case in 1954 found that
the revenues from licensing long distance transport across State boundaries were
inconsistent with s. 92 of the Constitution.
Two factors complemented each other to provide new life for railways in Australia.
They were the widespread application of diesel technology to Australian railways in
the 1960s and the growth of the minerals sector during the 1970s. Diesel
locomotives and the unit train (an entire train dedicated to a specific commodity)
excelled at the long distance haulage of the bulk commodities produced by the
minerals sector. Indeed, governments used their monopoly provision of rail freight
services to extract monopoly rents from mining companies — a practice only being




The changing nature of Australia’s freight railways is highlighted in table C.1. In
1960-61, railways carried most agricultural produce, two thirds of coal and mineral
production and about half of the production of fertilisers, cement and timber. In the
case of coal and minerals, railways maintained their market share in the context of a
rapidly expanding industry, but for all other commodities presented in table C.1,
railways have been unable to maintain even the tonnage freighted.
Table C.1 Rail freight and annual production for select commodities,









Rail freight Proportion of
production
Rail freight Proportion of
production
Rail freight Proportion of
production
’000 tonnes per cent ’000 tonnes per cent ’000 tonnes per cent
1960-61 15 413 86.4 22 054 61.4 5 929 45.8
1965-66 14 986 82.0 27 032 54.6 7 384 46.8
1970-71 18 041 75.3 41 266 53.4 6 460 38.3
1975-76 18 520 64.4 57 788 57.4 4 715 27.9
1980-81 19 334 70.3 78 966 58.3 5 611 27.2
1985-86 24 831 67.3 118 676 63.9 4 793 22.5
1990-91 17 845 47.7 139 099 60.9 3 638 17.5
1994-95 11 288 37.9 171 456 64.2 3 324 13.9
Source: BTE 1998.
Resolving the gauge problem
After World War Two the first serious attempts were made at solving the gauge
problem. In 1956, a Committee of the Federal Parliament delivered its report on the
unification of trunk railways in Australia, known as the Wentworth Scheme. The
Wentworth Scheme discarded the proposal for all Australia’s railways to be
converted to standard gauge. Instead, it was recommended that only the capital cities
should be linked by standard gauge, with little interference to existing lines of other
gauges (Kain 1995).
While there was only muted support for the committee’s recommendations, gradual
progress was made in standardising the rail links between Australia’s capital cities.
In 1962 the link between Sydney’s Central Station and Melbourne’s Spencer Street
Station was completed (Brooke 1988) and by 1970 a train could run on standard
gauge track from Sydney to Perth. The process of linking all of Australia’s mainland
capital cities (except Darwin) is summarised in table  C.2. Appendix  B contains
maps of Australia’s interstate and regional rail networks illustrating current gauge
differences.C6 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Table C.2 Major post-1950s gauge standardisation initiatives
Year Standardisation initiative
1962 Opening of a new Melbourne/Wodonga standard gauge line parallel with the existing
broad gauge route, linking Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane by standard gauge.
1969-70 Opening of new standard gauge links between Kalgoorlie and Perth and between Port
Pirie and Broken Hill, eliminating three breaks of gauge and facilitating through
Sydney/Perth services.
1980 Opening of the Tarcoola/Alice Springs rail line, replacing the former route via
Oodnadatta and Marree and eliminating one break of gauge.
1983 Conversion of the Adelaide/Crystal Brook line to standard gauge thus placing Adelaide
on the East-West standard gauge network for the first time.
1995 Conversion of the Adelaide/Melbourne broad gauge route to standard gauge,
completing standardisation of the interstate network.
Source: Kain 1995.
Financial crisis within railways
Despite the new advances in technology and growth of the minerals trade, the
railways were forced to face up to mounting revenue shortfalls and strong pressures
were placed on State budgets in the 1970s (IC 1991b). In particular, there was no
contribution to profitability from passenger services. Both urban and non-urban
passenger services operated at considerable losses.
Government responses to mounting rail deficits varied across both jurisdiction and
market segment. However, in general, most attempts by governments to improve the
fortunes of the railways can be categorised as some combination of:
·  the closure of the most uneconomical branch lines and passenger services;
·  the alteration of financial and governance arrangements;
·  the injection of capital to improve the state of the track or quality of the
rollingstock; and
·  the revision of fare structures.
In the case of freight services, it was accepted that these services — or at least some
of them — could operate on a commercial basis. To achieve this goal, governments
generally rationalised services and some branch lines were closed. In some instances




State Governments also gradually deregulated restrictions on the intrastate
movement of freight from the 1960s. Key factors prompting the deregulation of
freight transport included:
·  the inefficiency of carrying certain commodities by rail;
·  the ineffectiveness of the regulations at protecting rail from road transport; and
·  the costs imposed on businesses and the wider community.
The SA Government was the first State Government to deregulate freight transport
in 1963 and 1964. However, other State Governments were considerably slower in
following this lead. Only modest moves were made towards deregulation in the
1960s and 1970s. Regulations on commodity traffics as they stood in 1991 are
summarised in table C.3.
Since 1991, governments have removed many of these regulations on commodity
traffics. From 1993 the Victorian Government removed restrictions applying to the
transport of bulk oil, minor bulk commodities, timber, cement and briquettes
(PC  1998c). In Western Australia the transport of all bulk commodities was
deregulated in July 1995. However, the handling facilities at some ports are served
only by rail.
Table C.3 Regulated commodity traffics by State, 1991
State Traffics
New South Wales Under the NSW Environmental Protection Act, coal was usually required to be
transported by rail, if available. The use of road transport for export grain was
constrained by limited road receival facilities at export ports.
Victoria Domestic grains, cement, briquettes, limestone and petroleum were regulated
to be transported by rail, with carriage by road allowed under permit in certain
circumstances.
Queensland Coal, coke, domestic grains (except seed grains), limestone, liquefied
petroleum gas, minerals and ores and raw sugar were regulated to be
transported by rail. With the exception of grains, road permits were issued
when ‘road transport was more competitive for the carriage of these restricted
goods’.
South Australia No restrictions.
Western Australia Truck licences were not granted for domestic grains, fertilisers, bulk
petroleum, bulk ores and minerals, or some timber. Partial regulation of bulk
petroleum and fertilisers.
Tasmania Permit fees applied to the road haulage of bulk cement, bulk fertiliser,
limestone, timber, logs, coal and sulphuric acid.
Source: IC 1991b.C8 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The unprofitable urban rail passenger services posed even greater challenges for
governments:
For railway authorities this type of service poses a variety of problems. It is highly
visible to the general public, chronically in need of capital investment, vulnerable to
industrial disputes, and may interfere with other railway operations.
(Stevenson 1987, p. 105)
Governments maintained or increased their control over the operation of rail
passenger services. Ministers tended to take direct managerial responsibility, and
new construction had to be sanctioned by Parliament. When funds permitted, the
quality of track and rollingstock was upgraded in an attempt to improve service
quality and stem declining rail patronage.
Passenger fares were also tightly regulated. Changes to passenger fares were (and
continue to be) driven by a range of financial, social and political factors. For
example, in 1976 in New South Wales fares were reduced by 20 per cent to promote
patronage despite considerable financial losses at existing fare levels. In other cases,
fares were raised in response to increases in wages or other operating expenses.REFORM INITIATIVES D1
D Reform initiatives
The following tables outline the key rail-related reforms undertaken in Australia
during the 1990s. These are elaborated on in chapter 3.
Table D.1 Key reforms in the 1990s: industry structure
Jurisdiction Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
Cwlth 1991-92 National Rail Corporation (NRC) established to operate the interstate
rail freight business in Australia. The shareholders are the
Commonwealth, NSW and Victorian Governments.
1993-94 The interstate freight business of Australian National (AN) transferred to
NRC. NRC identified other assets required to conduct its operations and
State Governments then had discretion whether to transfer ownership of
the assets, give a long term lease or grant access to NRC.
1994-95 Specialized Container Transport (SCT) commenced interstate rail
freight operations. TNT (now Toll) commenced one year later.
1997-98 Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) established. The corporation
was given responsibility for management of access and infrastructure
maintenance in South Australia as track owner and in Victoria as track
manager under a five year lease agreement. Access arrangements for
the interstate track with New South Wales, Queensland and Western
Australia are currently being negotiated.
1998-99 ARTC commenced operation.
NSW 1995-96 Transport Administration Amendment Bill passed by Parliament in
June 1996. The legislation created an access regime and allowed the
State Rail Authority (SRA) to be restructured into four independent
entities.
1996-97 Four new entities commenced operation on 1 July. The new entities
were the Rail Access Corporation (RAC), FreightCorp, Rail Services
Authority (RSA) and a new SRA.
Vic 1993-94 Public Transport Corporation restructured into five business units and
three Commercial Services Groups.
(continued on next page)D2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Table D.1 (continued)Key reforms in the 1990s: industry structure
Jurisdiction Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
Vic (cont.) 1995-
96
Rail Corporations Act 1996 passed. The Act allowed for the establishment




VicTrack assumed responsibility for train control and signalling operations
on non-electrified intrastate track, the maintenance and management of
related land and infrastructure, and the marketing and negotiation of
access to the intrastate network.
1998-
99
Establishment of five vertically integrated businesses to operate Victoria’s
passenger train and tram businesses. They are Bayside Trains, Hillside
Trains, Yarra Trams, Swanston Trams and V/Line Passenger (regional
train and coach services).
SA 1994-
95
TransAdelaide established in July 1994 and assumed the operating
functions of the State Transit Authority (STA). Planning functions of the
former STA assumed by the Passenger Transport Board (PTB).
Majority of TransAdelaide’s bus depot and workshop assets transferred to
the SA Department of Transport and control of the ticketing system
transferred to the PTB.
Tas 1997-
98
Freight operations of AN in Tasmania were separated in preparation for
privatisation.
Sources: PC 1998c; Australian Rail Track Corporation sub. 74; VicTrack 1998; Victorian Government sub. 82.
Table D.2 Key reforms in the 1990s: governance arrangements (including
financial arrangements)
Jurisdiction Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
Cwlth 1997-
98
Freight and passenger rail operations of AN sold. The buyers were
Australia Southern Railroad, Great Southern Railway and Australian
Transport Network (Tasrail).
Commonwealth announced its intention to sell its share of NRC.
NSW 1991-
92
Funding arrangements for community service obligations introduced.
New South Wales became a shareholder in NRC.
1996-
97
RAC and FreightCorp corporatised on establishment.




Rail Services Authority renamed Rail Services Australia and corporatised.
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Table D.2 (continued)Key reforms in the 1990s: governance arrangements
(including financial arrangements)
Jurisdiction Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
Vic 1991-
92
Victoria became a shareholder in NRC.
1998-
99
Bayside Trains, Hillside Trains, Yarra Trams, Swanston Trams and V/Line
Passenger (regional train and coach services) corporatised on
establishment.
Freight Victoria announced as the successful bidder for V/Line Freight.
National Express announced as the successful bidder for the V/Line
Passenger and Bayside Trains franchises.
1999-
2000
Melbourne Transport Enterprises announced as the successful bidder for
the Hillside Trains franchise.
Qld 1991-
92
Transport Infrastructure (Railways) Act 1991 established QR as a




Review of the Government’s export coal royalty rail haulage policy resulted
in a phased removal of ‘de-facto’ royalties collected through rail freight
rates to be completed by 2000.






Review of corporatisation distinguished commercial activities from the
community service obligations and access functions of QR.
1998-
99




Corporatisation of Westrail abandoned in favour of financial reforms under
the ‘Right Track’ program (commercialisation).
1997-
98
WA Government announced its intention to privatise the freight operations
of Westrail as a vertically integrated entity.
SA 1994-
95
Passenger Transport Act 1994 established the PTB with responsibility for
regulation, coordination and funding of public transport services including






Australian Transport Network announced as successful bidder for AN’s
freight operations in Tasmania.
Sources: PC 1998a and 1998c; Department of Transport and Regional Services sub.  76; Victorian
Government sub. 82; WA Government sub. 60; Queensland Rail sub. 59; Queensland Transport sub. 75.D4 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Table D.3 Key reforms in the 1990s: access
Jurisdiction Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
Cwlth 1995-
96
AN established the Track Access Unit to manage the mainline interstate
rail network owned by the Commonwealth.
1997-
98







RAC established to negotiate the use of the rail track and fund the
upkeep of the rail track.
NSW rail access regime commenced operation.
NSW Government applied to the National Competition Council (NCC) to
recommend certification of the effectiveness of the regime.
SCT sought declaration of the Sydney to Broken Hill rail service.




NCC issued Draft recommendation on effectiveness of NSW rail access
regime.
NSW Government released an amended NSW rail access regime for
public comment.
NSW rail access regime gazetted in February 1999.
Vic 1995-
96
Rail Corporations Act 1996 passed to establish VicTrack and allow






Access to interstate network through ARTC.
Qld 1996-
97
Carpentaria Transport sought declaration of specified rail services on the
Brisbane to Cairns rail corridor.
1997-
98
Queensland access regime for rail services commenced operation.
Queensland Government applied to the NCC to recommend certification
of the effectiveness of the regime.
Network Access Group established within QR to deal with access issues.
Queensland Competition Authority established.
1998-
99
A voluntary access undertaking for rail infrastructure developed.REFORM INITIATIVES D5
Queensland Government withdraws application to NCC.
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Table D.3 (continued)Key reforms in the 1990s: access
Jurisdiction Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
WA 1996-
97
Westrail established an Infrastructure Division responsible for access.




SCT sought declaration for certain WA rail services.
1998-
99
Robe River Iron Ore Associates sought declaration of a rail service in the
Pilbara region operated and owned by Hamersley Iron.
Federal Court found that the rail service operated by Hamersley Iron was
exempt from Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act. The NCC and Hope
Downs Management Services appealed the Federal Court’s decision.
Upon proclamation, the Government Railways (Access) Bill 1998
provided for a formal regime for access to government railways.
The subsidiary legislation in the form of a Code developed.
WA Government applied to the NCC to recommend certification of the
effectiveness of the regime.
SA 1997-
98
Railways (Operations and Access) Act 1997 imposed access obligations
on operators who control the intrastate network.
1998-
99
Access to interstate network through the ARTC.
SA/NT Governments applied to the NCC to recommend certification of
the effectiveness of the regime relating to the track between Tarcoola and
Alice Springs.
Tas A rail specific access regime does not exist in Tasmania. Australian
Transport Network as owner of the rail track is required to enter into
negotiations with other operators under its contract of sale.
Table D.4 Key reforms in the 1990s: safety regulation and operating
procedures and standards
Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
1993 A National Approach to Rail Safety Regulation report recommended, among other
things, an intergovernmental agreement be developed to achieve consistent
national rail safety regulation. Recommendations endorsed by Ministers.
New South Wales was the first State to amend its rail safety legislation to include
safety accreditation, onus on the industry to perform to agreed standards, and
accountability and transparency.
1995 Part I of Australian Standard on Rail Safety Management (AS 4292) published.
(continued on next page)REFORM INITIATIVES D7
Table D.4 (continued)Key reforms in the 1990s: safety regulation and operating
procedures and standards
Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
1996 Intergovernmental Agreement signed by Commonwealth, State and Territory
Ministers.a Agreement set out principles and guidelines for the establishment of a
consistent approach to rail safety.
1997 National Rail Summit: Commonwealth and State Ministers signed Heads of
Agreement on Interstate Rail Reform.b Ministers agreed, among other things, to
develop a decision making process to speed up harmonisation of standards and to
commission a report on rail safety and operating standards (the Maunsell report).
Parts 2-5 of Australian Standard 4292 published.
Priorities determined and principles for reform agreed on. Various jurisdictions in the
process of amending rail safety legislation to incorporate safety accreditation and
mutual recognition. One body nominated as the safety regulator in each jurisdiction.
1998 Endorsement by Ministers of the Study of Rail Standards and Operational
Requirements (Maunsell report).
1998-99 Task groups established to progress the recommendations of the report and the
Intergovernmental Agreement. Industry was also involved in this process.
Ministers at Australian Transport Council meeting agreed to an independent review of
rail safety arrangements and the establishment of a national body to facilitate and
implement arrangements for the adoption of uniform operating requirements.
a  The ACT was not a signatory. b  Tasmania and the Territories were not signatories.
Sources: ATC 1993; IGA 1996; Heads of Agreement 1997; Maunsell 1998.
Table D.5 Key reforms in the 1990s: heavy vehicle charging
Date Nature of reform or policy initiative
1991 National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) established.
1992 NRTC recommendation on heavy road vehicle charges.
1994-95 In South Australia, national heavy road vehicle charges implemented.
1995 In Queensland, heavy road vehicle charges implemented.
1995-96 In Victoria, Western Australia, Tasmania and ACT heavy road vehicle charges
implemented.
1996-97 Implementation of uniform heavy road vehicle registration charges completed
across Australia.
1998-99 Revised set of national heavy road vehicle charges proposed by NRTC.




This appendix describes the experience of a selection of countries that have
undergone significant change in aspects of their organisational structure, ownership
and access arrangements in railways. The motivation for change is also considered.
This appendix concentrates on identifying and reporting experiences of particular
interest, such as the experience of franchising in Great Britain and investment issues
in Sweden.
Countries covered in this appendix are:
·  Argentina (section E.1);
·  Canada (section E.2);
·  Germany (section E.3);
·  Great Britain (section E.4);
·  Japan (section E.5);
·  Netherlands (section E.6);
·  New Zealand (section E.7);
·  Sweden (section E.8); and
·  United States (section E.9).
Table E.1 provides an overview of the structure and ownership of these railways.E2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
Table E.1 Overview of structure and ownership of overseas railways
Country Structure Train operator Track
infrastructure
Argentina Horizontally separated and vertically
integrated
Franchisees Government
Canada Horizontally separated (by function) and
vertically integrated with access for
passenger services
Various private Various private





Great Britain Horizontally and vertically separated Franchisees Private
Japan Horizontally separated and vertically












Horizontally and vertically integrated Private Government
(leased for
nominal rent)





Horizontally separated (by function) and
vertically integrated with access for
passenger services
Various private Various private
E.1 Argentina
Railways in Argentina have been horizontally separated on a geographic basis and
individually franchised as vertically integrated operations.
Most of the problems in the Argentinian rail industry were caused by a lack of
commercial orientation (World Bank 1996). Prior to restructuring, the Argentinian
rail network was particularly run down as a result of poorly targeted investment
decisions by Ferrocarriles Argentinos (FA), the Argentinian railway. FA had weak
management and a production oriented culture which paid little attention either to
satisfying customer needs or the increasing competition from other modes (Kopicki
and Thompson 1995). The restructuring of Argentina’s rail system had the objective
of generating private investment (Brooks and Button 1995).INTERNATIONAL
RAILWAYS
E3
Reform and structural organisation
Between the mid-1980s and 1994, restructuring of FA occurred in two stages:
·  the unbundling of the fully integrated and centralised network by dividing the
company into:
-  freight services;
-  intercity passenger services; and
-  urban passenger services.
·  franchising of railways (World Bank 1996).1
Freight and passenger services were separated because there was an opportunity for
the freight businesses to become commercially sustainable while passenger
businesses were going to require continual subsidies from government
(World Bank 1996).
The approaches taken in the franchising of services differed for freight, intercity
passenger and urban passenger services.
Freight services
In 1990, the freight service was separated into six sub networks and franchised. The
conditions of the franchises were that:
·  each franchise would be operated by a private company;
·  franchises would be for a period of 30 years with the option of a 10 year
extension;
·  the franchises would be vertically integrated and include freight marketing, train
operation, equipment and track maintenance and rehabilitation responsibilities;
·  franchises would include the exclusive right to the infrastructure and no other
operator could carry freight in the region without the franchisee’s permission;
·  the franchisee could also opt to provide passenger services, but if it chose not to
it would be compelled to allow someone else to operate the passenger service
and would be compensated fairly;
·  the franchisee was obliged to hire FA staff, but only as many staff as were
required;
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·  freight rates were deregulated but a maximum rate had to be submitted to the
Secretary of Transportation for approval; and
·  each franchisee would rent a set number of locomotives and wagons.
Five rail freight franchises have been awarded, leaving only the metre gauge
Belgrano Railway under government operation. The franchises have included the
use of all infrastructure and rollingstock plus access to the workshops
(ECMT 1996).
The Government no longer subsidises the freight business and the volume of traffic
has grown (Thompson 1997).2
Intercity passenger services
A study commissioned by the Argentinian Government in 1991 analysed the
profitability of intercity passenger services and found that only one service was
commercially viable. The report recommended the retention of commercial services
and some of the other marginal services (on social grounds). In 1992, the
Government decided not to continue to subsidise intercity passenger services and
offered the services to the Provinces to provide them at their own expense
(World Bank 1996). Seven Provinces agreed to the transfer of services and these
were franchised under the conditions that:
·  the franchisee should provide minimum service levels as outlined in the
schedule;
·  the franchisee should improve services to a specified level in a given period of
time;
·  at least 20 per cent of seating should be allocated ‘tourist class’ and prices should
be in US dollars;
·  the franchisees would give preference to FA employees but should only employ
as many as required; and
·  each franchisee would rent a set number of locomotives and passenger cars
(Kopicki and Thompson 1995).
                                             




Urban passenger services were separated into seven businesses and franchised. It
was anticipated that the farebox revenue collected by franchisees would be
insufficient to cover the cost of providing the services.
A three envelope model was used for the bidding process for the franchises.
Envelope one contained information about technical and operating experience,
envelope two contained a detailed business and operating plan and envelope three
contained the financial proposal for the franchise, including the subsidy required
from the Government to run the services.
The franchises were awarded on the basis of a single criterion, the lowest subsidy
required to operate the railway and undertake a specified investment and
rehabilitation program (envelope  3).3 The franchises were awarded to three
bidders — two of the three bidders were awarded franchises for three rail businesses
each.
Access
Provisions for access were incorporated into the franchising agreements. Freight
railways and urban passenger railways are required to allow access to the track for
intercity passenger operators in exchange for a ‘toll’ (World Bank 1996).
Argentina’s seven major passenger companies (all privatised) have formed an
association in an attempt to reduce the high track access charges being charged by
the major freight companies. The association will also set common standards for
Argentinian passenger fares (Australian Association of Timetable Collectors 1999).
E.2 Canada
Railways in Canada are vertically integrated and horizontally separated by function.
Canadian railways are characterised by profitable freight operations, unprofitable
intercity passenger railways and locally funded commuter rail services.
The motivation for reform of the railways in Canada differs substantially from other
countries in that it has been initiated by the industry, rather than the Government.
Industry initiated reform to facilitate improvements in efficiency. While the issues
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facing management (such as restructuring of services, network assets and liabilities)
are similar in the United States and Canada, reform in Canada has been much slower
because of the high level of restrictive regulation (Kopicki and Thompson 1995).
The constraints to reform included:
·  labour laws which limit opportunities for productivity gains;
·  the need for substantial cross-subsidies between passenger and freight services;
and
·  regulations which limit ownership rights (such as through the structure of access
arrangements).
In 1987 the Canadian transportation industry was deregulated under the National
Transportation Act 1987 (Statistics Canada 1993; Statistics Canada 1996). The 1987
Act is distinguished by its explicit concern for safety standards, emphasis on
intramodal competition, consideration of regulation as a last resort and identification
of transport as the key to regional economic development (IC  1991b). (See
appendix G for a summary of safety regulation reform in Canada.)
Reform and structural organisation
Canadian railways are dominated by a longstanding duopoly — Canadian National
(CN) and Canadian Pacific (CP) (Brooks and Button 1995). CN and CP are
primarily freight railways. It is a unique rail system in that CP and CN operate a
parallel track system across most of Canada. In addition, there are approximately 23
other mainly small rail operators, including some larger regional railways such as
British Columbia Rail.
The railway restructuring in Canada over the past 25 years has been characterised
by:
·  the creation of VIA Rail in 1977 to manage passenger rail services previously
provided by CN and CP;
·  the application of private sector principles to the administration of VIA Rail to
facilitate efficiency;
·  infrastructure rationalisation by CN and CP  —  for example, the sale of
operations in the Maritime Provinces;
·  strategic restructuring of CN and CP to coordinate operations, engage in mergers
and swap rail lines; and
·  development of shortline railways (Statistics Canada 1996).INTERNATIONAL
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VIA Rail provides 90  per  cent of Canada’s intercity passenger rail services,
including a transcontinental service and corridor services between Windsor and
Quebec City (Statistics Canada 1996). VIA Rail was designed to remove the burden
of providing uneconomic intercity passenger services from private freight railways.
The Canadian Government owns, operates and directly subsidises VIA Rail. VIA
Rail then contracts other companies to provide services — 92 per cent are provided
by CN.
In 1998, the Canadian Government announced its intention to franchise VIA Rail.
The Government will provide Can$170 million for rail passenger services per year
and limit payments for essential remote social services to Can$30  million
(Transport 2000  Canada 1998, vol. 20, no. 6, p. 2). In November 1998, the
operation of passenger services on Vancouver Island was transferred from VIA Rail
to a private operator (Australian Association of Timetable Collectors 1999).
VIA Rail pays access charges for operating on CN and CP rail lines. These charges
are paid on a pro rata basis and were renegotiated in 1995 for a 13 year period.
E.3 Germany
Railways in Germany are characterised by horizontal separation of freight and
passenger services and the establishment of separate business units (with their own
accounts) for track infrastructure and train operations. Most rail services are still
provided by an integrated railway.
The motivation for reform in Germany was a need to improve efficiency and to
solve the debt problem faced by the rail industry. German reunification acted as a
catalyst for change. The reform process commenced in 1989 when a commission
was established to examine the future of East and West German railways
(Jahanshahi 1998).
Reform and structural organisation
The German Rail Act 1994 led to the merger of the East and West German railways
and the subsequent reorganisation of the new national railway, Deutsche Bahn
Aktiengensellschaft (DBAG), into four business units. The units are responsible for
track, long distance passenger transport, local passenger transport, and freight.4 The
sole shareholder of DBAG is the Republic of Germany. By the end of 1999, DBAG
                                             
4 The freight business, DB Cargo, has merged with the Netherlands freight business, NS Cargo
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will become a holding company with five independent state-owned joint stock units.
Each unit has its own budget and is responsible for its own financial performance.
The business units include:
·  DB Travel and Tourism responsible for long distance passenger traffic;
·  DB Regio responsible for regional and local passenger services;
·  DB Station and Service responsible for stations and maintenance;
·  DB Cargo responsible for freight operations; and
·  DB Network responsible for infrastructure (International Railway Journal,
January 1999, p. 44).
Dissolution of the holding company and complete separation will take place at a
later date (Jahanshahi 1998).
The German rail reforms have also led to a large number of local private rail
operators. Regional transport authorities are responsible for local services. There are
150 private short haul rail operators providing mainly local passenger services.
Access
DBAG retains control of the rail infrastructure which is accessible to operators,
including the local shortline railways. All railways, including DBAG, are required to
pay access charges which are regulated by the Federal Railway Office. DBAG
determines and administers the access charges.
It publishes two sets of access charges, one for freight operations and another for
passenger operations. Different charges are applied to different track categories,
train categories and quantities (figure E.1). If the maximum class load is exceeded,
the operation requires special planning or specific track is reserved, then a
supplementary fee is paid. DBAG provides rebates for long term commitments,
large contracts (total network kilometres), empty wagons and single locomotives.
In general, the revenue received does not cover the infrastructure costs. Even so, the
OECD (1998) has suggested that the access charging regime has discouraged entry
because of high charges and quantity discounts. Consequently, only a handful of
new operators have entered the market in recent years — these have been
predominantly short haul private railways (OECD 1998).INTERNATIONAL
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Figure E.1 Structure of access charges in Germanya
Access charges
















a  Track categories incorporate regional differences in route quality and demand. Train categories incorporate
maximum train gross weight, maximum speed and desired degree of service planning in terms of travel time.
Investment
A separate division under DBAG is responsible for investment. In some instances,
regional authorities are also responsible for investment in track.
Investment in new lines is financed by interest free public debt. Some commuter
services are subsidised and are funded via agencies appointed by state authorities
which receive funds from the Federal Government.
E.4 Great Britain
The railways in Great Britain5 are horizontally and vertically separated by:
·  function — track infrastructure, train operations and rollingstock provision;
·  business — passenger, freight and maintenance services; and
·  geography.
In 1992, the British Government embarked on a national privatisation policy. A
Government White Paper on rail proposed using economic incentives and contracts
to encourage competition at a moderate pace.
                                             
5 The term Great Britain is used instead of the United Kingdom, since the latter includes Northern
Ireland. The reforms that are described are confined to Great Britain, that is England, Wales and
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The impetus for this change was the need to:
·  reduce subsidies at a time when investment was required;
·  make railways more responsive to customer needs; and
·  increase the attractiveness of rail transport as roads become more congested and
the level of environmental damage increases (OECD 1998).
Reform and structural organisation
Following the Railways Act 1993, British Rail was horizontally and vertically
separated to allow for competition at all levels of business except the provision of
infrastructure capacity. This led to the creation of about 100 businesses, including
25 passenger operators (train operating companies (TOCs)), six freight companies
(TOCs), three equipment leasing companies (ROSCOs) and numerous small scale
associated businesses (figure E.2). By 1997, these enterprises were either sold or
franchised.
















































Source: Kain 1998, p. 249.
The organisations that were sold included:INTERNATIONAL
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·  Railtrack (see below);
·  British Rail’s infrastructure support including seven infrastructure maintenance,
seven service design and six track renewal companies;
·  three ROSCOs6;
·  central service operations; and
·  six freight operations  —  three geographic bulk companies, one container
company, one non-bulk international operator and one postal services company
(Kain 1998).
Since the initial separation, the structure and ownership of rail businesses have
changed. The rail freight companies have been rationalised from six to two. English
Welsh Scottish Railways (EWS) has acquired five of the companies and carries
about 90 per cent of the rail freight, while Freightliner Limited remains separately
owned and competes in the intermodal container market (sub. DR95).7
Initially Railtrack was a government-owned commercial organisation. In 1996, it
was sold to the private sector through a stock exchange float. It continues to own
and manage all infrastructure, including 39  000  kilometres of track, signalling,
about 2500 stations and 90 depots. All stations, except 14, have been leased and all
maintenance work is performed by contractors. Railtrack is also responsible for
setting access charges (Kain 1998).
Two organisations have been established to support structural separation: the Rail
Regulator and the Franchise Director.
The Rail Regulator is the independent agency responsible for supervising access to
track and markets. It was established to protect the public interest by ensuring
nondiscriminatory access at reasonable prices. The Rail Regulator evaluates access
prices based on published criteria.
The Franchise Director manages relations with passenger service operators and was
initially responsible for franchising passenger services. Franchises have been
awarded for periods between five and 15 years. These were awarded in a market
where it was known that there was a possibility of a gradual introduction of
                                             
6 The ROSCOs combined to purchase the vehicle spare parts pool. The stock is maintained by
heavy maintenance suppliers.
7 EWS Railways is a rail freight company majority owned by the US railway, Wisconsin Central,
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competition from 1 April 1999.8 They were awarded on the basis of lowest subsidy
or highest franchise fee offered. The franchise agreements may stipulate renewal of
rollingstock. The Franchise Director administers subsidies to franchisees and in
1998 all but one passenger service was subsidised (Jahanshahi  1998). It is
anticipated that the level of subsidies will decline over time and there is some
evidence that this has happened already (Kain 1998).
In August 1998, the British Government announced its intention to create a
‘Strategic Rail Authority’ to provide strategic planning for the rail industry. A
shadow Strategic Rail Authority is currently operating and it will be fully
operational once legislation is passed. It operates in conjunction with the Rail
Regulator and the Franchise Director. The Strategic Rail Authority will be
responsible for managing the 25 passenger franchises (including the allocation of
subsidies) and providing grants for freight transport. It will also determine how
much competition is permitted between passenger operators. The Strategic Rail
Authority will take over some of the responsibilities of the Rail Regulator, including
consumer protection powers and the monitoring of Railtrack’s performance and
investment delivery (Railway Gazette International, August 1998, p. 497).
The reforms will not be complete until at least 2002, when it is anticipated that there
will be largely unrestricted access for passenger train operators. The experience of
Great Britain to date suggests that although the costs of transition have been high,
the demand for services has increased. In addition, there have been some difficulties
associated with the reform, such as coordination problems with passenger services
and disagreement between the Rail Regulator and Railtrack over the level of
investment required (Thompson 1997).
Access
Access to rail infrastructure is provided through agreements between Railtrack and
service operators. These agreements specify the route to be followed, the number
and timetable of trains, equipment types, service standards and access charges.
Where an agreement cannot be reached between parties (Railtrack and the operator)
the Rail Regulator may intervene. The condition of track and level of investment is
also monitored by the Rail Regulator.
Railtrack and the Rail Regulator are currently designing the access charging system.
It is anticipated that access charges will cover all system costs (including time and
capacity costs). Therefore track infrastructure is not subsidised by government. The
                                             
8 The Franchising Director sought agreement from the Rail Regulator to modify competitive entry
for an initial period because the market had no experience of franchising. This enabled
franchisees to establish their businesses and reduce the risk of failure.INTERNATIONAL
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British rail network is primarily used for passenger services and thus 90 per cent of
overhead costs are borne by passenger services.
Freight access charges are individually negotiated with each operator. An agreement
between Railtrack and the freight operator, EWS, provided a formula for calculating
track access charges. This has enabled instant price quotations for rail freight
customers. New access contracts have to be approved by the Rail Regulator, who
determines whether the terms are reasonable or whether they are harmful to the
interests of other users of the network or those who depend on it. It is anticipated
that these access arrangements may facilitate the entry of other freight operators.
Track access charges are to be reviewed by 31 July 2000. The review will consider
whether capacity is allocated on an appropriate basis, whether congestion charges
should apply and whether low additional access charges give the right incentives to
enhance capacity (OECD 1998).
E.5 Japan
The railways in Japan are characterised by horizontal separation and vertical
integration. Horizontal separation has occurred on a geographic basis and has been
accompanied by franchising.
Despite several attempts to control the railway deficit, by 1985 it had reached
US$13 billion. The OECD (1998) argued that the deficits were caused by Japanese
National Railways (JNR) focusing on management, engineering and operating
issues and not considering budgetary conditions.
Furthermore, JNR was unable to respond to the structural change in the industrial
sector in Japan. The OECD (1998) suggested that this was because the railway was
organised as a public corporation without managerial discretion, and its scale
exceeded a manageable size.
Reform and structural organisation
In 1987, the privatisation process of JNR commenced. JNR was divided into six
geographically based passenger services: one freight service; the Shinkansen (Bullet
Train) Leasing Corporation which owns high speed right of way leased to passenger
railways; and JNR Settlements Corporation which carries the unapportioned,
unfunded obligations of JNR. The passenger services are operated privately, while
the freight service has been gradually privatised since 1990.
In restructuring the railway there was a significant number of surplus staff
(approximately 93 000). To ease the adjustment burden there was a major programE14 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
of outplacement of staff. Most of these were transferred to the Japanese
Government, municipalities and other private companies (Fukui 1992).
There is yardstick competition between franchisees for the type of services
provided. The Japanese Government regulates train fares.
Access
Access charges are negotiated between the incumbent operator and the entrant, so
that, for example, freight trains using passenger lines would pay access fees to the
franchisee. The access charges are based on avoidable costs. The difficulty with this
arrangement is that where the capacity on the rail line is limited, there is no
incentive for the infrastructure provider to augment capacity as the freight operator
only pays marginal cost for access (ECMT 1996).
E.6 Netherlands
The railways in the Netherlands are characterised by horizontal (by function) and
vertical separation.
Until the early 1990s the Netherlands Railway, Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), was
subject to a high degree of government regulation. NS did not have the freedom to
determine its own fares, levels of service or investment plans. A report by the
Wijffels Committee in 1992 recommended that the Government allow NS to operate
as an independent business, to create separate organisational divisions within NS
and to adopt European policy measures (Nash and Toner 1999).
The primary motivations for the structural reform of NS were to:
·  achieve growth in the number of passengers using rail transport services; and
·  improve rail transport services (ECMT 1998).
Reform and structural organisation
In 1994, NS was separated into track infrastructure and train operations. The train
operations of NS became four business units responsible for:
·  passenger services (NS Reizigers)  —  established in 1994 operating as an
independent entity;




·  railway stations (NS Stations)  —  established in 1993 to charge rent to NS
businesses and external agencies and to improve the environment of stations; and
·  real estate (NS Vastgoed)  —  established in 1994 to pursue the commercial
development of NS property (Harris 1998).
In addition, three organisations were established to provide specialised services (on
a commercial basis) to the freight and passenger businesses:
·  NS Materieel comprises rollingstock workshops and depots and manages the
railway’s traction and rollingstock;
·  NS Beveiliging Services comprises police, protection and advisory services; and
·  NS Facilitaire Bedrijven comprises personnel administration, documentation and
research services (Harris 1998).
The track infrastructure is funded by government (Infrafonds, the government
infrastructure fund) and managed by:
·  NS Railinfrabeheer  —  a technically focused organisation, responsible for
maintenance of infrastructure and building new infrastructure;
·  Railned — responsible for managing capacity and regulating access. As part of
this function Railned:
-  specifies the future rail infrastructure requirements to government;
-  allocates capacity to the different railway operators;
-  operates in a transparent, auditable and nondiscriminatory way; and
-  supervises safety.
·  NS Verkeersleiding — responsible for the efficiency and safety of rail traffic
management including signalling and systems control (ECMT 1998;
Harris 1998).
Since 1996, NS Reizigers has had the freedom to set fares and establish timetables.
From 2000, passenger services will no longer be subsidised.9 Rather, when there are
services which the Dutch Government wishes to continue, these will be funded by
community service obligations through a purchaser-provider framework. The Dutch
Government also intends to competitively tender 30 loss-making lines
(Harris 1998).
There have been a number of new entrants and mergers in the Dutch rail market.
Since 1996, Lovers Rail has offered passenger services to tourists between
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Amsterdam and Ijmuiden, and later in 1998, between Haarlem and Leiden. From
May 1998, Oostnet has operated the Almelo-Marienbergine line using NS
rollingstock. In June 1998, it was announced that NS Cargo would merge with the
German freight business, DB Cargo. At this stage the Dutch Government has no
plans to privatise its railways (Harris 1998).
Access
Third party train operators may enter the rail market to compete for both passenger
and freight services. The Dutch Government encourages competition by creating
facilities for new train operators. The Government provides this assistance in order
to:
·  facilitate an efficient market for rail freight services; and
·  assist in achieving competitive neutrality with road (ECMT 1998).
Track infrastructure capacity is allocated by Railned through a ‘standard procedure’
(ECMT 1998). Access fees will be charged from 2000 and the charge will only be
related to the cost of maintenance of the infrastructure.
E.7 New Zealand
The railways in New Zealand are horizontally and vertically integrated.
Prior to restructuring, the New Zealand railways were unprofitable, inefficient,
production rather than customer focused, lacking commercial management skills
and not prepared to meet potential competition (Kopicki and Thompson 1995).
The main objective of the rail reform in New Zealand has been to inject greater
efficiency through privatisation of New Zealand Rail. The scale and network
benefits of coordinated services, such as linking ferry services with rail services,
were considered integral to improving efficiency (Brooks and Button 1995).
Reform and structural organisation
Before privatisation the Railways Corporation was restructured into two entities,
New Zealand Rail Limited (NZRL) and New Zealand Railways CorporationINTERNATIONAL
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(NZRC).10 NZRL operated the core rail freight, rail passenger and inter-island ferry
services. NZRC had landlord responsibilities and was also responsible for
administration of the debt.
The New Zealand rail system is now characterised by private monopoly operations
of rail services and public ownership of the right of way. In July 1993, NZRL (both
freight and passenger operations) was sold to a New Zealand-United States
consortium and now operates as Tranz Rail. Tranz Rail has entered into a long term
lease with the New Zealand Government for use of the track. The Regional
Governments subsidise urban passenger services in Auckland and Wellington.
Tranz Rail operates six businesses:
·  Tranz Link — markets and manages all freight services;
·  Tranz Scenic — markets and operates long distance passenger travel;
·  Tranz Metro — operates the commuter services in Wellington and Auckland;
·  The Interislander — manages all inter-island ferry operations;
·  Operations — manages infrastructure; and
·  Corporate office — covers safety, personnel and planning, corporate relations,
security, and financial and business services.
Since privatisation, profits have risen substantially, from NZ$54 million in 1993 to
NZ$105  million in 1995 (adjusting for redundancy payments) and were
NZ$82  million in 1997-98 (King  1996; Tranz Rail  1998). Performance has also
improved. Freight rates have decreased by about one quarter since deregulation
(Bollard and Pickford 1998).
Access
The control of access is defined in the lease between Tranz Rail and NZRC. When
freight and passenger traffic fall below critical levels, the New Zealand Government
may allow access to other operators (Brooks and Button 1995). Thus access to track
by other operators is not encouraged if minimum volumes are met by Tranz Rail.
This reflects the Government view that competition from road and shipping is
enough to ensure efficiency (OECD forthcoming).
                                             
10 The privatisation of New Zealand Rail was predated by two rounds of corporatisation. New
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There is no specific rail regulator in New Zealand. Disputes between potential
entrants and Tranz Rail are subject to arbitration by general competition authorities.
In addition, the New Zealand Commerce Commission has the power to investigate
the abuse of market power.
E.8 Sweden
The railways in Sweden are characterised by horizontal and vertical separation.
Prior to 1988, Swedish railways (train operations and track infrastructure) were
operated by one integrated public service enterprise, Swedish State Railways
(Statens Jarnvagar (SJ)). In 1988, the Government restructured Swedish railways
under the Transportation Policy Act. Subsequent legislation, passed in 1995, opened
the rail network to private providers (Jahanshahi 1998).
The restructuring of the Swedish railways occurred because:
·  Swedish railways were experiencing relatively poor financial performance;
·  there were differences in the treatment of road and rail (chapter 10 discusses this
issue in more detail);
·  the perceived environmental and safety benefits were thought to be greater for
rail than road; and
·  there was the view that the Government railway was inhibiting market oriented
activities (Jahanshahi 1998).
Reform and structural organisation
In 1988, SJ was organised into two separate organisations — Banverket (BV), the
national track authority and SJ, the national operator. BV is responsible for
maintaining track infrastructure (including land), signalling and telephone services,
and electricity supply. SJ and BV are not privatised (Jahanashahi 1998).
There is limited competition in the national network. A private operator, BK-Tag,
operates services on two passenger lines. SJ has been commercialised and operates
profitable services without operational subsidies. The regional networks have been
contracted and tendered by regional transport authorities.
Swedish railways operate within the framework established in the European
Commission’s (EC) 1991 Directive on the vertical structure of railways (box E.1).INTERNATIONAL
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Box E.1 European experience
Since 1990, the EC has adopted a series of directives designed to ‘liberate’ rail
services. The first Directive of the EC (Directive 91/440/EEC) specified that accounts
for all member countries’ railways should be divided into below and above track
operations and that open access should be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis. The
impetus for such reform was twofold — to facilitate the fair treatment of road and rail,
and to establish government entities to facilitate competition. The Directive excluded
urban and regional services. In addition, the EC has adopted two other Directives of
relevance to structural reform and access. Directive 95/18/EC described conditions on
the licensing of railway undertakings and established the need for a separate access
unit. Directive 95/19/EC related to the allocation of infrastructure and the charging of
access fees.
Directive 91/440/EEC is limited in scope. Some member states have decided to go
beyond the Directive and establish separate bodies for infrastructure management and
transport operations, either within a single undertaking or in a separate undertaking.
Some member states have also established wider access rights than those in the
Directive and have introduced competitive tendering and contracting. Despite this,
there has been limited opening of the market and the incumbent rail operator remains
dominant in most member states.
The experience of reform in safety regulation and operating procedures and standards
is outlined in appendix G.
Sources: EC 1998b; OECD 1998; Galenson and Thompson 1994; Kritzinger 1998.
Access
Access charges are paid by SJ to BV. Variable track access charges were
implemented to create conditions similar to roads. The access charge comprises a
fixed component, and a variable component in five classes — weighted  by
rollingstock type, wagon handling costs, catenary system usage, accident costs and
environmental costs of diesel fuel usage. However, the access charge is not designed
to enable full cost recovery — it is designed to recover one third of the cost. Hence,
the Swedish Government continues to provide a large (indirect) subsidy to rail.
In addition, there are a number of facilities which are regarded as common or
essential facilities  —  stations and terminals, land for railway purposes and
maintenance facilities. These are administered by the Swedish Railway Inspectorate
in accordance with EC Directive 95/18/EC.
The Swedish Government indicated that from 1 January 1999 many of the track
access charges were to be removed (Railway Gazette, August 1998, p. 529).E20 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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SJ has a monopoly position in interregional passenger services and retains
grandfather rights for freight services. However, new operators have entered the
market. The new operators include Malmtraffik I Kiruna AB (established in 1996 as
a joint venture between mining company LKAB, SJ and Norwegian Railways
(Norges Statsbaner BA (NSB) to haul iron ore), two small companies operating
regional passengers and eight small freight operators (Harris 1998; ECMT 1998).
Investment
BV owns tracks and platforms and SJ owns ‘ground’ and stations. The rail network
is owned by SJ, private companies and municipalities.
The State, through BV, is responsible for investing in infrastructure. Its level of
investment is not limited by the revenue collected from access charges. The
Government has increased funding to BV since the separation. The rationale for this
increase is to give equal treatment to both road and rail.
In 1993, BV was asked by the Ministry of Transport to develop a 10 year plan for
mainline investments. A long term plan was approved (1994 to 2003) which was
expected to result in significant railway investment (ECMT  1996). However, to
date, investment has been less than planned.
Thompson (1997) suggested that investment is not market driven. Costs and
revenues have been separated into two organisations (BV and SJ respectively) and
consequently the signals for efficient investment are distorted. Because there is no
mechanism linking the demand for investment by SJ to the supply of funding by
BV, there is a lack of coordination of investment. SJ wants to determine which track
requires investment, while BV funds investment based on political direction.
E.9 United States
The railways in the United States are vertically integrated and horizontally separated
by function. The rail industry is characterised by profitable privately owned freight
railways, an unprofitable publicly owned intercity passenger service, and locally
financed commuter networks.
The US rail freight industry’s share of the total freight transported has declined due
to competition from road transport. The decline was compounded by restrictive
regulation which attempted to force railways to subsidise passenger and rural freight
through higher charges for higher valued merchandise. By the early 1970s, much of
the rail system was close to bankruptcy. Structural reform ensued, culminating in theINTERNATIONAL
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Staggers Rail Act 1980, which deregulated the rail industry (box  E.2). Since
deregulation some 40 Class I railways have been consolidated into nine Class I
railways.11
Box E.2 The Staggers Rail Act 1980
The Staggers Rail Act 1980 enabled railways to market their product in terms of quality
and price. The Act included provisions which:
·  relaxed the method of regulating freight rates;
·  explicitly legalised contract rate making;
·  permitted abandoning unprofitable lines; and
·  removed antitrust limitations.
These reforms led to an increase in the productivity of labour and physical assets and
a decrease in freight rates. Over half the rail freight business in the United States
travels under contract freight rates.
Source: Carbajo 1993.
Reform and structural organisation
Freight services are undertaken by approximately 500 private freight rail companies
comprising Class I, II and III railways. Of these, seven railways undertake about
80 per cent of the nation’s rail freight. Intercity passenger services are undertaken by
Amtrak. These are partly funded by government.
The main structural reforms of the US rail system include:
·  the creation of Amtrak in 1970 (box E.3);
·  the nationalisation, reorganisation and privatisation of seven of the railways in
the North-East to form Conrail in 1970;
·  substantial deregulation to permit railways to adapt services to customers in 1980
(box E.2); and
·  the separation and sale of Conrail (approximately half to CSX Transport and the
other half to Norfolk Southern) in 1998-99.
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Box E.3 Amtrak, the United States intercity passenger service
Amtrak was created in 1970 under the Rail Passenger Services Act and began
services in May 1971. It is nationally owned and was created to:
·  place decision making and funding responsibility for passenger services in the
public sector;
·  improve the quality and cost effectiveness of passenger services; and
·  allow private railways to concentrate on providing freight services.
Amtrak is funded by the US Congress through federal capital and operating grants,
which are determined by Congress on an annual basis. The subsidy is to be eliminated
by 2002. The US Department of Transportation is the holder of the common stock in
Amtrak which is operated as a for-profit corporation and managed as a private
corporation. It is free of regulatory constraints on pricing and service frequency.
In 1996, Amtrak was restructured and organised into three business units:
·  North-East;
·  West coast; and
·  Intercity.
In 1997, a number of reforms relaxed labour market arrangements allowing Amtrak to
contract out some functions, such as food services. It is anticipated that over time
Amtrak will be permitted to choose the routes and services it will provide based on
demand for services.
Sources: Galenson and Thompson 1994; Harris 1998; OECD 1998.
In addition, the US freight railways have undergone rationalisation which has
resulted in a number of other mergers, the biggest of which were:
·  Burlington Northern merged in 1995 with Atchison, Topeka and Sante Fe to
become Burlington Northern Sante Fe Corporation (BNSF) (BNSF 1999);
·  Union Pacific merged in 1996 with Southern Pacific to become Union Pacific
Corporation (UP) (UP 1999); and
·  CN merged in 1999 with Illinois Central to become a major international railway
in North America.
All railway mergers are subject to the approval of the Surface Transportation Board.
The US market for rail freight transport is now dominated by four Class I railways:
two western railways —  BNSF and UP  —  and two eastern railways  —  CSX and
Norfolk Southern.
There has also been reform of the smaller railways (Class II and Class III). The
freedom to contract with shippers to customise services and the removal ofINTERNATIONAL
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mandatory labour protection has resulted in the emergence of some small rail
operators. This is referred to as the ‘shortline revolution’. Kopicki and
Thompson (1995) suggested that the success of the small rail operators has hinged
on their ability to pay lower wages, make minimum capital investment, control
costs, utilise technology and introduce greater flexibility in work arrangements.
Access
There are a number of contractual arrangements which provide limited access to
facilities owned by other railways. Access is arranged through the use of shared
infrastructure and contractual arrangements (box  E.4). These arrangements,
however, do not introduce competition into all segments of the market and there is
growing concern about bottleneck facilities (Jahanshahi 1998).12
The Surface Transportation Board supervises access and antitrust issues. The law
requires that any access arrangements be nondiscriminatory. Where contracts have
not been upheld or the conditions (including price) are perceived to be
discriminatory they can be appealed to the Surface Transportation Board.
Amtrak owns about 20 per cent of the rail track on which it operates, particularly the
North-East corridor track between Washington DC and Boston, Massachusetts. For
the remaining 80 per cent of track, Amtrak pays access fees to operate passenger
trains over the track owned by freight companies (OECD 1998; ECMT 1996). The
original track access contracts between Amtrak and the freight railways expired in
April 1996 after 25 years. Most of these contracts were renegotiated quickly.
However, after the Surface Transportation Board was required to resolve a dispute
between Amtrak and BNSF, a 15 year agreement was signed in October 1996. Many
freight companies have commented publicly that freight and passenger services are
incompatible (Harris 1998).
Access payments are made by Amtrak in the form of performance incentive
payments. The access charge is based on an exponential formula based on avoidable
costs which comprise a cost for gross tonnage and speed, linked to incentive and
penalty payments (OECD 1998).
                                             
12 In some circumstances competing railways may serve numerous origins, but there is only one
rail track to the final destination. In this case, the single segment of rail track to the destination is
referred to as a ‘bottleneck facility’. In the United States there have been a number of disputes
between energy companies and railways transporting coal regarding the access charges for the
use of the bottleneck facilities (Jahanshahi 1998).E24 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box E.4 Contractual arrangements in the United States
The contractual arrangements used in the United States to facilitate access to privately
owned track include:
·  trackage rights  —  one railway uses the tracks of another railway and pays an
agreed charge based on tonnage or a fee for service;
·  paired  track  arrangements — where  two  railways  have  parallel  track  they  may
agree to integrate their tracks to increase operating efficiency by forming a double
track line. As the benefits are mutual no financial compensation is made;
·  joint track arrangements — the track is co-owned by two or more railways. In these
instances railways take ‘turns’ for dispatch and maintenance. Each operator is
responsible for scheduling its own trains;
·  joint subsidiaries  —  a new corporation is established to undertake track
maintenance and some operations. It is a variation on joint track arrangements;
·  joint facilities — where the railway is owned by two or more operators;
·  reciprocal operating agreements — the operator provides rollingstock and the track
owner provides other equipment necessary for the incremental rail service. The
track owner undertakes maintenance and other responsibilities are shared based
on agreements. The track owner is paid a fee;
·  reciprocal switching — a mutual exchange of wagons from one line to another;
·  detours — permits the use of tracks of another railway to avoid temporary service
disruption due to unforseen events, such as natural disasters and derailments;
·  pooling — aggregation of several rail operators to serve large industries; and
·  haulage and car-handling contracts — one rail operator hauls another rail operator’s
wagons when it is not permitted or economically justified to run a separate train.
Source: Jahanshahi 1998.
Statistics Canada (1996) suggested that Amtrak has more favourable terms and
lower access charges than VIA Rail  —  Canada’s intercity passenger service.
Harris (1998) found that the access charges paid by Amtrak are very low, only one
third of the potential access charge.AUSTRALIAN ACCESS
REGIMES
F1
F Australian access regimes
In Australia, new and existing operators can seek to gain access to rail facilities
through:
·  private access arrangements; and
·  formal mechanisms, such as:
-  provisions under the National Access Regime contained in Part IIIA of the
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cwlth) (TPA); and
-  provisions under state-based regimes.
This appendix outlines the formal mechanisms for seeking third party access to rail
services. It supports the analysis of access arrangements presented in chapter 8.
F.1 The National Access Regime
In April 1995, the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments agreed to
establish a National Competition Policy (NCP) and to work cooperatively on
competition issues within their jurisdictions. The NCP has several elements,
including legislation to amend the TPA and the Prices Surveillance Act 1983
(Cwlth), as well as Intergovernmental Agreements setting out aspects of the NCP
that could not readily be legislated.
The National Access Regime is contained in Part IIIA of the TPA. Under Part IIIA,
a party can seek to gain access to certain infrastructure services through one of three
mechanisms. They can:
·  request that the National Competition Council (NCC) recommend that the
Minister ‘declare’ access to the services of a particular infrastructure facility. If
the infrastructure facility is declared, the infrastructure operator and the third
party are required to try to negotiate mutually acceptable terms of access;
·  seek access based on the terms and conditions of a legally binding undertaking
made by the infrastructure operator and approved by the Australian Competition
and Consumer Commission (ACCC); or
·  seek access through an ‘effective’ State or Territory access regime already in
existence.F2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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The declaration and arbitration process
Under the declaration and arbitration process a party seeking access to an
infrastructure service can request that the NCC recommend that the relevant
Minister ‘declare’ access to the services of a particular infrastructure facility. Once a
service is declared, the parties are required to attempt negotiations for terms and
conditions of access. In the event that negotiations fail, the parties can seek legally
binding arbitration.
The declaration process
Any person  —  parties seeking access for themselves, an infrastructure owner or
operator or a Minister — may apply to the NCC to have an infrastructure service
declared (TPA, s. 44F(1)).
The NCC assesses the application and makes a recommendation to the relevant
Minister who then decides whether or not to declare the infrastructure services. The
decision is appealable to the Australian Competition Tribunal (the Tribunal)
(NCC 1996b).
Criteria for assessment
In making its recommendations, the NCC must be satisfied that a number of criteria
are met before recommending that a service be declared. These are that:
·  access (or increased access) to the service would promote competition in at least
one market (whether or not in Australia), other than the market for the service;
·  it would be uneconomical for anyone to develop another facility to provide the
service;
·  the facility is of national significance, having regard to:
-  the size of the facility; or
-  the importance of the facility to constitutional trade or commerce; or
-  the importance of the facility to the national economy.
·  access to the service can be provided without undue risk to human health or
safety;
·  access to the service is not already the subject of an effective access regime; and
·  access (or increased access) to the service would not be contrary to the public
interest (TPA, s. 44G(2)).AUSTRALIAN ACCESS
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The NCC must also consider ‘whether it would be economical for anyone to
develop another facility that could not provide part of the service’ (TPA, s. 44F(4)).
On receiving the NCC’s recommendation, the Minister must also consider these
matters (TPA, ss. 44H(2), 44H(4)).
There has been substantial discussion and critical analysis of these criteria both in
broad terms and in their specific application to rail (for example IC 1997b;
NCC 1997d; NCC 1997e; NCC 1997f).
The NCC has considered a number of applications for declaration of rail
infrastructure, including declaration of:
·  rail freight, track and other services in the Brisbane to Cairns rail corridor by
Carpentaria Transport (NCC 1997b);
·  rail track service provided by Rail Access Corporation (RAC) from Sydney to
Broken Hill by Specialized Container Transport (SCT) (NCC 1997e);
·  rail track service provided by RAC in the Hunter Valley by the NSW Minerals
Council (NCC 1997d); and
·  rail track service and freight support services provided by Westrail from
Kalgoorlie to Perth by SCT (NCC 1997f).
On 24 September 1998, the NCC received an application for the declaration of rail
track services provided by Hamersley Iron in the Pilbara region of Western
Australia. However, Hamersley Iron applied to the Federal Court for a ruling on
whether its railway is a service which can be considered for declaration under
Part IIIA (NCC 1998d).
On 28 June 1999, the Federal Court ruled in favour of Hamersley, finding that the
use of the private rail line used to transport iron ore from Hamersley’s Pilbara mines
to port was integral to the mine production process and therefore should be
exempted from Part IIIA of the Trade Practices Act. On 19 July 1999, the NCC and
Hope Downs Management Services (a prospective iron ore company) appealed the
decision.
The arbitration process
If a service is declared, the parties are required to negotiate terms and conditions of
access. If the parties cannot reach an agreement, they may either:
·  decide to refer the dispute to private arbitration; or
·  seek arbitration through the ACCC (NCC 1996b).F4 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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If a private arbitrator is chosen, the arbitrator hears the dispute and the parties may
then enter into a contract in accordance with the arbitrator’s decision.
In this case the parties may request that the ACCC register the resultant contract. In
deciding whether to register a contract, the ACCC must take into account the public
interest and the interests of all those with rights to use the infrastructure service
(TPA, s. 44ZW). If the ACCC decides not to register the contract, the parties may
appeal to the Tribunal within 21 days of the publication of the ACCC’s decision
(TPA, s. 44ZX).
If the arbitrated outcome is registered by the ACCC, it is enforceable in the Federal
Court as if it were an ACCC determination and cannot be enforced by any other
means (TPA, s. 44ZY). If the parties do not seek registration, the arbitrated outcome
can be enforced in accordance with usual contractual principles (NCC 1996b).
If the parties seek arbitration through the ACCC, the ACCC may terminate the
arbitration if it thinks that the dispute is trivial, the parties have not acted in good
faith or an existing arrangement should continue (TPA, s.  44Y). Otherwise the
ACCC will arbitrate the dispute and make a written determination including a
statement of reasons for it (TPA, s. 44V).
A party to an arbitration may apply to the Tribunal for a review of the ACCC’s
determination. Any application for a review must be made within 21 days of the
ACCC’s determination or decision. The review of a determination is a re-arbitration
of the dispute in which the Tribunal may affirm or vary the ACCC’s determination
(TPA, s. 44ZP).
A party to an arbitration may appeal to the Federal Court on a question of law (not
an issue of fact) concerning the Tribunal’s decision on a determination. The appeal
application must be made within 28 days of the Tribunal’s decision, unless an
extended period is allowed by the Court (TPA, s. 44ZR).
No applications for rail services have proceeded to arbitration.
Certification
The National Access Regime overrides other access regimes, including those
established by State and Territory Governments unless such regimes are ‘certified as
effective’.
A State or Territory Government can ask the NCC to recommend that the relevant
Commonwealth Minister decide that a regime for access to a service is an effective
access regime (TPA, s. 44M). If the Commonwealth Minister decides that an accessAUSTRALIAN ACCESS
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regime is effective, the terms of access will be governed exclusively by that regime
rather than the National Access Regime.
After receiving an application, the NCC recommends that the regime be either
certified or not certified. If recommending certification, it must also recommend a
period for which certification should remain in force.
In making its recommendation, the NCC must apply the relevant principles set out
in the Competition Principles Agreement (CPA), in particular:
·  the broad circumstances in which the National regime should apply to
infrastructure services rather than a State or Territory regime (CPA, Clause 6.2);
·  the type of infrastructure services for which a State or Territory access regime
can be deemed effective (CPA, Clause 6(3)); and
·  the features an access regime must exhibit to be effective (CPA, Clause 6(4)).
The NCC has proposed to avoid adopting a narrow interpretation of the relevant
provisions of the CPA and will ‘apply the principles so as to ensure that State or
Territory access regimes reflect the policy objectives underlying the CPA’
(NCC 1996b, p. 44).
The NCC has also proposed to consider the effectiveness of access regimes in the
context of the need of States and Territories to ensure the continued provision of
community service obligations. The NCC also intends to accommodate, in special
circumstances, the provision of transitional arrangements (NCC 1996b).
After receiving the NCC’s recommendation, the Commonwealth Minister must
decide whether or not to certify the regime as effective. In reaching a decision, the
Minister must consider the principles set out in the CPA. Moreover, the decision
must specify the period for which certification, if granted, will be in force
(TPA, s. 44N).
The State or Territory Minister can appeal to the Tribunal within 21 days if the
Commonwealth Minister decides not to certify the regime. The Tribunal may affirm,
vary or reverse the original decision and, once decided, the Tribunal’s decision has
the same effect as the Commonwealth Minister’s decision (TPA, s. 44O).
Decisions recognising effective access regimes will be held on a public register at
the ACCC (TPA, s. 44Q).
The NSW Government (NCC 1998a; NCC 1998b) has applied to have its rail access
regime certified. However, it has not yet been certified. The Queensland
Government applied for certification but withdrew the application in February 1999F6 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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(NCC 1998c).1 The WA Government has lodged an application for certification of
its rail access regime. The NT and SA Governments have lodged an application for
the certification of a rail access regime for the rail line between Tarcoola and Alice
Springs and the proposed rail line from Alice Springs to Darwin.
Undertakings
An infrastructure owner can avoid being open to declaration by submitting an access
undertaking to the ACCC for registration. This allows the owner to control the
manner in which access is granted over its facility.
Undertakings specify in advance precise terms and conditions of having access to a
service, including access prices (or pricing methodologies), service standards,
connection and disconnection arrangements and capacity constraints and extension
of capacity. As the needs of different users  —  and consequently the costs of
providing services to them  —  can vary, it may not be possible for the service
provider to anticipate all these needs (and costs) in advance. Consequently,
undertakings can also establish procedures and clearly defined boundaries for
negotiations (such as maximum and minimum prices).
Criteria for assessment
In assessing undertakings, the ACCC’s overriding objective is to ‘ensure that access
to facilities covered by undertakings is provided in a way that promotes competition
and economic efficiency consistent with the objectives of Part IIIA [of the TPA] and
the criteria it establishes’ (ACCC 1997a, p. 4). Division 6 of the TPA outlines a
number of criteria that the ACCC must consider in assessing undertakings.
The criteria are general in nature, focusing on the interests of the various parties as
well as the public interest. According to the ACCC, the open ended nature of the
criteria gives:
… service providers considerable scope to design and implement an undertaking
suitable to their circumstances and the needs of service users and potential service
users. Similarly, such openness gives the Commission flexibility in analysing and
assessing the undertaking and its impact on different stakeholders. (ACCC 1997a, p. 3)
However, this flexibility may create some uncertainty about the ACCC’s approach.
The ACCC has published a draft guide to access undertakings (ACCC 1997a) to
                                             
1 The Queensland Government has advised the NCC that it is committed to the certification
process and will continue to work with it on this matter.AUSTRALIAN ACCESS
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assist in clarifying the framework for interpretation and application of the s. 44ZZA
criteria.
In applying the guidelines, an important role for the ACCC will be to give
appropriate weighting to the various concerns raised by interested parties and
achieve a workable balance between the diverse interests represented by the criteria.
There have been no undertakings for rail services.
F.2 Australian Rail Track Corporation
The Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) was incorporated in February 1998,
commencing operations on 1 July 1998. It is fully owned by the Commonwealth
Government through shareholder representatives of the Commonwealth Department
of Transport and Regional Services, and the Commonwealth Department of Finance
and Administration.
Its formation was an integral part of the rail reform process and sought to establish
an organisation that could provide a ‘one stop shop’ service to rail users on the
interstate network between Perth, Alice Springs, Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney and
Brisbane. The one stop shop approach concept arises from an Intergovernmental
Agreement (IGA) between the Commonwealth and mainland States. The IGA was
adopted by the Australian Transport Council in November 1997. The IGA envisaged
that each state track authority would facilitate the one stop shop through the
exclusive provision of selling rights to ARTC and the development of common
access terms and conditions across the interstate network.
The ARTC publishes reference prices and standard terms and conditions for
obtaining access to the track which it owns or manages. It currently owns the
interstate track in South Australia, plus the extensions to Broken Hill, Alice Springs
and to Kalgoorlie, and has a lease over the interstate track in Victoria. The ARTC in
conjunction with the track owners (the NSW, Queensland and WA Governments) is
negotiating wholesale arrangements for reselling track access. A draft wholesale
agreement is close to finalisation and consultation with train operators will take
place by the end of 1999.
The ARTC is in the process of developing an industry code for interstate access that
provides a framework for considering access issues regardless of whether the ARTC
is the track owner or manager. The industry code will incorporate relevant aspects
of the wholesale arrangements.F8 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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F.3 State-based access regimes
Each jurisdiction has developed or is developing an access regime for rail. Some of
these are rail specific and others are more general, applying to major infrastructure.
New South Wales
The New South Wales (NSW) Rail Access Regime was established under s. 19B of
the Transport Administration Act 1988 (NSW) and commenced operation in August
1996.
The regime operates in conjunction with the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984
(NSW), Transport Administration Act 1988 (NSW), Rail Safety Act 1993 (NSW),
State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW) and Independent Pricing and
Regulatory Tribunal Act 1992 (NSW).
In June 1997, the NSW Government approached the NCC to consider the
effectiveness of the New South Wales Rail Access Regime in accordance with the
CPA.
The NCC made a draft recommendation outlining changes to the regime agreed by
the NSW Government and additional changes required before it could recommend it
be certified as effective.
In February 1999, the NSW Government gazetted an amended New South Wales
Rail Access Regime. In March 1999, the NCC provided a recommendation to the
Commonwealth Minister for Financial Services and Regulation and is awaiting a
decision. The Minister has requested further information from the NSW
Government.
New South Wales Rail Access Regime
The RAC is responsible for managing access to the NSW rail network.
The key features of the NSW regime are contained in provisions in the New South
Wales Rail Access Regime and include:
·  a requirement that prices for general usage be negotiated between a ‘floor’ and
‘ceiling’ (Schedule 3, (i));
·  a separate pricing regime for coal freight which operates until June 2000
(Schedule 3, (ii));AUSTRALIAN ACCESS
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·  a requirement for RAC to negotiate with an access seeker ‘in good faith’ for the
purposes of entering the agreement (s. 3.1) and in relation to new investment
(s. 3.2);
·  a requirement for RAC to provide specified information to the access seeker
(s. 8, Schedule 5);
·  a requirement that RAC must not engage in the business of rail operations ‘for
reward’ (s. 7.3);
·  a compulsory dispute resolution process with a nominated arbitrator
(Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal, IPART) (s. 6.2);
·  a requirement that the agreement not inhibit RAC or access seeker providing
information regarding access, new investment or the agreement to the arbitrator,
any relevant regulatory agency or the Minister (s. 4.6); and
·  both an operator or access purchaser (end user) has the capacity to enter into an
access agreement (s. 3.1).
Coverage
The regime applies to railway and associated infrastructure owned by or vested in
RAC so it covers all train services, both interstate and intrastate.
Operation
The RAC will only permit access to the network through an agreement, except
where required by law (s. 4.1).
Under the regime, ‘access seekers’ negotiate access with RAC.2 There is an
obligation for RAC to negotiate with an access seeker in good faith
(s. 3.1 and s. 3.6). RAC must provide information to the access seeker relevant to its
request regarding the regime including the pricing policy, the network
configuration, recurrent costs, capital costs, the cost methodology, system usage,
operational information, under-utilised capacity and information of any
determinations published by the arbitrator in relation to the regime
(s. 8.3, Schedule 5).
Section 6  establishes the arbitration processes of the regime. IPART, or an
alternative arbitrator appointed by IPART, will act as arbitrator and Part 4A of the
                                             
2 An access seeker could be a current or prospective rail operator, a current or prospective rail
purchaser (who has contracted, or can potentially contract, with a rail operator to operate/move
rollingstock) or the ARTC (Schedule 7).F10 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Independent Pricing and Regulatory Act 1992 (NSW) will govern the arbitration
(s. 6.2). IPART will also publish the determination and any information before the
arbitrator that it considers appropriate (s. 6.3 and s. 6.4).
The regime contains pricing principles for general usage and coal freight
(Schedule 3). Under these principles, access prices for general usage are negotiated
subject to a ‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’ test.
·  The floor test requires that:
-  any access revenue must at least meet the direct costs imposed by the access
seeker(s); and
-  all sectors should recover their incremental costs, including incremental fixed
costs (Schedule 3 (i)).
·  The ceiling test requires that any access revenue must not exceed the full
economic cost of the sector(s) for which access is required on a stand alone basis
(Schedule 3 (i)). It is calculated on a combinatorial basis so that no combined
group of users pays more than the relevant ceiling for that group.
In addition, RAC’s total revenue must not exceed the stand alone full economic cost
of the entire network (Schedule 3 (i)).
Access prices for coal freight are on an origin-destination basis and are subject to an
‘adjustment component’ on some sectors.
·  On those sectors where no adjustment is made, the access price is negotiated
consistent with the principles for general usage (Schedule 3 (ii)).
·  On those sectors where an adjustment is made, the access price is the ceiling
price plus an adjustment component reflecting a share of the amount that rail
freight haulage revenue exceeded costs (access and rail operations) on that line
in 1996-97. The relevant share will be reduced to 50 per cent in 1998-99 and
25 per cent in 1999-2000 (Schedule 3 (ii)).
The cost definitions and methodology for asset valuation and permitted rates of
return on assets will be published in the Gazette and by IPART (Schedule 3 (iii)).
The regime also ‘establishes “passenger priority” provisions for the use of the
network’ (sub. DR128, p. 9). These provisions ensure that passenger trains have




The access arrangements in Victoria differ depending on the network being
considered — intrastate, or interstate and urban network.
Intrastate and urban networks
The Rail Corporations (Amendment) Act 1998 (Vic) established a regime to allow
for access to certain rail (and tram) infrastructure in Victoria.
Under the regime, rail infrastructure operators (or lessees) must provide access, on
fair and reasonable terms, to ‘declared’ rail services.
The Victorian Government has sold Victoria’s rail freight operations together with a
long term lease over the non-urban intrastate track and its workshops. However,
Victorian Rail Track Access Corporation (VicTrack) will retain ownership (landlord
responsibilities) for the non-urban intrastate track and country passenger stations
(sub. 82).
The key features of the Victorian regime are contained in provisions in s. 38 of the
Act and include:
·  a requirement that users have ‘fair and reasonable’ access to declared services
(s. 38B);
·  the Minister can recommend that a rail transport service be ‘declared’ to be
subject to the regime (s. 38C);
·  a requirement for the access provider to provide specified information to the
access seeker (s. 38E);
·  a compulsory dispute resolution process with a nominated arbitrator (s. 38F);
·  a requirement that the terms and conditions not vary simply because of the
identity of the access seeker (s. 38E); and
·  a requirement that no person should be prohibited or hindered from exercising
their reasonable right to access on declared services (s. 38N).
Coverage
Under the Victorian regime, services can be ‘declared’ to be subject to the access
regime on the recommendation of the Minister. In making a recommendation, the
Minister must be satisfied that it is necessary to do so to promote competition or
increase efficiency or the level of services to the public (s. 38C).F12 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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It is intended that the Minister will declare rail freight services in October 1999 and
passenger services in January 2000.
Operation
Under the regime, an access seeker negotiates directly with an infrastructure
‘operator’ (the access provider). According to the Victorian Government, franchised
passenger rail services will have priority over freight services in obtaining access to
the rail network, unless this results in ‘serious and unreasonable’ interference in
freight business (sub. 82, p. 14).
The access provider has several obligations to meet in negotiation, including the
requirement to ‘use all endeavours to meet the requirements of a person seeking
access to declared rail transport services’. The access provider must also provide
information to the access seeker. The terms and conditions of access cannot vary
simply because of the identity of the persons seeking access (s. 38E).
If a dispute arises, the matter can be referred to the Office of the Regulator General
(ORG) (s. 38F). In its determination, the ORG may:
·  require that access to the service be granted;
·  specify the terms and conditions of access; or
·  specify the extent that the determination overrides earlier determinations on the
matter (s. 38F).
A determination by the ORG cannot be challenged, appealed against or reviewed
(s. 38Q).
Interstate network
Access to interstate rail operations in Victoria is through the ARTC which has been
granted a five year lease for the control of standard gauge track (sub. 82).
Queensland
The Queensland Competition Authority Act 1997 (QCA Act) sets out a process for
gaining access to services provided by significant infrastructure in Queensland.
The Queensland regime for access to rail services commenced operation in
March 1998. It is part of the broader access regime under the QCA Act and followedAUSTRALIAN ACCESS
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amendments to the QCA Act contained in the Queensland Competition Authority
Amendment Regulation (No. 1) 1998.
In June 1998, the Queensland Government approached the NCC to consider the
effectiveness of the Queensland rail access regime in accordance with the CPA, for
the purposes of the TPA. This application was subsequently withdrawn in
February 1999.
Framework
The  QCA Act sets out a process for gaining access to services provided by
significant infrastructure, including certain rail services. The key features include:
·  the creation of the QCA to administer the access regime established under the
QCA Act (Part 2);
·  a declaration process to determine whether services ought to be subject to the
access regime (Part 5, Divisions 2 and 3);
·  a requirement for an access provider (in this case, Queensland Rail, (QR)) to
negotiate with an access seeker and, in doing so, to satisfy the seeker’s
reasonable requirements in relation to information required for negotiation
(Part 5, Division 4);
·  ‘access undertakings’, which provide a framework setting out conditions under
which the infrastructure owner undertakes to provide access (Part 5, Division 7);
·  a compulsory dispute resolution process with a nominated arbitrator (Part 5,
Division 5); and
·  a prohibition on preventing or hindering access when an access agreement has
been reached (Part 5, Division 5).
The QCA Act allows the responsible Ministers (the Premier and the Treasurer) to
‘tailor’ the access regime by making an ‘access code’ that applies to a class of
infrastructure (Part 5, Division 6). However, according to Queensland Transport
‘there is no intention to make an access code for rail infrastructure at this point’
(sub. 75, p. 6).
Coverage
Under the Act, services can be ‘declared’ to be subject to the access regime either:
·  by the relevant Ministers (the Premier and the Treasurer) on the recommendation
of the QCA, where the Ministers must also be satisfied that certain threshold
criteria have been met (Part 5, Division 2); orF14 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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·  by regulation, without the application of threshold criteria (Part 5, Division 3).
Rail services have been ‘declared’ by regulation under the Queensland Competition
Authority Amendment Regulation (No. 1) 1998. The declared services are railway
and associated infrastructure managed by QR, or a successor or subsidiary of QR
(s.  4). The regime excludes the standard gauge interstate rail infrastructure in
Queensland (s. 2).
Operation
Part 5, Division 4 of the QCA Act provides that once a service is declared, there is
an obligation on the access provider to negotiate with an access seeker (s. 99) and,
in so doing, attempt to satisfy the access seeker’s reasonable requirements in
relation to information required for negotiation (s. 101). In addition, both parties are
obliged to negotiate in good faith (s. 101).
The QCA Act provides for the owner of a declared service to submit a draft
undertaking to the QCA for its approval. QR has submitted to the Authority an
access undertaking covering certain services relating to the use of the rail
transportation infrastructure it owns. The draft undertaking addresses the following
issues:
·  scope and administration;
·  ring-fencing guidelines;
·  negotiation framework;
·  pricing principles;
·  capacity management; and
·  interface considerations.
Box F.1 briefly outlines the matters that may be included in an undertaking.
In deciding whether to accept a draft undertaking, the QCA will consider the
legitimate business interests of the owner, the interests of persons who may seek
access and the public interest. The QCA may also consider any other matter it
desires (s. 138(2)). Before approving a draft undertaking, the QCA is required to
publish and consider submissions on it and be satisfied that the undertaking is
consistent with any access code for the service (s. 138(3)).AUSTRALIAN ACCESS
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Box F.1 Access undertakings
The content and degree of specification of undertakings will vary from service to
service. The QCA Act indicates that the type of matters to be included in an
undertaking  may include (s. 137(2)):
·  how charges for access to the service are calculated;
·  information to be provided to access seekers and to the QCA;
·  time frames for providing information in the conduct of negotiations about access to
the service;
·  how excess capacity is allocated;
·  arrangements relating to the operation of secondary markets;
·  accounting requirements for owners and users in relation to the service or parts of
the service;
·  arrangements for separating operations, including the separation of commercial
activity;
·  terms relating to extending the facility;
·  requirements for the safe operation of the facility;
·  methods for calculating charges for access to the service where users have
contributed to the  cost of establishing or maintaining the facility;
·  provisions to be included in access agreements in relation to the service; and
·  the process for the review of the undertaking.
Source: QCA Act 1997 (Qld).
The QCA commenced a formal public consultation process in April 1999 as part of
its assessment of QR’s draft undertaking. The QCA is considering submissions
received in response to the paper.
The QCA will consult on issues relevant to the development of below rail access
charges (for example, asset valuation, rate of return, contributed assets, the structure
of reference tariffs, etc.) through a series of specific papers. In addition, the QCA
has yet to receive from QR a number of documents associated with the undertaking,
including ring-fencing guidelines, scheduling and train control protocols and cost
allocation arrangements. The QCA will consult on these matters once QR provides
details of its proposed approach. These factors will affect the timing of the release
of the QCA’s Draft Determination.
Once the QCA has approved an access undertaking, the undertaking sets a
benchmark for parties in negotiations (although parties are free to depart from itsF16 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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terms if they agree to do so), because the outcome of any dispute resolution
undertaken by the Authority must be consistent with the undertaking (s. 119(1)).
Parties have an enforceable right to ensure that the QCA is independent and that it
does not exhibit bias in its process or decisions through the Judicial Review
Act 1991 (Qld). The QCA also has in place procedures to ensure procedural
fairness, so that its role as a regulator (in recommending whether a service should be
declared) does not compromise its role and independence as an arbitrator.
There are three triggers for a review of an approved undertaking. First, an
undertaking itself may define a review event. Second, an infrastructure owner is free
to request the QCA to reconsider or amend an access undertaking (s. 142). Third, a
review may be triggered by a change in a provision of the QCA Act or an access
code (given that access undertakings need to be consistent with the Act and such
codes) (s. 139). Any changes resulting from a review of an undertaking would not
affect existing access agreements.
South Australia
The access arrangements in South Australia differ depending on the network being
considered  —  intrastate (Australian Southern Railroad’s regional network) or the
interstate (ARTC network). It is intended that a separate regime may apply to the
SA/NT network (Tarcoola to Darwin).
Intrastate network
The  Railways (Operations and Access) Act 1997 (SA) (RA Act) imposes access
obligations on infrastructure owners who control the intrastate network and
includes:
·  a means of assigning the functions of the regulator (s. 9);
·  a means for the regulator to establish pricing principles for the provision of
railway services (s. 27);
·  a requirement for the access provider to provide industry participants with
information regarding the terms and conditions on which it is prepared to make
the infrastructure available to others (s. 28);
·  a requirement for the access provider to provide access seekers with information,
subject to a reasonable charge for providing such information (s. 29);
·  a dispute resolution process for seeking access based on conciliation or
arbitration (Part 6); andAUSTRALIAN ACCESS
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·  a prohibition on preventing or hindering access to railway services including
negative conduct such as a failure or refusal to act, or delay (s. 24).
Coverage
Under the RA Act, operators and railway services can be ‘declared’ to be subject to
the regime by proclamation (s.  7). Proclamation applies to certain railway
infrastructure, including yards and sidings, terminals and stations on the intrastate
network (HORSCCTMR 1998b).
Operation
Under the RA Act, ‘industry participants’ (access seekers) negotiate access directly
with the ‘operators’ of the railway service (access providers). 3
The access seeker submits a proposal to the access provider regarding the nature and
extent of the access and the proposed terms and conditions for the provision of
access (s.  31). Following this, the access provider must negotiate with the
participant in ‘good faith’ with a view to reaching agreement on whether the
requirements could reasonably be met and if so, the terms and conditions for the
provision of access (s. 32).
The access provider must also provide the access seeker with information
reasonably requested by the applicant about the extent that the infrastructure is
currently being utilised, the extent that it would be feasible to add or extend the
infrastructure to meet the access seeker’s requirements and the general terms and
conditions to provide a service of a specified description (s. 29). This information
must be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis (s. 32).
Part 6 of the Act sets out the dispute resolution procedures in instances when
agreements cannot be reached. If the regulator becomes involved, it may attempt to
settle the dispute by conciliation but if this fails the regulator must appoint an
arbitrator (s. 36). In hearing and determining a dispute, the arbitrator has a statutory
duty to act as quickly as the proper investigation of the dispute allows (s. 42) and
must take into account certain matters defined in the Act (s. 38). The Minister may
participate in the arbitration proceedings by calling for evidence and making
representations on the questions subject to the arbitration (s. 41).
                                             
3 An ‘industry participant’ is an operator, or a person who operates or proposes to operate railway
rollingstock on the railway network (s. 4). An ‘operator’ is a person who provides, or is in a
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Currently, the regulator is proclaimed to be the Executive Director of Transport
South Australia. The arbitrator must be a person who is properly qualified and
independent (s. 37).
The regulator may establish pricing principles for fixing a ‘floor’ and ‘ceiling’ price
for the provision of railway services in general or railway services of a particular
class.
·  The floor price reflects ‘the lowest price at which the operator could provide the
relevant services without incurring a loss’ (s. 27).
·  The ceiling price reflects ‘the highest price that could fairly be asked by an
operator for provision of the relevant services’ (s. 27).
The principles do not prevent the access seeker and operator reaching a negotiated
access contract on terms that do not reflect the pricing principles. However, an
arbitrated price cannot be less than the floor price and cannot exceed the ceiling
price (s. 27).
Interstate network
Access to interstate rail operations in South Australia, including the Tarcoola to
Alice Springs line is through the ARTC which owns the track.
Northern Territory/South Australia Access Regime for Rail Services
The Commonwealth Government has undertaken to transfer the Tarcoola to Alice
Springs line to the eventual developer of a new line from Alice Springs to Darwin.
The access regime will only come into place if the Alice Springs to Darwin rail line
is constructed.
In March 1999, the SA and NT Governments submitted a rail access regime for the
Tarcoola to Darwin line to the NCC for certification. The NCC has released an
issues paper and has yet to make its draft recommendation.
Coverage
The regime would establish access arrangements for rail services provided by
existing track between Tarcoola and Alice Springs and the proposed track between
Alice Springs and Darwin. It applies to railway track, stations and platforms,
signalling systems, train control and communication systems and ‘such other




The legislation  —  AustralAsia Railway (Third Party Access) Bill (SA) and
AustralAsia Railway (Third Party Access) Bill (NT)  —  supporting the regime
(including an Access Code) was introduced to the SA and NT parliaments in early
1999 and has yet to be passed. However, the access regime will only come into
effect when construction of the rail line commences.
Access to rail services will be negotiated with the track owner. The NT and SA
Governments have sought submissions from the private sector to design, construct,
finance, operate and maintain a new railway linking the existing railway between
Tarcoola and Alice Springs with the deepwater port at East Arm, Darwin.
The Access Code establishes rules governing third party access to rail infrastructure
from Tarcoola to Darwin. Part 1, Division 2 of the Code sets out the powers and
functions of the regulator. Part 2, Division 1 establishes the Access Seeker’s right to
negotiate an access with the Access Provider and Divisions 2 and 3 establish dispute
resolution procedures. Division 5 establishes the pricing principles for calculating
access charges.
The access pricing approach adopted by the Code is based on the Competitive
Imputation Pricing Rule (CIPR). CIPR access prices are market based and ‘set at a
level where the Railway owner earns the same net income from the transport of
freight on the Railway whether or not the freight is transported by the Railway
owner’ or by a third party (Northern Territory and South Australian Governments
1999, p. 11).
Western Australia
Access to Government rail infrastructure services for interstate operators has been
granted since 1997 following an amendment to the Government Railways Act 1904
(WA).
Western Australia is developing a formal regime for access to government railways
through the Government Railways (Access) Act 1998 (WA) and subsidiary
legislation in the form of a Code. The Act was assented on 30 November 1998 but is
not yet proclaimed.
The regime does not cover the private iron ore railways in the Pilbara area. The
companies involved (Hamersley Iron, BHP Iron Ore and Robe River Mining
Company) are subject to individual agreements with the WA Government.F20 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Western Australia has submitted the regime to the NCC for certification as an
effective regime. The NCC is assessing the submission.
Government railways
The Government Railways (Access) Act 1998 (WA) imposes access obligations on
the infrastructure owner of the intrastate network. The key features of the Act
include:
·  provisions for the establishment of a Rail Access Code to govern the use of
Government railways by persons other than the Western Australian Government
Railways Commission (Westrail) (Part 2);
·  provisions designating a regulator with monitoring and enforcing functions
relating to the implementation of the code (Part 3);
·  provisions specifying the kind of administrative arrangements (ring-fencing) that
Westrail is to have in place for the purposes of implementation (Part 4); and
·  amending the National Rail Corporation Agreement Act 1992 to enable National
Rail Corporation to compete for intrastate services on equal footing with other
operators (Part 6).
The Act was based on Westrail continuing as a government-owned integrated rail
service. Amendments will be made to take account of the sale of the Westrail freight
business.
Coverage
The Government Railways Access Code 1999 establishes which parts of the railway
network (track and associated infrastructure) are available for access. In the code
submitted to the NCC for approval all operating lines in the Westrail network have
been included.
Operation
Under the regime, the Government Railways Rail Access Code will:
·  establish the railway network and infrastructure opened to access;
·  outline the negotiation process, including avenues for dispute resolution;
·  specify the matters to be considered in access agreements;
·  identify the information requirements of the Regulator; andAUSTRALIAN ACCESS
REGIMES
F21
·  outline the pricing principles to be applied (sub. 60).4
The Director General of Transport is the regulator of the regime (s. 14).
Tasmania
A rail specific access regime does not exist in Tasmania. However, Tasrail (the
infrastructure owner) is required to enter into negotiations with other operators
wishing to use its infrastructure through obligations contained in its contract of sale.
The Tasmanian Government suggested that:
… access arrangements between Tasrail and a number of State operators have been
negotiated successfully and on terms agreeable to both parties. Anecdotal evidence
from tourist and heritage rail suggests that set costs and conditions of access have been
established … (Tasmanian Government, sub. 81, p. 1).
                                             





G Safety regulation and operating
procedures and standards
This appendix outlines progress in regulatory reform in Australia and examines
safety regulation and operating procedures and standards in other countries. It also
describes the features of best practice regulation.
G.1 Key reforms in Australia
Since the Industry Commission’s 1991 inquiry, the Commonwealth, State and
Territory Governments, and industry have undertaken several joint initiatives to
improve rail safety regulations, and operating standards and procedures.1 These are
summarised in appendix D and elaborated on below.
The first major step occurred in 1993 when the Australian Transport Council
(ATC), comprising Commonwealth, State and Territory Ministers, endorsed a
report, A National Approach to Rail Safety Regulation (ATC 1993).2 The report
concluded that consistent rail safety regulation was required, particularly for
interstate operations. It recommended that Ministers agree, among other things:
·  that an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) be developed to achieve consistent
national rail safety regulation and be based on agreed aims and principles;
·  that the agreement focus on efficient and safe interstate operations, but also
provide a framework for intrastate rail safety regulation;
·  that the Railways of Australia, which was in the process of developing rail
standards covering technical, maintenance and operational issues, be given the
opportunity to play a key role in the proposed national arrangements;3 and
                                             
1 The Northern Territory, but not the ACT has been involved in progressing reform in this area.
2 The report was prepared by an ATC working group of Commonwealth, State and industry
representatives.
3 The Railways of Australia comprised all state rail authorities, but excluded National Rail
Corporation and private owners. In 1994 it was changed and broadened to become the
Australasian Railway Association which is the peak industry body with broad representation in
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·  that a national approach to rail safety could include features present in the NSW
Rail Safety Bill, including separation of regulator and operator, accreditation as
distinct from prescriptive regulation, and onus on the operator for safety
(ATC 1993).
The report also set out a timetable and process for achieving the proposed IGA,
scheduling the Ministers’ approval for around April 1995. The recommendations
were endorsed by Ministers.
Adhering to the recommended process, a Commonwealth/State task group was
formed to develop the draft IGA. A government/industry taskforce was also
established from which a committee was formed to continue developing, in
conjunction with Standards Australia, various rail standards to form parts of the
Australian Standard on Railway Safety Management (AS 4292).
The IGA was signed in July 1996 (approximately one year after the scheduled time)
by Commonwealth, State and Northern Territory Ministers.  The IGA contained
several principles:
… the Commonwealth, the States and the Territories of Australia have agreed to
establish a cost effective nationally consistent approach to rail safety which ensures
there is no barrier to the entry of third party operators, based on:
·  safety accreditation of railway owners and operators;
·  mutual recognition of accreditation between accreditation authorities;
·  development and implementation of performance based standards;
·  greater accountability and transparency; [and]
·  facilitating competition and technical and commercial innovation consistent with
safe practice. (IGA 1996, p. 1)
In particular, the Agreement set out guidelines for the establishment of a safety
accreditation system for interstate operations and noted that provision for
accreditation would be made under existing or future legislation. This included the
requirement for the Australian Standard (although not complete) to form a basis for
accreditation.
The next significant initiative took place in September 1997 when Commonwealth
and State Ministers signed the Heads of Agreement on Interstate Rail Reform (the
National Rail Summit).4 Among other things, the parties agreed that there was an
urgent need to reform interstate rail. One of the means of achieving reform was to
investigate the ‘organisational arrangements required to achieve these objectives and
                                             




harmonisation  of  technical  standards’  (Heads of Agreement 1997, p. 2).  Ministers
agreed to develop a process to speed up the harmonisation of standards and to
commission a report on safety and operating standards  —  the Maunsell report
(ATC 1997).
By the end of 1997 the issues had been prioritised and the principles for reform
agreed on. The Standing Committee on Transport (SCOT), as the main advisory
body to the ATC, established a Rail Group to facilitate rail reform and advance
uniformity of regulations and operating procedures and standards. The SCOT Rail
Group, in turn, established a number of specific Task Groups to address the rail
reform tasks nominated by Ministers at the National Rail Summit. States and
Territories were in the process of implementing the IGA — various jurisdictions
were amending rail safety legislation to incorporate safety accreditation and mutual
recognition, and one body had been nominated as the safety regulator by each
jurisdiction.
The Maunsell report provided a detailed assessment of the safety and operational
issues that needed to be addressed and implementation options. It was endorsed by
Ministers at the ATC meeting in April 1998 (box G.1).
The SCOT Rail Group established a number of Working Groups to address the
priority action tasks identified in the Maunsell report. The Rail Safety Committee of
Australia (RSCA), chaired by the Commonwealth and comprising State and
Territory accreditation authorities and industry representatives, was formed in 1998
specifically to address safety issues.
An Industry Reference Group (IRG), comprising representatives nominated by the
Australasian Railway Association, was established to develop nationally consistent
standards and operational requirements. One of the IRG’s tasks was to develop
codes of practice to facilitate more efficient interstate train operations.
Both the IRG and RSCA report progress directly to the SCOT Rail Group on a
regular basis. However the industry, rather than the SCOT Rail Group, will endorse
the IRG’s work on the codes of practice. Both of these groups developed action
plans, including specific tasks and timelines to address the relevant priority action
tasks identified in the Maunsell report (RSCA 1998; IRG 1999). The RSCA intends
to finalise its work by August 1999 and implementation of the IRG’s major task, the
codes of practice, is still some time away.G4 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box G.1 The Maunsell report
Nine key issues were identified in the Maunsell report as requiring action: safeworking,
crew management and training; communication requirements; management
information systems; train operating standards; axle load requirements; rollingstock
design specification; rollingstock gauge; safety accreditation; and access
arrangements. For each of these issues the report examined existing standards and
procedures, planned changes, industry perceptions, and recommended priority action
for improvement and implementation options.
Key themes which emerged in the report included:
·  leadership is needed to drive the reform process;
·  improvements in interstate operations should be consistent with intrastate
operations;
·  although uniformity is not essential in every area, it is essential at the interface
between rollingstock and infrastructure, and between operating personnel on trains
and personnel controlling the infrastructure;
·  standards that affect safety should be set on a national basis in consultation with
intrastate interests;
·  mechanisms are required for the enforcement of uniform standards;
·  commitment is needed by both industry and government to implement priority
actions; and
·  the accreditation process should be streamlined by simplifying the application
processes, reducing overly prescriptive accreditation requirements, reducing the
time required to gain accreditation, eliminating duplication and standardising
reporting requirements.
Source: Maunsell 1998.
In April 1999, the ATC agreed to SCOT establishing an independent review of
safety arrangements and the development of a framework for an IGA which would
include the establishment of a national non-statutory unit attached to the
Commonwealth Department of Transport and Regional Services to facilitate and
coordinate implementation of uniform operational requirements (ATC 1999).
States and Territories
This section provides more detail on various regulatory changes undertaken by the
States and Territories since 1991. Jurisdictions provided the following information





A review of the Rail Safety Act 1993 (NSW) commenced in mid 1998. Industry
consultation is being finalised and submission of legislation to Parliament is
anticipated in September 1999. Rewriting of the Act is expected to be
comprehensive, addressing issues such as mutual recognition.
In late 1998 and early 1999 the NSW Department of Transport held discussions with
the government-owned railways on managing interfaces between infrastructure
owners, rail operators and contractors. Full accreditation for NSW government-
owned railways is expected to be granted in 1999, embodying the agreed interface
requirements (NSW Department of Transport, pers. comm., 3 March 1999).
The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal released its report on rail safety
accreditation costs in March 1999. The recommendations will feed into the review
of the Act.
Victoria
The Public Transport Corporation Rule Book was implemented in 1994 and safety
accreditation required by law from November 1998 (Department of Infrastructure,
Victoria, pers. comm., 1 February 1999).
Queensland
The  Transport Infrastructure Act 1994 (Qld) was amended in 1995, in part to
provide a framework for access by other railway operators to the rail system, to
introduce a rail safety accreditation system and to provide generic rail legislation
(Queensland Department of Transport, pers. comm., 2 November 1998).
South Australia
The Rail Safety Act came into effect in 1998, establishing a safety regulatory regime
for all rail owners and operators in South Australia, and a coregulatory accreditation
scheme.
Apart from this, and the establishment of the Operations and Access Act, the SA
Government has not had direct involvement in non-urban rail since the sale of the
South Australian Railways to the Commonwealth in 1975 (Department of Transport,
Urban Planning and the Arts, South Australia, pers. comm., 19 February 1999).G6 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
Western Australia
The Rail Safety Act 1998 (WA), which has recently been proclaimed, establishes the
WA Department of Transport (Rail Safety Unit) as the independent regulator of rail
safety in Western Australia. Legislation is based on the coregulation model and is
consistent with the IGA on rail safety. Features include: mutual recognition; AS
4292 as the applicable rail standard; powers to conduct independent investigations;
and administrative procedures consistent with national procedures (Westrail, pers.
comm., 15 December 1998).
Tasmania
The Rail Safety Act 1997 (Tas) is to be proclaimed in 1999. The Act mirrors the SA
and WA rail safety acts and prescribes AS 4292 through legislation. It also allows
for the establishment of an Accreditation Authority, which will be able to grant
mutual recognition, and a rail safety accreditation system (Department of Transport,
Tasmania, pers. comm., 17 November 1998, 29 July 1999).
Northern Territory
The NT (Self Government) Regulations were amended by the Commonwealth
Government as from 1 September 1998 to include rail safety specifically.
The Rail Safety Act 1998 (NT), gazetted in February 1999, provides the legislative
basis for the administration of rail safety in the Territory (Department of Transport
and Public Works, Northern Territory, pers. comm., 30  October  1998, 3 August
1999).
G.2 Safety regulation and operating procedures and
standards in other countries
It is useful to examine how other countries are progressing the issue of inconsistent
safety regulation and operating procedures and standards where trains traverse
country borders and State or Provincial borders. Different approaches to regulatory





Inconsistent rail safety regulation and operating procedures and standards exist
within the European Union (EU) and between the EU and countries in eastern
Europe. Inconsistencies cover similar technical areas to those in Australia, and
include signalling and communication systems.
The EU recognised that inconsistencies adversely affect the efficient inter-country
operation of freight and passenger operations, thereby restricting trade.
The issue is being addressed by governments, through forums such as the European
Conference of Ministers of Transport, and by industry, through organisations such
as the International Union of Railways (UIC). The EU (1996) issued a Directive
(96/48/EC), outlining technical specifications, systems verification and other
matters, for greater consistency for high speed rail but has not yet issued a formal
plan for freight. One of the first steps in the process towards greater consistency was
the release of a report on the integration of conventional rail systems in 1998
(EC 1998a) (box G.2).
Industry is cooperating with several other agencies, including governments, to
progress consistency. For example, the UIC is, or has been, involved in developing:
·  technical standards for systems required by the EU Directive on interoperability
of the trans-European high speed rail system (96/48/EC);
·  a common rail traffic management and control system for commissioning in
2000;
·  a common radio control system (30 rail organisations have signed a
memorandum of understanding with the UIC on its application); and
·  a ‘UIC Code’ comprising more than 500 technical leaflets on rail operations as a
basis for consistency between countries (UIC 1997; UIC 1998).
While some progress has been made, it is likely to be some time before the issue of
consistency is satisfactorily resolved as agreement to change must be reached and
regulatory initiatives then implemented across Europe.G8 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Box G.2 Report on the integration of national railways in Europe
A report, prepared by Symonds Travers Morgan for the European Commission
(EC  1998a) addressed international freight and passenger services. It noted
inconsistencies in operating procedures and standards in Europe which are
substantially more complex than in Australia. Some of the latest locomotives are fitted
with six signalling systems and four electrification systems. Track gauge, axle load,
signalling and communication systems, electrification and electromagnetic
compatibility all vary widely across Europe. However, signalling was considered to be
the greatest technical barrier to international rail operations. Language was considered
to be the major social barrier.
The report concluded, among other things, that:
·  there have been improvements in reducing international inconsistencies, but this
has been for high speed passenger services rather than for freight;
·  operators providing international services require clarity in respect of operating,
safety and training standards, and certification (among other things). This is often
not the case at present;
·  there should be a long term vision for Europe’s railways focusing on track
geometry, signalling, electrification, electrical and mechanical systems, and axle
loads and permitted configurations;
·  a strategy should be developed for achieving harmonisation with medium term
goals (5  to  10 years). Harmonisation across all areas is very long term (up to
40 years). This is because it is more cost effective to move towards harmonisation
as the relevant parts become due for renewal;
·  there are many bodies working on these issues, with a consequent lack of
coordination. The establishment of one body should be considered; and




Rail safety in Canada is regulated nationally by the Railway Safety Directorate in
Transport Canada. It regulates the federal mainline companies, Canadian National
and Canadian Pacific, and international carriers. It does not regulate the provincial
rail companies, such as British Columbia Rail, or shortline companies, such as




Federal and provincial safety regulations are often inconsistent. This is a problem
for several reasons:
·  there has been an increase in the number of new, less experienced provincial
shortline rail operators;
·  provincial operators provide feeder services to federal mainline operators;
·  operators on the federally regulated track occasionally traverse provincial
regulated track and vice versa; and
·  federal rail safety inspectors are contracted to undertake inspection services in a
number of provinces.
Inconsistent safety regulation has been an issue in Canada for some years. In 1989 a
key piece of federal legislation, the Rail Safety Act 1989 (Canada), came into effect
with the purpose of ensuring the safe operation of railways. It established a new
regulatory regime founded on the principle that:
Railway management must be responsible and accountable for the safety of operations
and that the regulator must have the power to protect public and employee safety.
(Transport Canada 1998, p. 6)
A federal-provincial Working Group on Railway Safety Regulation was formed in
1994 to provide a forum for harmonisation of regulations between federal and state
jurisdictions (Churcher 1995). It suggested various techniques by which provincial
jurisdictions could adopt federal regulation, such as incorporation by reference and
interdelegation by agreement.5 An example of progress in this area is an
interdelegation agreement between the federal authorities and the Province of
Ontario to apply the safety regulation of the Act to the province’s shortline railways.
This working group continues to progress harmonisation, focusing on proposed
amendments to the Act and information exchange on various provincial initiatives.
A review of the Act in 1994 noted that:
·  ‘a consistent and national scheme is clearly needed both to ensure safety and to
provide a framework in which this segment of the industry may flourish’;
·  the regulatory system should be changed to one that is non-prescriptive and
industry-driven and out-of-date regulations should be eliminated;
·  flexibility should be encouraged; and
                                             
5 Interdelegation by agreement refers to a government entering into agreement with another
jurisdiction whereby the later jurisdiction ‘would perform all tasks relating to rule making,
monitoring for compliance and enforcement on behalf of the original’ (Churcher 1995, p. 4).G10 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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·  the federal government should show leadership by clarifying roles of various
parties (Railway Safety Act Review Committee 1994).
However, the recommendations were never incorporated into the Act because
Parliament was dissolved prior to an election in 1997. Another review of the Act in
1998 covered similar ground. This review stressed the need for regulatory change,
modernising the regulatory regime and review of the federal regulator’s capabilities.
Recommendations included:
·  in developing regulation, performance oriented requirements should be used and
the principles of Federal Regulatory Policy (similar to the Council of Australian
Governments principles of best practice regulation) be adhered to;
·  there should be clarification of roles and responsibilities of regulators, railways
and other stakeholders; and
·  railways should be required to implement a safety management system, with
detailed requirements to be developed by Transport Canada in consultation with
the railways so that the system is tailored to different operations
(Transport Canada 1998).
The United States
In the United States inconsistent regulation does not appear to be as significant an
issue as it is in Europe or Canada.
Inconsistencies in operating procedures and standards developed between private
rail operators rather than between government-owned railways. Most Class I
railways use one of two standard operating ‘rulebooks’. These are also used by
several shortline railways. Some railways have their own rulebooks.
Rail safety is regulated nationally by the Federal Railway Administration in the US
Department of Transportation. Over the years there has been an effort by railways to
remove inconsistencies between rulebooks in order to improve efficiency and safety.
Although most Class I railways have revised their rulebooks to reduce
inconsistencies, some remain (Federal Railroad Administration, United States, pers.
comm., 16 January 1999).
G.3 Best practice regulation
In 1995 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) endorsed the principles of
best practice regulation, to be applied to making new regulations and reviewing




Box G.3 Features of best practice regulation
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) noted that best practice regulation
should incorporate the following principles:
·  minimising the impact of regulation (regulatory measures should be the minimum
required to achieve the desired outcomes);
·  minimising the impact on competition (regulation should avoid imposing barriers to
entry, exit or innovation);
·  regular review of regulation; and
·  flexibility.
In applying these principles, best practice regulation should take account of several
practical objectives including: minimising regulatory burden on the community;
minimising the financial impact of administration and enforcement; accountability;
compliance strategies and enforcement; performance-based regulations; and public
consultation (COAG 1997).
Best practice regulation also includes a Regulatory Impact Statement (RIS) which
should be undertaken for all proposed regulation. A RIS should assess many of the
features of best practice regulation noted above and should include among other
things:
·  the key problem to be resolved;
·  the objectives;
·  options to achieving the desired objectives (both regulatory and non-regulatory) for
example, standards and codes (voluntary or mandatory, prescriptive or
performance-based), or self regulation;
·  an assessment of the impact (benefits and costs) on consumers, business,
government and the community of each option;
·  a consultation statement;
·  a recommended option; and
·  an implementation strategy.





H The network manager and investment
in the interstate track
Central to this inquiry is the issue of investment in the rail network. As noted in this
report, existing institutional arrangements have failed to secure adequate investment
in some parts of the rail network. In the case of the interstate track, the Commission
has proposed a mechanism that would take into account (or internalise) network
effects and facilitate appropriate investment in the system on a timely and self-
financing basis (chapter 10).
This appendix outlines — at a conceptual level — how investment would occur in
the interstate network under the single network manager model. Determining the
full detail of the manager’s responsibilities and functions would require further
development.
Under this approach, a network manager would be established to manage the
operation of the interstate track on behalf of both train operators and track owners.
To prevent conflicts of interest, the manager would not be permitted to own (or
lease) any track or rollingstock. A formal code of conduct would be developed,
setting out the manager’s functions. This code would need to be approved by the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. It is envisaged that, among its
key responsibilities, the manager would:
·  administer pricing and allocation of train schedules; and
·  facilitate planning and investment in the network.
There is an important interdependency between these functions — information
derived from the process of schedule allocation can be used to signal when and
where investment in the network is warranted.
Where train schedules are allocated by auctioning or other market trading methods
(as suggested in chapter 8), prices reflect the value that bidders place on their use of
the track. The prices bid for a given capacity are a direct measure of the strength of
user demand. For instance, where there is excess demand for schedules, auctioning
would result in rising prices. As prices surpass costs so that higher profits are being
earned, this acts as a trigger for further investment.H2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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An important role of the network manager would be to disseminate the price data
generated by auctioning as well as other planning information. These data would
assist potential investors — be they existing track owners or other parties — in
identifying profitable investment opportunities. The onus is on potential investors to
assess the viability of projects and bear the risks if the projects are undertaken. The
network manager does not bear any investment risks and would not be held liable
for the use of its planning information in project evaluations.
Once proponents are satisfied that a project is viable, they would prepare investment
plans for the purpose of public consultation — a process that could be coordinated
by the network manager. Following this process and providing that any major
concerns are addressed, the investment would then proceed.
To facilitate commercial investment, the code of conduct for the manager would
need to allow for different pricing and allocation arrangements depending on the
extent to which new investment is expected to meet or exceed user demand.
·  For projects aimed at addressing congestion problems, it may be possible for
investment to be undertaken up to a point where some demand pressures remain.
Although congestion would be eliminated (as auctioning ‘clears’ the market),
excess demand still persists owing to the targeted level of investment. Because
the access prices obtained from auctioning reflect an ‘excess demand’
component, they are still likely to generate a reasonable rate of return for the
investor.
·  As some infrastructure is large and indivisible, investment in such assets may
eliminate congestion and extinguish excess demand. Where there is significant
spare capacity, the use of auctioning would be likely to result in prices falling
below the cost of provision and investors incurring losses (at least in the short
term). In such cases, it may be appropriate to introduce posted prices which are
set in relation to average costs incorporating a return on capital. Over time, as
demand grows and spare capacity is taken up, auctioning could then be re-
introduced.
In sum, flexible pricing arrangements would facilitate investment by taking into
account the characteristics of infrastructure assets. In both cases, the methods for
determining access prices provide scope for a normal rate of return to be earned.
Importantly, these arrangements do not necessarily guarantee revenue streams or




I The purchaser-provider framework
This appendix describes the purchaser-provider approach to the provision of
subsidised transport services. Issues associated with the provision of such services
are discussed in chapter 11.
I.1 The framework
The purchaser-provider framework separates the responsibility for deciding which
goods and services are provided to the community from the responsibility for
delivering the services.1 The framework can improve accountability, transparency
and efficiency (box I.1).
Box I.1 Purchaser-provider framework
The purchaser-provider framework aims to clarify a government’s role as purchaser.
When applied effectively, the framework yields the following benefits:
·  improved accountability — by providing a clear delineation of responsibilities and
through the use of performance monitoring;
·  transparency — with the introduction of formal contracts between the government
and its providers, potentially the community can have access to improved
information on the cost and quality requirements of the services purchased;
·  resource allocation  —  purchasers have greater freedom and incentives to
determine those goods and services that most effectively and efficiently promote
the government’s stated objectives; and
·  efficiency — the provider is given greater freedom and incentives to seek new ways
of delivering a service, resulting in more output for a given level of resources, or
reduced unit costs for a given output.
                                             
1 Variations of the purchaser-provider framework include output-based management and
managing for outcomes. A general discussion of output-based management can be found in
Abrams, Cribbett and Gunasekera (1998).I2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Who should be the purchaser?
An appropriate government purchaser is one which has no conflict of interest in
determining the most cost effective way to achieve stated objectives. As argued by
the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal:
The best value for the CSO [community service obligation] dollar is most likely to be
established by negotiation between the transport agency and a CSO purchasing agency
which has no interest other than to achieve the best value for money for the CSO
dollar — a purchaser-provider model. (IPART 1996, p. 21)
Appropriate purchasers are likely to be those agencies with the greatest knowledge
of the needs of end users. For example, concessions for school children could be
administered by an education department. This does not preclude the purchasing
agency seeking assistance from other organisations (such as a department of
transport) in the planning, specification and purchase of required services.
Purchasers should not be the provider of any potential goods and services, own
assets used in production or be responsible for any debt liability (including deficit
funding) of providers.
The performance of the purchaser should be assessed in regard to the
appropriateness of the goods and services purchased (whether they are the most cost
effective means of promoting the government’s stated objectives).
I.2 Stages of the purchaser-provider framework
In the context of subsidised rail services, the Commission has identified five stages
in the implementation of the purchaser-provider framework:
·  the specification of policy objectives;
·  the specification of rail services required to promote the stated objectives;
·  the determination of the level and form of subsidy;
·  the delivery of specified services; and
·  the costing of rail services.
The five stages of the framework are presented in figure I.1, including the party
responsible for implementing each stage (government, purchasing agency or
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Specification of policy objectives
The first step in the purchaser-provider framework involves the government clearly
specifying its objectives to the purchasing agency. Table I.1, reproduced from the
Australian Urban and Regional Development Review (AURDR 1995) provides a
list of suggested transport-related policy objectives.
To give substance to policy objectives, performance indicators (preferably
quantitative) need to be developed. As argued by Australian Urban and Regional
Development Review:
… setting objectives and developing policies and programs is an inadequate response
without a method of monitoring their various (and perhaps unintended) outcomes.
(AURDR 1995, p. 24)
Making stated objectives and performance indicators available for public scrutiny
can strengthen the accountability of both the government and purchasing agency.I4 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
Table I.1 Transport policy objectives
Policy area Specific objectives
Environmental and
urban amenity quality
Increase air quality and reduce emissions
Reduce traffic noise and impact
Improve safety and reduce accidents, injuries and deaths
Reduce transport energy and consumption
Reduce CO2 emissions
Improve visual, aesthetic and other aspects of urban amenity
Reduce air pollution costs associated with congestion
Accessibility Improve accessibility to work (people with cars)
Improve accessibility to work (people without cars)
Improve accessibility to other activities (people with cars)
Improve accessibility to other activities (people without cars)
Economic efficiency Reduce costs for urban freight and commercial traffic, including costs of
congestion
Reduce travelling times and costs for work trips
Reduce travelling times for non-work trips
Reduce capital and other subsidies for providing transport except where
these form part of a wider pricing policy
Increase opportunities for economic integration
Source: AURDR 1995.
Specification of services
Once the government has specified its objectives, it is then the role of the
purchasing agency to assess and choose the most cost effective and efficient
services to achieve these objectives. It is here that the purchasing agency makes the
allocative decision on the level, quality and choice of transport services to be
subsidised.
Railways are only one transport mode that can be subsidised to promote non-
commercial objectives. In addition, there may be alternatives to subsidising
transport, such as parking restrictions, road pricing and car emission standards. As
noted by the National Capital Planning Authority:
Evidence from overseas suggests that there are four components of a balanced urban
transport strategy: appropriate investment in public transport ‘hardware’, investment in
complementary ‘software’ such as passenger information systems and training; the
application of appropriate transport policies such as restrictions on parking, use of toll
roads and traffic demand measures; and the use of complementary land use policies
such as urban consolidation and the focussing of development on centres with good
public transport links. (NCPA 1993, p. 2)
Techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, when applied in a consistent and rigorous




and services to provide to the community. Public consultation and disclosure of any
such analysis can strengthen the purchaser’s accountability to the government and
wider community.
Level and form of subsidy
Once the purchaser has specified those transport services to be subsidised, it is then
necessary to decide the contribution users make to the cost of provision (within
budget constraints determined by government).
Subsidies for public transport are commonly provided as general subsidies for all
users with additional concessions for targeted groups. Subsidies for freight are
usually directed to the transport of specific commodities as well as payments for the
maintenance of unprofitable branch lines.
Rail subsidies directly affect the price paid by users. To estimate the appropriate
level of subsidy, the purchaser should determine first the level of output (such as
passenger numbers or freight levels) required from the railway. The role of the
subsidy is then to ‘bridge the gap’ between what users are willing to pay at the level
of output chosen by the purchaser and the cost of providing the service.
The level of the subsidy required to induce sufficient passengers or freight to use
rail depends on the price elasticity of demand and this needs to be taken into account
by the purchaser.
The Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal commissioned the University of
Sydney’s Institute of Transport Studies to conduct a survey within the Sydney
region to estimate the sensitivity of travel choice to fare changes (IPART 1996). The
study indicated that demand for urban passenger rail services is quite inelastic with
respect to price (table I.2). For example, a 1 per cent increase (decrease) in the price
of a weekly train ticket would lead to a reduction (increase) in the purchase of this
ticket of 0.25 per cent.






Train travel pass -0.53
Source: IPART 1996.I6 PROGRESS IN RAIL
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Service delivery
Purchasers should seek to obtain specified services at least cost to taxpayers. For
railways, this objective can be promoted primarily through ‘competition for the
market’ (chapters 6 and 11).
Once a suitable provider has been selected, it is up to the provider to meet its
obligations under the contract. The purchasing agency is responsible for ensuring
that an adequate quality assurance system is in place to enable the contractor to meet
these obligations. Discussion on quality assurance and performance monitoring can
be found in the Industry Commission’s (IC 1996) report, Competitive Tendering and
Contracting by Public Sector Agencies, and is not repeated in this appendix.
Costing of rail services
An accurate costing of subsidised rail services involves an economic costing of each
service, based on the opportunity cost of all of the resources used in delivery. This
provides a basis for making valid comparisons between the cost of providing
different transport services (such as buses, taxis, trams and trains) within and across
jurisdictions.
Economic costing covers all variable operating costs, such as labour and fuel, plus a
rental charge based on an appropriate rate of return on the assets used. The
difference between the economic cost of the service and the payments made by
users accurately represents the subsidy by the community in providing non-
commercial transport services.
Government funded assets
In the case of railways, the government often provides the funding to purchase the
assets used in production (through either government equity or borrowings). For
example, the NSW Government provided $350 million in capital grants to the State
Rail Authority of New South Wales in 1997-98 (chapter 11). In most instances, as is
the case in New South Wales, governments choose not to recoup a return on the
capital invested. However, the opportunity cost of the assets still exists; the
government (and ultimately taxpayers) incur this cost.
It is therefore important that the opportunity cost of assets funded by the
government is added to negotiated subsidy payments to providers when presenting
information on the cost of providing non-commercial transport services.THE RAILWAY
WORKFORCE
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J The railway workforce
This appendix provides a statistical overview of Australia’s railway workforce,
covering employment levels and workforce characteristics. Issues regarding
employment in railways are discussed in chapter 11.
J.1 Employment
Railway employment data were obtained from the Steering Committee on National
Performance Monitoring of Government Trading Enterprises (SCNPMGTE) (1998)
Performance Indicators and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) Labour
Force Survey. Both of these sources have limitations and care needs to be exercised
in interpreting the data.
SCNPMGTE employment data are collected on a full-time equivalent basis for
monitored government rail authorities. These data underestimate the absolute level
of employment because private sector employment in railways is not included —
only government rail authorities are monitored by SCNPMGTE. The data are also
likely to overestimate the rate of decrease in employment because of the transfer of
functions and contracting out of activities that has occurred within government rail
authorities.
The ABS Labour Force Survey follows the Australian and New Zealand Standard
Industrial Classification (ANZSIC). Data are collected on the number of full-time
and part-time employees. ANZSIC defines employment in the rail industry
(class 6200) as ‘units mainly engaged in operating railways (except tramways) for
the transportation of freight or passengers, in operating railway terminal or depot
facilities for receiving, dispatching or transferring rail freight or cargo, or in
providing services allied to transport n.e.c. [not elsewhere classified]’
(ABS 1993a, p. 178).
The ANZSIC classification for rail transport (equivalent to its former Australian
Standard Industrial Classification) is also likely to understate the level of
employment in the rail industry. Class 6200 excludes persons mainly engaged in the
maintenance of rollingstock and locomotives and the construction and maintenance
of track and associated infrastructure.J2 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
There is greater variability in the ABS estimates compared to those of SCNPMGTE.
This variability can in part be explained by the fact that the ABS Labour Force
Survey is based on a sample of 0.5 per cent of households and is therefore subject to
sampling error.
Employment outside capital cities
The ABS Labour Force Survey indicates that railway employment outside
Australia’s capital cities has fallen more rapidly than within capital cities. The
largest absolute reductions in employment outside capital cities between 1986 and
1998 occurred in New South Wales and Queensland — 9600 and 12 000 workers
respectively (figure J.1). However, reductions in employment were also recorded in
Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania (figure J.2).
Figure J.1 Non-metropolitan full-time railway employment, New South
































Source: ABS (Labour Force, Australia, Cat. no. 6203.0, unpublished, various years).THE RAILWAY
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Figure J.2 Non-metropolitan full-time railway employment, Victoria,

































Source: ABS (Labour Force, Australia, Cat. no. 6203.0, unpublished, various years).
J.2 Workforce characteristics
A railway employee is likely to be:
·  an older male;
·  less ‘mobile’ than workers in other industries; and
·  a member of a trade union.
Age and gender
Railway employees on average tend to be older compared to those in the ‘all
industries’ category. In 1998, over 65 per cent of railway employees were greater
than 35 years of age compared to around 55 per cent for ‘all industries’ (figure J.3).
Conversely, only 6  per  cent of railway employees are aged less than 24 years
compared to 19 per cent for ‘all industries’.
Railway workers are predominantly male. Over 90 per cent of railway workers are
male compared to around 56  per  cent for employees across ‘all industries’
(ABS 1998b).J4 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM


































Source: ABS (Labour Force, Australia, Cat. no. 6203.0, unpublished, various years).
Educational attainment
In 1998, just under one half of railway employees had completed the highest level of
secondary school. Around one third of railway employees had also completed post-
school qualifications  —  with around two thirds of these employees undertaking
some form of basic or skilled vocational training. The remaining third had
undertaken some form of diploma or degree (ABS 1998f).
Labour mobility
Labour mobility data provide information on the extent to which railway workers
are able to adapt to structural change. The more ‘mobile’ a railway worker is, the
more readily adaptable a worker may be to moving to either a new employer (either
within or outside the rail industry) or changing the location of employment.
Employees in the rail industry appear to be less ‘mobile’ than the average for ‘all
industries’. In the twelve months to February 1998, 4  per  cent of all persons
employed in the rail industry changed their employer/business and/or location of
employment compared with around 14 per cent for ‘all industries’ (table J.1).THE RAILWAY
WORKFORCE
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Table J.1 Persons who changed employer/business or locality in
previous twelve months, February 1998
Whether changed employer/business or location Rail All industries a
%%
Changed employer/business only 2 10
Changed employer/business and location 1 1
Changed location only 1 3
Did not change employer/business or location 96 87
a  Totals do not add due to rounding.
Source: ABS (Labour Mobility, Australia, Cat. no. 6209.0, unpublished, various years).
Most employment flows over the twelve months to February 1998 occurred within
industries rather than between industries. A worker is classified to have changed
industry if the new position is outside his or her previous industry of employment as
categorised by the two digit ANZSIC subdivision. The proportion of railway
employees who changed their industry of employment between 1997 and 1998 was
below that for ‘all industries’ — 2 per cent compared with 6 per cent respectively
(table J.2).
Table J.2 Employees who changed industry between 1997 and 1998
Changed industry Total industry employment
Employees Proportion
number % number
Rail industry 652 2 38 864
All industries 453 052 6 7 670 078
Source: ABS (Labour Mobility, Australia, Cat. no. 6209.0, unpublished, various years).
Employment tenure and unionisation
Overall, employment tenure tends to be higher in the rail industry compared to ‘all
industries’. In 1998, 36 per cent of railway workers had been in the same job (which
may have changed responsibility and skill levels over time) for over 20 years
compared to around 9 per cent for ‘all industries’ (figure J.4).
The level of unionisation in railways is high. In 1998 around 85 per cent of railway
employees were members of a trade union compared to 31  per  cent for ‘all
industries’ (ABS 1998e).J6 PROGRESS IN RAIL
REFORM
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Source: ABS (Labour Mobility, Australia, Cat. no. 6209.0, unpublished, various years).REFERENCES
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